Risk Management
Practices in the
Fire Service
January 2018
Risk Management
Practices in the
Fire Service
January 2018
Mission Statement
We provide national leadership to foster a solid foundation for
our fi re and emergency services stakeholders in prevention,
preparedness and response.
i
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Preface ................................................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1: Overview .......................................................................................................... 1
Dening risk ...................................................................................................................... 1
Determining factors .................................................................................................. 1
Describing risk ........................................................................................................... 1
What is risk? ...................................................................................................................... 2
The probability of risk .............................................................................................. 2
Assessing risk ............................................................................................................ 2
Types of risk ...................................................................................................................... 2
Relative risk ................................................................................................................ 2
Insurance risk ............................................................................................................ 3
Probability, premiums and prots .......................................................................... 3
Three levels of risk management .................................................................................. 4
Risk management in the community ............................................................................ 5
Delivering re control services to the community ............................................... 5
Risk management related missions ....................................................................... 5
Risk management related activities ....................................................................... 6
Organizational risk management .................................................................................. 7
Public and private risks — A comparison .............................................................. 7
Emergency response as an essential public service ............................................ 7
Operational risks ............................................................................................................. 8
Identication, evaluation and control .................................................................... 8
Operational risk management involves a higher level of risk ............................ 9
Planning to manage risk ................................................................................................. 9
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management................................................................ 11
Denitions and concepts ................................................................................................ 11
Risk .............................................................................................................................. 11
Management .............................................................................................................. 12
Exposure .................................................................................................................... 12
Risk management ..................................................................................................... 12
Fire department risk management — Its mission ...................................................... 13
Supporting the mission statement ......................................................................... 13
High risks require special attention ....................................................................... 14
Losses and loss control ................................................................................................... 14
ii
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Delivering emergency services involves high-risk activities ............................... 14
Direct and indirect losses ........................................................................................ 15
Organizational risk management system .................................................................... 16
The role of a risk manager ....................................................................................... 16
Goals and objectives: The foundation of the system .......................................... 16
The steps in the process ................................................................................................. 17
The ve principal risk management steps ................................................................... 17
Step 1: Identifying the risk ....................................................................................... 17
Step 2: Evaluating risk potential .............................................................................. 18
Step 3: Ranking and prioritizing risks ..................................................................... 19
Step 4: Determining and implementing control actions ..................................... 19
Predicted eect .................................................................................................. 20
Time required ..................................................................................................... 20
Time to results .................................................................................................... 20
Eort required .................................................................................................... 20
Associated costs ................................................................................................. 20
Insurance costs ................................................................................................... 20
Funding ................................................................................................................ 20
Cost/Benet analysis ......................................................................................... 21
Options and categories of control measures ................................................. 23
Risk control categories ...................................................................................... 23
Step 5: Evaluating and revising actions and techniques ..................................... 24
Risk management is a system, not a solution ................................................ 24
Legal responsibility .......................................................................................................... 25
Statutory immunity .................................................................................................. 25
Responsibility to provide a safe and healthy workplace ..................................... 25
Acceptance of risk ..................................................................................................... 26
An Incident Commander must have responsibility with authority ................... 26
Protection from liability ........................................................................................... 27
Occupational safety and health regulations ......................................................... 27
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Plan states ....................... 27
Non-Occupational Safety and Health Administration Plan states .............. 27
A regulatory framework ........................................................................................... 28
Consensus standards ............................................................................................... 28
Documentation is essential ..................................................................................... 29
Specic areas of concern for the emergency service risk manager ......................... 29
Balancing risks at the scene of an incident ........................................................... 29
Why risk has to be managed even during nonemergency times ....................... 29
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 30
iii
Table of Contents
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management .................................................................... 31
Risk management and emergency response .............................................................. 31
Acceptance of risk ..................................................................................................... 32
Bravery in the face of risk ........................................................................................ 33
Today’s risk versus protection ................................................................................. 33
What is expected? ..................................................................................................... 33
The fundamental principle of occupational safety and health .......................... 34
Review of operations ................................................................................................ 34
Managing risk in emergency incidents ......................................................................... 35
Risk management is a fundamental responsibility .............................................. 35
Develop an incident management plan and share it ........................................... 35
National Fire Protection Association 1500 ............................................................ 36
Systematic approach required: All members must be involved ........................ 36
Risk assessment ........................................................................................................ 36
Risk management drives the strategic plan .......................................................... 37
Initial risk assessment .............................................................................................. 38
Risk factors known and assumed ........................................................................... 38
Ongoing Incident Commander responsibilities .................................................... 38
Responsibilities at all levels ..................................................................................... 39
Roles and responsibilities ........................................................................................ 39
Gathering additional information ........................................................................... 40
The role of the Incident Safety Ocer ................................................................... 40
Balancing perspectives ............................................................................................ 41
Application of risk management policies ..................................................................... 41
Experience and judgment ........................................................................................ 42
Unoccupied, vacant and abandoned buildings .................................................... 42
Judging the risks of abandoned structures ........................................................... 42
Risk to the community ............................................................................................. 43
Unusual situational risks ................................................................................... 43
Unusual structural situations ........................................................................... 43
Evaluating information from dierent sources .................................................... 44
The time factor .......................................................................................................... 45
Rules of thumb .......................................................................................................... 46
Unacceptable risk ...................................................................................................... 46
Focus ........................................................................................................................... 46
Conducting operations safely ........................................................................................ 47
Denition of acceptable risk .................................................................................... 47
Accepting inherent risks ........................................................................................... 47
iv
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Operational modes of reghting .......................................................................... 47
Why Incident Commanders might change strategy ............................................. 48
When to change strategy ......................................................................................... 48
Implementing a change in strategy ........................................................................ 48
Standard operating procedures.............................................................................. 49
The need for a consistent approach to safety ...................................................... 49
Components of a basic operational system ......................................................... 49
Information from preincident planning ................................................................. 49
Communications ....................................................................................................... 50
A personnel accountability system ........................................................................ 50
Rapid Intervention Teams ........................................................................................ 51
Rest and rehabilitation ............................................................................................. 51
Overhaul and salvage ............................................................................................... 51
Limiting risk by carrying assigned responsibilities .............................................. 51
Personal protection .................................................................................................. 53
Protection is limited .................................................................................................. 53
Personal protection benets and concerns .......................................................... 53
Preparation for incident command ............................................................................... 54
Experience is a job requirement ............................................................................. 55
The need for judgment ............................................................................................ 55
Developing judgment ............................................................................................... 55
Judgment under stress ............................................................................................. 56
Predictability .............................................................................................................. 56
Do not rely on good luck .......................................................................................... 57
Recognition of dangerous situations ..................................................................... 57
Balancing probabilities and consequences ........................................................... 57
Training and education ............................................................................................ 58
Critiques ..................................................................................................................... 58
Observation ............................................................................................................... 59
Practice ....................................................................................................................... 60
Investigations ............................................................................................................ 60
An investigative report example ............................................................................. 60
Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire — Risk assessment ................................................ 60
Progress reports .............................................................................................................. 61
Ten rules of engagement for structural reghting ................................................... 63
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 65
v
Table of Contents
Chapter 4: Managing Information ................................................................................... 67
The importance of managing information ................................................................... 67
Two categories of information ................................................................................ 67
Preincident planning and preparation .......................................................................... 68
The goal of preincident planning ............................................................................ 68
Three steps in preincident planning....................................................................... 69
Information gathering methods ............................................................................. 69
The objective of site visits ........................................................................................ 69
The value of site visits .............................................................................................. 70
Storage, processing and retrieval of information: System options ................... 70
Paper-based systems......................................................................................... 70
Applications of advanced information technology ....................................... 70
Factors that drive gathering, storage and retrieval decisions ............................ 71
Eective use of graphics .......................................................................................... 71
Managing and applying information during emergencies ........................................ 72
Early command ......................................................................................................... 73
Consequences of failure .......................................................................................... 74
Command support sta........................................................................................... 74
Providing support ..................................................................................................... 75
Command support systems .................................................................................... 76
Special information management considerations ...................................................... 77
Hazardous materials ................................................................................................ 77
Technical rescue planning ........................................................................................ 78
Conned spaces ........................................................................................................ 78
Intelligence ................................................................................................................. 78
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction .......................................................................... 81
What is community risk reduction? ............................................................................... 81
Steps of a successful community risk-reduction program ........................................ 82
Implementation of a community risk-reduction program ........................................ 84
Sample community risk-reduction plan ....................................................................... 85
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 89
References .......................................................................................................................... 91
Appendix: Organizations and Sources Providing Risk Management Information ... 93
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................ 95
vi
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
vii
Preface
Preface
This report was developed through a partnership between the U.S. Fire Administration
(USFA) and the International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) at Oklahoma State
University (OSU). The IFSTA and its partner OSU Fire Protection Publications have been
major publishers of re service training materials since 1934. Through IFSTAs aliation with
the OSU College of Engineering, Architecture and Technology, it also conducts a variety of
funded, technical research on re service, re prevention, and life safety issues. They have
published numerous previous reports for the USFA. The extensive information provided
within this report would not have been possible without the dedication and eorts of the
following people assigned to this project:
Project Administrator — Nancy Trench, Assistant Director for Research, OSU Fire Protection
Publications
Principal Investigator — Todd Haines; Managing Director; Critical Risk Group, LLC;
Keller,Texas
Editorial — Lynne Murnane, Editor and Michael A. Wieder, Executive Director, IFSTA
viii
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
1
Chapter 1: Overview
Chapter 1: Overview
This chapter provides a basic understanding of the risk management vocabulary and
presents the operational assumptions and concepts that form the foundation of a risk
management philosophy. This chapter helps prepare re service executive sta, Incident
Commanders (ICs) and other emergency responders in the following ways:
ĵ Dening risk and risk management.
ĵ Describing the risk management mission.
ĵ Providing examples of operational risk management considerations.
This chapter also addresses the following portions of the National Fallen Fireghters
Foundation’s (NFFF’s) 16 Fireghter Life Safety Initiatives (FLSIs):
ĵ
Initiative 3: Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident
management at all levels, including strategic, tactical and planning responsibilities.
ĵ Initiative 4: All reghters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
ĵ
Initiative 14: Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a
critical re and life safety program.
ĵ
Initiative 15: Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the
installation of home re sprinklers.
Dening risk
To discuss risk management, we must rst dene what we mean by “risk.” Unfortunately,
the term risk has come to be used interchangeably in widely disparate settings. As a result,
its meaning can be blurred in the minds of many.
Dictionaries dene risk as both a noun and a verb:
ĵ
(noun) The possibility of meeting danger or suering harm or loss, or exposure to
harm or loss.
ĵ (noun) A person or thing insured or representing a source of risk.
ĵ (verb) To expose to the chance of injury or loss.
Determining factors
Three interrelated determining factors are inherent in all the above denitions:
ĵ The probability that an undesired event might occur.
ĵ A harmful or undesirable consequence.
ĵ The severity of the harm that might result.
Describing risk
The probability of an occurrence can be described in subjective terms, such as rare and
high, or in numerical terms, such as one in a million, one in three, and 20 percent.
In the same way, harmful consequences are often expressed in descriptive terms like
death, incapacitation, injury, disaster, and destruction. They may also be described in
2
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
more concrete terms, such as “loss of a $1.5 million facility” or “the combined costs of
medical payments, compensation, pension benets, and lost productivity” (in the event
of a worker’s injury).
Probability and consequence can be combined and expressed mathematically as the
product of loss and probability. An insurance company, for example, might describe a
facility as a $10 million risk with a 2 percent probability of loss. A nancial analyst might
calculate a $10 million investment that has a 2 percent probability of loss as a $200,000 risk.
What is risk?
The probability of risk
The probability of risk is two-pronged. It relates not only to the risk of something undesirable
happening, but also to the probable outcome as rated on a scale of negative consequences.
For example, based on statistical calculations, we can predict the number of trac accidents
likely to occur per million miles driven. We can also predict the number of injuries and
fatalities that will come about as a result. However, such a statistics-based approach will
not tell us as individuals where or when we might be involved in an accident ourselves.
Those predictive statistics certainly cannot tell us if our next accident will be a fender
bender in a shopping center parking lot on a sunny afternoon, or a multivehicle pileup on
a dark two-lane road on a stormy night.
Assessing risk
The integration of probability and consequence helps us plan our lives and guides many
of the routine personal and professional decisions we make every day. Out of habit, we
often apply the term risk to virtually any type or degree of undesirable consequences or
negative outcomes — from a minor inconvenience to a major disaster. For instance, we
might talk about the risk of having to share a 60 second elevator ride with an undesirable
companion, or we might talk about the risk of an earthquake devastating a region of the
United States.
Each situation carries with it a probability of occurrence and a potential degree of harm that
might result. When we subjectively weigh a risk in terms of the undesirable consequence,
we might place the outcome anywhere on a scale of undesirability. In the examples above,
we might measure the negative outcome in lives lost and property damage in the millions,
or simply by wishing we had waited for the next elevator.
Types of risk
Relative risk
We judge the consequences of specic unpleasant events on a broad scale of relative
undesirability. For example, a heart attack can lead to hospitalization, therapy and a long
period of recovery. Or it can be fatal. Both potential outcomes are undesirable. Clearly,
though, recovery is the better alternative. Often, a person who has recovered from a
heart attack considers the probability and potential consequences of having another
and attempts to mitigate that risk by changing exercise patterns, eating habits, and other
lifestyle choices.
3
Chapter 1: Overview
Figure 1.1 — Insurance companies assume a level risk when they insure a home
against re.
Photo courtesy of Chris Mickal, New Orleans (LA) Fire Department Photo Unit.
Insurance risk
An insurance company refers to the item, object or person insured as the risk. When we
buy re insurance, we make value judgments about how much we are willing to pay to be
compensated for a loss if our property is damaged or destroyed by re (see Figure 1.1).
When an insurance company sells us that policy, it is making a value judgment about two
aspects of probability:
ĵ The probability that a re will occur.
ĵ The probable extent of the loss that will result.
Probability, premiums and prots
To determine a premium, an insurance company evaluates the probability of a loss occurring
and the potential size of that loss. When it establishes the rate prot for a re insurance
policy, a company takes into account many of the property’s characteristics, such as:
ĵ The type of structure.
ĵ Size.
ĵ Value of contents.
ĵ On-site activities.
ĵ Built-in re protection systems.
ĵ Available re department resources.
Insurers work those factors into a prediction that considers the loss history of similar
properties, the level of public re protection, and other inuences (such as local climate).
4
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
The rate is ultimately based on the insurer’s loss experience with similar risks, as well
as the probability and potential scope of loss for the insured property — over time. If
predictions are not accurate for a specic building, the insurer should still be protable if
its predictions are generally accurate across a large number of insured risks.
Three levels of risk management
In this section, we will examine the principles and practices of risk management as they
apply on three levels:
1. The community as a whole.
2. The emergency response organization.
3. Emergency response operations.
According to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1250, Recommended Practice
in Fire and Emergency Service Organization Risk Management, the term “risk management”
refers to the process of planning, organizing, directing and controlling the resources and
activities of an organization in order to minimize detrimental eects on that organization.
Risk management comprises the entire process of identication and evaluation of risks, as
well as the identication, selection and implementation of control measures that might alter
risk. Those control measures, dened in Table 1.1, can be categorized in the following ways:
ĵ Administrative.
ĵ Engineering.
ĵ Personal protection.
Table 1.1 — Risk management control measures
These controls … Consist of … And are intended to …
Administrative
Guidelines, policies and procedures
established to limit losses. Examples:
ĵ Standard operating procedures.
ĵ Training requirements.
ĵ Safe work practices.
ĵ Regulations and standards.
Make the task safe for
the worker.
Engineering
Engineered systems that remove or limit
hazards. Examples
:
ĵ Apparatus design.
ĵ Mechanical ventilation.
ĵ
Lock-out and tag-out of electrical
hazards.
Make the task safe for
the worker.
Personal
protection
Equipment, clothing and devices designed
to protect the worker. Examples:
ĵ Helmets.
ĵ Gloves.
ĵ
Self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA)
.
ĵ Tools.
Make the worker safe
from
the
hazards.
5
Chapter 1: Overview
Risk management in the community
By having trained personnel, as well as specialized equipment on
hand, emergency responders exemplify a community’s response to
risk. In fact, the basic mission of the re, Emergency Medical Services
(EMS), and rescue services is intimately related to the control of risk
throughout a community. Fire departments play a critical role in
defending their communities against res and other situations that
threaten lives and property.
Although most public re departments focus on the control of res
in individual properties and the rescue of endangered occupants,
the re suppression role of the re department is still based on the
need to protect the community’s property and population. In that
respect, the re department is part of the community’s re risk
management program. It exists to limit the probable loss when a
re occurs.
Delivering re control services to the community
A community expresses its assessment of overall re risk through the
control-service resources it is willing to commit to its re department.
If the re department is unable to perform its re control mission,
the community’s re risk balance could be compromised. The re
chief is responsible for the following:
ĵ Managing the community’s re risk.
ĵ
Providing a set of services that are part of the risk management
system (the service delivery mission).
ĵ Ensuring the department can perform its mission at all times.
Risk management related missions
In addition to re control units, most of the other services within re departments and other
emergency response organizations also conduct activities directly related to community
risk management.
EMS respond to urgent situations that are related to the health and welfare of the community’s
citizens (see Figure 1.2). Emergency management services protect the community from
the eects of man-made and natural disasters. Rescue teams safely remove citizens from
dangerous predicaments, avoiding the risk of injury or death that untrained, unprepared
citizens might face if they tried to perform that mission. Hazardous materials response
teams protect the population and the environment from the eects of uncontrolled releases
of hazardous materials. The common thread among the missions of all those teams is the
community’s need for protection from potentially harmful or undesirable events.
Historical note:
Public fire departments were
organized primarily to defend
communities against the risk of
conflagrations. Conflagrations
grow from small fires that are
not controlled in their early
stages until they reach a size
where they cannot be controlled.
Before modern concepts of re
protection were developed,
conagrations often devastated
cities and towns.
Over the years, our increasing
ability to limit the size of fires
has almost, but not entirely,
eliminated the occurrence of
urban conflagration. Today,
the wildland urban interface
continues to challenge emergency
responders with a version of
conagration.
6
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 1.2 — Fire departments provide emergency medical services in a variety
of manners.
Photo courtesy of Mike Wieder, Stillwater, OK.
Such teams play signicant roles in reducing a community’s vulnerability to one or more
types of harm. Just the same, emergency response is typically only one dimension of
their total mission; however, the need for today’s re service needs to be multifaceted to
support the needs of the local communities.
Risk management related activities
Key activities that support risk management principles and practices include re prevention,
code enforcement, public education, and other eorts that make citizens more aware of
how to do the following:
ĵ Recognize potentially dangerous situations.
ĵ Prevent risks that cause emergencies.
ĵ Respond eectively to an emergency.
Communities benet from educational and motivational programs, such as:
ĵ Hazard recognition, avoidance and elimination.
ĵ
Standards that require automatic sprinkler systems, re-resistive construction and
re alarm installation.
ĵ Inspection and code compliance enforcement.
Taken together, all these activities reduce a community’s vulnerability and are an integral
part of a community’s re risk management system.
7
Chapter 1: Overview
Organizational risk management
The responsibility of a manager to safeguard the assets of their organization is just as applicable
to an emergency response agency as to any business or family. Although their mission is to
manage community risk, re departments and other emergency service organizations must
also be concerned with risk to themselves. In several dierent ways, those risks can keep
the organization from successfully carrying out its mission. The re department is open to a
variety of risks similar to those faced by every private organization and enterprise.
There are interesting parallels between the two sectors. A risk manager in a private
enterprise tries to protect the assets of the enterprise and ensure that it can stay in
business. Similarly, a risk manager in a re department tries to protect public assets,
including its personnel, facilities, and equipment, as well as making sure the emergency
service organization can perform its mission.
Public and private risks — A comparison
By the same token, the nature of the risks each organization faces and the impact of loss
can be quite dierent. Just as a re in a restaurant can put it out of business, a re at a re
station can compromise the capacity of that re department to respond to res. Many of
the assets of the re department are just as essential to the ability to deliver emergency
services as a kitchen is to a restaurant’s ability to serve food. However, there is one critical
dierence. If a restaurant loses business, its employees might be out of work, but the
patrons can nd someplace else to eat. If a re station burns down, the community as a
whole may be without adequate re protection or EMS.
Emergency response as an essential public service
Emergency response organizations are viewed as essential public services. Emergency
response managers should recognize that they are responsible for ensuring that their
organizations are always ready and able to perform their missions and to meet the
expectations of their communities. Emergency response managers must be aware of
potential disruptions to service. After all, they are expected to recognize and manage risk
as part of their everyday professional lives.
The managers of public safety organizations are also custodians of public funds and assets.
They must restrict any undesirable outcome that costs money, consumes public dollars,
and reduces the government’s capability to spend those funds where they would do the
best. For example, an agency could run up large bills replacing or repairing damaged, lost
or stolen equipment and apparatus (see Figure 1.3). It could also incur high expenses
paying liability claims for vehicle accidents, paying medical bills for injured members, legal
expenses to defend against claims, and paying overtime replacing them. In other words,
the agency could be spending money to compensate for circumstances that should have
been avoided. It is the manager’s responsibility to prevent such things from happening.
