CH 19 Evidence

EVIDENCE .................................................................................................................. 1

§19-1 Right to Present Evidence ................................................................................... 1

§19-2 Relevant Evidence ................................................................................................. 9

§19-2(a) Generally ...................................................................................................... 9

§19-2(b) Examples .................................................................................................... 17

§19-2(b)(1) Relevant Evidence ........................................................................ 17

§19-2(b)(2) Irrelevant or Unduly Prejudicial Evidence ............................ 30

§19-3 Limited and Curative Admissibility ................................................................ 49

§19-4 Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ............................................................... 54

§19-5 Demonstrative and Physical (Real) Evidence ............................................... 54

§19-6 Re-opening Evidence, Rebuttal, Surrebuttal ................................................ 65

§19-7 Objections and Offers of Proof .......................................................................... 68

§19-7(a) Objections ................................................................................................... 68

§19-7(b) Offers of Proof ........................................................................................... 71

§19-8 Evidence of Character ........................................................................................ 74

§19-8(a) Generally .................................................................................................... 74

§19-8(b) Defendant’s Character ............................................................................ 75

§19-8(c) Witness’s Character ................................................................................. 78

§19-8(d) Complainant’s Character ........................................................................ 80

§19-9 Evidence of Escape, Flight, Tampering with Evidence and Witnesses ... 86

§19-9(a) Escape ......................................................................................................... 86

§19-9(b) Flight ........................................................................................................... 86

§19-9(c) Tampering .................................................................................................. 88

§19-10 Out of Court Statements Generally ................................................................. 89

§19-10(a) Definition of Hearsay .............................................................................. 89

§19-10(b) Constitutional Aspects of Hearsay ..................................................... 102

§19-10(c) Examples: Admissible Testimony ....................................................... 131

§19-10(d) Examples: Inadmissible Testimony .................................................... 142

§19-10(e) The “Completeness” Doctrine .............................................................. 151

§19-10(f) Testimony About Conversations To Show Police Investigation . 156

§19-11 Admissions: Exculpatory and False Exculpatory Statements ................. 166

§19-12 Co-Conspirator Statements ............................................................................. 174

§19-13 Dying Declarations ............................................................................................ 177

§19-14 Spontaneous Declarations; Corroborative Complaints; Statements

Under 725 ILCS 5/115-10 ......................................................................................... 180

§19-14(a) Spontaneous Declarations (Excited Utterances) ............................ 180

§19-14(b) Corroborative Complaints ................................................................... 190

§19-14(c) Statements Under 725 ILCS 5/115-10 ................................................. 192

§19-15 Prior Inconsistent Statements ........................................................................ 205

§19-15(a) As Impeachment ..................................................................................... 205

§19-15(b) As Substantive Evidence ...................................................................... 215

§19-16 Prior Consistent Statements ........................................................................... 228

§19-17 Prior Statements of Identification ................................................................. 237

§19-18 Testimony From Prior Proceedings .............................................................. 242

§19-19 Statements Against Penal Interest ................................................................ 248

§19-20 Statements Concerning State of Mind .......................................................... 257

§19-21 Statements to Treating Physicians ................................................................ 263

§19-22 Judicial Notice .................................................................................................... 268

§19-22(a) Generally .................................................................................................. 268

  ii   
§19-22(b)  Proper Judicial Notice .......................................................................... 271 
§19-22(c)  Improper Judicial Notice ..................................................................... 275 
§19-23 Opinion Testimony ............................................................................................ 279 
§19-23(a)  Opinions of Lay Witnesses .................................................................... 279 
§19-23(b)  Opinions of Expert Witnesses .............................................................. 291 
§19-24 Other Crimes Evidence ..................................................................................... 313 
§19-24(a)  General Rules .......................................................................................... 313 
§19-24(b)  Examples .................................................................................................. 342 
§19-24(b)(1)  Generally ...................................................................................... 342 
§19-24(b)(2)  Modus Operandi, Common Scheme or Design ..................... 352 
§19-24(b)(3)  Intent, Knowledge, Absence of Mistake ................................ 363 
§19-24(b)(4)  Identity; Connecting Defendant to the Crime Charged .... 372 
§19-24(b)(5)  Motive ............................................................................................ 377 
§19-24(b)(6)  Time and Place Proximity ........................................................ 383 
§19-24(b)(7)  Consciousness of Guilt .............................................................. 383 
§19-24(b)(8)  Circumstances of Arrest; Narrative of Crime ...................... 384 
§19-24(b)(9)  Details of Other Crimes ............................................................. 390 
§19-24(c)  Evidence Suggesting Other Criminal Conduct ............................... 393 
§19-25 Photographs ........................................................................................................ 399 
§19-26 Privileged Communications ............................................................................ 410 
§19-26(a)  Marital Privilege ..................................................................................... 410 
§19-26(b)  Attorney-Client Privilege ..................................................................... 415 
§19-26(c)  Physician and Therapist Privileges ................................................... 421 
§19-26(d)  Other Privileged Communications .................................................... 425 
§19-27 Scientific Evidence ............................................................................................ 429 
§19-27(a)  Generally .................................................................................................. 429 
§19-27(b)  Finger and Shoe Prints ......................................................................... 444 
§19-27(c)  Polygraph ................................................................................................. 448 
§19-27(d)  Hypnotically Enhanced Evidence ...................................................... 452 
§19-27(e)  Ballistics & Firearms ............................................................................. 453 
§19-27(f)  Handwriting ............................................................................................ 455 
§19-27(g)  Blood; Hair; DNA .................................................................................... 456 
§19-28 Writings ................................................................................................................ 461 
§19-28(a)  Best Evidence Rule ................................................................................ 461 
§19-28(b)  Business and Public Records ............................................................... 464 
§19-28(c)  Summaries ................................................................................................ 478 
§19-28(d)  Refreshing Recollection ........................................................................ 479 
§19-28(e)  Past Recollection Recorded ................................................................. 480 

EVIDENCE

§19-1

Right to Present Evidence

United States Supreme Court

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) Whether

based on due process or the compulsory process and confrontation clauses of the Sixth

Amendment, the federal constitution guarantees a meaningful opportunity to present a

complete defense. This right is violated by a rule which infringes on the ability to present a

defense and which is arbitrary or disproportionate to its intended purpose. However, the

Federal Constitution permits rules of evidence which exclude evidence on the ground that

the probative value is outweighed by other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or potential to mislead a jury.

Under a rule adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, defense evidence

showing that someone other than the defendant committed the crime is admissible if it raises

a reasonable inference of the defendant's innocence. Such evidence is inadmissible, however,

if it merely casts bare suspicion on another or raises a "conjectural inference" of a third party's

guilt. In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the rule as precluding

defense evidence of third party guilt if the State has strong forensic evidence of the

defendant's guilt.

The Supreme Court concluded that the South Carolina rule violated the constitutional

right to present a defense, because it excluded evidence of third party guilt based solely on

the strength of the prosecution's case, even if the defense evidence had great probative value

and did not cause harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues. In addition, the court

criticized the South Carolina rule because it took the prosecution's evidence at face value,

without any examination of credibility or reliability, and because it was not rationally related

to its intended purpose - to focus the trial on central issues by excluding evidence which has

only a weak logical connection to those issues. See also, Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,

116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (due process does not guarantee the right to present,

and have considered by the trier of fact, all relevant evidence to rebut the prosecution's

evidence concerning the elements of the offense, as relevant evidence may be excluded

because it is incompetent or privileged, because the defendant has failed to comply with

procedural requirements, or because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, undue delay or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence;

although due process does place limits on a State's ability to restrict the introduction of

relevant evidence, those limits arise only where the restriction "offends some principle of

justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental").

U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) The right to present

relevant evidence is subject to reasonable restrictions, and may be required to "accommodate

other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Thus, State and Federal rulemakers

have broad latitude to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. Such

exclusionary rules do not abridge the right to present a defense so long as they are not

"arbitrary" or "disproportionate" to their purpose; the exclusion of evidence is

unconstitutionally "arbitrary" or "disproportionate" only if "it [infringes] upon a weighty

interest of the accused."

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  A  per  se  ban  of  polygraph  evidence  in  military  justice  proceedings  serves  the 
legitimate governmental interest of insuring that the trier of fact in a criminal trial considers 
only  reliable  evidence.  Because  there  is  no  consensus  in  the  scientific  community  that 
polygraph  evidence  is  reliable,  a  per  se  ban  cannot  be  considered  "arbitrary"  or 
"disproportionate."   
  A plurality of the court found that a per se prohibition of polygraph evidence serves 
two additional governmental interests: (1) preserving the jury's function of making credibility 
determinations (i.e., preventing the trier of fact from being unduly persuaded by polygraph 
evidence), and (2) avoiding litigation over collateral issues such as the appropriateness of the 
test procedures, the qualifications of the examiner, the validity of interpretations of the test 
results, and whether the examinee was able to use countermeasures to distort the polygraph 
readings.   
  Rock v. Arkansas (admission of the defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony), 
Washington v. Texas (testimony by an accomplice in the defendant's favor) and Chambers 
v. Mississippi (exclusion of a third party's confession to the crime with which the defendant 
was charged), all of which struck down per se bans on certain types of evidence, do not require 
admission of polygraph evidence when offered by a criminal defendant. In those cases, the 
per se exclusions "significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense" 
by excluding factual evidence or testimony about the case itself. By contrast, no fundamental 
element of the defense is undermined by exclusion of polygraph evidence - the respondent is 
merely barred from introducing an expert's opinion to boost his own credibility.   
  In a footnote, the court observed that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,  509  U.S.  579  (1993),  which  superseded  Frye  v.  U.S.,  293  F.  1013  (C.A.D.C.  1923) 
concerning  the  admissibility  of  expert  testimony,  was  not  intended  to  foreclose  per  se 
exclusionary rules for certain types of expert or scientific evidence. 
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) Criminal defendants 
have the right to present relevant, competent evidence and witnesses in their defense. 
 
Illinois Supreme Court 
People  v.  Walker,  211  Ill.2d  317, 812  N.E.2d  339  (2004)  Adopting  the  reasoning  of  Old 
Chief v.  U.S.,  519  U.S.  172 (1997),  the court  held  that  where a  prior  felony  conviction  is 
introduced solely to prove the defendant's status as a convicted felon, the trial court errs by 
allowing  the  State  to  reject  a  defense  offer  to  stipulate  to  the  fact of  the  prior  conviction. 
Where the sole purpose of the evidence is to establish felony status, the precise name and 
nature of the prior conviction present a risk of prejudice that outweighs the probative value. 
  The court noted that the same rule would not apply had the name and nature of the 
prior conviction been admissible for purposes other than to prove defendant's felony status. 
 
