Letter to Mark Hamer
July 28, 2020
Page 18
platforms if any exist; moreover, only one Licensing Program (for connected vehicles) is currently
proposed. Third, Section 7.4 provides benefits to licensees. As licensors commit to Avanci, this
provision may help to make the proposed Platform a more effective “one stop shop” for vehicle
manufacturers to license cellular SEPs. To the extent it reduces the incentive for licensors to defect
to other pools, it may also help to mitigate royalty stacking across multiple pool licenses. Thus,
on balance, we conclude the provision is not anticompetitive as proposed.
3. Transparency and Nondiscrimination
Under the proposed 5G Platform, Avanci, as an independent licensing agent, would make
licenses available to vehicle manufacturers on transparent and non-discriminatory terms. These
safeguards also help to minimize competition concerns.
121
The Platform’s flat per-vehicle royalty
rate based on the type of connectivity in the vehicle will be publicly available. The rates will not
change as new essential patents are added to the Licensing Program.
122
This transparency
streamlines negotiation and helps to reduce transaction costs.
In addition, Avanci has indicated there “would be no restriction on who can receive a
license within the Licensing Program’s field of use,” which is limited to vehicles that have 5G
functionality.
123
Although the 5G Platform’s field of use is limited to connected vehicles and not
other components in the supply chain, such as telematics units,
124
this limited field of use does not
necessarily make the Platform anticompetitive.
Here, the efficiencies from the proposed field of use appear to be considerable and are
likely to outweigh the potential competitive harm caused by limiting the scope of the Standard
PLA to connected vehicles. The Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
make clear that field-of-use restrictions can be procompetitive because they allow the licensor “to
exploit [its patents] as efficiently and effectively as possible” and that they may “increase the
licensor’s incentive to license.”
125
Avanci has indicated that limiting the Platform’s field of use to
connected vehicles and collecting royalties from OEMs will result in numerous licensing
efficiencies, such as simplifying scope, pricing, and royalty collection.
126
Avanci represents that
“the Vehicle manufacturer base is more visible, smaller in number, and more consistent over time,
121
Id., Ch. 3, § III(C)(1)(d), at 71-72; RFID Business Review Letter, supra note 59, at 10 (indicating licenses to
make products compliant with the Gen-2 standard were available from an independent licensing agent on
nondiscriminatory terms).
122
BRL Request, supra note 1, at 15.
123
Id. at 11.
124
A telematics control unit (“TCU”) is typically the component in a connected vehicle that exchanges data with a
network. Telematics Control Unit Market Will Exceed $6,600 Mn By 2027, MARKETWATCH (last visited June 22,
2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/telematics-control-unit-market-will-exceed-6600-mn-by-2027-
2020-05-20?mod=mw_quote_news&tesla=y.
125
Antitrust-IP Guidelines, supra note 53, § 2.3.
126
See BRL Request, supra note 1, at 16-18.