8
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 1.3 — Damage to re apparatus creates additional costs for re
departments to encumber.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
Operational risks
Some risks are unavoidable and are accepted as part of the duty of a reghter or a
member of a public emergency response system. When one’s mission is to save the
property and lives of people in danger, one must expect to encounter danger. Emergency
responders are recognized for their bravery because they are willing to accept risks the
general public nds personally unacceptable. Certainly, the nature of the activities of
emergency responders exposes them to a high level of inherent risk that all too often
results in line-of-duty injuries and deaths.
Some risks are simply too great to take. Conditions or circumstances can exist in which the
proper response is to not take actions that could place the lives of responders in danger.
Training that prepares an emergency responder to recognize and respect dangerous
situations and to work safely in a dangerous environment provides a considerable amount
of counterbalance to the risk inherent in the work itself. The equipment that makes it
possible to survive and safely perform required actions also helps balance the risk.
Identication, evaluation and control
Although we cannot always eliminate such danger from the work environment, we can
reduce the risk of injury or death if we:
ĵ Identify the nature of the threat (identify).
ĵ Determine the risk potential, based on signs and symptoms (evaluate).
ĵ
Incorporate risk management practices into the plan for conducting operations (control).
9
Chapter 1: Overview
The concepts of operational risk management have always been important considerations
for emergency response organizations. The actual application of risk management is a focal
point of incident management. A relatively new development within emergency service
organizations is community risk reduction, which will be discussed later in this report.
Operational risk management involves a higher level of risk
A signicantly higher level of risk management is involved in directing emergency operations
and in regulating the overall exposure of responders to the risks of an incident. Emergency
incident risk management expands the standard approach to directing and conducting
emergency operations by incorporating risk evaluation and the assessment of optional
approaches to the problems at hand. Doing that serves as the basis for determining what
levels of risk are acceptable in dierent situations and guides ICs as they make strategic
decisions. To deliver emergency services with an appropriate concern for the health and
safety of the personnel who provide those services, an incident manager or IC must balance
the approaches he or she takes.
Planning to manage risk
The NFPA adopted NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health,
and Wellness Program in 1987. It was the rst consensus standard to directly address many
issues that are related to the avoidance of injuries, fatalities and occupational illnesses
that emergency response personnel experience while performing their duties. In 2000,
the NFPA adopted NFPA 1250, with of scope of establishing minimum criteria to develop,
implement or evaluate a re and emergency service organization risk management program.
The elements of a risk management plan, as outlined in NFPA 1500, are intended to
apply to all aspects of a re department’s operations and activities. It is their application
to emergency operations in particular, though, that makes the risk management plan
a signicant advancement in risk management. Annex D in NFPA 1500 summarizes the
provisions of a risk management plan as follows:
ĵ Risk identication.
ĵ Risk evaluation.
ĵ Establishing priorities for action.
ĵ Risk control.
ĵ Other methods of control.
ĵ Risk management monitoring and follow-up.
Summary
The primary focus of this manual is the application of risk management concepts to the
operational practice of re departments. Throughout the manual, we address specic
challenges involved in incorporating a “risk management approach” into the delivery of re
department services. It is a goal of this manual to assist departments and their leaders in
their eorts to improve the performance of their organizations and to reduce the risks their
communities, their organizations, and their individual members face virtually every day.
10
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Some of the key points discussed in this chapter include the following:
ĵ
Individuals who provide emergency services accept a higher level of risk than members
of the general public; hopefully, we can learn to manage these risks.
ĵ
Risk management is a dynamic system that must be managed — not a “worry of the
week” problem to be solved.
ĵ
A signicantly increased risk of injury or death is part of the environment in which
emergency responders are expected to perform their duties.
ĵ
It is impossible to avoid many of the risks inherent in an emergency responder’s work
environment, but, through control measures, we take steps to minimize those risks.
ĵ The risk of injury or death is reduced by the following control measures:
Ý Training, experience, protective clothing and equipment.
Ý Implementation of appropriate strategies and tactics.
Ý Avoidance of unnecessary risks.
ĵ NFPA 1500 requires the establishment of a written risk management plan.
ĵ
The application of risk management to emergency operations is intended to recognize
the inherent risks and assist an IC in implementing appropriate plans and actions in
dangerous situations. Development and implementation of any community’s risk-
reduction eorts must address engineering, education and enforcement programs.
ĵ Fire departments must manage nancial, liability and safety risks within three major
categories:
Ý Risk to the community (community risk).
Ý Risk to the re department organization (organizational risk).
Ý Risk during emergency operations (operational risk).
11
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk
Management
The objectives of this chapter are as follows:
ĵ Dene risk management and loss control.
ĵ
Introduce the general principles of risk management and loss control as they apply to
organizations that deliver emergency services.
ĵ
Present a ve-step risk management process that can be used by emergency service
providers.
ĵ Address legal responsibility as a component of risk management.
ĵ
Address specic areas of concern relating to risk management for re departments
and other emergency service providers.
This chapter also addresses the following portions of the NFFF’s 16 FLSIs:
ĵ
Initiative 1: Dene and advocate the need for a cultural change within the re service
relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability
and personal responsibility.
ĵ
Initiative 2: Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and
safety throughout the re service.
ĵ Initiative 4: All reghters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
Denitions and concepts
Risk
The New Oxford American Dictionary denes risk as follows:
ĵ A situation involving exposure to danger.
ĵ Expose (someone or something valued) to danger, harm or loss.
NFPA 1500 denes risk as follows: “A risk is a measure of the probability and severity of
adverse eects that result from an exposure to a hazard.”
The concept of risk includes two dimensions of probability: the probability that an
undesirable event will occur, and the probable magnitude or severity of the undesirable
consequences. The term risk is used in several contexts to refer to undesirable consequences
that might occur in dierent situations. Those consequences might include the following:
ĵ Death/Injury.
ĵ Property loss or damage leading to increased operating costs.
ĵ Payments for losses incurred by others.
ĵ Loss of the ability to provide service.
ĵ Inconvenience and many other considerations.
12
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Management
Webster’s New World Dictionary denes management as, “The way something is handled,
careful treatment, supervising skills, or those in charge of a business or group.” Management
suggests an organized and directed approach that implements evaluated techniques to
control systems, events and people. Risk management implements a proactive, rather than
reactive, approach to solving problems or limiting risks. The term “risk management” refers to
a systematic eort to identify, evaluate and control risk(s) to reduce both the probability that
something might go wrong and the adverse eects (magnitude) if something does go wrong.
Exposure
Exposure is an important term related to risk management. Exposure is a threat that some
action (or even nonaction) can lead to a loss of some kind. Recognizing and identifying
exposures is an essential step in any risk management program.
Risk management
Risk management incorporates a full range of measures that may be used to limit, reduce
or eliminate the probability that an undesirable outcome will occur. It also includes all types
of measures that can be used to limit, reduce or eliminate the anticipated magnitude of
the undesirable outcome, if it does occur. Risk management measures may address the
probability of the occurrence, the probable magnitude of the outcome, or both.
Emergency service organizations are involved in many situations that could result in
undesirable outcomes, including death or injury to members of the department while
delivering emergency services. Other undesirable outcomes include loss or damage to the
organization’s apparatus, equipment or facilities that would have to be replaced or repaired.
They would also include the death or injury of other people that could result from errors
or omissions by the emergency service providers, as well as damage to their property.
Managing organizational risk is not unique to re departments. All organizations must
manage some types of risk. The nature of the activities conducted by a re department
makes risk management a highly important and challenging task. Some potential exposure
areas and specic examples within each of those areas are listed in Table 2.1.
13
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Table 2.1 — Exposures and techniques
Potential exposure area Risk management techniques
Personnel
Failure to meet minimum performance
requirements.
Personnel
Establish minimum performances.
Failure to properly train.
Establish and conduct performance-based
training for all personnel. Training should
conform to relevant OSHA, NFPA and other
standards.
Failure to adequately equip.
Provide protective equipment that meets
NFPA standards.
Fire inspection practices
Failure to notify owners of hazards.
Fire inspection practices
Require complete records of every
inspection.
Failure to pursue compliance.
Consistently issue citations and seek judicial
intervention when hazards are imminent.
Administration
Level of service not dened.
Administration
Define level of service for all service
deliverables.
Incomplete records.
Document and address all complaints
promptly (policy).
Communication
Failure to dispatch promptly.
Communication
Ensure that specic dispatch policies are in
place and that performance is monitored.
Failure to properly advise callers of potential
delay.
Establish policy and procedure to address
these issues.
Fire department risk management — Its mission
Managing risk for others is, in fact, the re department’s mission. The community is always
at risk from an endless number of potential hazards or sources that could cause harm.
The mission of the re department is to reduce the probability of harm to the community
that could result from dierent harmful situations and circumstances. The re department
must manage its internal (organizational) risk while it performs its mission of managing
external (community) risk. This report addresses managing risk within re departments
and other emergency service organizations.
Supporting the mission statement
Every re department has the need to explicitly express its mission in the form of a
mission statement. That formal document can be the starting point for a department’s
risk management eorts and can form the base from which to create a broad spectrum
of risk management policies, processes and procedures to be implemented throughout
every level of the entire organization — top, middle and bottom.
14
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
High risks require special attention
Dierent activities that are performed by emergency service organizations involve
exposure to dierent kinds of risks. The primary mission of re departments is to reduce
the probability that the community will be damaged or destroyed by re and the probability
that deaths or injuries will result from res. The probability of re occurrence is addressed
through re prevention and public education activities, which are relatively low risk
activities. Fire suppression and rescue functions are conducted to limit the damage and
other negative consequences that result when a re does occur and involves signicantly
higher risk to the service providers. For example:
ĵ
EMS reduce the risk of death or disability when citizens are injured or suer from
serious illnesses.
ĵ
Hazardous materials response teams address the risk that is created by harmful
substances that have escaped from their normal containment.
ĵ
Conned space and technical rescue teams conduct high risk tasks that require the
highest level of risk management when responding to incidents that other people or
organizations are not prepared to manage.
Although each emergency service organization is associated with a dimension of risk
management at the community level, this report is directed toward management of internal
risk — which includes all the things that can go wrong when departments attempt to
deliver the services that dene their mission. It also includes any undesirable outcomes that
might result from nonemergency activities and other functions the organization performs.
Losses and loss control
Delivering emergency services involves high-risk activities
Every person and every organization has to face a variety of risks in life. The following are
some examples of these risks:
ĵ The risk of being involved in a trac accident, or being injured in an accident.
ĵ The risk of your house being struck by lightning.
ĵ The risk of you being struck by lightning.
ĵ The risk of a oor collapse or the risk of being on the oor when it does collapse.
Everyone also participates in some form of personal and organizational risk management,
such as driving safely to avoid accidents and wearing seat belts to limit injuries if an accident
should occur. Fire departments and emergency service organizations have a special need
for risk management due to the following:
ĵ They engage in high risk activities that expose them to elevated risk.
ĵ
They are responsible for delivering critical emergency services to protect their communities.
If we didn’t attempt to manage risk, we would be leaving our fate to chance. There is a
possibility we would soon be dead, injured, battered, broken-down or incapable of protecting
anything. The risk management process is a system developed to limit both the probability
that undesirable events will occur and the magnitude of those consequences if they do
occur. We will never be able to eliminate all risks, but we can eliminate some, reduce many,
15
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
and limit even more. For example, to reduce the probability of reghters being injured,
we develop and conduct training programs. Driver training reduces the probability of
vehicle accidents. Furthermore, to reduce the magnitude of injury if a vehicle is involved
in an accident, we enforce a policy that requires the use of seat belts.
Loss control is a component of risk management; the objective of the loss component of
control is to limit the consequences of risk. There are hundreds of potential risk losses that
are faced by re departments, but essentially, they t into four major management categories:
1.
Personnel losses. These losses include life loss, injury and illness to members of the
department. People are important. They are our most important asset and must
be protected.
2.
Property losses. Fire department property includes vehicles, facilities and equipment.
Losses in this category could include an apparatus that is damaged or destroyed in
an accident, a re station that is damaged by a re, or a piece of equipment that is
lost or stolen.
3.
Downtime losses. These losses result when property is not available for its intended
use. An apparatus that is out of service as the result of an accident is not available to
respond. A re station that is damaged by a re may not be able to house reghters
or an apparatus.
4.
Liability losses. Liability is the obligation to compensate others for losses and damages
that are caused by our acts or omissions. The frequency and magnitude of this type of
loss for re departments are rapidly increasing. A person who sues the re department
for negligence after being injured in an accident with a retruck creates a signicant
potential liability to the department.
Most losses can be related to some form of cost to the organization. Loss reduction is
intended to minimize these costs, which can be classied as direct or indirect.
Direct and indirect losses
Life safety, that of the public and of our response team members, is always the primary
concern. The cost of loss can be high for individuals, as well as organizations. Direct costs
are usually easy to identify. The loss of a piece of equipment will cost a certain number
of dollars to replace. An apparatus involved in an incident will cost “X” dollars to repair.
Indirect costs associated with these losses, such as the impact of not having that piece of
equipment available when it is needed, might be dicult to determine. There are many
types of indirect costs that should be recognized.
For example, an injury to a reghter often costs much more than the direct costs associated
with treating the injury. Direct costs would involve doctors’ bills and hospital expenses.
Worker’s compensation insurance might pay for that reghter’s lost time and medical
treatment, but higher claims could cause the costs of insurance to increase. The injured
reghter’s position might have to be lled using overtime. If the reghter is permanently
disabled, the department might have to recruit and train a replacement. The reghter’s
experience and knowledge might never be replaced. The department might also have
to pay for a doctor’s evaluation of the reghter’s medical condition and for a lawyer to
process a disability pension.
16
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Organizational risk management system
The re department risk management program is a system of functions, components and
activities designed to reduce the level of risk throughout the organization. All department
members are responsible for managing various components of that system.
NFPA 1500 mandates planning to manage organizational risk. Section 4.3.1 states the following:
The re department shall adopt an ocial written departmental occupational
safety and health policy that identies specic goals and objectives for the
prevention and elimination of accidents and occupational injuries, exposures
of communicable disease, illnesses and fatalities.
NFPA 1500’s intent is to provide the framework for a safety and health program for a re
department or any other organization that provides similar services.
There is no single method or solution to manage risk. Numerous publications provide a wide
range of suggested methodologies for managing risk. Determining how to manage risk is a
decision each department must make individually. The process must be frequently reviewed
and, where necessary, upgraded. Most importantly, once a risk management process is
instituted, it must be properly managed, continuously evaluated, and updated at least annually.
The role of a risk manager
In “Emergency Incident Risk Management: A Safety & Health Perspective,” Murrey E. Loin
and Jonathan D. Kipp oer this prole of the risk manager:
This individual will typically have oversight over the risk management
programs of several departments, emergency services among them. However,
many of the functions can be centralized, which will relieve the department’s
administrator from some of the risk management tasks. Most frequently, the
risk manager will handle relations with outside agencies such as insurance
companies and/or agents, and can be responsible for handling the insurance
needs of various departments. In addition, this individual is familiar with
the overall risk management process, and can serve as a valuable resource
for guidance and information.
Goals and objectives: The foundation of the system
A risk management system is a dynamic process. To be eective, its objectives should
begin with establishing goals, followed by establishing objectives to meet those goals. As
in any system, the goals and objectives should be as follows:
ĵ Specic.
ĵ Measurable.
ĵ Attainable.
ĵ Realistic.
ĵ Time-based.
Those who are expected to see that the goals are met should be involved in the process.
Risk management should be looked upon as a continuous, on-going, standard process
for an emergency service organization. There will always be risks, and there will always
be room for improvement.
17
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
One of the re department’s goals should be to minimize injuries. For example, the objective
might be established as “reduce on-the-job injuries by 25 percent for FY17.”
To meet an objective, the department should establish specic plans or actions that
support its achievement. One action might be that all department members participate
in a training program designed to increase member awareness of the causes of injuries.
Another might be to ensure adequate lighting is provided at incident scenes so members
can identify and avoid safety hazards.
The steps in the process
Any system for managing risk must provide for three fundamental steps:
1. Identication of risk.
2.
Evaluation of the probability and the potential magnitude of losses related to those risks.
3. Establishment of appropriate control measures.
Agencies, organizations and individuals have developed several dierent models that can
be used as a foundation for a re department risk management program. Most of the
models use ve to 10 steps. The model presented in this report uses ve steps.
The essential steps of all of the models include the identication of risks and the evaluation
of the potential harm that can result. That is followed by the identication, selection and
implementation of control measures. The number of steps depends on how these individual
core steps are broken down.
No matter how many control measures are applied, it must be recognized that losses will most
likely occur and that control mechanisms for funding those losses must also be provided.
The ve principal risk management steps
The ve principle risk management steps that will be addressed in this section provide
a solid foundation for developing a risk management program. The steps are as follows:
1. Identifying risk exposure.
2. Evaluating risk potential.
3. Ranking and prioritizing risks.
4. Determining and implementing control actions.
5. Evaluating and revising actions and techniques.
Step 1: Identifying risk exposure
This is the foundation of an integrated process for managing risks. Its purpose is to identify
the kinds of things that create risks to the re department. A re department’s exposure
to risk stretches beyond emergency response and training activities. Potential risks in
all activities can be grouped in several dierent ways. General areas of risk to consider:
ĵ People: deaths, illnesses and injuries, health exposures.
ĵ
Apparatus and vehicles: accidents, malicious acts, damage due to mechanical failure,
operator error.
ĵ
Occupancies/Facilities: natural disasters, res, malicious acts, failure to open apparatus
bay doors before driving out.
ĵ
Equipment: theft, damage from use, damage from misuse, failure to close doors
before leaving.
18
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Look to your own department. Use incident, injury, accident and other internal reports to
identify local experience and trends.
Potential risks should also be identied through reading articles and reports and through
analyzing data from other sources of information. Neighboring departments that are
“similar” might have experienced losses that can alert you to specic potential losses.
Comparing data with other organizations or national averages could also identify problems
that might not have been recognized within the organization. A re department that
records one injury per re might consider that rate routine until it nds that surrounding
re departments have less than one injury for every ve res. Numerous professional and
trade organizations can provide relevant risk identication information.
Step 2: Evaluating risk potential
The evaluation of risk potential involves determining or estimating the likelihood that an
event will occur and the consequences that will result if it does. Probability is generally
established by studying the frequency at which incidents have occurred in the past.
However, an undesirable event might not have a local history. The fact that something
has not happened to one particular re department in the past does not ensure that it
will not happen in the future. Similarly, the magnitude of a loss might be predictable from
past experiences, but it is important to remember that incidents with the most severe
consequences are usually the rarest.
Note: If incidents with severe consequences occurred more often, we would be compelled
to prevent them. This is a simple illustration of the principles of risk management.
The evaluation step should provide information to answer the following questions:
ĵ What is our local experience?
ĵ What do we know about national experience?
ĵ What are the probabilities of dierent things happening?
ĵ What are the probable consequences if they do occur?
In evaluating risk potential, both the likelihood and loss potential need to be addressed
simultaneously.
In the book previously mentioned, “Emergency Incident Risk Management: A Safety &
Health Perspective,” Kipp and Loin refer to using “frequency” and “severity” as measures
to evaluate risk potential. The text provides a methodology and sample risk management
plan that serve as eective tools for integrating frequency and severity factors into a
document with which to put a department’s risks into priority.
Frequency is an estimate of how often a loss has occurred — or is likely to occur — as
a result of any of the risks determined during the identication step. Severity, which
constitutes the second half of the evaluation phase, estimates the potential losses to the
organization posed by the identied risk.
19
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Step 3: Ranking and prioritizing risks
After considering the probabilities of occurrence and the probable outcomes, the next step
is to prioritize the risks and decide on the areas that need to be addressed as priorities (see
Figure 2.1). Generally, risks with the most severe potential outcomes are considered ahead
of risks with relatively minor outcomes. Those that are more likely to occur are prioritized
ahead of those that are less likely to occur. Doing that requires a considerable amount of
judgment and a thorough analysis of the practicality of addressing certain types of risks.
Figure 2.1 — Establishing priorities for risk management actions.
High Severity
High Frequency
High Severity
Low Frequency
Low Severity
High Frequency
Low Severity
Low Frequency
Most organizations will be able to identify a fairly long list of risks that deserve attention
that should be able to address several of them simultaneously or in fairly rapid succession,
including some that are relatively easy and inexpensive and some that might require a
major eort over a lengthy period of time. The compilation of a prioritized list of areas
needing attention is an important step in managing risk.
For example, applying a band of reective tape to the front, rear and sides of all emergency
vehicles to increase their visibility can be accomplished quickly and inexpensively. On the
other hand, providing thermal imaging camera for all front-line apparatus might take several
years and involve a considerable expense. Enforcing a policy that requires all reghters
to remain seated with their seat belts fastened while vehicles are in motion should not
involve any expense or take more than a few hours to implement.
Step 4: Determining and implementing control actions
Several factors must be considered in determining control actions. Those factors are often
interrelated. They will frequently make it dicult to act on one without having an impact
on another. Before implementing control measures, the cost and associated benets will
have to be considered. The benets will frequently deal with improved safety and health to
personnel, but if they cost real dollars, someone will have to justify the cost. In determining
which control actions to implement, the following factors should be considered.
20
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Predicted eect
What savings will likely result? This factor will require the risk manager to estimate the
predicted eect of control actions that would be implemented. When considered in
conjunction with the cost to implement the control, it will determine the cost/benet factor.
Time required
How long will it take to implement the control measures? Can the resources needed to
control the risk be used more eciently and eectively during that time? Will other eorts
be adversely aected?