People v. Lopez, 207 Ill.2d 449, 800 N.E.2d 1211 (2003) Illinois courts have no authority to 
order a physical examination of the complainant in a sex offense case. 
  Under the rationale of People v. Wheeler, 151 Ill.2d 298, 602 N.E.2d 826 (1992), the 
State is precluded from introducing an examining expert's testimony if the complainant in a 
sex offense prosecution refuses to submit to a physical examination by a defense expert. To 
determine  what  medical  evidence  the  State  is  allowed  to  introduce,  the  trial  court  must 
balance the due process rights of the defendant and the privacy rights of the alleged victim. 
Here, the defense conceded that the State should be able to introduce non-examining expert 
testimony concerning the complainant's physical condition. Furthermore, “it would be error 

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to exclude expert evidence by the State that is objectively verifiable without an independent 
physical examination.” 
 
People  v.  Kirchner,  194  Ill.2d  502,  743 N.E.2d  94  (2000)  The  trial  judge  did  not  err  by 
denying a defense request to have a  critical  State's  witness  submit  to a psychological and 
psychiatric evaluation. A reviewing court will not overrule the trial judge's ruling on the scope 
of cross-examination unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest 
prejudice.   
  Because the witness's mental health treatment records were provided to the judge in 
camera,  defendant  was  allowed  to  use  eight  documents  as  impeachment,  and  the  witness 
testified concerning his history of  substance abuse, mental illness, and memory problems, 
the refusal to order a psychological and psychiatric examination did not constitute an abuse 
of discretion or cause manifest prejudice. 
 
People  v.  Buss,  187  Ill.2d  144,  718  N.E.2d  1  (1999)  No  error  occurred  where  relevant 
evidence was admitted despite the defendant's offer to stipulate. Once a defendant pleads not 
guilty, the State is entitled to prove every element of the offense, even if the defense does not 
dispute the relevant facts or offers to stipulate to them. Thus, evidence that is relevant and 
more probative than prejudicial need not be excluded, even where the State rejects an offer 
to  stipulate.  See  also,  People  v.  Speck,  41  Ill.2d  177,  242  N.E.2d  208  (1968)  (when  a 
defendant  pleads  not  guilty,  the  State  has  the  right  to  prove  every  element  of  the  crime 
charged and is not obligated to rely on a defendant's stipulation). But see, Old Chief v. U.S., 
519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 574, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (prosecutor was not entitled to refuse an 
offer to stipulate to existence of prior conviction as predicate for offense; prior conviction was 
relevant  only  to  establish  defendant's  legal  status,  and  it  was  likely  jury  would  consider 
details of prior conviction on issue of defendant's guilt of this offense). 
 
People v. Reid, 179 Ill.2d 297, 688 N.E.2d 1156 (1997) Generally, the standard of review for 
questions involving the admission of evidence is "abuse of discretion." 
 
People v.  Melock, 149 Ill.2d 423, 599 N.E.2d 941 (1992) Under these circumstances, the 
due process right to present a defense, which includes the right to explain the circumstances 
of  a  confession  so  that  the  jurors  may  weigh  its  reliability,  required  an  exception  to  the 
general  rule  barring  polygraph  evidence.  The  defense  sought  to  introduce  the  fact  that 
defendant was falsely told that the polygraph had proven his guilt, in order to explain why 
defendant had made a confession that he claimed was false. 
 
People v. Wheeler, 151 Ill.2d 298, 602 N.E.2d 826 (1992) The combined effect of Ch. 38, 
§115-7.1, which barred a trial judge from ordering the victim in a sex offense to undergo a 
psychological examination,  and  Ch. 38, §115-7.2, which provides that expert testimony on 
post-traumatic stress syndrome shall be admitted, was to deny defendant's due process right 
to present witnesses in his own behalf. The State would enjoy an unfair advantage if it could 
introduce expert testimony based upon a personal examination while the defense expert was 
restricted to examining written reports and observing the complainant's testimony. 
  Although a complainant cannot be compelled to submit to an examination by a defense 
expert,  her  refusal  to  do  so  precludes  the  State  from  introducing  rape  trauma  syndrome 
evidence based on a personal examination. See also, In re Kortte, 317 Ill.App.3d 111, 738 
N.E.2d 983 (2d Dist. 2000) (725 ILCS 207/30(c), which provides that if the respondent in a 

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sexually  violent  person  proceeding  fails  to  cooperate  with  an  evaluating  expert  from  the 
Department  of  Human  Services  he  "shall  be  prohibited  from  introducing  testimony  or 
evidence from any expert or professional person who is retained or court appointed to conduct 
an evaluation of the person," violated due process where, although the respondent failed to 
cooperate, the State calls an evaluating expert who based his evaluation on written records 
rather than on a personal evaluation of the respondent; §30(c) was intended to assure a "level 
playing  field"  by  precluding  the  defense  from  calling  an  examining  witness  where  the 
respondent's failure to cooperate prevents the State from calling such an expert, and does not 
prevent the defense from eliciting expert testimony where the State is able to introduce such 
testimony despite the failure to cooperate). 
 
People v. Cobb, 97 Ill.2d 465, 455 N.E.2d 31 (1983) The trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to allow the defense a continuance to locate and call a State's witness, who could 
have provided a foundation for testimony that the offense had been committed by the witness 
and a  third party. The  court noted that  the evidence would have directly contradicted the 
State's chief witness and was crucial for the defense case. 
 
People v. Manion, 67 Ill.2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313 (1977) An accused has the right to present 
a defense, including calling witnesses to establish a defense and presenting his version of the 
facts to the trier of fact. 
 
Illinois Appellate Court 
People v. Avendano, 2023 IL App (2d) 220176 The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when  it  prevented  defendant  from  introducing  evidence.  In  a  predatory  criminal  sexual 
assault  trial,  the  State  was  allowed  to  introduce  evidence  of  a  prior  allegation  of  similar 
conduct. The defense moved to introduce the fact that DCFS had determined this allegation 
to  be  “unfounded.”  Defendant  cited  People  v.  Ward,  2011  IL  108690,  which  held  that 
defendant has a right to introduce the fact that he was acquitted of other crimes introduced 
by the State.  The  appellate  court  here  found  Ward  distinguishable,  as  a DCFS finding  of 
“unfounded” is not equivalent to a not guilty verdict. Additionally, at the time of the DCFS 
finding, there hadn’t been corroboration of in the form of the instant offense. 
 
People v. Jenkins, 2021 IL App (1st) 200458 On direct, an officer who testified to seeing 
defendant holding a gun testified that she did not wear a body-cam, was never given a body-
cam  to  wear,  and  that  as  a  member  of  the  U.S.  Marshals  Fugitive  Task  Force,  she  was 
“exempt” from the body-cam law. The defense was barred from cross-examining the witness 
on the body-cam requirements and its exemptions. And the trial court refused non-pattern 
jury instructions tendered by the defense, which sought to inform the jury that the witness 
was in fact required to wear a body-cam. 
  The Appellate Court found no error. The details of the body-cam law were improper 
subjects  for  cross-examination  of  a  fact  witness.  The  defense  should  have  called  its  own 
witness to establish department policy on body-cams. Although the witness mentioned she 
was “exempt,” she apparently made that assumption from the fact that neither she nor other 
task  force  members  were  issued  body-cams.  Either  way,  the  line  of  questioning  was  not 
relevant. Even if she was incorrect about being “exempt,” this mistake would not affect her 
credibility where it was presumably her department who had made such a determination. 
  Nor did  the trial court abuse its  discretion in refusing to instruct the jury as  to  50 
ILCS 706/10-30, which states that if a recording was intentionally not captured, the jury shall 
consider  that  fact  in  weighing  the  evidence,  unless  the  State  provides  a  reasonable 

  5   
justification.  The  Appellate  Court  took  judicial  notice  of  a  Chicago  Police  Department 
directive establishing that body-cams are required only for “Bureau of Patrol” officers  and 
that  other  unspecified  members  are  exempt  from  the  body-cam  law.  Defendant  failed  to 
establish that the task force witness was not exempt, and therefore there was no basis for 
the instruction. 
 
People v. Cross, 2021 IL App (4th) 190114    The circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
when it precluded defendant from introducing an alleged third-party admission. Defendant 
argued that a man named Gardner took credit for the killing in a rap video. The Appellate 
Court  affirmed  after  analyzing  the  evidence  under  the  factors  outlined  in  Chambers  v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
  The  statements  were  made  three  months  after  the  shooting  and  posted  online. 
Therefore, they were not made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime 
occurred.  Second,  they  lacked  substantial  corroboration  aside  from  defendant  and  his 
girlfriend’s  testimony  that  Gardner  drove  the  vehicle  used  in  the  shooting,  which  the 
Appellate Court found “too vague” to corroborate the confession. The statements were also 
not  sufficiently  self-incriminating  because  the  lyrics  did  not  explicitly  take  credit  for  the 
offense and the phrase “had to hunt him down” never actually states that Gardner himself 
did so. The court noted that, regardless, hip hop lyrics often describe or take credit for crimes 
the artist  had no actual involvement in, and thus any admission contained in  a  rap video 
would  have  little  probative  value.  Finally,  there  was  no  opportunity  to  cross-examine 
Gardner  because  he  was  shot  and  killed  before  trial.  Thus,  the  statement  was  properly 
excluded. 
  Finally, citing only a similar complaint in its own prior opinion, the court bemoaned 
appellants’  tendency  to  “constitutionalize”  evidentiary  issues  by  claiming  the  exclusion  of 
defense evidence violates the defendant’s due process right to present a defense. The court 
found the claim “adds only clutter to whatever legitimate arguments he may have on appeal.” 
 
People  v.  Mayberry,  2020  IL  App  (1st)  181806  The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  barring 
evidence  that  the  gun  used  in  the instant  shooting was  also  used in another  crime, three 
months  later,  at  a  time  when  defendant  was  already  in  custody  for  this  offense.  While 
defendant intended to introduce it as  evidence  of an alternate suspect,  the use of a single 
weapon in both offenses was not enough where there were not other commonalities between 
the  two  crimes  and  no  evidence  that  the  alleged  perpetrator  of  the  later  offense  had  any 
connection to the instant shooting. 
 