Time to results
This is not the same as time required. Long term results are a very dicult “sell” in today’s
environment. The community and those responsible for allocating its tax dollars might not
be patient. If the eort is critical to the department’s risk management goals, and results
will not be seen for an extended period of time, eective communication of the plan and
its benets to the community, its leaders, and its elected ocials, is essential.
Eort required
How much is required, and can that eort be more eectively applied to other programs?
Is there more than one solution? Will one solution require less eort than others? If you’re
looking for more ecient ways to address a risk, involve the people it aects the most.
Associated costs
How much will it cost — directly and indirectly? How do you arrive at and document those
costs? Cost alone will often determine if a proposed control measure is implemented or
ignored. It will always aect where that measure appears on a priority list. Although it
is a component of the cost/benet factor, it will also be viewed separately. As discussed
earlier, all factors need to be considered collectively. The determination to implement
control measures directly related to the safety or health of workers must not be made
based solely on cost. The risk manager, however, must be able to properly establish, and
then communicate, both direct and indirect costs.
Insurance costs
Will initiating the control measure reduce the related insurance cost? Will implementing
it increase that cost? If so, is the cost reduction or cost increase worth instituting or not
instituting the measure? Costs for almost all insurance programs are determined by viewing
loss experiences generically and also on a customer specic basis. Costs are established
by estimating anticipated losses. Departments with high accident or injury rates will pay
more. Those with less will pay less.
Funding
Risk management requires a balance of other risk control and risk nancing measures.
The measures or methods used should support each other. They are essential to any risk
management strategy. Eective risk control eorts will limit the costs of risk nancing
while nancing will limit address costs when control measures fail. There are two principal
types of risk nancing: risk retention and risk transfer.
21
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Risk retention relies on internal funds. Risk transfer, on the other hand, looks outside the
organization for money needed to pay for losses. Risk retention techniques:
ĵ Budgeting to pay for relatively inexpensive or small losses, such as minor damage to
apparatus, equipment or facilities.
ĵ Establishing a reserve fund to address irregular losses.
ĵ
Borrowing funds to pay for unexpected losses. In this case, the borrower has an
obligation to pay a specic amount for a given loss. The risk is therefore retained and
not transferred.
Risk transfer techniques:
ĵ
Purchasing commercial insurance and contractually transferring the risk to another entity.
ĵ
Insurance that transfers the nancial burden for future risks to the insurer in exchange
for a fee.
ĵ
Contractual transfers that involve another entity assuming responsibility for the
nancial burden of a loss. This option is frequently referred to as an indemnity clause.
Cost/Benet analysis
Ranking and prioritizing risks is an integrated process that requires the frequency and
severity of a risk be quantied and ranked in some way. Each of the ranked risks should
then be prioritized by evaluating a series of risk factors. The risk manager will seldom have
all the data required to make a quantitative assessment and will have to rely on knowledge,
experience and judgment to make required assumptions.
The risk manager will need to consider all the factors above in developing a cost/benet
analysis. Although the benets will frequently deal with improved safety and health of
personnel, if they cost real dollars, someone will have to prepare a “balance sheet” (cost/
benet analysis). The sheet will require real and valid numbers. Someone will have to justify
the numbers and prove the benets are worth the investment. Figure 2.2 presents a sample
“balance sheet” for conducting a cost/benet analysis. Many of the publications referenced
in the appendix also provide recommendations or models for conducting a cost/benet
analysis. Figure 2.2 is intended to be a tool, and like any other tool, can be modied. Use a
tool that meets your needs. No matter how you conduct a cost/benet analysis, the value
of your ndings will depend upon the quality of your data and your assumptions.
22
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 2.2 — Example of a cost/benet analysis balance sheet.
ESTIMATED SAVINGS AFTER CONTROL COSTS:
ĵ Total estimated savings: $7,160
ĵ Total cost of control: $325
I. CURRENT STATE: (Briey describe assumptions and provide facts.)
Example: There were 25 hand injuries that resulted from packing hose during the
previous year.
Direct costs: (Describe assumptions or provide costs.)
1. Hospital/Medical costs: 25 x $250 = $6,250
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS: $6,250
Indirect costs: (Describe assumptions or provide costs.)
1. Additional stang to ll positions: 15 shifts x 180 per shift = $2,700
TOTAL INDIRECT COST: $2,700
TOTAL CURRENT STATE COSTS: $8,950
II. FUTURE STATE: (Describe assumptions or provide facts.)
Example: Revised procedure and training will prevent 80 percent of all identied
injuries.
Direct costs: (Describe assumptions.)
1. Hospital/Medical costs: 5 x $250 = $1,250
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS $1,250
Indirect costs: (Describe assumptions.)
1. Additional stang to ll positions: 3 x $180 = $540
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS: $540
TOTAL FUTURE STATE COSTS: $1,790
III. TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS PRIOR TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES:
Total cost current state = $8,950
Total cost future state = $1,790
TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS PRIOR TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES
IV. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTROL MEASURE: (Briey describe.)
Example: Revised operational procedure and shift training will reduce injuries by
80 percent.
Direct costs: (List the direct costs associated with the proposed control measure.)
1. Cost of video = $325
TOTAL DIRECT COSTS: $325
Indirect costs: (List the direct costs associated with the proposed control measure.)
1. Training - shift requirement - no cost.
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS: $0
TOTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTROL MEASURE: $325
V. TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS AFTER CONTROL COSTS: $6,835
23
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Options and categories of control measures
The means by which potential risks are addressed are referred to as risk control options.
Methods that are used to address the risks are categorized into three risk control categories.
The specic steps that are taken to control the risks are referred to as risk control measures.
In almost all cases, the options, categories and specic methods selected are intended to
limit the risk potential. There are three risk control options:
1. Risk avoidance.
2. Risk reduction.
3. Risk transfer.
Total risk avoidance is a sure route to reducing risks. It is usually the safest solution, but
often the least realistic. Many times, it is no option at all. We can’t stop going to res, and
all res present some risks. If an action, activity or condition pose a risk to the operation,
consider whether or not it can be avoided or eliminated entirely. Although we are required
to respond to a structural re, we can choose not to enter the structure.
Risk can often be reduced by planning, training, testing, maintenance of standards, and
enforcement of codes. The fundamental purpose of standard operating procedures
(SOPs), planning and training is to reduce the risk to personnel. Proper selection, design
and maintenance of facilities and vehicles is intended to reduce various forms of risk.
It may be feasible to transfer our risks to other parties by purchasing insurance or contracting
out to other organizations to perform certain activities. Good risk management practices
should reduce insurance costs. In addition to assuming a portion of the risk, many insurance
companies provide valuable assistance in identifying and reducing risks. By doing so, they
intend to reduce a department’s losses and the probability of claims.
Risk control categories
When it is not possible to eliminate risks, they should be limited or minimized. For example,
although we can’t eliminate the need for reghters to respond to emergencies, we can
minimize the risk they face while responding to and operating at an incident. Risks may
be systematically eliminated or minimized by implementing control measures. Control
measures t into three general areas which we call risk control categories. The general
categories of control are as follows:
ĵ Administrative.
ĵ Engineering.
ĵ Personal protection.
Administrative controls, such as SOPs, and engineering controls, such as apparatus
specications, are directed toward making the workplace safe for the reghter. In contrast,
personal protection controls, such as SCBA are focused on making the reghter safe for
the workplace. When establishing a risk control program, re departments should use
administrative and engineering controls to limit exposure to risk before relying on personal
protection control measures.
24
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Administrative controls provide the foundation for a department’s risk control program.
They include the following:
ĵ Emergency vehicle operation procedures and regulations.
ĵ Training requirements.
ĵ Enforcement of re codes.
ĵ Preincident planning to identify hazards accountability systems.
Consistent application and enforcement of administrative controls constitute an essential
administrative control. If you have a policy and don’t enforce it, or if you have a required
procedure and don’t require it, in reality you have neither a policy nor a procedure.
Engineering controls are intended to remove specic hazards from the workplace. Fire
departments use engineering controls to improve safety and health in re stations and
on apparatus by designing improved components or entire systems. Improving ventilation
at a re station to remove diesel exhaust, relocating the siren on an apparatus to reduce
noise in the cab, providing foam for ammable liquid res, and providing lighting for night
operations are all examples of engineering controls.
Personal protection controls do not remove hazards from the workplace. They are designed
to provide an element of personal safety. Personal protective clothing, SCBA, personal alert
safety system (PASS) devices, and life safety ropes are examples of personal protection
controls. When operating at emergency incidents, reghters are required to rely heavily
on personal protection controls.
Step 5: Evaluating and revising actions and techniques
Risk management should be a continual process with established mechanisms to monitor
performance and evaluate progress. Risk management eorts should yield positive results
in terms of better outcomes. The change may be sudden and obvious, or it may take a
long time to yield measurable results.
The evaluation stage should parallel the steps that were taken to identify risks and seek
conrmation that the process is working. It should focus on the areas that were identied
as requiring attention and provide follow-up to determine if they actually result in the
desired change in outcomes. In many cases, this will include an improved focus on the
problem areas, since a risk management action plan can include a component to more
closely monitor the specic area of concern.
For example, if hand injuries were identied as a problem and new gloves were issued as
the solution, the frequency and severity of hand injuries should be monitored to conrm
that the desired impact is being achieved. Doing that might include a more detailed process
for categorizing hand injuries and considering the eectiveness of the new gloves.
All actions should be evaluated routinely to ensure that they are achieving the desired
outcomes and are not creating other unanticipated problems. Risk management is a
process of balancing dierent factors. The balance can often be inuenced by any number
of changing circumstances.
Risk management is a system, not a solution
Kipp and Loin dene the risk management process as “a system for treating pure risk;
identication analysis of exposures, selection of appropriate risk management techniques
to handle exposures, implementation of chosen techniques and monitoring of results.”
The risk management process is intended to minimize losses. It is a dynamic system and
25
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
not a xed solution. Most losses are avoidable costs, and no department can aord to pay
for avoidable costs. The results of administrative, engineering and personal protection
control systems will determine the success of your risk management program.
Legal responsibility
The risk that an individual or organization could be held legally responsible for an undesirable
outcome is one important consideration in risk management. Organizations are generally
considered to be legally responsible for any harm that results from their acts or omissions,
and they are expected to conduct their activities in a responsible manner that does not
expose individuals or the community to an unreasonable level of risk. This basic principle
could apply to a wide variety of injuries:
ĵ Physical injury or fatality.
ĵ Damage to public or private property.
ĵ Damage to the environment.
ĵ Negative economic impacts on an individual or corporation.
ĵ Damage to an individual’s reputation.
Statutory immunity
Because of the nature of the mission, many re departments have limited statutory immunity
under state laws. Statutory immunity protects them from being held responsible for failure to
provide adequate protection to save lives or property from res, assuming the re department
did not cause the re and did not take any unreasonable actions that resulted in a greater loss.
Most legal decisions have found that the duty of a re department is to protect the
community at large from res, which does not include a specic duty to protect individual
citizens or their property. This gives the re chief or the IC a large measure of authority to
make decisions concerning whether it is reasonable or unreasonable to attempt to save
property, based on the risks to reghters that would be involved in attempting to save it.
This type of statutory immunity is usually limited to the delivery of specic governmental
services and may not apply to incident types other than res. Depending on the state and
location, contracted companies and independent volunteer organizations might not have
the same statutory immunity. The rules are dierent in dierent states and for dierent
services, particularly for EMS that have a direct service delivery relationship with their patients.
Responsibility to provide a safe and healthy workplace
The re department, like other public or private organizations, also has legal responsibilities
to manage the level of risk to which its members and employees are exposed in the
performance of their activities. These duties are dened by occupational safety and health
laws and regulations as an employer’s responsibility to provide a reasonably safe and
healthy work environment for employees.
Virtually every human activity involves some degree of risk, and every occupation involves
at least some potential for injury, illness or even death. In most work relationships, the
employer is considered to have almost unlimited responsibility to manage the level of risk.
There are few occupations today where the willingness to accept a high risk of injury or
death is considered to be an important qualication.
26
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Because they cannot be held responsible for hazards that might be present where their
work must be performed, re departments and other emergency response agencies have
a dierent relationship with occupational risk than any other type of organization. The
nature of the work requires emergency responders to accept situations as they are found
and to deal with whatever unplanned and uncontrolled event might ensue.
Although the risks involved in a specic situation might be beyond the ability of the
responding agency to predict or control, the nature of the risks is usually predictable. Many
risks are avoidable. Under those circumstances, re departments must be prepared to
work as safely as is reasonably possible.
The following are some key factors about the re department’s work environment that
must be considered:
ĵ A re department has limited control over the emergency location until it is called to
respond to an emergency.
ĵ
The work environment is not designed with the expectation that the re department
might have to respond to work.
ĵ
The nature of the work is dealing with situations that are too dangerous for anyone
else to handle.
ĵ
The urgency of the situation usually does not allow a re department to know the
current hazards that are present before they take action.
It is important to note that these factors apply only to the emergency response environment.
The re department has the same responsibility as any other organization for the safety of
its members when they are working at a facility that is under the control of the department.
Acceptance of risk
Emergency responders knowingly accept the increased risk of accidents, injuries and
potential death that is inherent in their work. They willingly operate in an elevated risk
environment. In most states, legal precedents protect a property owner against negligence
suits brought by reghters for injury or death resulting from an incident on their property.
What is the rationale behind such precedents? It is assumed that the reghter was aware
of the risks involved in the activity and knowingly/willingly accepted them.
That principle has been challenged in cases in which the evidence indicates the occupant or
property owner was doing something that posed an unreasonable risk to the responders.
The property owner’s protection might be compromised if hazards have been knowingly
concealed or if the owner has failed to correct re code violations.
The requirement in NFPA 1500 to incorporate risk management in the process of conducting
emergency operations can be interpreted as increasing the duty of re ocers to be responsible
for the health and safety of the personnel they command and supervise. That responsibility
is dierent in some respects from the duty to provide protection to the community.
An Incident Commander must have responsibility with authority
Because the primary responsibility of a re department is to protect the community from
res, state and local laws usually provide a re chief virtually unlimited power to control
and determine the fate of private property that is burning or threatened by re. An IC can
make a determination to let a building burn due to the excessive risk to reghters and
if the structure’s integrity is compromised. In an extreme situation, the decision could
27
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
be to discontinue rescue operations because the possibility of a successful rescue does
not justify the risk to rescuers. The laws provide for such discretionary power because it
would be virtually impossible to conduct emergency operations under the threat of being
legally challenged over every discretionary decision.
A re chief must have the authority to make discretionary decisions for the overall good
and public safety of the community. In the absence of gross negligence, the law provides
protection for re departments and ICs.
Protection from liability
It is within the legal rights of virtually anyone to le a suit against any individual or
organization for anything bad that happens to them. There are no guarantees that a re
department or re chief will not be sued. The immunity principles make it easier to defend
against such suits and often to have them dismissed as groundless. Still, it should not
come as a surprise to any public ocial to become a defendant in legal action. NFPA 1500
establishes a set of risk management principles that could be cited to justify a decision
not to expose reghters to excessive risks.
Occupational safety and health regulations
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) enforces federal standards that apply to private sector workers and employees of
the federal government. The primary regulations that apply to re departments are OSHA’s
1910.120 (Hazardous Materials); 1910.134 (Respiratory Protection); 1910.154, 155 and 156
(Fire Brigades); 1910.1030 (Bloodborne Pathogens); and 1910.1200 (Hazard Communication).
Hazardous materials regulations are also enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency
where OSHA does not have jurisdiction. In addition, every state has a regulatory structure
to provide for the safety and health of workers.
OSHA regulations establish a minimum standard. Individual “OSHA Plan states” may adopt
equivalent or more stringent regulations. Those states also determine if they will enforce
regulations for volunteer re departments and other emergency response organizations,
or if they will only apply them to paid workers. Increasingly, the trend is to enforce the
same regulations on volunteer organizations and fully-paid departments.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Plan states
Twenty-two states and territories (known as “OSHA Plan states”) have agreements with
the DOL to enforce federal standards through state agencies. Even though the DOL does
not have jurisdiction over state and local government agencies, designated state agencies
in the OSHA Plan states are required to enforce federal regulations on public agencies.
Non-Occupational Safety Health Administration Plan states
OSHA itself enforces federal regulations in the remaining states. States that do not have
agreements to enforce the federal regulations generally adopt their own regulations
and determine how to apply them. For example, in some states, the regulation of re
departments is assigned — not to an occupational safety and health agency — but to the
state re marshal or a state agency responsible for re protection regulations.
Policies and enforcement programs dier signicantly from state to state, so it is important
that each re department and emergency response agency become familiar with specic
regulations that apply and become familiar with the state agency that has the authority
to enforce them.
28
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
A regulatory framework
OSHA regulations and other federal and state regulations that apply to worker health and
safety do not specically address operational risk management. However, they do establish
a regulatory framework that is intended to establish a safe working environment. In most
cases, the regulatory language does not address the issue of an inherently dangerous
occupation, but does hold an employer responsible for recognizing hazards and taking
appropriate action to eliminate or minimize the risk of harm to the employees.
Consensus standards
Where there is no specic regulation, most regulatory agencies have the ability to refer
to a consensus standard that addresses a specic issue. An agency may also refer to an
established consensus standard that establishes a reasonable standard of care if it is
more specically applicable to a subject or situation than the regulation that is in force.
In this manner, NFPA 1500 establishes a basic foundation for a risk management approach
to emergency operations. A re department that adopted and conscientiously followed the
requirements of NFPA 1500 would be in a very good position to show that it is approaching
risk management proactively and responsibly. The same basic concept applies to all of the
provisions of NFPA 1500. A re department that adopts and follows the requirements of
NFPA 1500 will meet or exceed the requirements enforced by most regulatory agencies.
It is very dicult to determine if a re department has an eective approach to operational
risk management without examining its application to specic situations. A regulatory agency
might examine a department’s SOPs and training programs to see what is documented, but
it is dicult to judge from the written procedures if a risk management approach is routinely
applied and if its application is reasonable. Actions taken at a particular incident might be
reviewed by a regulatory agency to determine if appropriate procedures were followed.
Examples:
ĵ
An aerial ladder collapses at a re, causing serious injury to a reghter. Was the ladder
tested by a qualied individual or company within the previous year? Was it regularly
inspected for defects? Was the operator properly trained?
ĵ
A reghter becomes lost in a burning building, runs out of air, and dies. Were their
SCBA properly maintained and tested? Was the air quality checked? Was the PASS
device working? Did they use a buddy system? Was accountability used? Was there
an appropriate incident command system in place?
ĵ
A re in a chemical facility results in a major ecological incident when water runo
carries contaminants into a protected wildlife refuge. Did the re department take
appropriate action to control or prevent the runo? Did the eort to control and
extinguish the re create a greater problem than letting it burn? Is the re department
or the owner of the facility responsible?
In such cases, it is likely that the risk management approach dened in NFPA 1500 would
be used as a yardstick to determine if appropriate judgment was used. There have been
relatively few cases in which a re department has been ned or formal warnings have
been issued for failure to comply with occupational safety and health regulations at
particular incidents — although substantial nes have been assessed in some of those cases.
Enforcement actions against re departments are generally initiated by state occupational
safety and health authorities, which have jurisdiction over local government agencies.
29
Chapter 2: Organizational Risk Management
Documentation is essential
Because operational risk management requires a large measure of subjective judgment,
its performance can be most easily evaluated after an incident occurs. Risk management
practices are most likely to be reviewed in two sets of circumstances:
1.
If a regulatory investigation is prompted by an accident that has resulted in a death
or injury.
2. If a complaint is led by a member of the department.
A re department should be able to demonstrate that its individual ocers and members:
ĵ Are competent and well-trained in the duties they are expected to perform.
ĵ Are familiar with the regulations and current standards that apply to those duties.
ĵ
Follow established SOPs and standard operating guidelines (SOGs) that are consistent
with the regulations and standards.
The department should also be able to show that it applies a consistent approach to risk
management to every incident.
Specic areas of concern for the emergency service risk manager
The responsibility for managing risk in an organization that exists to provide emergency
public safety services is extremely challenging. On one side of the equation, it can be
easy to categorize many risks as inherent, and to let the objective of saving lives and
property dominate the mission. On the other side of the equation, an approach that is
too conservative could render the service ineective.
In some situations, poor risk management judgment can create even greater risks. For
example, a re department that arrives too late at an incident will be unsuccessful at
saving lives or limiting property losses, but a re department that drives too fast in order
to arrive quickly may cause as many deaths as it prevents. The only reasonable approach
is to embrace a professional, responsible and systematic approach to managing risk and
to apply it unwaveringly to every aspect and activity of the organization.
Balancing risks at the scene of an incident
Balancing risk factors is most critical at the scene of an emergency incident where situational
judgment must be exercised at an incident by individuals that are at dierent levels within
the organization — from the IC down to the Company Ocer (CO) and the individual
reghter who must decide what to do in the face of a critical situation.
Why risk has to be managed even during nonemergency times
Many risk factors can be managed in nonemergency times to regulate the level of risk
in operational situations. For example, a ladder that is too expensive to test or repair
becomes a major liability if it collapses when it is being used at a re. SCBA that has not
been thoroughly inspected, tested and calibrated for over a year might be “good enough”
today, but it might not be good enough tomorrow, if a medical examiner determines an
inadequately maintained breathing apparatus caused a reghter’s death.
30
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Poorly trained reghters might be able to survive dozens of easy situations, yet be
unprepared for the rst life-threatening emergency they face. An SOP that is routinely
ignored because it is inconvenient for the majority of situations could also be ignored in a
situation in which it is critically important. Knowing a building has a wood truss roof might
not seem important unless the attic is on re.
Summary
ĵ
Most individuals responsible for risk management in emergency response organizations
are not professional risk managers.
ĵ
Just because something has not happened to one particular re department in the
past does not ensure that it will not happen in the future. The magnitude of a loss
could be predictable from past experiences, but by the same token, incidents with the
most severe consequences are usually the rarest.
ĵ
Many departments are, to a certain degree, eectively dealing with risk without formal
risk management programs. For example, most departments require reghters to be
trained to a certain level and to wear full protective clothing when responding to a re.
Equipment is inspected and maintained on a scheduled basis, and various certications
are required for specied responsibilities. The risk management process incorporates and
expands those practices and provides a systematic approach to safety and loss control.
The risk management process is intended to provide a comprehensive and detailed
system for examining practical and cost eective ways of addressing potential losses.
31
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Chapter 3: Operational Risk
Management
The purpose of this chapter is to provide practical information on how to meet applicable
national reghter health and safety standards, such as NFPA 1500, especially as it relates
to risk management planning during emergency operations. The objectives of this chapter
include the following:
ĵ Explain the application of risk management to emergency operations.
ĵ
Provide guidance on appropriate practices and judgmental factors that must be
considered in conducting emergency incidents.
ĵ Recommend ways to develop and improve operational risk management skills.
This chapter also addresses the following portions of the NFFF’s 16 FLSIs:
ĵ
Initiative 2: Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and
safety throughout the re service.
ĵ
Initiative 3: Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident
management at all levels, including strategic, tactical and planning responsibilities.
ĵ
Initiative 5: Develop and implement national standards for training, qualications
and certication (including regular recertication) that are equally applicable to all
reghters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
ĵ Initiative 9: Thoroughly investigate all reghter fatalities, injuries and near-misses.
Risk management and emergency response
Operational risk management refers primarily to the risk of injury or death to emergency
responders that could result from the performance of their duties. In a broader sense,
it applies to other types of accidents and undesirable events that could occur during
emergency operations.
Emergency responders knowingly subject themselves to elevated levels of risk in the
performance of their duties (see Figure 3.1). Some of those risks are unpredictable and
unavoidable. On the other hand, many are well-known and can be eectively limited or
avoided through the application of operational risk management practices.
32
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 3.1 — There is an element of risk associated with every emergency.
response.
Photo courtesy of Bob Esposito, Pennsburg, PA.
Acceptance of risk
The acceptance of risk by emergency responders is intimately related to the reasons
emergency organizations exist. Emergency responders perform essential functions too
dangerous for ordinary citizens who are neither properly trained nor adequately equipped,
or who might not be physically able to perform such functions. Emergency responders
place themselves between the public and a variety of dangers to protect the lives of others.
They accept the increased risk to their own lives that is often involved in protecting life
and property.
Risk is an inherent component of the work emergency responders perform. Their ability to
work in an elevated risk environment sets emergency responders apart from the general
population. In order to survive, emergency responders must eectively manage their
exposure to risk by recognizing danger, considering and weighing alternatives, and balancing
anticipated benets with potential consequences. In some cases, doing that leads to the
conclusion that a given situation simply does not justify the risk involved in taking action.
Risk management occurs at every level of an organization in an emergency operation. It must
begin at the top, where the IC must determine the appropriate strategy for the incident,
and extends down to COs who must evaluate conditions that dene the risk exposure for
small groups of workers before they initiate and as they perform their assigned functions.
It extends still further throughout the entire organization, top-middle-bottom, down to
the individual emergency responder who must use the same type of judgment to decide
on personal actions in many situations.
33
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Bravery in the face of risk
Firefighters’ reputations are frequently associated with courage and bravery. That
perception often suggests that reghters are willing to accept any risk to their personal
safety to perform their duties. Blind acceptance of risk used to be virtually unlimited
and unquestioned in the re service. It was not unusual for reghters to be exposed
to very high levels of risk, with very little concern for their personal safety. Fireghters
were expected to follow any order without question and to accept any risk to accomplish
the mission. The most respected reghters were often those with the most obvious
disregard for their own safety — those who demonstrated the attitude that the re must
be defeated “at any cost.”
Today, we are moving toward a dierent perception of the relationship between bravery and
risk. Without question, we still respect, value and honor bravery and courage, particularly
when a situation involves saving lives.
Even so, a contemporary sense of values requires a very dierent assessment of appropriate
and inappropriate risks. In many cases, that calls for limiting the exposure of personnel to
risks that they might be willing to accept for themselves. A re department’s denition of
acceptable risk might be more conservative than the level of risk an individual reghter
might willingly accept. In the current value system, higher level ocers are often more
responsible for limiting risk exposure than for demanding courage from their forces.
There are times when only a rescuer’s willingness to risk life and limb can save a life.
Bravery is still a respected and valued quality for emergency responders. Medals of valor
are given to individuals who are willing to risk their own lives to save a total stranger. The
general public admire the heroism of reghters and emergency responders, but no one
expects them to risk their lives where there are no lives to be saved.
Today’s risk versus protection
Today’s emergency responders have advanced clothing and equipment to protect them,
much more capable apparatus and equipment to work with, and much better training than
previous generations. Even so, they must also face some situations that are much more
complicated. Their ability to perform safely and eectively in high risk environments is highly
dependent on their ability to recognize the specic dangers that apply to each situation and
to work within the limitations of their protective clothing, protective equipment, training,
and incident management system (supervision, coordination and SOPs).
What is expected?
The citizens and visitors who depend on emergency service providers for protection have
varying perceptions and expectations about the delivery of those services. The general
public clearly recognize and value the courage and bravery of all emergency responders,
but they also recognize that there are reasonable limits as to what can be expected and
what is a reasonable level of risk. The expectation is that reghters will act rationally
and professionally, controlling threatening situations without exposing themselves to
unnecessary danger.
Emergency response organizations are expected to take every reasonable step to protect
their workers from accidents, injuries or disabling occupational diseases. The general
public expect emergency response organizations to provide their personnel with the
34
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
training, tools, equipment and support systems that are necessary to perform safely, as
well as eectively. The community is generally willing to pay for equipment emergency
responders need, particularly when they are needed to save lives, if those needs are clearly
presented. It is not acceptable to the public for re departments to risk the lives of their
members because they are not adequately trained or equipped or because they do not
apply appropriate judgment in conducting emergency operations.
The public recognizes that many aspects of emergency operations are dangerous and
unpredictable. No one expects reghters to risk their lives where there are no lives to be
saved. There is no logical reason for reghters to risk their lives ghting res in known
abandoned structures.
The risk balance for an unoccupied structure might require conducting aggressive oensive
re attack operations, but those operations always involve some degree of risk. Using
protective clothing, protective equipment, good training, tactics, supervision and other
factors reduce risk, but the risks cannot be eliminated. If a danger is recognized, it should
be avoided. The only acceptable risks in operations are those that are directed toward
saving lives or property, inherent dangers of an unanticipated event, and unknown hazards.
The fundamental principle of occupational safety and health
The fundamental principle of occupational safety and health laws is that an employer
(the re department or emergency service organization) is responsible for providing a
reasonably safe and healthy workplace for an employee. The application of this concept
to emergency operations essentially means an organization must do the following:
ĵ
Recognize, identify and evaluate the dangers inherent in performing emergency operations.
ĵ Take reasonable steps to protect employees from those dangers.
Determining what is reasonable in this context generally involves interpreting standards that
have been incorporated by reference into regulations, such as NFPA 1500. The expectation
today is that reghters must be properly trained, supervised and equipped to function
as safely as possible, recognizing the inherent risk factors that are involved in conducting
emergency operations.
Review of operations
Every IC should anticipate that the authority having jurisdiction for occupational safety
and health laws will thoroughly review any incidents in which injuries or fatalities occur,
using NFPA 1500 and other applicable standards as benchmarks, to consider if actions
taken were reasonable under the circumstances. A re department should expect that an
investigation would seek to determine if its members were provided with every appropriate
form of protection, including training and SOPs.
The best approach a re department can take is to regularly review and evaluate its own
operations. That way a department can ensure all the components to manage operational
risk are in place and that established procedures are consistently applied. The review will
address administrative, engineering and personal protection risk management control
methods. The review should determine if established policies, procedures, training and
equipment are appropriate, and if actions taken in conducting operations are reasonable.
35
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Managing risk in emergency incidents
Risk management is recognized as an inherent and important responsibility of emergency
response agencies on emergency scenes, but it is also recognized in the day-to-day
operations of the organization. Today, we expect the ocers who command and supervise
emergency operations to function as real-time risk managers, which involves making
critical decisions very quickly with limited information.
Risk management is a fundamental responsibility
Managing risk is a fundamental responsibility at every level of the incident management
process (see Figure 3.2). The specic recognition of risk management is relatively new,
but most of the basic principles have always been incorporated into the management of
emergency incidents. Fire ocers have always been called-upon to make decisions that
weigh the risks of a particular course of action against the potential benets. The major
change is the recognition of risk management at the emergency scene as a well-dened,
value-driven process — not just a matter of personal and situational judgment.
Figure 3.2 — Command personnel must manage numerous risks and personnel
at incidents.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
Develop an incident management plan and share it
An IC who establishes the overall strategic plan for an incident must identify and evaluate the
risks involved in each situation. They must make conscious decisions about the acceptable
level of exposure to those risks. Supervisors who direct and regulate the activities of their
subordinates at every level within the incident management structure must be guided by
the IC’s strategic plan, including the risk management considerations incorporated into the
36
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
strategic plan. All supervisors must also continually evaluate the particular risks present
within their assigned areas of responsibility.
Safe operation at any incident will require continuous identication, evaluation and control
of changing conditions. The responsibility to identify, evaluate and manage risks extends
to every individual operating at the incident.
National Fire Protection Association 1500
NFPA 1500 denes the basic principles of operational risk management. The standard
establishes specic expectations that the ocer in command of an emergency incident will
manage the level of risk to reghters as a fundamental incident management responsibility.
The risk management approach described in NFPA 1500 should be used as the basis for
a re department’s operational risk management policies. A policy statement, supported
by a system of SOPs or SOGs, should establish the specic manner in which all members
of a department, from the re chief on down to the newest member, expect to operate at
emergency incidents. The principles have been widely adopted as the standard operational
approach to risk management. The section that specically refers to operational risk
management was introduced in the 1992 edition of NFPA 1500.
Systematic approach required: All members must be involved
The individual in command of an incident is specically responsible for managing risk at
the incident; however, one person cannot be expected to apply these principles to an
incident if the organization has not integrated a standard approach to risk management
into its SOPs and its organizational culture. To be eective, risk management principles and
policies must be integrated into the entire operational approach of the re department
or emergency response organization. They must be incorporated within the duties and
responsibilities of every ocer, supervisor and member.
Risk assessment
The most important and dicult concept in the operational risk management process is the
actual determination of the types and levels of risk that are present in each situation and
the degree of risk that is acceptable for the personnel who are operating at that incident.
There is always some degree of risk involved in conducting emergency operations. The
IC has to determine the limits of risk that are acceptable for each situation and direct
operations to ensure that those limits are not exceeded. There are three simple guidelines
that dene acceptable levels of risk:
1.
Activities that present a signicant risk to the safety of members shall be limited to
situations in which there is a potential to save endangered lives.
2.
Activities routinely employed to protect property shall be recognized as inherent risks
to the safety of members, and actions shall be taken to reduce or avoid those risks.
3.
No risk to the safety of members shall be acceptable when there is no possibility to
save lives or property (see Figure 3.3).
37
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Figure 3.3 — No signicant risk to personnel should be taken when a building is
obviously going to be a total loss.
Photo courtesy of Chris Mickal, New Orleans (LA) Fire Department Photo Unit.
Those three statements place major responsibility on an IC to rst, identify and evaluate
the risks that are present in each situation, and then exercise good judgment to determine
when the level of risk is excessive. Without good judgment, risk management policies are
nothing more than words on paper.
Risk management drives the strategic plan
The strategic plan for a re denes where, when and how reghters will seek to control
that re. An IC’s most fundamental responsibility is to establish and implement a strategic
plan to conduct an emergency operation. The IC must always weigh the exposure to
danger against the anticipated results of a strategic plan. Risk management is one essential
consideration in developing a strategic plan.
An IC’s choice of operational mode, oensive or defensive, denes the “rules” that apply
to everyone involved in that incident. In oensive situations, reghters enter burning
structures and attempt to control a re where it is burning. They expose themselves to
all the risks present in that environment. In the defensive mode, reghters avoid many
of those risks by staying out of the most dangerous areas and conducting operations that
limit the spread of a re to an area that can be defended without exposing participants
to unnecessary risks.
Note: A parallel exists with every emergency operation in which ICs must decide if the
potential benets justify exposing personnel to the risks that are present.
38
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Initial risk assessment
The determination of acceptable risk and the choice of operational mode begin with the
rst arriving ocer, who must assume command of the incident and make an initial size-
up. Even if the decision applies to only the rst arriving company, basic risk management
policies must be applied to determine appropriate actions, including the initial choice
between oensive and defensive operations.
At a re incident, the rst arriving CO often has to decide if and when it is appropriate to
enter a burning structure to conduct oensive operations. The choice depends on risk
factors that are identied with respect to the size, location and stage of the re, as well
as the capabilities of the re suppression force.
Before an interior attack can be initiated, the ocer must be assured that reghters
and equipment available on the scene have the capability to conduct a safe and eective
interior operation. The initial risk assessment must consider the possibility of saving
lives, because the acceptable level of risk to save a life is higher than the acceptable risk
to protect property. It must also consider the re conditions and the risks they present to
reghters. If the rst unit does not deliver enough personnel to conduct a reasonably
safe interior attack operation, the interior attack might have to be delayed until additional
personnel arrive. If the situation is too dangerous for safe entry, the plan should be limited
to exterior operations.
Note: A similar determination must be made for many other types of emergency incidents.
For example, in a trench rescue situation, the decision would be related to whether or not
it is safe to have the rst-arriving personnel begin to dig to rescue a trapped victim. If the
risk to rescuers is excessive, a rescue attempt must wait until a specially trained trench
rescue team arrives with the appropriate equipment and shoring. The decision depends
on where and how the victim is trapped and the risk of further collapse that could turn the
rescuers into victims. Similarly, in a conned space rescue incident, the rst arriving ocer
must determine if personnel at the scene have the skills and equipment that are needed to
initiate a rescue operation. If not, the rescue must wait until a specialized team responds.
Risk factors known and assumed
It is often impossible to obtain and verify all the pertinent information before making
important strategic decisions. The decisions that guide initial actions must often be made
with a limited amount of information, making allowances for factors that are not known. A
rapid size-up seldom allows for a full evaluation of all the risk factors. An IC must consciously
dierentiate between factors that are “known” and those that are based on assumptions,
experience and standard approaches. The IC must then place a priority on either conrming
these assumptions or revising them as soon as factual information can be obtained.
Ongoing Incident Commander responsibilities
An IC is responsible for determining the operational mode, oensive or defensive, for the
entire duration of the incident. After making an initial strategic determination, an IC should
dene tactical objectives and assign resources to perform specic functions. He or she
must also begin to establish a command structure to eectively supervise the operation.
Whenever command of an incident is transferred, the responsibility for strategic risk
management is also transferred (see Figure 3.4).
39
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Figure 3.4 — Transfer of command should occur at the CP.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
Responsibilities at all levels
Ocers and supervisors assigned at each level of the incident management organization
must apply risk management policies within their areas of responsibility by following the
strategic plan and the associated “rules” established by the IC. Keeping the IC informed is
one of their major responsibilities. That is especially true if changing conditions indicate
the need to change the strategic plan.
The single most important reason to establish an eective incident management structure is
to ensure that operations are conducted safely. Every individual in the incident management
structure is responsible for monitoring and evaluating risks and for keeping the IC informed
of any factor that could be a reason to reconsider the risk management balance.
A risk assessment should be reprocessed with every observation and progress report.
Every bit of new information that comes to the IC should be considered to see if strategy
or tactics should be changed.
Roles and responsibilities
As indicated in Table 3.1, every individual in the emergency response system has a role
in operational risk management.
40
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Table 3.1 — Roles and responsibilities in operational risk management
Role Responsibilities
Incident Commander
Is expected to make strategic decisions based
on risk acceptance or avoidance. Decisions are
incorporated in the selection of oensive or defensive
operations— a major component of the strategic
plan for the incident.
Sector and Company Ocers
Are expected to supervise tactical operations based
on risk acceptance/avoidance in the situations they
encounter within the areas they supervise. Their
determinations must be consistent with the direction
provided by the Incident Commander. They must
keep the Incident Commander informed of any
situations they encounter that may have an impact
on the strategic plan.
Individual emergency responders
When no ocer is present, might be called on to
make personal decisions about risk acceptance/
avoidance, which must also be consistent with the
strategic plan and with departmental policies. They
also need to keep their ocers informed of any
signicant information.
Incident Safety Ocer
On-scene Risk Manager
Is the risk management consultant for emergency
operations The Incident Safety Ocer is an advisor
to the Incident Commander and should provide an
overview of the situation specically directed toward
identifying and evaluating safety concerns.
Gathering additional information
The initial strategic plan is always subject to revision as the amount of conrmed information
increases and the degree of uncertainty decreases. An IC must constantly seek out
information to replace assumptions or perceptions with veried facts. Ocers assigned
to supervise dierent areas or functions are expected to provide regular progress reports
to an IC. In addition, an IC must ask questions and actively seek information that is not
always provided without prompting.
An IC should not hesitate to assign individuals to reconnaissance missions to observe
conditions rsthand, or seek out information and report back to the Command Post (CP).
An IC should always have this capability, even if it requires calling for an additional CO or
Command Ocer to perform this important function. At major incidents, reconnaissance
can often be assigned to sta personnel who report to the CP, especially to individuals
known to be particularly capable at gathering and managing information.
The role of the Incident Safety Ocer
There should be a standard system for assigning an Incident Safety Ocer at working
incidents, preferably by dispatching someone (or more than one person) with this specic
responsibility (see Figure 3.5). Whenever possible, the Incident Safety Ocer should begin
41
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
by making a 360-degree survey of the incident scene to evaluate the
overall situation and look for the following:
ĵ Problems.
ĵ Hazards.
ĵ Inconsistent observations.
ĵ Any other factor that could indicate a safety concern.
After making an initial survey, the Incident Safety Ocer should report
to the CP to discuss his or her observations and safety concerns with
the IC.
Balancing perspectives
The Incident Safety Ocer does not relieve an IC of the responsibility
for managing risk at an incident. By the same token, an IC should be able
to rely on the Incident Safety Ocer to provide a balancing perspective
on the situation. An IC should look at a situation as, “How to get the
job done and operate safely.” The Incident Safety Ocer should look
at the situation as, “How to operate safely and still get the job done.”
In most cases, the two perspectives should lead an IC and the Incident
Safety Ocer to reach the same conclusions. If they do not, the IC must
recognize the possibility of a problem and rethink the risk analysis.
Application of risk management policies
An IC has to successfully balance two sets of factors:
1. Those that determine the nature and extent of operations.
2. Those that address the safe conduct of operations.
This section explores some of the complexities involved in trying to consistently apply risk
management policies to determine the nature and extent of operations.
The operational risk management guidelines dened earlier establish a simple framework
that should serve as the basis for operational risk management decisions. Many situations
are complicated. It is often dicult to interpret how a policy that is stated in general terms
relates to a specic situation. An IC is expected to:
ĵ Use judgment and experience.
ĵ Make reasonable decisions in the application of policy guidelines.
An IC has a wide span of discretionary authority for making risk management decisions.
A strategic plan must not needlessly place the lives of emergency responders in danger,
but it should not be so over-cautious that it allows a re to destroy property that could
be saved, or keeps other valuable functions from being performed. The ultimate test of
a risk management decision is whether or not a reasonable, well-informed person would
nd the decision appropriate under the circumstances.
Figure 3.5 — The safety ocer
must be able to visualize the
entire incident scene.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
42
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Experience and judgment
The circumstances responders actually encounter in emergency incidents are often very
complex. That fact can make it extremely dicult to apply the required policy guidelines
to each particular situation. The application of policy guidelines requires specic skills
at obtaining, considering and applying information. A combination of experience and
judgment are essential to perform the actual evaluation of the risk factors.
Unoccupied, vacant and abandoned buildings
As Table 3.2 shows, the distinguishing characteristics of unoccupied, vacant and abandoned
structures inuence an ICs’ decisions. Fires in vacant, unoccupied or abandoned buildings
are a problem to many re departments. The fundamental risk management guidelines
state that the lives of reghters should not be risked where there is no possibility of saving
lives or property. That would restrict entry into many vacant or abandoned structures to
conduct interior operations on the basis that there are no occupants and there is nothing
of value to be saved.
Table 3.2 — Distinguishing building characteristics
Describe a building
or structure as …
Implies
Unoccupied
That it has no contents and is suitable for occupancy; however,
no one is present at the time of the incident.
Vacant
That the interior space is not currently in use and presumably has
neither contents of value or occupants. However, the structure
itself might be considered valuable property.