People v. Haiman, 2018 IL App (2d) 151242 A defendant has the right to the meaningful 
opportunity to present a defense, but evidence of a purported defense can be excluded if its 
probative  value  is  outweighed  by  its  prejudicial  impact,  if  the  evidence  would  lead  to 
confusion  of  the  issues,  or  if  the  evidence  has  the  potential  to  mislead  the  jury.  Where 
defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in prohibiting defendant from testifying that she had a prescription for 
the  pills  in  question.  Defendant  disclosed  the  proposed  defense  to  the  State  but  did  not 
provide a copy of a prescription and said she would not name the prescribing doctor or date 
of prescription.   
  It  is  defendant’s  burden,  pursuant  to  720  ILCS  570/506,  to  establish  her  right  to 
possession of the substance pursuant to a lawful prescription under 720 ILCS 570/302(c)(3). 
Defendant’s proposed self-serving testimony would have verged on a conclusion of ultimate 
fact and would have rendered the burden of proof meaningless. Her testimony also would 

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have been legally insufficient because the pills were not in their original container and the 
statutory defense requires proof that the prescription was issued by a “practitioner” which 
could not be established on defendant’s non-specific testimony. 
 
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 140725 The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
nor infringe on defendant’s right to present a defense when it barred expert testimony from 
a doctor, and lay testimony from defendant’s family, that would show that defendant was in 
a confused state following an epileptic seizure at the time of the shooting. The defense made 
clear that it was not raising an insanity defense, but rather wanted to show the absence of a 
voluntary act. The Appellate Court agreed with the State’s argument that the testimony gave 
rise  to  a  diminished  capacity  defense,  which is  not  allowed  in  Illinois.  Unlike  other  cases 
finding involuntary acts are not criminal, the testimony here could not establish whether the 
acts after a seizure are voluntary or involuntary. Thus, the testimony was irrelevant, would 
not aid the jury and would confuse the issues. 
 
People v. Fillyaw, 2018 IL App (1st) 150709 At defendants’ retrial, the court allowed the 
State  to  admit  the  prior  trial  testimony  of  an  unavailable  witness.  The  trial  court  erred, 
however, in refusing to allow defendants to impeach that prior testimony with a recantation 
affidavit from that witness. Under Illinois Rule of Evidence 806, where a hearsay statement 
is admitted at trial, its credibility can be attacked by any evidence the same as if the hearsay 
declarant had testified at the trial. And, under Illinois Rule of Evidence 901, the recantation 
affidavit could be authenticated by establishing a rational basis on which the fact-finder could 
conclude it had been written by the declarant. Here, defendants were prepared to call the 
witness who notarized the affidavit to establish its authenticity. The trial court’s skepticism 
of the recantation is not a basis on which the affidavit could be excluded. And, the court’s 
error was not harmless where the witness in question was important to the State’s case. 
 
People v.  Barnes, 2017  IL  App (1st)  143902  The  State  alleged  that  defendant  and a  co-
defendant  entered  the  complainant’s  hotel  room,  beat  him,  and  stole  his  money  clip.  The 
complainant  identified  defendant  as  the  offender,  and the  co-defendant  testified  as  to  the 
defendant’s  planning  of  and  participation  in  the  home  invasion  and  robbery.  Defendant 
testified  that  the  complainant  invited  defendant  to  his  room  for  purposes  of  a  sexual 
encounter, and when defendant resisted, the complainant grabbed him, prompting defendant 
to defend himself. 
  On appeal,  the  defendant asserted that the  trial  court erred in denying his Lynch 
motion,  seeking  to  introduce the  complainant’s  21-year-old  convictions  for  resisting  arrest 
and battery. The defendant alleged that the age of the convictions are not a part of the Lynch 
analysis, and go to weight rather than admissibility. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding 
the Illinois Supreme Court, in cases such as People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001), has 
implicitly recognized remoteness as a relevant factor when considering the admissibility of 
prior convictions under Lynch. Furthermore, defendant failed to establish that either prior 
conviction indicated that the complainant was physically violent toward others. 
 
People  v.  White,  2017  IL  App  (1st)  142358  Defendant  was  convicted  in  a  bench  trial  of 
delivery of a controlled substance. The officer who conducted the controlled buy testified that 
he did not remember seeing scars on the seller’s face or tattoos on his body. Similarly, the 
surveillance officer testified that he had a clear and unobstructed view of the seller, who was 
wearing a white tank top, and that he did not observe any tattoos on the seller’s body. 

In the defense case, defense counsel sought to demonstrate tattoos on defendant’s

arms to the trial judge. The officer testified that the seller conducted the transaction with his

right arm, and the judge allowed the defendant to show the top of his right arm but only with

the palm down. In denying counsel’s request that defendant be allowed to show the tattoos

on his right arm with his palm up, the judge stated that defense counsel had not asked the

officer whether defendant’s palm was up or down. The record showed that defendant had a

tattoo from elbow to wrist on his forearm, but the judge stated that the tattoo could not be

seen when defendant had his palm down.

The trial judge also found that it was irrelevant that defendant had a tattoo on his

left arm because the record showed that the seller performed the transaction with his right

arm. In addition, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection that the judge was

observing defendant’s tattoos while on the bench and from above, instead of standing next to

defendant as the officer had done when conducting the buy.

The officer who conducted the buy was recalled and testified that he did not remember

how defendant’s hand was positioned during the transaction. However, the officer

demonstrated how defendant reached toward him during the buy, and the trial court stated

that the officer’s arm was extended with the palm down.

The Appellate Court found that defendant was denied a fair opportunity to present

his defense that he had been misidentified because the trial court required defendant to show

his forearm with the palm down, refused to allow defendant to show the tattoo on his left

arm, refused to permit the officer who conducted the buy to identify defendant’s tattoos in

court, and refused to allow defendant to demonstrate that his tattoos would have been visible

from the officer’s position at the time of the offense.

A criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense. Here, defendant was denied such an opportunity because the

trial court substituted its own observations of defendant’s tattoos for a demonstration

whether the officer could have seen the tattoos during the offense. Evidence that the tattoos

would have been visible to the officer at the time of the transaction would have been

unquestionably probative and relevant to the credibility of the officer’s identifications of

defendant as the drug dealer. Furthermore, the demonstration would have been conducted

under substantially similar conditions so long as the positions of defendant and the officer

were the same as during the transaction.

The court also found that the trial court’s view from its vantage point on the bench

some two feet above defendant was not indicative whether defendant’s tattoos could have

been seen by a person who was standing in front of him. Thus, the trial court erroneously

substituted its view of defendant’s arm under conditions that were not substantially similar

to the conditions at the time of the offense.

The trial court also erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to introduce evidence

regarding the tattoos on defendant’s left arm. The court deemed such evidence irrelevant,

because the seller conducted the transaction with his right arm.

However, the offense allegedly occurred about 5:30 p.m. on a summer day, and the

officer who made the buy said that the seller emerged from a garage in an alley and walked

toward him. The officer was therefore able to observe the seller’s left arm, and he did not

testify otherwise. The trial court’s ruling denied defendant a fair opportunity to challenge the

officers’ identification by showing that he had a tattoo on his left arm which extended from

elbow to wrist.

The court rejected the argument that the errors were harmless. The court noted the

officers’ clear testimony that they did not see any tattoos on the seller’s forearms. In addition,

the identification evidence was less than overwhelming, defendant did not have any narcotics

or prerecorded funds on his person or in his home when he was arrested, and a photo array

in which one of the officers identified defendant was arranged in such a way that defendant’s

photograph was emphasized.

Defendant’s conviction was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

People v. Villa, 403 Ill.App.3d 309, 932 N.E.2d 90 (2d Dist. 2010) In Illinois, rules of

evidence are derived both from case law and statutory authority. The legislature does not

offend the separation of powers doctrine by enacting new rules of evidence, or by altering

existing rules that were originally adopted by Illinois Supreme Court decisions.

By contrast, the legislature may not modify a Supreme Court Rule, which is

promulgated under the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority over the court system.

A defendant may “open the door” to what would otherwise be inadmissible evidence

by testifying in a manner which can be reasonably construed as an attempt to mislead the

jury. Here, defendant “opened the door” to evidence of his prior juvenile adjudication.

Defendant claimed that he gave police a false statement because he was afraid, and

because he had “never been in a situation like that before.” Defendant also stated, “I’ve never

been in prison or nothing like that.” Because 18 months earlier defendant had given the same

two officers a statement about a different offense, “it is not unreasonable to construe [his]

attempt to portray himself as unseasoned” as an attempt to mislead the jury.

People v. Carmona-Olvara, 363 Ill.App.3d 162, 842 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 2005) A

defendant is entitled to call an interpreter to give an alternative interpretation of a statement

made in a foreign language. Where the arresting officer was the only witness to testify

concerning the meaning of defendant's statement in Spanish, there was a real possibility that

the interpretation was affected by bias or partiality.

People v. Willis, 299 Ill.App.3d 1008, 702 N.E.2d 616 (1st Dist. 1998) A trial judge has

discretion to allow testimony to be heard outside the courtroom. The trial judge did not err

by having the jury transported to a hospital in order to hear the testimony of the victim of an

attempt first degree murder.

The State was not required to agree to defendant's offer to stipulate, and had the right

to present evidence of every element of the crimes although alternative means (such as an

evidentiary deposition) were available. The court also held that viewing the witness in the

hospital was no more prejudicial than having him transported to the courtroom, because his

medical condition would have required the presence of medical personnel and equipment in

either case.

The trial court did not err by allowing a physician to testify at the hospital rather than

by coming to the courtroom. The doctor's testimony was important to demonstrate the

injuries experienced by the victim, whose testimony was to be heard at the hospital.

People v. Quick, 236 Ill.App.3d 446, 603 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1992) Defendant's

constitutional right to present a defense was denied when she was not allowed to testify that

her family had been threatened when she attempted to withdraw from a conspiracy,

especially when the man who allegedly made the statements was allowed to testify in rebuttal

that he had not made any threats.

§19-2

Relevant Evidence

§19-2(a)

Generally

Illinois Supreme Court

People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171 The concerns underlying the admission of other-crime

evidence are not present when the uncharged crime was not committed by the defendant.

There is no danger that the jury will convict the defendant because it believes he has a

propensity to commit crimes. The admissibility of such evidence is analyzed under ordinary

principles of relevance, not according to rules governing the admission of other-crime

evidence.

Defendant was charged with a murder that allegedly arose out of a conflict between

two gangs. The feud began with the shooting of a member of defendant’s gang. Then on the

day prior to the murder, a rival gang member rode a scooter into the territory of defendant’s

gang. When Donegan, a member of defendant’s gang, shot at the person on the scooter, he

was struck by a car containing other rival gang members that was following the scooter.