Abandoned
That it has no value that justies the level of risk associated with
an interior, oensive operation, unless the possibility of transients
in the building exists.
The rst priority in a re suppression operation is rescue. Many re departments operate
with the assumption that there could be occupants in any building. As long as it is reasonably
safe to enter, they attempt to conduct a search of every occupancy. If the structure (or
part of it) is fully involved in ames, there is no reasonable possibility that anyone could
be alive to rescue and no reason to conduct an interior search.
Unoccupied and vacant structures could justify operations that involve a limited amount of
risk. It could also be appropriate to enter an abandoned building to conduct a rapid search
if there is reason to believe that it might be occupied by transients or other “unocial”
occupants. Some deciding factors to be weighed:
ĵ The extent of the re.
ĵ The structure’s condition.
ĵ Whether it is truly abandoned or simply vacant.
Judging the risks of abandoned structures
Fireghters arriving at a small re in an abandoned building might have to consider the risks
they could encounter in an interior attack versus the consequences of not attacking the
43
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
re. There might not be any justication to risk the lives of reghters to save a worthless
structure, but it could be possible to justify making entry to extinguish an incipient stage
re or a re that is contained within a small area. If the re can be safely controlled, an
interior attack might involve less risk than staying outside and letting the re grow.
This type of attack is justiable only when not attacking and controlling the small re would
expose reghters to a greater risk. If entry is made in this type of situation, it must be
very cautious and closely supervised.
Risk to the community
The risk evaluation might have to consider more than the structure that is on re. A re
that grows to fully involve a large abandoned building could create a signicant risk of re
spread to occupied exposures or to the surrounding area. The IC might have to weigh the
risks of an oensive attack against the risk of re spread to the exposures.
If the exposures can be protected without exposing the surrounding community to excessive
risk, the IC can evaluate the risks to reghters in relation to the building that is on re.
If the resulting re cannot be contained to the abandoned building, the risk evaluation
should also consider the potential consequences of a fully involved structure.
Unusual situational risks
There are many additional examples of situations in which good judgment is clearly required,
considering the health and safety of reghters in relation to the potential consequences of
dierent strategies. The potential consequences often have to be considered in determining
the level of risk that is acceptable.
Here are two examples:
1.
A building could be known to contain hazardous materials that would cause a massive
contamination problem if water runo carried them into a nearby river. That possibility
could make it unacceptable to ght a re, causing the re department to limit control
actions to protecting exposures.
2.
In another situation, should a re be allowed to burn, the release of toxic products
of combustion could result in the greatest risk. In some cases, the risk of exposing
reghters to hazardous materials could make it unacceptable to enter. In other cases,
entering and controlling the re before it reaches the hazardous materials could be
the best plan to protect the reghters and the community from a greater risk.
Unusual structural situations
Fireghters should never assume a situation is “routine.” They should always be looking out
for situations that present unusual risks. Well-developed sources of information can uncover
hundreds of factors that might draw immediate attention to the possibility of high risk.
When any of those factors are seen or reported, an IC should automatically do the following:
ĵ Reprocess risk management decisions already made.
ĵ Re-evaluate the strategy adopted for the incident.
44
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
In “Fire Command: The Essentials of Local IMS,” retired Fire Chief Alan Brunacini of the
Phoenix, Arizona, Fire Department points to three components that comprise incident
information management:
1. Visual reconnaissance.
2. Preincident planning.
3. Familiarity with the location or situation.
Examples of these include the following:
ĵ
Buildings with grade level entrances on dierent sides that lead to dierent interior
oor levels. That could cause confusion about the level where dierent crews are
operating above, below or on the same level as the re.
ĵ
Buildings that have been remodeled, where interior supports may have been removed
or replaced with inadequate construction.
ĵ
Buildings with extra roofs, floor coverings, or ceilings that conceal the original
construction. Such spaces make it impossible to evaluate the structural characteristics
and might allow a re to grow and extend.
ĵ
Buildings with engineered, lightweight structural systems, such as lightweight wood
trusses, that are susceptible to sudden and early collapse.
ĵ
Buildings with unexpected interior shafts or stairways that could allow a re to extend
to an upper level.
ĵ
Buildings with complicated interior arrangements and long travel distances to entry
and exit points.
ĵ
Interconnections between buildings that cannot be easily interpreted from the exterior
arrangement.
Evaluating information from dierent sources
While conducting operations, an IC should carefully evaluate information and reports
that come from sector ocers or other individuals, and should consider their consistency.
Communication starts with knowing how to listen carefully and critically. If information does
not appear to make sense, an IC should question and verify it. An IC should always take a
pessimistic view of conicting or uncertain information. It is alright to hope for the best, but
plans and actions should always anticipate the worst predictable outcome. Some examples:
ĵ
Reports from dierent sources that describe inconsistent re conditions. One observer
might report “re under control,” while another reports heavy smoke or re conditions.
The discrepancy suggests they are looking at dierent areas, or that one does not
know about re conditions that are evident to the other. Crews operating in the area
where the re appears to be under control might be in serious danger if they do not
know where the re actually is or if it is still burning.
ĵ
Evidence of a signicant interior re that cannot be located should sound a warning
to the IC. Crews working in a smoke-lled building might be unable to nd the re;
although, at the same time, the continuing or increasing presence of heavy smoke
suggests that a signicant re is burning somewhere inside the structure. The risk of a
sudden outbreak of re or a structural collapse increases with time spent on the scene.
45
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
An IC and other ocers should look for unusual colors or movement of smoke. Smoke
movement often provides good information about the size and extent of a re. A distinct
thermal column and rapid smoke movement would suggest the presence of a hot re,
possibly in a concealed space.
The time factor
One of the major challenges in operational risk management is the time factor. The most
critical decisions often have to be made very quickly and under great pressure. An IC must
be an ecient decision-maker, able to quickly do the following:
ĵ Recognize dangerous situations (see Figure 3.6).
ĵ Evaluate information.
ĵ Make decisions.
Figure 3.6 — Fire personnel must be constantly aware of potential changes to
re intensity and structural integrity.
Photo courtesy of Chris Mickal, New Orleans (LA) Fire Department Photo Unit.
Some emergency responders tend to be more inclined to take action than to stop and
compare the risks that could be involved in alternative approaches. Individuals who have
to make risk management decisions must be able to gather and process information
eciently and to think clearly and quickly in stressful situations. In some cases, they must
slow down action-oriented individuals to provide time to evaluate the situation.
Time tends to work against a decision-maker in high stress situations. The time that is
available to make decisions passes very quickly, while the time it takes for information to
be gathered and reported seems to take forever. It is easy to lose track of time in a stressful
situation. A system that reminds the IC when each 10 or 20-minute period has elapsed is
a valuable addition to an incident management system.
46
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
In many cases, particularly in res where the structure is deteriorating as long as the re
continues to burn, the risk factors will also change with time. If a re is not controlled,
interior crews must be withdrawn and regrouped in safe areas before a structural collapse
occurs. Waiting to see what happens may prove to be a fatal error.
Rules of thumb
These are some “time factor rules of thumb” for structural collapse:
ĵ
An ordinary construction building is susceptible to structural collapse after 20 minutes
of re involvement.
ĵ A lightweight wood truss structure may collapse within 10 minutes.
ĵ A re in a re-resistive building may withstand full involvement of a re area until all
of the available fuel is consumed.
Unacceptable risk
There are many situations that require an IC to exercise judgment to determine the
acceptable level of risk. There are other situations in which, under almost any conceivable
circumstances, the level of risk is clearly unacceptable. When an IC encounters such a
situation, he or she must be prepared to direct a course of action that avoids the danger.
Examples of these situations include the following:
ĵ Fighting res that could involve explosives.
ĵ
Conducting interior operations in a structure that exhibits signs of imminent structural
collapse. (Any individual who spots evidence of such a condition should immediately
see that the IC is made aware of it.)
A re department ocer should have a good knowledge of situations that are outside the
limits of acceptable risk exposure and should know how to quickly recognize and react to
them. Many risk-laden situations can be identied through inspection activities or preincident
planning visits. When situations are found that would create an unacceptable risk, they
should be documented in a manner that supports training and hazard awareness, as well as
in a way that provides critical information for an IC, should an incident occur at the location.
Focus
There are often many distractions at the scene of an incident that could keep an IC from
focusing on (and processing) important risk evaluation factors. That possibility reinforces
the importance of making risk assessment a standard part of the process of commanding
incidents. If an IC thinks about risk factors in every situation, risk evaluation will become
a priority among the distractions of a complex situation.
Thinking ahead of the incident will also help an IC make dicult decisions under the pressure
of time. Many situations and circumstances are predictable, whether it is an anticipated re
in a particular building or a predictable situation that could occur in a variety of locations
and circumstances. If potential situations can be predicted, and the risk factors can be
thoroughly evaluated in advance, when there are no time pressures, an IC only has to
recognize that situation when it occurs and has to implement the planned strategy. For
example, if an imminent risk of structural collapse is identied, the IC should be prepared
47
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
to immediately withdraw all companies from the interior or exposed positions, to conduct
a personal accountability of all personnel, and to regroup the operating companies for
defensive operations.
Conducting operations safely
The previous section dealt with determining the nature and extent of operations based on
reducing the potential for risk to emergency responders at a reasonable and acceptable
level in a wide variety of situations. In this section, we will give equal consideration to the
safe conduct of operations that limit risk to an acceptable level.
Avoiding operational risks must begin long before an incident occurs. For example, many
operational risks could be avoided if re prevention activities were eectively implemented.
When prevention fails, re departments respond and must face operational risks. To fully
avoid operational risk, a re department would have to take such a cautious approach that
it would accomplish very little in the sense of saving lives or property. In many cases, the
best way to minimize overall risk is to take decisive action, using all the force necessary to
eectively control a problem while it still can be managed.
Emergency operations must always be conducted as safely as possible. Even during potential
rescue situations, in which the maximum exposure to risk is permissible, standard safety
rules are not suspended. Whether the acceptable level of risk is high or low, the operation
must support safe operations with every available skill and technological resource.
Denition of acceptable risk
No on-duty reghter fatality or serious injury can truly be considered acceptable. However,
after taking every reasonable precaution, there is the possibility that a reghter could be
injured or killed. The threshold of acceptable risk is set higher when there is an expectation
of saving lives. No property is worth risking the life of a reghter.
Accepting inherent risks
The risks that are inherent in reghting and other types of emergency operations are
considered acceptable, yet they are signicant. After all, it is very possible to be seriously,
perhaps fatally, injured as the result of an inherent risk. Then why are inherent risks
generally considered acceptable? The risks are considered acceptable only because
reghters and emergency responders are trained, equipped, prepared, and organized
to conduct operations with a reasonable degree of safety in dangerous environments.
The preparedness makes the inherent risks acceptable.
Operational modes of reghting
Operational reghting strategies are based on two distinctly dierent modes of operation:
oensive and defensive. Oensive operations occur when reghters are in close contact
with a re, inside a building, and exposed to all the potential dangers that exist in that
environment. They are dependent on their protective clothing and equipment for protection.
When conducting defensive operations, reghters should be outside the area of direct
exposure. Still, many things could happen to injure reghters. For example, the IC must
ensure that all personnel stay outside an area identied as dangerous, including outside
the range of falling walls.
48
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Why Incident Commanders might change strategy
Often, the initial action occurs in the oensive mode because occupants are believed to be
inside and in need of rescue. Then conditions change. They reach a point at which there is
no further possibility that lives can be saved. All occupants may have been removed and
accounted for, or the re may have grown beyond a point where anyone could survive.
When that happens, the IC has to re-evaluate the original determination of acceptable
risk, now based on the possibility of saving property. The overall situation might no longer
support continued interior oensive operations. If the IC determines that the potential
benets no longer justify the risks, he or she must change the strategy from interior
oensive operations to exterior defensive operations.
When to change strategy
An IC must change the operational strategy whenever the level of risk deemed to be
acceptable for operating personnel is exceeded — either because the situation has changed
from a life-saving to a property-saving operation, or because an interior oensive re
attack is not controlling the re. If that happens, reghters must be removed from the
interior before they are trapped by ames or buried by a structural collapse. An IC must
always anticipate the likelihood of deteriorating conditions and be prepared to change his
or her strategy on extremely short notice.
The IC should be outside at a CP where the primary tactical-level on-scene incident command
functions are performed. This is where it is possible to evaluate the “big picture” and direct
operations in an environment that is conducive to managing information and communications.
Often, the IC has to depend on other individuals to provide information about changing
conditions that are not visible from the CP, particularly interior conditions. At the same time,
interior crews have to depend on the IC’s ability to evaluate conditions, because their ability
to evaluate a situation may be very limited. (It is dicult to evaluate conditions eectively
while wearing breathing apparatus and operating a hoseline inside a smoke-lled building.)
The IC has to depend on others to report information, particularly risk-related information,
and the interior crews have to trust the IC’s judgment to decide when it is time to retreat.
Implementing a change in strategy
When the strategy is changed from oensive to defensive, participants are removed from
the danger area to operate from positions where there is the least possible risk of accident
or injury. To implement the change, an IC should do the following:
ĵ Order all interior attack crews to immediately abandon their eorts and evacuate to
a safe position. (This can be accomplished by a distinctive radio notication and by
other methods, such as sounding apparatus air horns.)
ĵ
Conduct a positive accountability check to ensure that all personnel have evacuated
and removed themselves to safe positions.
Interior crews must be prepared to react to a change in strategy without hesitation or
delay. An IC should initiate exterior attack operations only after verifying the safety of all
personnel through the personnel accountability system.
49
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Standard operating procedures
SOPs or SOGs establish the basic framework for conducting emergency operations safely
and eectively. Some procedures are specically directed toward safety; others support safe
operations by establishing a system of predictable and consistent operations. Coordination,
consistency and standard approaches are all important and valuable components of safe
emergency operations. One key component of operational risk management is to ensure
that operations are always conducted in a standard manner that incorporates a full range
of safety considerations.
The need for a consistent approach to safety
Consistency in operational risk management begins with:
ĵ Establishing safety procedures.
ĵ Obtaining full documentation.
ĵ Training all members of the organization in the application of those procedures.
ĵ Ensuring that required procedures are consistently implemented at every incident.
A consistent approach to safety requires that all the applicable SOPs are actually followed
(see Figure 3.7). The only thing worse than having no safety procedures might be to have
procedures that are not consistently applied and enforced.
Figure 3.7 — Consistent approach to safety.
Consistent Approach to Safety
DO THE RIGHT THINGS
DO THEM THE RIGHT WAY
ENSURE THEY ARE BEING DONE THE RIGHT WAY
Components of a basic operational system
Important safety-related components and considerations that should be established
within a re department’s basic operational system include:
ĵ Preincident planning information.
ĵ Communications.
ĵ Accountability system.
ĵ Rapid Intervention Teams (RITs).
ĵ Rest and rehabilitation.
Information from preincident planning
ICs are generally pressured by time and must rely heavily on rapidly gaining information
visually and by reconnaissance. Commanders usually acquire visual information by personally
surveying the scene. Reconnaissance information is usually gathered by others who are
assigned to this task by the IC.
50
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
An IC can also obtain valuable information from other agencies’ formal prere planning or
from other activities that provide useful information. Having access to previously generated
sets of facts about a structure or a given situation:
ĵ
Can provide an IC information that is more complete than would be available through
other methods.
ĵ
Can allow the IC to re-allocate personnel who might have been assigned to
reconnaissance and obtaining information on the scene.
ĵ Can save valuable time that would be needed to gather information.
Preincident planning and managing information are critical components of the incident
risk management system.
Communications
To direct an emergency operation, an IC must have an eective communications system.
All interior crews should have portable radios to maintain contact with the IC or their
sector supervisor. A reliable two-way radio link between an IC and each operating sector
ocer, group, company, attack team or other organizational unit provides the means for:
ĵ Operating personnel to call for assistance if they need to be rescued.
ĵ
The IC to direct personnel to evacuate a building or take other actions when he or she
recognizes an imminent hazard is recognized or reported.
ĵ All personnel to be aware of any changes in the Incident Action Plan (IAP).
A standard protocol should be established for transmitting emergency messages to
ensure that they receive priority over all other radio trac. The radio channel used for
tactical communications (tactical channel) at the incident scene should be reserved for
that purpose to ensure that unrelated radio trac does not block out critical messages.
The tactical channel should be used by all units working at the incident, and a designated
individual at the CP must constantly monitor the channel for messages concerning safety-
related situations or emergencies. Where multiple radio channels are used, there should
be one dedicated channel for any unit that needs emergency assistance. That channel
must be constantly monitored at the CP.
A personnel accountability system
A personnel accountability system should be employed at emergency incidents to keep
track of the location, assignment and welfare of all personnel operating in hazardous or
potentially hazardous areas (see Figure 3.8). The system should keep track of individuals
assigned to each company or team working at the incident scene. It should be used to verify
the status of each company or team at regular intervals. An immediate priority must be
placed on locating anyone who is not conrmed to be safe when an accountability check is
made. A full accountability check should be made when designated events occur, such as:
ĵ An evacuation of interior crews.
ĵ A switch to defensive strategy.
ĵ A report of personnel in trouble.
ĵ The reaching of a benchmark.
51
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
The ability to use an eective accountability system depends
absolutely on the following:
ĵ An eective incident organization.
ĵ A realistic span of control.
ĵ Capable supervisors at every level.
ĵ Recognized responsibilities at all levels.
ĵ All players buying into the process.
Rapid Intervention Teams
Assigning one or more RITs at working incidents provides the
ability to immediately initiate a rescue eort to locate, rescue
or assist any reghters (or anyone else) who are in trouble at
the scene of an incident. RIT members should be standing-by
wearing their protective clothing with SCBA ready for immediate
use. They should have forcible entry tools, rescue rope, and any
other equipment that could be needed quickly. At hazardous
materials incidents, or other situations where special protective
equipment is required, the RIT should be ready with the same level
of protective clothing and equipment as the entry team requires.
Rest and rehabilitation
Crews who are fatigued are much more susceptible to accidents
and injuries than fresh, well-rested crews. The standard
operational approach should provide the following to avoid fatigue
and exhaustion among crew members:
ĵ Monitored periods of rest.
ĵ Rehabilitation.
ĵ Fluids at regular intervals.
ĵ Medical evaluation.
Overhaul and salvage
Many reground injuries occur after the re is under control — during salvage, overhaul,
investigation and returning to service phases of an incident. These activities are usually
considered nonurgent priorities. However, this may be the most dangerous time for
reghters, and safety must remain the primary concern. It is often advisable to withdraw
crews and assign sector ocers or the Incident Safety Ocer to conduct a complete survey
of the damaged area before assigning personnel to complete the remaining tasks. This
survey can identify hazards that must be avoided and can determine where it is safe to
operate. It also provides time to set up portable lighting and ventilation fans to eliminate
hazards before assigning any crews to work in these areas. Protective breathing apparatus
and personal protective equipment (PPE) should not be removed during these operations.
Limiting risk by carrying assigned responsibilities
Fire suppression operations should be conducted by well-trained, well-equipped reghters,
operating under an eective incident management system and working in teams under
the supervision of capable ocers to perform assigned tasks that have been coordinated
within an IAP (see Figure 3.9).
Figure 3.8 — All members must use the
accountability system and procedures
in order for it to be eective.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
52
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 3.9 — Fire attack must be a well-coordinated eort.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
The IC establishes the overall strategy that denes the acceptable risk level for an incident.
The responsibility for managing risk extends throughout the incident management structure.
It includes every level from incident command down to the individual reghters who
must be able to recognize hazards and avoid unnecessary risks. The IC must eectively
communicate the strategic plan to every part of the organization and must ensure that
everyone understands his or her assignment.
Whether or not they agree with the IC’s assessment of the situation, subordinates are
expected to follow the directions that come down the chain of command. They have to feed
information back up the chain of command to keep their IC aware of what is happening.
There is no absolute measure or denition of an acceptable level of risk exposure for
individual reghters performing their duties. Some individuals or crews might be willing
to accept a higher level of risk than the organization or the IC are willing to authorize. From
their limited perspective, they might be unaware of critical information, or they might
simply be willing to expose themselves to a higher level of risk.
A re department establishes the context in which risk acceptance/avoidance decisions
are made. Risk management policies and approaches should be part of the organizational
culture — dened by policy, supported by training, and applied with experience and
judgment. Operating outside the established system should never be accepted.
A consistent approach and application of safety procedures should establish a basic level of
operational safety for the organization. At each incident, the IC adds situational judgment
that denes the level of risk exposure for that incident. The operational discipline of the
organization must require everyone to follow orders, even if they feel their actions are
being unnecessarily restricted.
53
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Personal protection
The ability of re departments and emergency response organizations to operate safely
is constantly improving as advancements are made in personal protective clothing and
equipment. These advances have actually reduced the risk of injury or death during
operations that were already considered “reasonably safe” in many situations. The margin
of safety has been improved for users who are performing the same operations.
The improvements in personal protection have also expanded the range of conditions where
reghters can operate without being injured. In the past, reghters’ levels of exposure
were often regulated by the limited protection provided by their protective clothing. Working
with exposed ears, poorly insulated gloves, and wearing coats and three-quarter length
boots that provided limited insulation, reghters were able to sense the heat. They were
often stopped from further penetration by the threshold of pain. First- and second-degree
burns to ears, knees and wrists often provided evidence that reghters had advanced
as far as they could into a superheated atmosphere.