Donegan then recruited defendant to assist him in exacting revenge by committing a drive-

by shooting, which led to the murder for which defendant was convicted.

The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, finding that evidence of the scooter

shooting was improperly admitted as other-crime evidence where there was no evidence

connecting defendant to that incident.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court. Because it is undisputed

that defendant was not involved in the scooter shooting, the scooter shooting is not evidence

of another crime for purposes of evaluating its admissibility. The scooter incident was

relevant to show defendant’s motive for the subsequent murder. The fact that defendant may

have had a secondary motive, the rival gang’s shooting of defendant’s fellow gang member,

did not mean that he was not also motivated to retaliate for the scooter incident.

The defendant was not prejudiced by a jury instruction that directed the jury to

determine whether defendant was involved in conduct other than that charged in the

indictment. There was evidence at trial that at the time of the murder defendant and

Donegan drove a car stolen by use of a “jiggler” key. Since the evidence at trial clearly showed

that defendant was not involved in the scooter shooting, the instruction must have referred

to the stolen car.

The Supreme Court also rejected defendant’s argument that evidence of the scooter

shooting should have been excluded because the motive for the murder was not the scooter

shooting, but rather the subsequent striking of Donegan with the car. This was not a random

incident in which Donegan was struck by a car. The car followed the gang member on the

scooter. There was a continuing gang war between the two gangs. These two events were

linked and it would be illogical to separate them and give the jury only half the story.

Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of evidence of the scooter shooting.

Any concern about an implied inference of guilt by association would more likely come from

the evidence of defendant’s gang membership than from the scooter shooting in which

defendant was clearly not involved.

The Supreme Court remanded for the Appellate Court’s consideration of the

remaining issues raised by defendant.

  10   
People  v.  Morgan,  197  Ill.2d  404,  758  N.E.2d  813  (2001)  It  is  within  the  trial  court's 
discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant; the trial judge's decision will be reversed 
only if there was a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs only where the 
trial  court's  decision  is "arbitrary,  fanciful  or  unreasonable,"  or  where no  reasonable  man 
would take the trial court's view.   
  Evidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of an action either more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. Even relevant evidence may be excluded, however, where it is remote, 
uncertain or speculative. 
 
People v. Patterson,  192 Ill.2d 93, 735 N.E.2d 616  (2000) The court rejected the State's 
argument that other suspects' allegations of beatings or torture are admissible only if the 
defendant suffered a physical injury. The existence of a physical injury is but one factor to be 
considered  in  determining  whether  evidence  of  prior  allegations  of  police  brutality  are 
relevant in a particular case. See also, People v. Newbury, 53 Ill.2d 228, 290 N.E.2d 592 
(1972) (evidence is inadmissible where its relevance depends upon unproved assumptions). 
 
People v. Eyler, 133 Ill.2d 173, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989) In the trial court's discretion, relevant 
evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 
 
People  v.  Monroe,  66  Ill.2d  317,  362  N.E.2d  295  (1977)  Relevant  evidence  is  evidence 
having  any  tendency  to  make  the  existence  of  any  fact  that  is  of  consequence  to  the 
determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence. 
 
People  v.  DeHoyos,  64  Ill.2d  128,  355  N.E.2d  19  (1976)  Although  relevant  evidence  is 
normally  admissible,  its  admissibility  may  also  depend  on  whether  its  probative  value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. Evidence should be excluded when its prejudicial effect far 
outweighs its probative value. 
 
Illinois Appellate Court 
People v.  Jones,  2024  IL  App  (1st)  221555  The trial court did not err in excluding body 
camera  footage  video  where  the  officer  stated  his  belief  that  one  of  the  individuals  with 
defendant  had  murdered  two  people  previously.  Defendant  argued  that  the  footage  was 
relevant to support his claim of self-defense for firing at the officer in the basement of a home 
where the police had pursued him. More specifically, the officer may have believed that he 
was  pursuing  the  other  individual  and  would  be  confronting  a  possible  double-murderer, 
making it more probable that the officer fired first in the belief he needed to protect himself 
and defendant fired back in self-defense. The appellate court agreed that this evidence was 
“somewhat  relevant,”  but  ultimately  concluded  it  had  minimal  and  speculative  probative 
value. 
  The court first clarified that the appropriate standard of review is whether the trial 
court  abused  its  discretion  in  excluding  the  evidence.  Defendant  had  argued  for  de  novo 
review, asserting a denial of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present 
a complete defense. But, the court found that this was an ordinary relevance ruling and did 
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. On the merits, the court found no abuse of 
discretion.  There  was  no  other  evidence  that  the  officer  fired  first,  and  admission  of  his 
statements on the body camera footage would have encouraged speculation on that question. 

  11   
And, even if the evidence should have been admitted, its minimal probative value precluded 
any finding that defendant was prejudiced by its exclusion. 
 
People  v.  Mayberry,  2020  IL  App  (1st)  181806  The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  barring 
evidence  that  the  gun  used  in the  instant  shooting was  also  used in another  crime, three 
months  later,  at  a  time  when  defendant  was  already  in  custody  for  this  offense.  While 
defendant intended to  introduce it as evidence of an  alternate suspect, the use  of  a single 
weapon in both offenses was not enough where there were not other commonalities between 
the  two  crimes  and  no  evidence  that  the  alleged  perpetrator  of  the  later  offense  had  any 
connection to the instant shooting. 
 
People  v.  Tatum,  2019  IL  App  (1st)  162403  Trial  court  did  not  err  in  allowing  autopsy 
photos into evidence. Although the cause and manner of death were not disputed, relevance 
does not require that the evidence tend to prove only disputed facts at trial. The State may 
offer evidence tending to prove any essential fact, even if that fact is not disputed. While the 
court  initially  found  that  the  photos  should  not  be  published  to  the  jury  during  the  trial, 
defense counsel’s closing argument  made the photos relevant to the theory of defense and 
therefore the court did not err in sending them back to the jury room during deliberations. 
 
People v. Clark, 2018 IL App (2d) 150608 Evidence of a witness’s commission of another 
crime  is  not  analyzed  as  “other  crimes”  evidence  under  Illinois  Rule  of  Evidence  404(b). 
Instead,  admissibility  is  evaluated  under  ordinary  relevance  principles.  Here,  defendant 
admitted participating in a robbery with the co-defendant, Nesbit, where Nesbit brandished 
a firearm. The sole issue before the jury was whether the gun displayed by Nesbit was real. 
At  defendant’s  trial,  Nesbit  testified  for  the  State.  Nesbit’s  recent  prior  commission  of  an 
armed robbery with a real firearm was deemed relevant. Defendant’s jury could reasonably 
infer use of a real firearm in this case based upon Nesbit’s use of a real firearm in the prior 
armed robbery. The prejudicial impact of Nesbit’s prior armed robbery did not outweigh its 
probative value where its use at defendant’s trial was limited to the issue of whether the gun 
was real. 
 
People  v.  White,  2017  IL  App  (1st)  142358  Defendant  was  convicted  in  a  bench  trial  of 
delivery of a controlled substance. The officer who conducted the controlled buy testified that 
he did not remember seeing scars on the seller’s face or tattoos on his body. Similarly, the 
surveillance officer testified that he had a clear and unobstructed view of the seller, who was 
wearing a white tank top, and that he did not observe any tattoos on the seller’s body. 
  In  the  defense  case,  defense  counsel  sought  to  demonstrate  tattoos  on  defendant’s 
arms to the trial judge. The officer testified that the seller conducted the transaction with his 
right arm, and the judge allowed the defendant to show the top of his right arm but only with 
the palm down. In denying counsel’s request that defendant be allowed to show the tattoos 
on his right arm with his palm up, the judge stated that defense counsel had not asked the 
officer whether defendant’s palm was up or down. The record showed that defendant had a 
tattoo from elbow to wrist on his forearm, but the judge stated that the tattoo could not be 
seen when defendant had his palm down. 
  The trial judge also found that it was irrelevant that defendant had a tattoo on his 
left arm because the record showed that the seller performed the transaction with his right 
arm.  In  addition,  the  trial  court  overruled  defense  counsel’s  objection  that  the  judge  was 
observing defendant’s tattoos while on the bench and from above, instead of standing next to 
defendant as the officer had done when conducting the buy. 

  12   
  The  trial  court  erred  by  refusing  to  allow  defense  counsel  to  introduce  evidence 
regarding the tattoos on defendant’s left arm. The offense allegedly occurred about 5:30 p.m. 
on  a  summer  day,  and  the  officer  who  made  the  buy  said  that  the  seller  emerged  from  a 
garage  in  an  alley  and  walked  toward  him.  The  officer  was  therefore  able  to  observe  the 
seller’s left arm, and he did not testify otherwise. The trial court’s ruling denied defendant a 
fair opportunity to challenge the officers’ identification by showing that he had a tattoo on 
his left arm which extended from elbow to wrist. 
  Defendant’s conviction was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. 
 
People v. Lopez, 2014 IL App (1st) 102938-B The admissibility of evidence of a prior crime 
in  which  the  defendant  was  not  a  participant  is  determined  under  ordinary  principles  of 
relevance, and not by standards governing other crimes evidence. People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 
115171. The trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that three weeks before 
the  murder  with  which  defendant  was  charged,  some  of  the  co-defendants  in  the  charged 
offense beat a man and vandalized property in the same parking lot where the charged crime 
occurred. The court noted that the only evidence tying the prior incident to the charged crime 
was that three of the co-defendants in the charged crime participated in the earlier crime. 
There was no evidence that defendant knew about the earlier incident or that the charged 
crime was in any way motivated by the earlier event. 
  The court stressed that the key issue in the charged offense was whether the State 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was one of the perpetrators in the beating 
death of the  decedent. Evidence about an unrelated incident several weeks  earlier had no 
probative value on that issue, at least in the absence of evidence indicating that there was 
some link between the offenses. 
  Defendant’s conviction for murder was reversed and the cause remanded for a new 
trial.   
 
People v. Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121080 In order to admit a document as substantive 
evidence, the proponent must authenticate its authorship. A document may be authenticated 
through circumstantial evidence. In other words, the authentication requirement is satisfied 
where the document’s contents, in conjunction with other circumstances, reflect distinctive 
characteristics which connect it to the author. Illinois Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4). 
  At defendant’s trial for disorderly conduct based on transmitting by email a threat of 
violence, the email in question was properly authenticated by circumstantial evidence. Thus, 
the email was properly admitted substantively. 
  The  court  noted  that  the  email  raised  several  matters  that  were  also  contained  in 
notes on a folder which was confiscated from defendant. Under the circumstances, it would 
have been reasonable for the trial court to find that the same person wrote both the email 
and  the  notes  on  the  folder.  The  court  also  noted  that  in  a  voluntary  written  statement, 
defendant stated that he had written the email. 
  Under these circumstances, the email was sufficiently authenticated to be admitted. 
The  court  rejected  defendant’s  argument  that  to  authenticate  an  email,  the  State  was 
required to present evidence to “connect” defendant to the IP address from which the email 
was sent. 
 
People v. Starks, 2014 IL App (1st) 121169 At defendant’s trial for first degree murder, a 
police officer testified that while she and other officers were investigating an unrelated case 
at  an  apartment  building,  they  observed  defendant  exit  the  back  of  the  building  and  run 

through an alley while wearing a t-shirt and no shoes. When the officer stopped defendant

and learned his name, she realized that he was the subject of an investigative alert.

A second officer testified that as part of the unrelated investigation, he entered an

apartment where the door was ajar. He observed three handguns on the kitchen counter. One

of the handguns was subsequently determined to have been the weapon used in the shooting

with which defendant was charged.

DNA analysis revealed that the weapon used in the shooting contained the mixed

DNA profiles of at least three people and that defendant could not be excluded as the primary

contributor of the DNA. The shooting had occurred two months before the weapon was seized

from the apartment.

The Appellate Court held that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of weapons

that were found in the apartment but which were not shown to have any connection to the

offense. A weapon found in the defendant’s possession is generally inadmissible unless it has

some connection to the crime charged. For a weapon to be admitted, there must be evidence

to connect it to both the defendant and the crime. Evidence that the weapon is suitable for

commission of the crime satisfies the second element.

Here, it was error to admit the weapons because there was no evidence to connect

them to the defendant. Not only was there no evidence to show that defendant possessed the

weapons, there was no evidence to connect him to the apartment where the weapons were

found. Defendant was stopped because, while police were investigating an unrelated offense,

they saw him running barefoot through the alley. He was not seen leaving the apartment

where the weapons were found, and there was no evidence to connect him to either the

apartment or the two weapons that were not suitable for committing the offense. Under these

circumstances, those weapons were irrelevant and should not have been admitted. Because

the evidence was closely balanced, admission of the weapons constituted error under the first

prong of the plain-error doctrine.

People v. Barnes, 2013 IL App (1st) 112873 Defendant was charged with heinous battery

and aggravated battery of a child after a four-year-old child in his care suffered severe burns

when he was exposed to hot water. The court concluded that the trial court abused its

discretion by allowing the assistant State’s Attorney to use the child as an exhibit by pulling

down his pants, picking him up, and showing the jury the scars on his side and legs.

Although permanent disfigurement is an element of heinous battery, using the child

as an exhibit was cumulative where the State had already established permanent

disfigurement through photographs and expert testimony. The court also found that due to

the risk of inflaming the jury’s passions, the prejudicial effect of using the child as an exhibit

outweighed any probative value.

Also, the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the four-year-old victim suffered

a liver contusion at some point. Defendant was charged with injuring the child by exposing

him to hot water. The State’s expert testified that the child’s blood work indicated that he

had suffered a liver contusion at some point within the 24 to 36-hour-period before he was

examined at the emergency room. The State’s expert also admitted that the liver contusion

may have had an explanation other than child abuse and that there were no signs of bruising

on the child’s abdomen. Defendant did not have sole custody of the child in the 24 to 36-hour-

period preceding the examination.

In finding an abuse of discretion, the court concluded that the probative value of the

evidence was tenuous and that there was only mere suspicion that defendant was responsible

for the injury. In addition, the evidence was highly prejudicial because the jury would be

more likely to convict the defendant of the charged crimes if it believed that he was also

responsible for a separate injury.

The court concluded that the combination of errors caused manifest prejudice to the

defense. The alleged justification for using the child as an exhibit was to establish the

permanent disfigurement element of heinous battery. However, defendant did not dispute

the cause or extent of the child’s injuries, and the only issue was whether the defendant acted

intentionally. Under these circumstances, it was unnecessary to display the child to the jury.

In addition, the evidence of defendant’s intent was closely balanced. The jury chose to

acquit of heinous battery, and there was testimony that defendant had cared for the child on

several prior occasions without incident. Under these circumstances, the combined prejudice

of displaying the four-year-old’s physical scars and admitting evidence of an injury which

could have been inflicted by someone other than the defendant could well have affected the

verdict.

Defendant’s conviction was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

People v. Garcia, 2012 IL App (2d) 100656 It is within the trial court’s discretion to

determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible and the trial court’s decision on the

issue will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

The police found cocaine and cannabis in defendant’s car after a traffic stop. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that defendant’s passenger pleaded

guilty to a lesser charge of cocaine possession. The State’s theory was that defendant and his

passenger jointly possessed the drugs and the passenger’s admission did not establish his

exclusive possession of the drugs or rule out joint possession with defendant.

McLauren, J., dissented. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable than it would be without the evidence.

While not conclusive or dispositive on the issue of possession, the guilty plea was

relevant. It would have bolstered defendant’s credibility when he said that the drugs were

his passenger’s “in that it would have taken much of the sting out of the idea that defendant

was just looking for the most convenient person to blame. Furthermore, it weighs heavily

against the simplest theory of events: defendant’s truck, defendant’s drugs, [the passenger’s]

bad luck.” The case was credibility driven. Evidence of the passenger’s guilty plea would have

required the jury to actually consider the issue of joint possession and could have materially

affected the verdict. It would not have been unduly prejudicial to the State because it claimed

that the possession was joint.

People v. Wilson, 2012 IL App (1st) 092910 At defendant’s trial for aggravated unlawful

use of a weapon and unlawful use of a weapon, the trial court erred by precluding the

defendant from introducing records of an Independent Police Review Authority investigation

of the arresting officers’ conduct during the events leading to the charges against the

defendant. The defense theory was that after a police officer shot the unarmed defendant and

planted a gun near him, officers mishandled the gun to account for the fact that it did not

contain defendant’s fingerprints. In his motion in limine, defendant presented evidence that

the IPRA investigation concerned whether the first officer improperly fired at defendant and

whether two other officers improperly handled the gun found next to the defendant.

The Appellate Court concluded that the IPRA investigation gave rise to an inference

that the witnesses had something to lose or gain by testifying, because the investigation

involved the same incident for which the defendant was charged and the outcome of both the

investigation and the trial depended in large part on the testifying officers’ portrayal of the

events. “For obvious reasons, if an officer subjected to an IPRA investigation provides a

statement to an investigator, the same officer could be motivated to testify consistently at a

trial regarding the same incident to maintain his or her credibility.”

The court concluded that evidence of the IPRA investigation was not remote or

uncertain and directly affected the defendant’s case. Therefore, the evidence should have

been admitted on the issue of the motive and bias of the arresting officers.

The court concluded that the “abuse of discretion” standard of review applied to the

above question. The court viewed the trial court’s ruling as denying the motion in limine

concerning the IPRA investigation, but allowing the defense to cross-examine on all relevant

manners including interest or bias based on evidence other than the IPRA records. Rulings

on motions in limine are generally left to the trial court’s discretion, as are matters involving

the admission of evidence. Furthermore, the trial court has discretion to limit the scope of

cross-examination.

Defendant’s convictions were reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing.

People v. Fillyaw and Parker, 409 Ill.App.3d 302, 948 N.E.2d 1116 (2d Dist. 2011) The

mental health history of a witness may be relevant if it relates to the credibility of the

witness. Witness Deshae R.’s psychiatric diagnosis, treatment with psychotropic

medications, and experience with hallucinations may be relevant to her credibility as a

witness. Therefore the circuit court was directed to conduct a further in camera review of her

mental health records on remand, and tender to the defense attorneys the relevant portions

of those documents.

People v. Garcia-Cordova, 2011 IL App (2d) 070550-B The trial court did not err by

denying a motion in limine to exclude portions of defendant’s statements to police which

indicated that he had been sexually abused as a child. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant

to an issue in dispute and the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact that is of

consequence to the proceeding either more or less probable than would otherwise be the case.

The trial court has discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible.

The court concluded that defendant’s history of having been sexually abused as a child

was relevant in two respects: (1) in evaluating the credibility of defendant’s statements to

police, and (2) concerning the context in which those statements were made. The court noted

testimony that defendant’s demeanor changed after he admitted having been sexually abused

as a child, and that he then made the written and oral statements that were admitted at

trial.

Defendant’s convictions were affirmed.

People v. Atherton, 406 Ill.App.3d 598, 940 N.E.2d 775 (2d Dist. 2010) In a prosecution for

predatory criminal sexual assault, a child welfare supervisor who worked for a private social

services agency testified to the characteristics of child-sexual-abuse-accommodation

syndrome that are often observed in children who have been sexually abused. The Appellate

Court addressed three issues related to the admissibility of that evidence.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative

value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Evidence is considered relevant

when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Testimony regarding child-sexual-abuse-accommodation syndrome was relevant.

Few jurors have sufficient familiarity with child sexual abuse to understand the dynamics of

  16   
a sexually-abusive relationship. The defense attacked the credibility of the child witness by 
introducing  evidence  of  her  delayed  reporting  and  inconsistencies  in  her  testimony.    The 
syndrome evidence aided the trier of fact in weighing that evidence. 
 
People v. Limon, 405 Ill.App.3d 770, 940 N.E.2d 737 (2d Dist. 2010) Evidence is admissible 
if it: (1) fairly tends to prove or disprove the offense charged; and (2) is relevant in that it 
tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable. Evidence should be excluded if it 
is too remote in time or too speculative to shed light on a fact to be found. 
  At defendant’s trial for robbery and aggravated battery, the State introduced evidence 
that 11 days following the offense in which complainant was robbed by two men, the police 
observed defendant and another man in dark clothing. Defendant first hid in a shadow, then 
ran when one of the officers identified himself as a policeman. The officer saw defendant grab 
at his waistband, trip, and fall. A handgun fell out of his pants. Defendant clenched his hands 
at his chest when the police attempted to handcuff him, causing the police to hit defendant 
in the face and rib cage with fists to effect his arrest. The court instructed the jury to consider 
that evidence for the limited purpose of explaining the circumstances of the arrest. 
    The  Appellate  Court  concluded  that  the  court  abused  its  discretion  in  admitting 
evidence  of  defendant’s  possession  of  the  handgun.  The  probative  value  of  evidence  that 
defendant possessed a gun 11 days after the offense did not outweigh the prejudicial effect of 
this evidence where the charged offense did not involve any element of possession or use of a 
weapon. 
  Presentation of irrelevant, prejudicial evidence of the gun was not justified based on 
the  hypothetical  possibility  that  defendant  would  claim  that  he  was  coerced  into  making 
incriminating statements by police brutality. Evidence of the gun was not necessary to rebut 
a  theory  of  coercion  because  defendant’s  refusal  to  put  his  hands  behind  his  back  was 
sufficient to explain the officers’ use of force in effecting the arrest. Although defendant had 
not informed the court that he would not pursue a theory of coercion and police brutality, a 
defendant is not required to forgo, in advance, a potential defense to preclude the State from 
introducing  irrelevant,  prejudicial  evidence.  Even  if  defendant  had  advanced  a  theory  of 
coercion, evidence of the gun was not relevant. 
 