Note: Members must take time to ensure they are wearing appropriate personal protective
clothing and equipment. Check each other. No exceptions.
Protection is limited
Fireghters should wear full protective clothing ensembles that meet current standards.
Breathing apparatus and PASS should be checked and function-tested at regular intervals
to ensure they will perform reliably. Facepiece tting should be tested regularly. Fireghters
should be trained to achieve a high level of condence and familiarity with their breathing
apparatus. Major advances, based on extensively monitoring the environment to which
reghters are exposed, were made in the development of protective clothing and equipment.
Levels of exposure to dierent temperatures were evaluated to establish performance
standards for protective clothing, including relative exposure to radiant, convective and
conductible heat. The new generation of protective clothing is designed to prevent burns
to a reghter who is caught in a ashover for 10 to 20 seconds. The level of risk to the
reghter is signicantly reduced in relation to the atmosphere for which it was designed.
Personal protective clothing and equipment provide limited protection from the heat of
a re. It is very dicult to control the direct exposure of reghters who are engaged in
interior re attack operations. In many cases, only the individual members who are actually
making the attack are in a position to evaluate the interior re conditions.
Personal protection benets and concerns
Improved protection might also allow users to increase their penetration into a re
atmosphere, knowingly or unknowingly. Although many injuries have been prevented or
reduced in severity with the protection provided by new clothing, the risk balance shifts
in the wrong direction if the extra protection causes reghters to be exposed to a more
dangerous situation.
How could that happen? Fireghters might be able to get in deeper and control res where
they could not previously penetrate, but they might also be unable to sense the danger
of a hotter atmosphere or rapidly increasing temperatures. In this situation, they might
unwittingly expose themselves to an increased risk of severe injury.
54
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
An IC at an exterior CP cannot manage this type of risk. If conditions appear to be too
dangerous from an IC’s vantage point, they must withdraw reghters from the interior.
The operation must switch from oensive to defensive operations.
It is virtually impossible for an IC outside a structure to fully evaluate conditions inside.
In most cases, the risk of penetration into the re atmosphere can be monitored and
evaluated only at the place it occurs. An IC has to depend on COs, sector ocers and the
Incident Safety Ocer to help him or her:
ĵ Observe and evaluate conditions.
ĵ Monitor the level of exposure.
ĵ Control the actions of the attack crews.
The advances that have been made in protective clothing and equipment must be matched
with closer supervision, coordination and communications. Training, SOPs and experience
are also important factors in controlling the exposure to excessive risk and conducting
safe operations.
Preparation for incident command
As noted in the previous section, an IC has a wide span of discretionary authority for
making risk management decisions. There is no easy way to develop good judgment; some
individuals are more capable in this regard than others. That factor should be considered
in making promotions and assignments. Experience is always valuable. Gaining experience
takes time, and experience can never address every situation an IC might face. Also, there
is always a rst time for any occurrence to happen.
ICs can improve their abilities and self-condence in making judgmental decisions through
several dierent methods, beginning with a thorough understanding of the basic policies
and their application to specic situations. Experience can be expanded and shared in
the following ways:
ĵ Training.
ĵ Studying reports of incidents that have occurred.
ĵ Attending critiques.
ĵ Carefully observing as many operations as possible.
Every re ocer and potential emergency IC must be prepared to make critical risk
management decisions. An eective IC must be able to evaluate situations and predict
outcomes. If the outcome of a situation is predictable, the IC can take action to minimize
the exposure of danger to operating personnel. If the outcome is not predictable, or the
indicators are not recognized, situations might be left entirely to chance.
To be prepared to make good risk management decisions, a Command Ocer has to develop
a foundation of knowledge, judgment and experience. The ability to predict outcomes and
exercise good judgment must be based on either personal or shared experiences. The
risk assessment process should be internalized well in advance of an incident in which its
application might be a matter of life or death.
55
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Experience is a job requirement
One of the best ways to develop a base of experience is to consciously identify and evaluate
the risk factors that apply to each emergency incident and to practice making judgmental
risk management decisions. The conscious application of the risk evaluation process is a
good start, but few individuals have the opportunity to personally experience a full range
of situations before they are called upon to use their risk management skills.
A re ocer must be able to evaluate situations and predict their potential outcomes —
particularly high risk situations that might result in very bad outcomes. If the danger is
recognized, the IC should be able to determine the appropriate course of action to reduce,
minimize, or completely avoid the risk. Judgment is important to dierentiate risks that
are acceptable from situations that are too dangerous.
The need for judgment
The application of risk management policies relies heavily on the judgment of ocers
and supervisors, as well as individual reghters and emergency responders. A capable
CO or Command Ocer must be able to predict what is likely to happen in a wide variety
of situations and to weigh the risks against the potential benets of dierent actions.
Actual and potential dangers must be recognized, evaluated and placed in perspective in
relation to the three guidelines that dene acceptable risk (referred to earlier). The ability
of trained and experienced ocers to make appropriate risk assessments and apply risk
management policies requires good judgment.
Judgment is often associated with experience. Personal experience is probably the easiest way
to develop good judgment, but in today’s reality, a total reliance on experience as the basis
for judgment is inadequate. There are far too many lessons to be learned about managing
operational risk and too few occasions to develop the necessary experience. In addition,
there is no assurance that the experience will come before the situation that requires the
best judgment. There isn’t time to wait for the experience to develop the judgment.
Developing judgment
A responsible ocer must make a full spectrum of eorts to learn about the subject matter
that forms the foundation for good judgment by doing the following:
ĵ Taking courses that include operational safety.
ĵ Reading books.
ĵ Studying reports of incidents that have occurred in other jurisdictions.
ĵ Attending critiques.
ĵ Looking at buildings under construction and demolition.
ĵ Looking at buildings where res have occurred.
ĵ Visiting properties to develop prere plans.
ĵ Simulation-based training/critiques.
Training for ocers and ICs should provide a thorough understanding of the principles of
operational risk management and the opportunity to practice their application in exercises
and simulations. That type of training is essential to prepare individuals who might have
to make critical decisions in situations they have never personally experienced.
56
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Even those ocers who respond to a large number of incidents generally face only a few
situations that are truly challenging. The relatively large percentage of situations that
are uncomplicated and easily controlled tends to make it even more dicult to rely on
personal experience to recognize crises and act appropriately. As a result, many ICs rarely
get enough “real world” experience to develop solid judgment and decision-making skills.
That’s why training that provides the opportunity to develop command skills is critically
important. Simulations followed by thorough, detailed critiques provide essential learning
experiences for all potential ICs.
ICs must develop a discipline for managing incidents systematically, by consistently applying
the process and the principles to all types of situations. The regular application of the
process will help to develop the habit of approaching every situation in a standard manner.
This discipline is essential to avoid the situation in which an IC, facing a critical incident,
has to apply an unfamiliar process to fulll his or her risk management responsibilities.
Judgment under stress
There are times when critical risk management decisions must be made under conditions
of extreme stress, with incomplete information and with only seconds to evaluate the
alternatives. An IC must be prepared to decide if a given situation justies the exposure
of responders to the degree of risk that would be involved in implementing dierent
strategies. Those determinations must be based on judgment that allows an IC to apply
the principles of operational risk management.
Predictability
The ability to anticipate the outcome of emergencies is an essential component of a risk
manager’s eectiveness. Once a dangerous situation is recognized, it is usually possible
to avoid or prevent the undesirable outcome. As Gordon Graham, retired risk manager of
the California Highway Patrol, has said, “If it is predictable, it is preventable.”
An IC must have these abilities:
ĵ Recognize dangerous situations.
ĵ Predict what could happen.
ĵ Take action to avoid the predictable danger.
An IC should never nd themselves in the position of having to say, “I realized what could
have happened, but all I could do was hope for the best.” In many cases, the explanation
for an unfortunate outcome has been, “We recognized the danger, but we took a calculated
risk.” In many situations, that means somebody recognized danger and did nothing to
prevent the occurrence.
The IC should be pessimistic. When an IC recognizes a risk factor that could result in a bad
outcome, he or she should make the avoidance of that bad outcome an integral part of the
strategic plan. The IC should evaluate the steps that will either prevent it from happening
or protect reghters and emergency workers from harm if it does happen. Possible
risk reduction or avoidance actions must be considered in relation to the probability and
potential consequences of the negative outcome. These actions must also be balanced
against the need to take action to control the emergency.
57
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Do not rely on good luck
An IC should never rely on good luck to make an operation safe and to keep a predictable
outcome from happening. Bad luck can ruin a good operation. There are some unavoidable
risks that are virtually outside of anyone’s control. Those are the inherent risks of conducting
emergency operations. Fortune and misfortune denitely play a part in determining outcomes,
but they should have an impact only in circumstances that are beyond the control of an IC.
Recognition of dangerous situations
An IC must have the ability to quickly recognize and react to dangerous situations (see
Figure 3.10). The process of looking out for indications of danger should be a routine part
of the incident management process. It extends to everyone involved in operations at the
scene. The IC and everyone else involved in the incident should always be on the lookout
for indications of potential danger.
Figure 3.10 — The IC must always be alert for signs that the intensity or danger of
the incident is increasing.
Photo courtesy of Chris Mickal, New Orleans (LA) Fire Department Photo Unit.
Balancing probabilities and consequences
Risk management always involves balancing probabilities and consequences. There is at least
a remote possibility that any burning building could collapse because of some undetected
aw in the construction. That said, it is also true that reghters cannot eectively control
structure res if they stay out of every burning building. They must be able to recognize
buildings that have characteristics that make them more susceptible to structural collapse.
There is no excuse for having reghters buried in the rubble of a building that exhibited
recognizable warning signs or characteristics prior to collapse.
58
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
In emergency operations, it is often necessary to work with the recognition that something
bad could happen. It would be impossible to take eective action without facing some
danger. There are some overwhelming potential dangers that are always at least remote
possibilities. A trained and experienced ocer must develop the ability to recognize
dangerous situations and predict outcomes. Once the danger is recognized, the risk
assessment has to consider the probabilities and potential consequences to decide if the
predictable outcome is unacceptable.
Training and education
It is dicult to train an individual to exercise good judgment. Judgment is highly dependent
on experience, which must be acquired and internalized; however, the fundamental
principles and application of risk management can be learned. Training should also allow
an individual to learn about dierent situations that have occurred, so the indicators can
be recognized, even if the individual has never had the personal experience.
For example, a re ocer must know that lightweight wood truss construction oors and
roofs are likely to collapse without warning if the trusses become involved in a re, even
if they have never actually seen it happen. An ocer must know about the risk, recognize
the type of construction, and know where it is likely to be encountered. Similarly, an
ocer must know about the risk of a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, even
if they have never encountered a burning propane tank. Fire ocers should also learn
to beware of buildings with entrances on multiple levels that might confuse companies
operating on dierent oors. They should recognize occupancies that are likely to have
hazardous contents.
Important experience can be acquired through training that gives an ocer the opportunity
to relate risk factors and indicators to predictable outcomes. Proven methods:
ĵ Classes.
ĵ Seminars.
ĵ Books.
ĵ Videos and other media.
ĵ Simulations and critiques.
It is critical that re ocers also study published incident reports, particularly reports about
incidents that resulted in injuries, fatalities or close calls, to determine signicant factors in
each case. Doing that should prepare an ocer to quickly recognize situations that indicate
an increased level of risk (such as buildings with lightweight construction components or
components that are susceptible to sudden failure) and see how it corresponds to the
policies, procedures and trainings of their own organization.
Critiques
Participation in incident critiques should be an important part of the learning process for
everyone who responds to emergency incidents (see Figure 3.11). Fire ocers should
carefully review every incident in which they have been involved and use each new
experience to expand their personal risk evaluation skills. Looking back, after having seen
the outcome, each signicant incident allows the participants to focus on the accuracy of
their observations and their analysis of the situation.
59
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Figure 3.11 — A formal post-incident critique may be conducted in a comfortable
setting well after the incident has ended.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
The learning experience in a critique can be shared by others who were not involved in
the incident or in the direction of the operation. One of the most important values of a
critique comes from the capacity to replay, in light of the known outcome, the thought
process that went into making strategic and tactical decisions. Ocers who were involved
in the decision-making process should discuss what they saw and how they interpreted the
situation. Then they should explain the decisions that were made based on that information.
A critique provides an opportunity for others to share the experience of using information
and observations to predict outcomes.
Observation
Personal experience should also be supplemented by observing as many incidents as
possible. It is often revealing to stand back at a safe distance and watch what is happening at
an emergency scene. The “big picture” might be quite dierent from the narrow perspective
that is available to the participants, who might be seeing only a small part of the situation.
Monitoring radio trac also helps to compare visual observations with information
reported over the radio from dierent positions and vantage points. A re ocer should
also develop the skill to look for risk indicators in occupancies and locations where they
may have to respond at some time in the future. Preincident plans should be developed
for high risk occupancies, particularly where the risk indicators are not easily recognized.
An observant risk evaluator should always be looking for indications of risk factors.
Some of the most important characteristics of re behavior can often be interpreted by
observing the behavior of smoke and ames and their relationship to the building. Visual
clues may also provide important evidence of structural weaknesses. The IC should try
to establish the CP at a location that provides a good view of a re scene. If the IC cannot
make a personal 360-degree size-up, he or she should assign personnel to make a full
visual survey and report back to the CP.
60
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Practice
The IC must have a well-developed sense of the priorities that will have to be applied to
actual situations, based on actual incidents that have occurred, as well as on hypothetical
situations that can be imagined or predicted. Aspiring ICs should try to apply this value
system to situations that are likely to occur in the particular area where they may be
called upon to make those decisions. Working out situations in advance can prove to be
extremely valuable when the real situations have to be confronted.
Investigations
The investigation of accidents that occur during emergency operations is an essential
component of operational risk management. Those events illustrate the weaknesses of
established approaches and identify areas in which improvements are needed.
Although some injuries are unavoidable, they should never be considered acceptable. All
injuries should be investigated. The results should be used to reduce the probability of a
reoccurrence. In fact, the primary purpose of any safety investigation should always be
to reduce the probability of future accidents.
Line-of-duty deaths (LODDs) must always be thoroughly investigated to determine the
cause and the steps that are necessary to absolutely keep it from happening again. A re
department should be prepared to immediately launch a full-scale safety investigation
when a death or injury occurs. “The Guide for the Investigation of a Line of Duty Death”
published by the International Association of Fire Fighters, and the “Fireghter Autopsy
Protocol” published by the USFA, are recommended references.
An investigative report example
The following section includes portions of a reghter fatality investigation developed by
the City of Charleston after a re claimed the lives of nine reghters on June 18, 2007.
The report demonstrates the complexity of a major incident and the diculties that can
be encountered in trying to identify, evaluate and manage the risks that might be present.
1
Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire — Risk assessment
The importance of conducting re suppression operations with a “risk management
approach” is emphasized in NFPA 1500. The application of the risk management concept to
this incident is particularly signicant. The risk assessment must be based on a combination
of factors, including a size-up of the structure and the re conditions. The IC seldom has
complete knowledge of all the potential risk factors during the early stages of an incident.
Operations must often be initiated based on the best information that is available and
then adjusted as additional information is obtained.
The re occurred in a building that was occupied by two operating businesses and was
reported by a tenant who detected smoke. The situation observed on arrival appeared
to be an exterior re extending to the interior. The structure appeared to have many of
1
J. Gordon Routley, Michael D. Chiaramonte, Brian A. Crawford, Peter A. Piringer, Kevin M. Roche and Timothy
E. Sendelbach, Fireghter fatality investigative report: Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway Charleston, South
Carolina, June 18, 2007 (May 2008).
61
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
the characteristics of a heavy timber structure. These observations would support the
initiation of an interior attack. The initial strategic plan was an oensive attack, intended
to keep the exterior re from penetrating into the building.
An east to west attack direction was identied by the rst arriving ocer and approved by
the acting deputy chief who assumed command of the incident. Additional companies were
assigned to the west side to prevent extension of the re and were specically directed to
avoid a conict with the interior attack crews. The plan was eectively communicated to
all of the operating crews. At this stage of the operation, it was not known or suspected
that the re was actually in the basement, or that the basement contained a structural
element that would result in a sudden oor collapse.
A prere plan might have made the IC and other ocers more aware of the arrangement
of the structure and could have resulted in earlier recognition of the re in the basement. It
is questionable whether the “aw” in the structure that resulted in a sudden oor collapse
would have been recognized when a prere plan was developed.
As the incident progressed, the attack plan appeared to be successful. The visible exterior
re was controlled, and there were no reports of signicant interior involvement from the
attack crews. The fact that they had not encountered any signicant re involvement on
the ground oor was not reported, so it was assumed that the attack plan was working.
The main body of re had been located in the basement, under the attack teams, by a
company assigned to the west side of the re, but this information was not reported back
to the IC because its signicance was not recognized. This critical factor could have caused
the IC to evacuate the interior crews before the oor collapsed under their feet.
Progress reports
The IC often has to depend on progress reports and information from other observers
to evaluate the eectiveness of the attack plan. One of the primary responsibilities of
COs and division or sector ocers is to keep the IC informed through regular progress
reports. The IC should be informed immediately of any factors that could impact the overall
strategy for the incident. To evaluate interior progress, Division Supervisors must either
go inside, where the companies are operating, or depend on COs to keep them informed
with accurate reports.
At this incident, the assigned Division Supervisors did not transmit any progress reports,
positive or negative, to the IC. The COs who were leading the interior attack teams did
not provide any progress reports or information on interior conditions to their Division
Supervisor, who was located outside the building. He could see that the interior was heavily
charged with smoke, but did not know that the companies were encountering very little
re inside. He did not have any information to provide progress reports to the IC and was
not asked for a report.
The Division Supervisor on the west side saw the large re in the basement, moments before
the collapse occurred. However, the signicance of this observation was not recognized,
and it was not reported. It was assumed that the IC knew about the re in the basement.
The presence of interior attack crews immediately above was not known to the crews
who found the re.
62
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
In the absence of progress reports, the IC had to rely on other indicators to evaluate the
eectiveness of the attack plan. The exterior re was knocked down, and there were no
reports to suggest that the interior crews were having diculties controlling the re. These
observations suggested that the strategic plan was working. A progress report from either
Division Supervisor could have caused the other to recognize the inconsistency and would
have alerted the IC to the problem.
Battalion Chiefs — The lack of progress reports appears to be related to the lack of aides
or assistants to support the Division Supervisors. The Battalion Chiefs, who are normally
assigned as Division Supervisors, do not have aides.
The Battalion Chiefs were overloaded by trying to direct operations and perform
accountability functions while trying to monitor two separate radio channels at the same
time. Some departments use a “passport” accountability system, which requires a control
point to be established outside the building, near each entry and exit point. This could
involve them performing this function in addition to monitoring radio trac. These
responsibilities would keep them outside, at secondary CPs, where they have to rely on
COs to inform them of interior conditions.
A Battalion Chief would need a “partner” to be able to go inside the building and at least
one assistant to stay outside to perform the accountability function. This would require
at least two assistants to be assigned to each Battalion Chief.
Reconnaissance — It was dicult to visually size-up the situation from a single vantage point.
The conguration of the buildings made it dicult to interpret the interior arrangement
without a prere plan or a 360-degree size-up. Dierences in grade levels made it dicult
to lap all the way around the structure to determine the arrangement and access points.
The visible smoke and re conditions were dicult to relate to the actual location and
magnitude of the re inside the structure. All except one of the companies and Command
Ocers responding on the rst alarm approached the re from the same direction, and
all saw the large volume of ames against the west wall of the structure. This observation
was interpreted as an exterior re threatening to extend into the building.
The view from the CP was obstructed by trees and vegetation, which made it dicult to
visually size-up the structure. The area where the re was venting from the basement to
the exterior was below the street level and out of sight from the CP.
Operating companies — The interior attack crews never encountered any signicant interior
re involvement on the upper level; they found only a few spot res near the oor which
they quickly controlled. They did not realize the re was in the basement, directly below
them, because the concrete oor prevented smoke and ames from penetrating through.
The initial conditions were heavy smoke and moderate heat, which was consistent with
their expectations. When rooftop ventilation was accomplished and the heated gases were
released, the interior atmosphere cooled, which is usually an indicator of good progress.
They believed that their eorts were successfully keeping the re out of the building.
Engine 5 could not advance the line out onto the roof because of the electrical power line
that had dropped in their path. This kept them from closely examining the west wall of the
two-story section, which would have allowed them to see that the visible re was actually
venting out of the basement.
63
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Engine 2 located the door into the re area and determined that a large area of the
basement was heavily involved in re. Because of the assignment they had been given,
they expected the attack crews to be pushing the re toward them, so they prepared
to defend their position. They did not recognize that no one else was aware of the large
interior re or that the interior crews were directly over it.
In retrospect, it can be determined that very dierent interpretations of the structure
and the re were being made from dierent vantage points. The individuals making these
observations did not recognize the signicance of their information to the IC. This emphasizes
the value of a complete 360-degree size-up of the re scene, as early as possible, by the
IC or by an individual who can report in person to the IC with a “full picture” of the scene.
Ten rules of engagement for structural reghting
Acceptability of risk:
1. No building or property is worth the life of a reghter.
2. All interior reghting involves an inherent risk.
3. Some risk is acceptable, in a measured and controlled manner.
4. No level of risk is acceptable where there is no potential to save lives or property.
5.
Fireghters shall not be committed to interior oensive reghting operations in
abandoned or derelict buildings.
Risk assessment:
6.
All feasible measures shall be taken to limit or avoid risks through risk assessment by
a qualied ocer.
7. It is the responsibility of the IC to evaluate the level of risk in every situation.
8. Risk assessment is a continuous process for the duration of every incident.
9. If conditions change and risk increases, change strategy and tactics.
10. No building or property is worth the life of a reghter.
The risk management guidelines are intended to assist the IC in identifying the appropriate
strategy for a particular situation:
ĵ Oensive strategy involves committing reghters to conduct an interior re attack.
The objective of an oensive attack is to control and extinguish the re within the area
that is already burning, while preventing extension to any of the exposures.
ĵ
Defensive strategy is directed toward conning a re within a dened area, while
keeping reghters outside and in safe operating positions.
The International Association of Fire Chiefs’ acceptable risk guidelines would support the
initiation of an oensive attack during the initial stage of the Sofa Super Store incident, if the
IC believed the re could be contained to the loading dock without exposing reghters to
excessive risk. (This situation would be classied as Medium Risk and Marginal Probability
of Success) (see Table 3.3).
64
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Table 3.3 — Risk assessment rules of engagement
Fireghter
injury/life
safety risk
High probability
of success
Marginal probability
of success
Low probability
of success
Low
Initiate offensive
operations. Continue
to monitor risk factors.
Initiate offensive
operations. Continue to
monitor risk factors.
Initiate offensive
operations. Continue
to monitor risk factors.
Medium
Initiate offensive
operations. Continue
to monitor risk factors.
Employ all available risk
control options.
Initiate offensive
operations. Continue to
monitor risk factors. Be
prepared to go defensive
if risk increases.
Do not initiate oensive
operations. Reduce
risk to re ghters and
actively pursue risk
control options.
High
Initiate offensive
operations only with
conrmation of realistic
potential to save
endangered lives.
Do not initiate oensive
operations that will put
fire fighters at risk for
injury or fatality.
Initiate defensive
operations only.
The re that was burning in the loading dock presented a signicant tactical challenge. The
re involved a relatively large space (approximately 2,200 square feet) that was lled with
highly combustible contents. A successful oensive attack would have to deliver sucient
re ow (water) to overcome the volume of re within this space.
The situation was greatly compounded by the circumstances. Access to the re area was
dicult, and the building conguration created immediate exposures on three sides. In
addition to delivering a powerful attack to suppress the re within the loading dock, the
IC would have to ensure the re did not extend into any of the exposures.
The IC was responsible for determining whether the available reghting resources had
the ability to control and/or contain the re and whether this action could be accomplished
safely. The risk assessment should have changed as additional information was obtained
and re conditions were re-evaluated. If the IC lacked the capability to conduct a safe
and eective oensive re attack in the time that was available, the strategy should have
changed to defensive.
As soon as the re extended into the void spaces above the showrooms, the situation
exceeded the capability of the Charleston Fire Department to control the re with an
oensive strategy. Multiple large hoselines would have been required to stop the spread
of hot re gases within the void spaces. The hoselines would have to be operated by crews
inside the showrooms, and would involve opening ceilings to attack the re. This attack
would have to be coordinated with vertical ventilation, opening holes in the roof to release
the trapped smoke and re gases.
A risk management analysis at that point would have determined that attempting to
conduct an interior oensive re attack under these circumstances placed reghters
in conditions of unacceptable risk. (The risk analysis would classify this situation as high
risk and low probability of success.) The revised risk analysis would dictate a switch to
defensive strategy and the withdrawal of all reghters from interior positions.
65
Chapter 3: Operational Risk Management
Summary
Clearly, the nature of emergency response itself carries with it some degree of inherent
and unavoidable risk. Many of those risks can be readily identied and evaluated. However,
no incident should be considered routine. That is why the presence of inherent risk only
intensies the need to implement sound risk management strategies at every level of an
emergency response organization and before, during and after every phase of emergency
incident operations.
Experience and reality-based training help an emergency response ocer develop the
judgment that incident command demands. Written policies and standards provide risk
management guidelines. PPE provides measurable margins of safety. Still, it takes diligent,
watchful, ongoing application of consistent safety-minded practices, during every emergency
response operation, to eectively reduce risk to acceptable levels and aord all personnel
the highest levels of protection possible.
66
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
67
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Chapter 4: Managing Information
The ability to assemble and process incident-related information is an essential skill for
people who direct emergency operations. This chapter presents several approaches to
managing information to support operational risk management. This chapter includes
the following topics:
ĵ The importance of preincident planning.
ĵ Preincident planning and preparation.
ĵ Managing and applying information during emergencies.
ĵ Special information management considerations.
This chapter also addresses the following portions of the NFFF’s 16 FLSIs:
ĵ
Initiative 8: Use available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health
and safety.
ĵ
Initiative 14: Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a
critical re and life safety program.
ĵ
Initiative 15: Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the
installation of home re sprinklers.
The importance of managing information
Risk assessment decisions have to be based on information about the risks that are present
and signicant in each situation, so that the IC can predict what is likely to happen. An
individual who has accurate, timely, reliable and complete information is in a much better
position to evaluate risk than one who is working with fragments of information and large
quantities of confusion. The IC seldom knows everything about a situation at the beginning
and sometimes does not nd out about important factors until the operation is over.
Two categories of information
Information considerations for risk management fall into two inter-related categories:
1. Preincident planning and preparation.
2. Information management and application during emergencies.
Preincident planning is a crucial component of the risk management process. Preincident
planning activities are intended to gather, store and retrieve information that will be
valuable when a re or other emergency incident occurs. What makes it so important?
These are the two most important reasons to develop preincident plans:
1. Recognize hazards.
2.
Compile pertinent information about those hazards that will help an IC implement
the risk management process.
The ability to acquire and manage information during an emergency incident is an important
component of incident management and operational risk management (see Figure 4.1). The
IC’s ability to achieve a safe and desirable outcome necessarily involves managing the risks
that apply to each situation. In order to successfully manage risk and many other aspects
of the incident, the IC needs to quickly and eciently gather and process information.
68
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 4.1 — The IC should remain at the CP for the duration of the incident.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
Preincident planning and preparation
Preincident planning and hazard awareness activities can greatly improve the ability of
re departments and other agencies to deal with operational risk. The more that is known
about a property before an incident occurs, the easier it becomes to manage the incident
and the related risk. An eective program will allow responders to do the following in
advance of an incident:
ĵ Recognize risks.
ĵ Fully evaluate the risk.
ĵ Develop appropriate tactical plans.
The goal of preincident planning
Preincident plans are often developed to support eective tactical operations, but their
ability to provide hazard awareness information might be even more signicant. That is
because, rst and foremost, a preincident plan should inform an IC of safety hazards. To
do that, the information in the plan has to be timely, accurate and accessible.
Let’s look just a little closer at that third point: accessibility. Emergency responders must
be able to nd the information they need when they need it. What good is accurate
information that is made available on a timely basis if it is not also in a format readily
accessible to those who need it the most?
69
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Three steps in preincident planning
A preincident plan should make signicant information available to the IC when the
incident occurs. The most critical information relates to hazards that would be dicult or
impossible to identify or evaluate at the time of the incident. Prior awareness may be the
only way to account for these risks. Creating prior awareness takes three distinct steps:
1. Gathering information.
2. Recording and storing information.
3. Retrieving and applying information.
In addition, the information should be reviewed at regular intervals and updated as
necessary when changes occur.
Information gathering methods
The most common method of developing preincident plan information
is to assign the rst-due company to gather information by touring
target locations and other structures whose features present potential
problems, such as lightweight truss construction (see Figure 4.2).
That approach serves the dual purpose of providing an on-site
familiarization tour along with gathering information. Other methods
include the following:
ĵ
Assigning a special team or group within the re department to
develop preincident plans.
ĵ
Entering information directly from information submitted for
building occupancy.
ĵ Reviewing hazardous materials and special use permits.
ĵ
Requiring building owners to submit plans in a specic format
that meets the requirements of the department.
Whatever method is used, a standard format, such as the one that
follows, should be established to enter basic information about
each location and particular facts that apply to certain categories
of buildings or occupancies.
The objective of site visits
The objective of every preincident site visit should be to gather and organize as much
information as possible about the locations where incidents might occur, particularly
properties known to be complicated or hazardous. Any information that would make an
IC aware of a hazardous situation should be considered important (for example, NFPA 704,
Standard System for the Identication of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response).
This is particularly true if the information would not be readily apparent or easily identied
during an incident.
Figure 4.2 — Preincident
planning is useful in nding
otherwise unknown hazards
that might be in a facility.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
70
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
The value of site visits
Fire suppression companies should regularly visit occupancies in their response areas to
identify hazards and plan eective operations. Why? A preincident planning visit makes it
possible, before an emergency occurs, to detect, evaluate and record all types of hazards
found at that site. Some examples of these hazards:
ĵ
The presence of construction components that are susceptible to sudden failure, such
as lightweight wood truss roof and oor assemblies, should be prominently noted.
ĵ
Unusual occupancy characteristics, such as hazardous materials storage or open
shafts, should be identied to alert responding companies and inform the IC of the
hazards that are likely to be present.
In addition, familiarization visits allow a potential IC to update the recorded information
and to consider specic risks and the potential benets of dierent strategies that might
be employed if an incident were to occur at the location. In the same way, ocers should
review preincident plan information from time to time, as a training exercise, to become
familiar with the documented information and to ensure that it is routinely updated to
reect any changes that have occurred.
Storage, processing and retrieval of information: System options
Over the years, re departments have developed many dierent systems with which
they gather and store preincident plan information. In many cases, the information
processing system has been structured around the capabilities of the hardware and
software that happens to be available, rather than designing a system to meet specic
needs. Many departments still rely on traditional paper-based systems. In recent years,
though, information technology has made remarkable advances and signicantly improved
departments’ gathering, storage and retrieval capabilities.
Paper-based systems
Some systems are based entirely on paper maps, diagrams and printed information.
Frequently, information is kept in three-ring binders and carried in the cabs of re apparatus.
Other departments maintain ling cabinets in re stations or communication centers. Some
systems place pertinent information on the premises where an incident might occur. There
it can be accessed by units when they arrive at the scene of a call. Storing a preincident plan
on the premises is particularly useful for occupancies, such as high-rise buildings that have
complex alarm and re suppression systems. Obviously, the eectiveness of a paper-based
system is limited by the ability to organize, store and retrieve information on paper.
Applications of advanced information technology
Several systems have been developed as components of computer-aided dispatch (CAD)
systems to automatically retrieve information associated with a specic address when
units are dispatched to an incident at that location.
The newest versions of mobile digital terminals have signicantly increased capabilities to
store graphic and text information that can be updated easily to provide the most accurate
information to emergency responders while en route or on the scene.
71
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Factors that drive gathering, storage and retrieval decisions
The purpose of preincident planning is to put information in the hands of an IC. Choices
among gathering, storage and retrieval systems storage must always be made with that
purpose in mind. One of the most important considerations in entering and managing
information should be the easy retrieval of information when it is needed to support an
IC’s planning and risk assessment priorities. The system should include the following:
ĵ Be readily available.
ĵ Be easy to use.
ĵ Be accurate.
ĵ Clearly emphasize the most critical factors.
Eective use of graphics
Graphics presentations should use standard symbols and color coding to convey important
information eciently. Information that is less time-sensitive might be accessed by referencing
text pages. Drawings should provide enough information to support operational needs.
They should be “user friendly.” More detailed drawings and information that are less likely
to be critical during an incident can be documented as secondary reference information.
72
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figure 4.3 — A sample preincident plan form.
Prefire Plan
Building: 221B
Dimensions
Length:
Width:
Floors:
Sq Ft:
100 ft
90 ft
3
27,000
Construction:
Classification:
Type II
Manufacturing
Make:
Model:
Location:
FireSafe
FS-101-XL
Lobby
Mechanical Room
Building Informaion Fire Alarm System
Elevators
QTY:
Make:
Service:
2
Upzendowner
Smith Co.
(405) 555-1010
QTY:
Make:
Output:
Location:
1
Northern CAT
480 Kw
SE corner
Location: Room 1001C3
Emergency Generator Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
Natural Gas
Location: NE side of building
near Door B4
Location: NE side of building
near Door B4
Location: Building 221A
Generator
UPS
Water Mains Electrical
Fire Hydrants
NE corner @ 52 ft
SE corner @ 67 ft
QTY:
Make:
Capacity:
Auto/Manual:
2
Kente
2,500 GPM
Ye s
QTY:
Type:
Location:
1
Siamese wall mount
NE side of building
near Door B4
Fire Pumps
Fire Department Connection (FDC)
Communications
Public Address System
Elevator Phone
Inside: 3rd floor
Room 303M5
Door B4
Roof Access
Utility Shut-offs
Known Chemical Hazards Within Building
Sprinkler System (WET)
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a preincident plan form.
Managing and applying information during emergencies
An eective preincident plan system must be capable of putting the signicant information
at an IC’s disposal when an incident occurs. The dispatch system should inform responding
units when there is a preincident plan available for an occupancy, and the records
management system should make the information immediately available.
73
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Early command
The principles of incident management emphasize the need for one person to be in overall
command of every incident, from beginning to end, although the identity of that individual
might change during the incident. If action takes place before command is established, an
IC has to start the process from behind to try to catch up with the situation. To evaluate
exposure to risks, an IC must know where companies are operating and what they are
doing. An IC who has to start the command process after all the rst alarm units are
committed is likely to spend the most critical decision-making time just trying to gure
out who is where, doing what.
A delay in establishing command adds risk to a situation because it interferes with the
prompt identication, evaluation and processing of the risk factors. Risks that have not
been identied cannot be evaluated or managed. When eective command is initiated
from the outset of operations, an IC should have eective control over all the action taking
place and should be in a better position to focus on evaluating risks. When the identity
of the IC changes, an orderly transfer of command process ensures that continuity of
information is maintained. For that reason, the ocer assuming command responsibility
for an incident will, in many cases, keep the previous IC involved at the CP for that exact
purpose (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 — A relieved initial IC may stay at the CP to assist a new IC.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
The incident management process is also intended to structure the ow of information
up, down and through the entire chain of command. COs and Sector/Group/Division
Supervisors move information up the chain of command, just as they move orders and
instructions down the chain of command. Eective communications are essential to make
the system work.
74
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Ocers at dierent levels in the organization routinely make risk evaluation and risk
management decisions within the scope of their responsibilities. Those decisions must be
coordinated with the strategic plan that is directed by the IC. They must also be coordinated
with other units when the recognized risks may impact their tactics.
Although an incident management structure is intended to facilitate risk management and
information ow, it can have the opposite eect if the ocers assigned to supervise dierent
areas focus entirely on their own specic assignments or functions, and consequently fail to
fulll their responsibilities for coordinating actions with other groups. Coordinating between
activities is often as important as supervision over individual functions. Supervisors must
pay attention to what is happening around them, as well as what is happening under their
direct supervision.
Consequences of failure
The failure to communicate signicant information up and down the incident management
structure is one of the most common breakdowns that leads to reghter injuries and
fatalities. Post-incident analysis of fatal incidents often reveals that critical observations were
made by individuals on the scene, but the information was not eectively communicated.
In many cases, the individual who had the information did not recognize its signicance
or realize that it was not known by the IC. In other cases, the information would only have
been signicant if its inconsistency with information coming from a dierent vantage
point had been realized. If neither observer reports their observations, the inconsistency
is unlikely to be recognized.
For example, in several incidents, groups of reghters have died when oors gave way
under them while they were searching for, or trying to extinguish, res on one level when
the main body of re was actually on the level below them. In some cases, other crews
were working on the lower level, aware of the re, but unaware that crews were working
directly above the re. At some incidents, individual reghters noted factors that indicated
the re was below them, such as a very hot oor or small res breaking out at the oor
level, but did not recognize the signicance of their observations until after the incident.
Deaths might have been avoided if information had been communicated in a manner
that caused the IC to recognize the situation and remove the crews who were operating
directly over the re.
Command support sta
Risk management responsibilities might be compromised if ocers within the incident
command structure do not have anyone to assist them with support functions, including
information support. An ocer responsible for supervising an area or function must be aware
of tactical activities taking place in that area, as well as the risk factors present. An ocer
who is preoccupied with managing information and resources could lose track of the actual
activities occurring within his or her areas of responsibility. That might become a problem
for the IC, as well as for supervisors at other levels of the incident management structure.
Information management is recognized as an important component of incident command.
An IC should have one or more assistants at the CP to assist in managing information
and handling communications (see Figure 4.5). There are specic responsibilities for
information management in the Incident Command System assigned to the Resource and
Situation Status Units.
75
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Figure 4.5 — During lengthy or complex operations, a variety of personnel may
be at the CP at any given time.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
A division or group ocer often requires one or more sta assistants to help keep track of
information (including accountability tracking) and to ensure that eective communications
are maintained with the incident command. A standard system for managing information at a
CP or within a sector is an important component of an eective incident management system.
Providing support
In many re departments, the responsibility for supporting the IC and sector ocers used
to be assigned to chiefs’ aides who acted as both chaueurs and sta assistants for chief
ocers. Budget constraints have caused many re departments to eliminate this position.
A variety of other approaches have been developed to provide an equivalent capability to
support Command Ocers at the scene of an incident.
One option is to dispatch additional Command Ocers to working incidents to assemble a
command support sta who can eectively manage incidents. Some departments routinely
dispatch as many as four chief ocers to working one-alarm res to ll predesignated
sta positions, including planning chief, staging ocer and safety ocer. They may be
supplemented by a mobile CP that responds with its own crew to perform command support
and information management functions (see Figures 4.6 a and b). Another option is to
train and dispatch predesignated companies to perform this function at working incidents.
76
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Figures 4.6 a and b — Larger incidents may require the use of a specially-
designed mobile CP vehicle.
Photos courtesy of Mike Wieder, Stillwater, OK.
Command support systems
To control the information necessary to manage an incident, re departments should use
these systematic approaches:
ĵ Standardized tactical reference worksheets.
ĵ Status boards.
ĵ Manual and computerized accountability tracking systems.
A standard approach allows for incidents to be expanded or contracted, for command
to be transferred, and for the command structure to be adjusted without losing track of
important information. All forms and systems should be designed for upward integration,
so information developed early can be easily incorporated into an expanding command
support system if the incident grows.
Command support systems should be user-friendly and should use color and format to
visually assist the user in organizing information. Forms and worksheets can be designed
to provide reminders and guide the user through complex situations, with check boxes
to indicate that functions have been addressed and blanks to ll in information. Where
appropriate, forms should include spaces for drawn-in diagrams and sketches or for
preprinted plans, maps, data sheets or printouts from computer systems. The walls of CP
vehicles should be set up to locate the same information in the same place every time with
“free form” space left for unusual information that could be important for unusual incidents.
All components of a command support system should t together. Sector ocers should
have clipboards with grease pencils or writing instruments that can be used outdoors,
regardless of the weather. When passport accountability systems are used, individual
name tags should t onto company or team boards. The company boards should t onto
sector boards, and there should be designated spaces on the walls of CP vehicles to mount
the sector boards (see Figure 4.7). If information is stored in computers, it should be
formatted to print out in a format that is compatible with other forms and worksheets.
77
Chapter 4: Managing Information
Figure 4.7 — Accountability tags are placed in the upper right-hand corner of the
command board.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
Forms and worksheets should provide a record of an incident that will be valuable for
critiques and analysis. The rst priority should be to assist Command Ocers and COs in
managing incidents eectively, safely and eciently. The ocer who concentrates on lling
out forms perfectly might fall into the trap of failing to manage the incident or the risks.
Special information management considerations
Hazardous materials
Fire departments should require occupancies
that process, store or use hazardous materials to
submit inventory information and Material Safety
Data Sheets (see Figure 4.8). Fire departments
should have systems that make such information
immediately available to units responding to a
reported incident at that location. Preincident
information should include the following:
ĵ Location of hazardous materials.
ĵ How it is stored.
ĵ How much of it is stored/used.
ĵ Proper handling techniques.
Figure 4.8 — A typical structure
containing a 704 marking.
Photo courtesy of IFSTA/Fire Protection Publications.
78
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
The information should also include the following:
ĵ Appropriate emergency actions.
ĵ Personal protective clothing and equipment requirements.
ĵ Evacuation requirements and distances.
ĵ Any other information that would be signicant in the event of an emergency.
One of the advantages of preincident planning is that it provides for all the time needed to fully
research a situation before it occurs. Instead of attempting to obtain and interpret information
about a hazardous material that is already involved in an active incident, the research can
be conducted in cooperation with the party responsible for the premises and with access
to every available expert and source of information. A re department might not be able to
anticipate every situation that can occur with hazardous materials, but it should be able to
assemble enough information to be prepared for most incidents that occur in xed facilities.
Technical rescue planning
Advance planning and practice can increase the safety of all types of technical rescue
operations. Although such incidents can present many complex and unpredictable
challenges, some factors are predictable. SOPs should be developed for specic types
of operations, and their application should be incorporated in preincident plans for the
locations where those incidents can be anticipated. Particular attention should be directed
toward locations where the potential need for technical rescue operations can be anticipated:
ĵ Major construction sites.
ĵ Bridge and tunnels.
ĵ Popular recreational climbing areas.
ĵ Swift-water boating areas.
It is also possible to develop an SOP for a specic type of technical rescue incident that
can be applied at any location. An SOP is a generic preincident plan which is applicable or
adaptable to a variety of situations.