People  v.  Simmons,  372  Ill.App.3d  735,  867  N.E.2d  507  (1st  Dist.  2007)  The  trial  court 
erred by excluding defense evidence that someone else committed the crime. Generally, such 
evidence should be admitted if it tends to prove the particular offense in question. Although 
the evidence here was not clear, the court found that it was not so uncertain or speculative 
as to justify exclusion. 
 
People v. Collins, 351 Ill.App.3d 175, 813 N.E.2d 285 (2d Dist. 2004) Where the State did 
not object in the trial court to consideration of the jury foreman's testimony about the effect 
of  an  unauthorized  visit  to  the  crime  scene,  and  the  prosecutor  urged  the  trial  judge  to 
consider that testimony, the State was precluded from arguing on appeal that the evidence 
should have been excluded as improper evidence of the process by which the jury reached a 
verdict.  "[A]bsent  an  objection,  otherwise  inadmissible  evidence  is  to  be  given  its  full 
probative effect." 
 
People  v.  Rivera,  145  Ill.App.3d  609,  495  N.E.2d  1088  (1st  Dist.  1986)  A  witness's 
credibility  is  always  a  material  issue.  See  also,  People  v.  Adams,  106  Ill.App.3d  467,  435 
N.E.2d 1203 (1st Dist. 1982) (the bias and relationship of a witness to the defendant are never 
collateral). 

§19-2(b)

Examples

§19-2(b)(1)

Relevant Evidence

Illinois Supreme Court

People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747 Defendant and his cousin, Mayfield, were involved in a

neighborhood dispute which intensified over the course of a single day. The dispute

culminated in a physical confrontation between two groups of individuals, ending with

defendant’s firing the shots that killed one man and injured another. Defendant claimed that

he shot in self-defense, fearing for his safety and the safety of others. Ultimately, defendant

was convicted of felony murder predicated on mob action, aggravated battery with a firearm,

and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.

The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction of aggravated battery with a

firearm but otherwise affirmed. In the Supreme Court, defendant argued that the trial court

erred in refusing to admit a State witness’s rap video as a prior inconsistent statement at

trial. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1, a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted

substantively if it meets certain requirements specified in the statute, specifically that it

narrates, describes, or explains an event of which the witness had personal knowledge and

that it was accurately recorded by video, audio, or other similar electronic means. Those

requirements were met here, but the trial court reasoned that the rap video was made for

entertainment purposes and thus was not akin to a prior witness statement and was

therefore inadmissible. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its

discretion in excluding the video.

Once a statement satisfies the requirements of Section 115-10.1, it is admissible so

long as it is relevant. Here, the statements on the video bore a “strong nexus” to the

circumstances of the underlying offense in that the rap purported to narrate the events of

that day, thus it was relevant as a statement of historical fact. But, the error in excluding

the video was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was cumulative to other

evidence introduced at trial.

People v. Epstein, 2022 IL 127824 The supreme court held that the trial court erred when

it barred admission of a blood test showing a blood alcohol level (“BAC”) of 0.107 four hours

after defendant’s arrest for DUI.

At a pre-trial hearing, the defense called a pharmacology expert who reviewed the

evidence, including the test results, the dashcam of the stop and field sobriety tests, and

defendant’s statement that she was drinking in the hour before driving. According to the

expert, a BAC test taken four hours after the stop could not prove a BAC over 0.08 at the

time of driving, without knowing when the alcohol level peaked. The fact that defendant

recently drank and did not exhibit signs of intoxication immediately after the stop, suggested

she was still absorbing alcohol and that her BAC had not yet peaked. The expert concluded

there wasn’t sufficient information for a retrograde extrapolation, so there was no way to

determine BAC at the time of the stop. The trial court found the results were inadmissible

under Rule of Evidence 403, because, without retrograde extrapolation to show BAC at the

time of driving, the risk of prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value.

The supreme court held the test results should have been admitted. It found the

evidence was highly probative, as a BAC of 0.107 four hours after a traffic stop suggests

  18   
defendant  drank  heavily  before  driving.  And  while  defendant  argued  that  prejudice  could 
result if the jury believed the test constituted conclusive proof of a BAC over 0.08 at the time 
of driving, the court found the risk of substantial prejudice remote. Courts have previously 
held  that  evidence  of  a  BAC  greater  than  the  legal  limit  does  not  require  retrograde 
extrapolation, and that questions as to BAC at the time of driving go to weight rather than 
admissibility. The jury should be allowed to consider all of the evidence, including the test 
result and any expert opinion as to its meaning, and assign it the appropriate weight. 
 
People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171 Defendant was charged with a murder that allegedly arose 
out  of  a  conflict  between  two  gangs.  The  feud  began  with  the  shooting  of  a  member  of 
defendant’s gang. Then on the day prior to the murder, a rival gang member rode a scooter 
into the territory of defendant’s gang. When Donegan, a member of defendant’s gang, shot at 
the person on the scooter, he was struck by a car containing other rival gang members that 
was  following  the  scooter.  Donegan  then  recruited  defendant  to  assist  him  in  exacting 
revenge by committing a drive-by shooting, which led to the murder for which defendant was 
convicted. 
  The  Appellate  Court  reversed  the  conviction,  finding  that  evidence  of  the  scooter 
shooting  was  improperly  admitted  as  other-crime  evidence  where  there  was  no  evidence 
connecting defendant to that incident. 
  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court. Because it is undisputed 
that defendant was not involved in the scooter shooting, the scooter shooting is not evidence 
of  another  crime  for  purposes  of  evaluating  its  admissibility.  The  scooter  incident  was 
relevant to show defendant’s motive for the subsequent murder. The fact that defendant may 
have had a secondary motive, the rival gang’s shooting of defendant’s fellow gang member, 
did not mean that he was not also motivated to retaliate for the scooter incident. 
 
People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill.2d 209, 761 N.E.2d 1175 (2001) Gang membership evidence is 
admissible only where there is sufficient proof that the membership was related to the crime. 
Once a relationship  is shown  between  gang  activity  and  the crime, gang evidence may be 
admitted if relevant to an issue in dispute, provided the probative value is not substantially 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect. One purpose for which gang evidence is admissible is to 
provide a motive for the defendant's actions.   
  Where  the  State  argued  that  the  stabbing  was  not  in  self-defense,  as  defendant 
claimed, but was instead the result of gang-based violence, evidence of "various gang-related 
boasts and taunts . . . as well as the flashing of gang signs, substantiated [the State's] theory 
and helped to explain what occurred." Thus, the evidence was properly admitted. See also, 
People  v.  Joya,  319  Ill.App.3d  370,  744  N.E.2d  891  (1st  Dist.  2001)  (where  there  was 
"absolutely  no  testimony"  of  any  gang  involvement,  "any  inference  that  .  .  .  mutual  gang 
membership  supported  the  State's  theory  that  they  acted  in  concert  was  cumulative  and 
unnecessary" in view of overwhelming direct evidence); People v. Davenport & Clemons, 
301 Ill.App.3d 143, 702 N.E.2d 335 (1st Dist. 1998) (gang-related evidence must relate to the 
crime charged  in order  to  be admitted;  while  some  of  the  gang testimony  was  relevant to 
explain  the crime  and  establish  motive,  testimony  regarding  the  background,  history  and 
criminal  activity  of  rival  gangs  was  "peripheral"  to  the  offense  and  therefore  more 
"troublesome"); People v. Mathews, 299 Ill.App.3d 914, 702 N.E.2d 291 (1st Dist. 1998) (in 
light of defendant's statement that he was a member of the Blackstones and an eyewitness's 
testimony  that  hostile  gang  symbols  were  exchanged  before  the  shooting,  there  was  a 
sufficient connection between the gang membership activity and the crime to admit evidence 
that  several  of  defendant's  acquaintances  were  Blackstones;  unless  defendant  objects, 

  19   
however, the jury must be instructed, both when the evidence is admitted and at the close of 
trial, that gang-related testimony may only be considered for limited purposes).   
 
People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 643 N.E.2d 636 (1994) Where a third party had confessed to 
the  crimes  with  which  defendant  was  charged,  details  of  the  third  party's  confessions  to 
similar crimes should have been admitted both to show modus operandi and to corroborate 
the  third  party's  claim  that  he  had  acted  alone  in  committing  the  instant  crime.  The 
statements  about  the  offenses  with  which  defendant  was  charged  were  against  the 
declarant's penal interest, and therefore were not inadmissible hearsay. See also, People v. 
Wilson, 149 Ill.App.3d 293, 500 N.E.2d 128 (3d Dist. 1986) (the defense is entitled to present 
evidence tending to show that someone else committed the crime if such evidence is not too 
remote or too speculative; evidence offered by the defendant was not remote since it showed 
an argument on the day of or the day before the murders, and was not speculative). 
 
People  v.  Whiters,  146  Ill.2d  437,  588  N.E.2d  1172  (1992)  At  a  trial  for  voluntary 
manslaughter, the trial court erred by excluding evidence that on the day before the offense, 
the  decedent  said  he  had  beaten  a  certain  women  the  previous  night.  The  testimony  was 
relevant to show defendant's reasonable belief in the need for self-defense. 
 
People v. Nitz, 143 Ill.2d 82, 572 N.E.2d 895 (1991) At a trial for murder at which the State's 
theory was that the victim was killed because he was a homosexual, testimony showing that 
the  defendant  hated  homosexuals  and  organized  a  motorcycle  club  to  patrol  an  area 
frequented by homosexuals was relevant on the question of motive. 
 