Conned spaces
Occupancies where workers occasionally enter areas, or equipment that meets the denition
of a conned space, are required to make provisions for rescue. In addition, they must make
the location available to the designated rescue team for familiarization and training. Conned
space entry certicates are required for entrants and will provide essential information about
the space and the hazards. When a re department is made aware of this type of hazard, the
full procedure that would be used for entry into the conned space should be researched,
planned, documented and practiced. The rescue plan should be regularly reviewed for
training purposes by the companies that would be expected to respond to the location.
Intelligence
One of the most dicult problems for re departments is how to deal with information related
to homeland security threats. It would be dicult to justify withholding this information from
the re suppression forces because advance notice could allow them to identify hazards and
avoid unnecessary risk if an anticipated incident actually occurs. However, it is critical that the
re department is a key stakeholder in the threat/vulnerability assessment with appropriate
law enforcement to plan, mitigate and prepare for any potential incidents that may occur.
79
Chapter 4: Managing Information
In some special cases, the appropriate law enforcement tactic might be to establish
surveillance over the property in an eort to capture an arsonist in the act. That is
particularly true when information is condential and the case is part of a major conspiracy.
When that happens, re suppression units that would respond to the location should be
advised of the threat and the surveillance. They should review all available preincident plan
information. To develop a preincident plan, a determination would have to be made if their
presence at the location would jeopardize the investigation. That is a special form of a risk
management decision that would occur in advance of a re or other emergency situation.
Summary
To be eective, risk management decisions must be based on accurate, timely and complete
information about hazards that are present and signicant. Managing information must
be an organizational priority to properly protect our responders and our communities.
Fire departments should design and implement management information systems that
enable preincident planning and on-site incident risk management.
Paper-based systems can be eective, but modern information technology is rapidly
developing more ecient and more eective ways to provide ICs with information that
helps them recognize, evaluate and control risks during emergencies (such as integrated
plans tied to the CAD system).
Communication up, down and across the incident chain of command is essential to make
maximum use of all available information, to facilitate the risk management process, and
to prevent loss and injury. At all times, ICs must be aware of special circumstances and
conditions at each emergency location that could aect risk management decisions.
80
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
81
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
Community risk reduction is the proactive process that re and emergency service
organizations can implement by using appropriate data to understand the primary
hazards and risks that are aecting their communities. Community risk reduction is an
all-hazard, systematic, communitywide approach that builds partnerships and educational
opportunities to provide solutions to the changing needs that challenge the community’s
vitality, citizens and businesses.
This chapter also addresses the following portions of the NFFF’s 16 FLSIs:
ĵ
Initiative 3: Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident
management at all levels, including strategic, tactical and planning responsibilities.
ĵ
Initiative 14: Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a
critical re and life safety program.
ĵ
Initiative 15: Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the
installation of home re sprinklers.
What is community risk reduction?
According to NFPA 1035, Standard on Fire and Life Safety Educator, Public Information Ocer,
Youth Firesetter Intervention Specialist and Youth Firesetter Program Manager Professional
Qualications, community risk reduction is dened as “programs, actions and services
used by a community, which prevent or mitigate the loss of life, property and resources
associated with life safety, re and other disasters within a community.”
Community risk reduction is nothing new to re and emergency services; however, due
to changes in the community, leadership, nancial impacts or other priorities, numerous
re and life safety programs have not been able to be sustained or are no longer relevant.
Community risk reduction creates goodwill within your community, helps communities
face new and emerging hazards, increases reghter safety, and is proactive in building
support before an incident occurs.
In 1947, President Truman commissioned the “President’s Conference on Fire Prevention”
that reviewed and raised awareness about the re problem and introduced the three
E’s (Education, Enforcement and Engineering) to the re industry, which was a way to
help reduce risks in a systematic order. Later, the National Fire Academy (NFA) would
add economic incentive and emergency response to the list, due to the importance in
community risk reduction.
In 1972, President Nixon convened the National Commission on Fire Prevention and
Control and produced the report “America Burning,” which provided recommendations
to reduce losses and increase safety to citizens and reghting personnel. In 1987 and
2002, the “America Burning” report was reviewed and updated. However, many of the
recommendations from any of the versions still have not been fully implemented.
82
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Currently, the NFPA has developed other standards and a guide that help share the
framework of community risk reduction:
ĵ
NFPA 1300, Standard on Community Risk Assessment and Community Risk Reduction
Plan Development, covers requirements on the process to conduct a community risk
assessment and to develop, implement and evaluate a community risk-reduction plan.
ĵ
NFPA 1452, Guide for Training Fire Service Personnel to Conduct Community Risk Reduction,
helps re departments design and implement a dwelling re safety survey as part of
a communitywide, all-hazards risk-reduction program to protect lives and property.
The guide applies in both rural and urban communities, and serves as a manual for
establishing a locally prepared community risk-reduction program designed to address
specic problems faced by local re service organizations.
When fully implemented and adopted by an organization, community risk reduction helps
to do the following:
ĵ Identify risks.
ĵ Prioritize risks.
ĵ Determine how to prevent/mitigate risks.
ĵ Focus eorts.
ĵ Become more of a community player.
ĵ Provide value-added services.
ĵ Improve quality of life for the community.
Steps of a successful community risk-reduction program
It is critical that organizations follow a step-by-step process to develop a successful and
sustainable community risk-reduction program. Too many times, organizations develop
a program after an incident or incidents occur that are temporary, without truly dening
the root causes and needed changes to reduce the risks or hazards to the community and
eect change (see Figure 5.1).
83
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
Figure 5.1 — The goal of community risk reduction is to prevent critical losses
within the jurisdiction.
Photo courtesy of Ron Jeers, Union City, NJ.
Steps to a successful program:
ĵ Conduct a community analysis.
ĵ Develop partnerships in a community.
ĵ Create a strategy to solve a problem.
ĵ Implement the strategy in the community.
ĵ Evaluate the results.
The needs assessment of the target population is the process of collecting and analyzing
information and developing an understanding of the issues, resources and constraints. The
assessment’s purpose is to determine whether the needs of the people are being met. It is
critical that community members should be involved with the entire planning process. Target
population and stakeholder involvement is necessary during the planning and implementation
stage. This involvement of target population members helps develop program ownership
and provides critical insight that could make or break the program’s eorts.
The community risk-reduction program needs to have a separate mission statement, which
is a narrative statement describing the focus of the program from the overall organizations.
This is critical to make sure everyone understands the operations.
Next, the development of program goals that are SMART (Specic, Measurable, Attainable,
Realistic and Time framed) and shared with all stakeholders will determine if the program
becomes successful or not. Developing goals and objectives are necessary for all to
understand the importance and to provide a road map to a successful, sustainable program.
Basing a new program on other successful programs is important. A review of the professional
literature and other documents will help generate a list of potential interventions.
84
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Selecting appropriate interventions to an identied problem through data, research and
community involvement is critical for the program’s success and acceptance. The plan
evaluation is a continuous process and a step that is often not accomplished to its fullest
potential. Selecting evaluation methods and questions that will facilitate process, impact
and outcomes will make the program sustainable in reducing the risks.
It is important to test interventions with a small group that represents the target population
and helps identify potential aws or problems with the intervention. Information from
this step can help make corrections that streamline resources and time.
Finally, evaluation of a program is necessary for an organization to determine the worth
or value of the intervention eort. It is important to note it may take years to start seeing
a change in programs and goals, so emergency service leadership needs to be committed.
Implementation of a community risk-reduction program
In 2016, the NFPA Urban Fire and Life Safety Task Force developed a white paper titled
“Community Risk Reduction: Doing More with More,” which assists in helping re service
leaders gain management support for launching a community risk-reduction program in
their departments. To fully integrate all re protection strategies, the white paper states
that re departments that adopt a community risk-reduction program need to involve the
community in problem-solving and strategic implementation, prevent LODDs and injuries,
and ensure the survival of the organization.
It is critical that the organizations develop a unied plan that is both strategic and tactical
with all internal and external community stakeholders. The following is an example of a
case study by the NFA on the process, resources and time commitment required to develop,
implement and evaluate a proactive approach to community risks.
85
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
Sample community risk-reduction plan
IMPLEMENTATION/EVALUATION PLAN
Central City Life Safety Coalition Bike Safety Program
Vision:
Central City will be one of the safest communities in the region.
Problem Statement:
The problem is Central City has a high rate of bicycle incidents involving children
between the ages of 10 and 18, as compared to similar communities.
Goal:
To decrease the number of bicycle incidents involving children between the ages of
10 and 18 in Central City.
Outcome Objectives
By December 2021, reduce bicycle injuries requiring hospitalization to children
between the ages of 10 and 18 in Central City from 18.6 per 10,000 population in 2016
to 15.9 per 10,000 population. Target setting method 20 percent. Evaluation methods:
EMS reports, hospital records and anecdotes. (Example uses rates per 10,000.)
or
As compared to baseline data, the following changes will have occurred: By December
2021, there will be a 20 percent reduction in bicycle injuries requiring hospitalization
to children ages 10 to 18 in Central City. Evaluation methods: EMS reports, hospital
records and anecdotes.
By December 2021, there will be a 20 percent reduction in bicycle vehicle collisions
involving children ages 10 to 18 cycling in Central City. Evaluation methods: EMS
reports, police reports and anecdotes.
Impact Objectives
By June 2018, the Central City Department of Public Works will have installed
signage for bicycle routes throughout the city. Evaluation measure: signs installed.
Interventions: Education and Engineering.
By August 2018, the local school board will adopt a state-approved K-12 health and
safety curriculum with emphasis on highway safety in general, and bicycle safety
in particular. Evaluation measure: adoption of curriculum. Intervention: Education.
By January 2019, the Central City Council will have adopted a bike helmet law for
children ages 18 and under. Evaluation measure: passage of law. Interventions:
Education, Engineering and Enforcement.
By January 2019, each public and private school in Central City will adopt and enforce
written policies requiring safe bicycle practices to and from school, including proper
use of bicycle helmets on school property. Evaluation measures: adoption and
enforcement of policies. Interventions: Education, Engineering and Enforcement.
86
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
By January 2019, the Central City Council will have adopted a citywide o-road
bicycle trail.
By June 2019, the Central City Police Department will begin enforcing bicycle laws and
all laws that aect the safety of bicyclists, including those aimed at aggressive drivers.
Evaluation measure: enforcement of law. Interventions: Education and Enforcement.
By December 2020, the Department of Public Works will have marked lanes for on-
road bicycle routes in Central City. Evaluation measure: Adoption of bicycle trail.
Interventions: Education and Engineering.
As compared to baseline data, the following changes will have occurred: By September
2020, there will be a 50 percent increase in the number of children ages 10 to 18 who
wear bike helmets and wear them correctly. Evaluation methods: observational surveys,
self-report surveys, and pretests and post-tests. Interventions: Education, Engineering
and Enforcement.
By December 2020, there will be a 50 percent increase in the number of children
ages 10 to 18 who know rules of the road as they pertain to cycling. Evaluation
methods: observational surveys, self-report surveys, and pretests and post-tests.
Intervention: Education.
By December 2020, there will be a 50 percent increase in the number of children
ages 10 to 18 who obey all trac signs, signals and other trac control devices.
Evaluation methods: observational surveys, self-report surveys, and pretests and
post-tests. Intervention: Education.
By December 2020, there will be a 60 percent increase in the number of bicycles
outtted with safety equipment required by law. Evaluation methods: observational
surveys, self-report surveys, and pretests and post-tests. Interventions: Engineering
and Enforcement.
By December 2020, there will be a 50 percent increase in the number of parents/
caregivers who can name three ways their children can be safe bike riders. Evaluation
methods: pretests and post-tests. Intervention: Education.
Process Objectives
Starting January 2018, the project coordinator will monitor changes in the prevalence,
incidence and severity of child bicycle injuries by collecting and analyzing data from
city EMS run report data, the county medical examiner’s logs on fatalities, trauma
registry data on children treated in three hospital emergency rooms and local clinics,
police reports, and city trac engineering department reports. Evaluation methods:
injury/loss statistics and anecdotes. Intervention: Education.
By January 2018, the coalition will have drafted legislation requiring children ages
18 and under to wear bike helmets when cycling. Evaluation method: drafting of
legislation. Intervention: Enforcement.
By April 2018, the project coordinator will begin implementing a social media campaign
to raise awareness about bike safety and use various mediums to reach the target
audience throughout the life of the program. Evaluation methods: counting number
of tweets, tags, posts, news releases and articles, and estimating percent of public
receiving the communications. Intervention: Education.
87
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
By June 2018, the coalition will develop a calendar to conduct regular meetings to
review crash trends and to provide guidance in implementation. Evaluation measure:
number of meetings planned.
By September 2018, the coalition will have acquired 300 bicycle helmets and developed
a plan for distribution. Evaluation measures: counting number of helmets distributed.
Intervention: Education, Engineering and Economic incentive.
By September 2018, the coalition will get approval from local schools to install two bike
racks at each school by the end of the fall semester. Evaluation measure: approvals.
Interventions: Education and Economic incentive.
By September 2018, the project coordinator will receive commitment from local
merchants to oer discounts on bicycle helmets and display posters.
By October 2018, the project coordinator will have received permission from the school
board to expand the program to three additional schools in Cleveland Park. Evaluation
measures: letter of agreement and adoption of curriculum. Intervention: Education.
By October 2018, the station commander at the Cleveland Park Station, with the
assistance of the coalition, will have begun conducting three bike rodeos a year
(2018 to 2021) and will oer bike helmets to those qualifying. Evaluation measures:
estimating number of people in attendance, number of helmets given away, number
of children going through bike rodeo course. Interventions: Education, Engineering
and Economic incentive.
By November 2018, the coalition will provide training to law enforcement personnel
on eective measures to reduce crashes among bicyclists. Evaluation measure:
training law enforcement personnel. Intervention: Education.
By December 2018, the project coordinator will recommend that the board of
education adopt a specic health and safety education curriculum to address highway
safety in general, and bicycle safety in particular, that meets state-approved K through
12 health and safety objectives. Evaluation measure: recommendation made to board
of education. Intervention: Education.
By December 2018, each member of the coalition will have conducted a training/
presentation to a local government agency or a community group about the bicycle
safety program. Evaluation measure: counting. Intervention: Education.
By January 2019, the project coordinator will have trained teachers in the three
additional schools to use the curriculum consisting of classroom instruction, skill
training in trac, correct t of helmets, and reinforcement by parents/caregivers.
Evaluation measures: skill testing, counting and questionnaires. Intervention: Education.
By December 2020, the coalition will have distributed 300 bicycle helmets to
children between the ages of 10 and 16 in Cleveland Park who participate in the
free and reduced lunch program, and will have provided education about use, t
and maintenance of bicycles and bicycle helmets. Evaluation measure: counting
number of bicycle helmets distributed. Interventions: Education, Engineering and
Economic incentive.
88
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
Formative Objectives
By April 2017, the Life Safety Coalition will have conducted a community risk
assessment of Central City. Evaluation measure: risk assessment conducted.
By April 2017, the Life Safety Coalition will select the risk issue and target population to
address in Central City. Evaluation measures: risk issue and target population selected.
By May 2017, the Life Safety Coalition will identify core stakeholders in Central City
and the Cleveland Park District to join the bicycle safety program. Evaluation measure:
stakeholders identied.
By August 2017, the Life Safety Coalition will develop goals, interventions and objectives
for the bicycle safety program. Evaluation measure: goals, interventions and objectives
developed.
By September 2017, the Life Safety Coalition will begin a fundraising campaign to raise
$10,000 to purchase helmets for children and props for bicycle rodeos. Evaluation
measure: fundraising campaign initiated.
By January 2018, the coalition will have developed culturally relevant and multilingual
materials and resources to promote bicycle safety. Evaluation measure: development
of materials.
By April 2018, the project coordinator will have trained all reghters in the Central
City stations on bike safety, how to conduct a bike rodeo, and t helmets. Evaluation
measure: training.
By April 2018, the coalition will have identied one elementary school to pilot the
bicycle safety program. Evaluation measure: pilot selection.
By September 2018, the project coordinator will have trained teachers in the pilot
school to use the curriculum consisting of classroom instruction, skill training in
trac, correct t of helmets, and reinforcement to be given by parents/caregivers.
Evaluation methods: skill testing, counting and questionnaires.
By October 2018, teachers in the pilot program will have taught lessons on bike safety
and will have conducted pilot testing of students. Evaluation measure: lesson taught.
By October 2018, the project coordinator will have received commitment from local
merchants to oer discounts on bicycle helmets and display posters. Evaluation
measure: commitment from merchants.
By December 2018, the project coordinator and coalition will review various health
and safety education curricula and textbooks to ensure that highway safety in general,
and bicycle safety in particular, are included in the state-approved K through 12
health and safety curriculum.
By January 2019, the project coordinator, with the assistance of the coalition, will
review materials and make changes based on teachers’ recommendations. Evaluation
measure: review of materials.
89
Chapter 5: Community Risk Reduction
Summary
Community risk reduction is a gateway to the reinvention of the re service culture. It
requires buy-in from the top and strong visionary leadership to champion needed change
and navigate the process.
The continued goal of reducing risks within communities is particularly challenging in
the face of increased growth demands, changing demographics, emerging hazards, and
budget constraints.
Implementing a successful community risk-reduction program brings additional resources to
the eort through partnerships within the re department, as well as the community served.
This community-based approach increases public safety because of the collective work
with the community to understand, assess and provide inclusive solutions to community
safety issues.
It is critical that we develop sustainable, timely and proactive programs for all ages on the
community risks that we face every day so we can answer that everlasting question and the
media can report on the positive and heroic outcomes of disasters, versus the tragic ones.
There have been decades of written after-action reports to major incidents, best practices,
development of building and re codes, re safety research and security prevention programs.
The majority of the time, it is developed and shared after a major incident. We need to
develop community risk-reduction programs that can be an integral part of all the stages
of our lives, from preschool to nursing home, so everyone can be an advocate every day.
Our world changes every day, and new threats arise. One thing that remains over the
centuries is the dedication of professionals around the country willing to sacrice themselves
to help others. Today needs to be the day to truly start making our countries more proactive
in risk reduction and crisis management. We all need to start making re, life safety and
security education a priority on an international level, with a consistent message that
empowers local jurisdictions and citizens of all ages to understand the impacts and aect
change without waiting for the next major incident to happen.
90
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
91
References
References
Brunacini, Alan. (2002). Fire command: The essentials of local IMS. National Fire Protection
Association.
FEMA & NFA. (2016,). Student Manual. Leadership Strategies strategies for Community
community Risk risk Reduction reduction (3rd ed.). Emmitsburg, MD: Author.
Kipp, Jonathan D. & Loin, Murrey E. (1996). Emergency incident risk management: A safety
& health perspective.
“Management.” (n.d.). In Webster’s New World Dictionary.
NFFF. (2004). 16 Fireghter life safety initiatives.
NFPA. (2015). NFPA 1035, Standard on re and life safety educator, public information ocer,
youth resetter intervention specialist and youth resetter program manager professional
qualications. Quincy, MA: Author.
NFPA. (2015). NFPA 1250, Recommended practices in re and emergency service organization
risk management. Quincy, MA: Author.
NFPA. (2018). NFPA 1500, Standard on fire department occupational safety, health, and
wellness program. Quincy, MA: Author.
Routley, J. Gordon, Chiaramonte, Michael D., Crawford, Brian A., Piringer, Peter A.,
Roche,Kevin M., & Sendelbach, Timothy E. (2008). Fireghter fatality investigative report:
Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007.
“Risk.” (n.d.). In New Oxford American Dictionary.
Thygerson, V.A.L., Thygerson, S. M., & Thygerson, J. S. (2008). Injury prevention (3rd ed.).
Jones & Bartlett Learning.
92
Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service
93
Appendix: Organizations and Sources Providing Risk Management Information
Appendix: Organizations and
Sources Providing Risk Management
Information
American Society of Safety Engineers
http://www.asse.org/
Emergency Management Institute
https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx
National Fallen Fireghters Foundation
Everyone Goes Home
https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/
Fire Department Safety Ocers Association
https://www.fdsoa.org/
International Association of Fire Chiefs
https://www.iafc.org/
International Association of Fire Fighters
http://client.prod.ia.org/
International Fire Service Training Association
https://www.ifsta.org/
International City/County Management Association
https://icma.org/
International Code Council
https://www.iccsafe.org/
National Fire Academy
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/training/nfa/
National Fire Protection Association
http://www.nfpa.org/
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
National Safety Council
http://www.nsc.org/pages/home.aspx
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
https://www.osha.gov/
Public Risk Management Association
http://www.primacentral.org/
Risk Management Society, Inc.
https://www.rims.org/Pages/Default.aspx
95
Acronyms
Acronyms
CAD computer-aided dispatch
CO Company Ocer
CP Command Post
DOL Department of Labor
EMS Emergency Medical Services
FLSIs Fireghter Life Safety Initiatives
IAP Incident Action Plan
ICs Incident Commanders
IFSTA International Fire Service Training Association
LODDs line-of-duty deaths
NFA National Fire Academy
NFFF’s National Fallen Fireghters Foundation’s
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSU Oklahoma State University
PASS personal alert safety system
PPE personal protective equipment
RITs Rapid Intervention Teams
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus
SOGs standard operating guidelines
SOPs standard operating procedures
USFA U.S. Fire Administration
16825 South Seton Ave.
Emmitsburg, MD 21727
www.usfa.fema.gov
January 2018