People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988) At a trial for murder, a State 
witness's testimony that she had been the common law wife of the victim and that they had 
a  one-year-old  child  was  proper.  The  witness  served  as  "a  life  and  death  witness  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  the  identification  of  the  decedent";  the  isolated  reference  to  the 
victim's family appeared to be incidental and not calculated to cause the jury to believe it was 
material to the question of guilt or innocence. See also, People v. Jimmerson, 127 Ill.2d 12, 
535  N.E.2d  889  (1989)  (evidence  of  the  personal  traits  and  characteristics  of  two  murder 
victims was not presented in a manner that was calculated to cause jury to believe that it 
could be legitimately considered in determining guilt or innocence; the "great bulk" of the 
information  "either  was  relevant  and  admissible"  or  "elicited  from  the  witnesses  in  an 
incidental, nonprejudicial manner"). 
 
People v. Fierer, 124 Ill.2d 176, 529 N.E.2d 972 (1988) At the defendant's jury trial for the 
murder of his wife, the trial court did not err by admitting a newspaper clipping found in 
defendant's bedroom. The clipping dealt with a divorce-related homicide. 
 
People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985) "An agreement reached between an 
accomplice witness and the State to secure the witness' testimony is relevant because it goes 
to the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony." 
 
People  v.  Stewart,  105  Ill.2d  22,  473  N.E.2d  840  (1984)  Evidence  of  defendant's  arrest 
several years before the murder for which he was on trial was relevant to show motive.   
 

  20   
People  v.  Albanese,  104  Ill.2d  504,  473  N.E.2d  1246  (1984)  Evidence  that  defendant 
solicited  a  third  party  to  murder  his  brother  and  sister-in-law  was  proper  because  it 
"represented the ultimate step in defendant's plan to fabricate exculpatory evidence and, as 
such, constituted evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt." 
 
People  v.  Free,  94  Ill.2d  378,  447  N.E.2d  218  (1983)  The  trial  court  properly  admitted 
evidence that an officer stopped defendant 24 hours before the crime in the vicinity of  the 
crime, and that defendant was carrying a knife. Such testimony was relevant to place the 
defendant  in  the  vicinity  of  the  crime  within  24  hours  before  it  was  committed,  and  was 
particularly  relevant  because  defendant  was  an  out-of-state  resident  who  was  residing  in 
Iowa. 
 
People v. Bartall, 98 Ill.2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983) State's evidence describing gruesome 
details about the victim's injuries was proper because it tended to establish the location and 
nature of the injuries.   
 
People v. Watson, 36 Ill.2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966)  Trial court committed reversible 
error at forgery trial by refusing to allow the defense to offer evidence that another traveler's 
check from the same stolen series had been signed and cashed after defendant was in custody. 
 
Illinois Appellate Court 
People v. Thornton, 2024 IL App (4th) 220798 The trial court did not err when it admitted 
social media messages and a prior inconsistent statement at defendant’s murder trial. The 
messages  showed  defendant  arguing  with  a  member  of  the  deceased’s  gang  before  the 
shooting, suggesting a motive. While defendant argued that this theory was too speculative, 
such that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value, the appellate 
court  disagreed.  The  conversation  was  three  weeks  before  the  shooting  and  showed  the 
escalation of threats between the rival gangs. It was therefore relevant to show the beginning 
of a sequence of events that established defendant’s motive for killing the deceased. 
  The court also properly admitted the prior inconsistent statements of a State witness. 
Defendant argued that the State failed to establish the “personal knowledge” requirement of 
section  115-10.1(c)(2),  because  in  the  prior  statement,  the  witness  stated  that  he  saw 
defendant leave the car just before defendant shot the victim, but he did not say he actually 
witnessed  the  shooting.  The  appellate  court  held  that  this  argument  misconstrues  the 
“personal knowledge” requirement – the knowledge refers to the events described in the prior 
statement. There is no requirement that the witness must have personal knowledge about 
all aspects of the crime. Rather, the statement cannot derive from information obtained from 
a third party. Because Davis’s prior statement stated that he actually witnessed defendant 
leave the car, and implied that he saw defendant shoot the victim, the statement met the 
requirements of section 115-10.1(c)(2). 
  A special concurrence noted that, had the officers and State obtained the witness’ prior 
statement under oath, the “personal knowledge” requirement would not have even come into 
play. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(1). This justice suggested the police and State should take 
witness statements before a grand jury or at a judicial hearing, such as a request for an arrest 
warrant. The justice described his own personal experience of driving to meet a witness and 
two  police  officers  in  a  parking  lot,  entering  the  squad  car,  swearing  in  the  witness,  and 
taking the statement under oath before issuing an arrest warrant. Such a statement could 
be admitted at trial if inconsistent with the witness’ trial testimony. 
 

People v. Watts, 2022 IL App (4th) 210590 The trial court did not err in admitting evidence

of defendant’s prior sexual assaults of three other women pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3.

All three incidents shared facts in common with the charged offense. Specifically, defendant

invited the women, who he knew, to hang out with him. Each rode in a vehicle with

defendant, and all of the prior incidents involved the consumption of alcohol. Defendant

assaulted each of the women at a time when they were unable to legally consent. While the

charged incident did not involve alcohol, but rather a victim who could not consent because

of her age, the differences were not enough to render the prior assault evidence more

prejudicial than probative. And, while a significant amount of propensity evidence was

admitted at defendant’s trial, it did not amount to an improper “mini-trial” on the subject.

The evidence was relatively straightforward, and was not “prosecutorial overkill” as in

People v. Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d 462 (2008).

Additionally, where the victim here claimed that defendant threatened self-harm in

order to convince her to leave her home and meet him on the date in question, the court did

not err in admitting evidence that defendant had made a similar threat to another individual

on a prior occasion. That evidence showed defendant’s use of such threats to manipulate

others in order to get his way. Thus, his prior statements of self-harm were relevant, and it

was not an abuse of discretion to admit them into evidence at trial.

Finally, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to introduce evidence of memes

found on defendant’s phone. The State asserted that the memes showed defendant’s belief

that it was appropriate to sexually assault incapacitated women. For authentication

purposes, the court treated the memes like any other form of documentary evidence. A proper

foundation for documentary evidence will be found where the proponent presents a rational

basis from which a fact finder can conclude that the document belonged to or was authored

by the party alleged. Here, there was no dispute that the phone belonged to defendant, and

there was evidence that the memes were contained in text messages defendant exchanged

with another person. Thus, there was evidence that the memes belonged to him, even if

defendant did not author them. This was enough to render the memes admissible, and it was

for the trier of fact to determine what weight to give them.

People v. Walker, 2021 IL App (4th) 190073 At defendant’s trial for predatory criminal

sexual assault, the complainant’s father testified that he was suspicious of defendant based

on the time defendant spent with the complainant. The prosecutor asked the complainant’s

father how news of the complainant’s allegations affected him emotionally. He testified that

it made him “sick,” that he didn’t want to believe it, and that it confirmed his suspicions.

Defendant, asking for plain error review, alleged that the court erred in admitting this

testimony. He alleged the prejudicial effect of the father’s testimony about his emotional

reaction outweighed its probative value, that the father’s description of his suspicions

constituted improper lay opinion testimony, and that the father’s beliefs as to what occurred

improperly opined on the ultimate question of fact for the trier of fact.

The Appellate Court disagreed. The father provided several concrete examples of

observations that had aroused his suspicion, and Rule of Evidence 701 expressly permits a

witness to testify about his or her perceptions. His emotional reaction represented his state

of mind at the time of the disclosure, another proper area of testimony that was relevant to

provide context for his decision to subsequently confront defendant. Notably, state of mind

testimony is admissible even if hearsay; here, the witness was on the stand and available for

cross-examination. Finally, it is now “well settled” that expert or lay witness opinions on an

ultimate fact or issue are admissible.

People v. Hardimon, 2021 IL App (3d) 180578 Defendant was convicted of murder after

he was identified as the perpetrator of a shooting outside a night club. At his trial, one

witness, a bouncer, testified that as he escorted defendant out of a club, he heard defendant

say he would “light this bitch up.” The bouncer testified that based on his familiarity with

street slang, he understood the comment to mean that there would be some “gun play.”

Defendant argued on appeal that this comment constituted improper lay opinion testimony.

Defendant further alleged that aspects of his videotaped statement, in particular the

commentary and accusatory questioning of the officers, was overly prejudicial.

The Appellate Court rejected these claims. Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 states that

“lay witnesses may offer opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the

perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony

or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge.” The Appellate Court found the bouncer’s testimony was proper lay

opinion. It was rationally based on his familiarity with street vernacular. The statement was

helpful to the determination of the fact of the defendant’s guilt in that there was, in fact,

some “gun play.” The statement was not based on scientific, technical, or specialized

knowledge.

Nor did the court err in admitting certain portions of defendant’s videotaped

interrogation which he alleged to be overly prejudicial. In a prior appeal, the appellate court

deemed the interrogation prejudicial, based on officer comments and accusations, after

approximately 26 minutes. At the second trial, the parties argued over whether the jury

should see beyond the 25:46 mark or the 28:35 mark. In between, the interrogating officers

presented defendant with their theory of the case, accusing him of shooting the victim after

an argument in the bathroom of the nightclub, and told defendant a witness could identify

him entering a Mitsubishi after the shooting. The Appellate Court found these officer

statements admissible as allowable interrogation techniques, and noted that defendant

admitted to being in the Mitsubishi, making this portion of the interrogation relevant.

People v. Rudd, 2020 IL App (1st) 182037 When the State seeks to establish a defendant’s

motive by introducing evidence of an insurance policy on the victim’s life, it must “provide

evidence that the accused knew of the policy, knew it was valid, or believed it was valid, and

knew that [he] would benefit therefrom.” Thus, life-insurance-as-motive evidence is governed

by the conditional relevance provision of Rule of Evidence 104(b). Under this rule, the

question is, after examining all of the evidence, “whether the jury could reasonably find the

conditional fact *** by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of

defendant’s deceased wife’s life insurance policies. The court rejected defendant’s argument

that the State failed to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the policies. The couple worked

for the same company, and when asked whether the deceased had insurance, defendant

admitted that most people who worked for their company did have insurance. And the

changes in the deceased’s policy in the one month between their marriage and her death,

naming defendant as primary beneficiary, and adding a benefit for accidental death, required

an active step on her part. It was not unreasonable to presume that the matter would have

been discussed between a

married couple.

People v. Schlott, 2019 IL App (3d) 160281 Writings found in defendant’s home office after

the offense were admissible despite not knowing exactly when they were written. The time-

frame was narrowed to a six-week window, and the writings included lists in preparation for

  23   
the  offense,  as  well  as  letters  of  apology  to  various  family  members.  The  content  of  the 
writings  showed  their  relevance,  and  the  foundation  was  adequate  where  defendant’s 
handwriting was identified and the letters had been recovered from defendant’s office. 
 
People  v.  Whitfield,  2018  IL  App  (4th)  150948  Admission  of  defendant’s  video  recorded 
interrogation  was  not  error  even  though  the  recording  also  included  statements  by  the 
interrogating officers suggesting that defendant was not credible and opining that the State’s 
case against him was strong. The officers’ statements on the video were not offered for their 
truth, but rather provided context for the interrogation, so they were not hearsay. Similarly, 
the officers’ statements were not improper opinion testimony because the video recording was 
not  testimony.  Unlike  People  v.  Hardiman,  2017  IL  App  (3d)  120772,  where  the  court 
improperly admitted portions of an interrogation consisting of prejudicial police accusations 
and defendant's denials, the defendant here made admissions throughout the duration of the 
videotaped statement, making the officers' accusations relevant. 
 
People v. Clark, 2018 IL App (2d) 150608 Evidence of a witness’s commission of another 
crime  is  not  analyzed  as  “other  crimes”  evidence  under  Illinois  Rule  of  Evidence  404(b). 
Instead,  admissibility  is  evaluated  under  ordinary  relevance  principles.  Here,  defendant 
admitted participating in a robbery with the co-defendant, Nesbit, where Nesbit brandished 
a firearm. The sole issue before the jury was whether the gun displayed by Nesbit was real. 
At  defendant’s  trial,  Nesbit  testified  for  the  State.  Nesbit’s  recent  prior  commission  of  an 
armed robbery with a real firearm was deemed relevant. Defendant’s jury could reasonably 
infer use of a real firearm in this case based upon Nesbit’s use of a real firearm in the prior 
armed robbery. The prejudicial impact of Nesbit’s prior armed robbery did not outweigh its 
probative value where its use at defendant’s trial was limited to the issue of whether the gun 
was real. 
 
People v. Davis and People v. Graham, 2018 IL App (1st) 152413 The trial court did not 
abuse  its  discretion  in  admitting  gang  evidence.  The  State  provided  evidence  that  the 
shooting was gang motivated, and therefore gang evidence was relevant. The State did not 
call an expert on gang evidence or inundate the jury with gang evidence, and therefore the 
gang  evidence  was  not  overly  prejudicial.  Although  evidence  suggested  that  co-defendant 
Davis was in a different gang from the two gangs at war, evidence did show that co-defendant 
Graham was in one of the two warring gangs and that Davis acted in concert with Graham. 
 
People v. Betance-Lopez, 2015 IL App (2d) 130521 Generally, the trial court may admit a 
written transcript of a recording to assist the trier of fact. However, it is the recording itself, 
and not the transcript, that constitutes evidence. 
  The court concluded that the general rule is “impractical, or even impossible,” where 
the recording contains statements in a foreign language. In such a case, it is not possible for 
the  trier  of  fact  to  rely  on  the  recording  to  the  exclusion  of  an  English  translation.  Thus, 
where the recording contained questions and answers in Spanish which were then translated 
by one of the officers conducting the interrogation, the trial court did not err by admitting a 
subsequently prepared English transcript as substantive evidence. 
  The  court  rejected  the  argument  that  because  the  recording  contained  the  officer’s 
English translation of statements which defendant made in Spanish, the trial court should 
not have relied on the subsequently-prepared transcript. The court noted that the translator 
who prepared the transcript had the luxury of listening to the recording, multiple times if 
necessary, to ensure that the translation was accurate. In addition, defendant conceded that 

there was a proper evidentiary foundation for the transcript. Under these circumstances, the

trial court did not err by admitting the transcript.

People v. Jaimes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121368 Gang-related evidence need not be excluded

where it is relevant to an issue in dispute and the probative value is not substantially

outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The trial court’s decision regarding the admission of

gang-related evidence will not be disturbed unless there was an abuse of discretion.

Here, gang-related evidence was admissible because the State’s theory was that the

offense occurred as a result of an altercation between rival gangs. In addition, evidence that

defendant identified himself as a member of a gang was admissible although the jury was

informed that the admission was made to an employee at a juvenile detention facility and

thus learned that defendant was involved in the juvenile justice system. The court noted that

the employee did not testify to the reason defendant was being detained and that the evidence

merely satisfied the requirement that the State establish a proper foundation for the

testimony.

The court noted, however, that it was unnecessary for the State to introduce testimony

by a second correctional officer concerning a separate admission by defendant that he was a

gang member. Although the gang-related evidence introduced in this case was not excessive

or unduly prejudicial, by presenting the duplicative testimony of a second witness the State

came “close to crossing that forbidden threshold.” The court stated that in the future, the

State should be “more circumspect” in its use of such cumulative evidence.

Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder and attempt first degree murder were

affirmed.

People v. Degorski, 2013 IL App (1st) 100580 Occupation (reputable or disreputable) is an

ordinary part of the background information elicited from any witness, and is properly

considered in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to allow the former assistant State’s

Attorney who obtained a confession from the defendant to testify that he was now a judge,

particularly where the State complied with the court’s direction that it not give that fact

undue emphasis, and the State did not argue that the jury should give the testimony of the

witness greater weight because he was a judge. While a judge’s occupation may lend an air

of credibility to his testimony, the trier of fact is still free to disbelieve the witness.

Much like police officers, assistant State’s Attorneys are authority figures whose testimony

may be prejudicial if they inform jurors that they should believe the prosecution’s case. But

there is a distinction between an assistant State’s Attorney testifying to a prior opinion of

belief in a defendant’s statement at the time it was made, and offering a present opinion of

defendant’s guilt at trial. Present opinion testimony is improper; previous opinion testimony

is permissible.

The testimony of a former assistant State’s Attorney that he believed defendant’s

confession at the time of its making was not a present opinion of defendant’s guilt and was

permissible.

People v. Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 110882 Evidence that defendant was a gang member

or involved in gang-related activities is admissible to show a common purpose or design, or

to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. However, due to the possibility of strong

prejudice against street gangs, gang-related evidence is admissible only if there is adequate

proof that membership or activity in the gang is related to the crime charged. The trial court

must take great care in admitting gang-related testimony.

The trial court erred at a trial for first degree murder by admitting testimony from

eyewitnesses that defendant was a member of the Latin Kings. The Court rejected the State’s

argument that such evidence strengthened eyewitness identifications of the defendant as one

of the perpetrators. Although two of the eyewitnesses stated that they knew defendant was

a gang member, none of the eyewitnesses based their identifications of defendant on that

fact. Instead, the witnesses stated that they recognized the perpetrators of the offense

because they had seen them in the neighborhood for several years. Thus, gang membership

was not related to the identifications.

Similarly, the trial court improperly admitted photographs of defendant’s tattoos and

testimony from a police officer that the tattoos showed that defendant was a member of the

Latin Kings. Although the judge also admitted this evidence to corroborate eyewitnesses’

identifications, none of the witnesses mentioned the tattoos or suggested that the tattoos

were an aid in identifying defendant as one of the perpetrators. Thus, the evidence was not

relevant to the identifications and had the effect of inflaming the jury.

Furthermore, the gang evidence was not admissible to support the State’s theory that

the murder was gang related. The State argued that the perpetrators killed the victim to

avenge a perceived slight to the Latin Kings a few weeks earlier, when workers at the factory

where the offense occurred gave shelter to a man who was being beaten. The court stressed

that the State failed to present any evidence to show that the instant offense was intended

as retaliation for a perceived slight. In addition, there was no evidence that either this

incident or the prior one was gang related, as there was no testimony that the perpetrators

flashed gang signs, yelled gang slogans, or otherwise indicated that they were members of a

gang.

Finally, the trial judge erred by denying defense counsel’s request to remove a “Gang

Unit” sticker from the State’s courtroom cart, especially since the State had no objection.

Given the strong risk of prejudice that is inherent whenever a jury is exposed to gang-related

evidence, the presence of the sticker on the cart had the potential to negatively impact the

defense. The court stated, “Whether the case involves gang affiliation or not, fairness dictates

that the cart be identified with a sticker that does not transmit a potentially prejudicial

message, especially when an innocuous alternative is so easy.”

People v. Fillyaw and Parker, 409 Ill.App.3d 302, 948 N.E.2d 1116 (2d Dist. 2011) The

mental health history of a witness may be relevant if it relates to the credibility of the

witness. Witness Deshae R.’s psychiatric diagnosis, treatment with psychotropic

medications, and experience with hallucinations may be relevant to her credibility as a

witness. Therefore the circuit court was directed to conduct a further in camera review of

her mental health records on remand, and tender to the defense attorneys the relevant

portions of those documents.

People v. Santiago, 409 Ill.App.3d 927, 949 N.E.2d 290 (1st Dist. 2011) Just as evidence of

a co-defendant’s confession is inadmissible as evidence of defendant’s guilt, evidence that a

co-defendant pleaded guilty or was convicted is inadmissible as evidence of defendant’s guilt.

A defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined based on the evidence

against him without being prejudged according to what has happened to another. People

v. Sullivan, 72 Ill.2d 36, 377 N.E.2d 17 (1978).

The court held that this rule was not violated where the prosecutor elicited from the

co-defendants that they had pleaded guilty, but in the context of admitting statements that

they had made at their plea hearings acknowledging the accuracy of their post-arrest

statements. The post-arrest and guilty-plea statements inculpating defendant were admitted

as substantive evidence pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 as they were inconsistent with the

co-defendants’ testimony at trial. The State never argued to the jury or even suggested that

the co-defendants’ guilt was evidence of defendant’s guilt.

Nor was it error to elicit evidence of the sentences that the co-defendants received.

The jury was not informed of the sentences for the improper purpose of suggesting that

defendant faced a comparable sentence if convicted, but to emphasize the doubtful

explanation offered by the co-defendants for their decision to plead guilty.

It was also not error for the prosecutor to elicit evidence that defendant was not

present when the co-defendant pleaded guilty. This evidence was offered to provide a

plausible explanation for the co-defendant’s contrary testimony at trial, i.e., that defendant’s

absence at the plea hearing made it easier for the co-defendant to testify to defendant’s guilt,

and defendant’s presence at trial made it difficult for the co-defendant to repeat that

testimony.

Justice Robert E. Gordon specially concurred. It was error, although harmless, to elicit

evidence of co-defendants’ guilty pleas, where it was not necessary to elicit that evidence in

order to introduce the prior inconsistent statements they made at the plea hearing.