Fidelity Stewart Administrative Complaint (Public)

181 0127

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS: Joseph J. Simons, Chairman

Noah Joshua Phillips

Rohit Chopra

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter

Christine S. Wilson

In the Matter of

Fidelity National Financial, Inc.,

a corporation

Docket No. 9385

and

REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION

Stewart Information Services

Corporation,

a corporation.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), and by

virtue of the authority vested in it by the FTC Act, the Federal Trade Commission

(“Commission”), having reason to believe that Respondents Fidelity National Financial, Inc.

(“Fidelity”) and Stewart Information Services Corporation (“Stewart”) have executed a merger

agreement in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which if consummated

would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and Section 5 of the

FTC Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be

in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint pursuant to Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, 15

U.S.C. § 45(b), and Section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b), stating its charges as

follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

Respondents Fidelity and Stewart are two of the four largest title insurance

underwriters in the United States. Title insurance protects customers and lenders in real estate

transactions from defects in the property’s title. Title insurance policies issue in nearly every

real estate transaction in the United States. A title insurance underwriter bears the risk

underlying each one of those policies.

Four underwriters dominate the U.S. title insurance industry. The industry

recognizes these players as the “Big 4”: Fidelity, Stewart, First American Title Insurance

Company (“First American”), and Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (“Old

Republic”). On a national level, the Big 4 account for more than 85 percent of all title insurance

sales. The individual shares of the Big 4 vary by state. A merged Fidelity-Stewart would

account for more than 43 percent of national sales on its own. No underwriter outside of the Big

4 exceeds 3.5 percent of the sales nationwide.

Fidelity’s proposed merger with Stewart (the “Merger”) is the latest in a series of

transactions that have consolidated the title insurance industry, and would reduce the Big 4 to a

Big 3. This increase in concentration is likely to result in anticompetitive harm. As the former

Chairman of Stewart’s Board of Directors observed in 2016, “The industry has shrunk

considerably to just 4 companies with double digit market power. Further consolidation at the

top 2 companies could lead to a duopoly . . . .”

The Big 4 are the only underwriters that meaningfully compete to provide title

insurance for large commercial transactions. For purposes of this Complaint, large commercial

transactions are commercial real estate transactions involving title insurance liability amounts

greater than $20 million. Despite motivated efforts, smaller underwriters have been unable to

establish themselves as viable competitors for these large commercial transactions. Post-Merger,

these transactions will be vulnerable to anticompetitive effects. Competitive harm is also

possible for transactions below this liability threshold.

The Merger also will increase concentration and reduce competition in relevant

markets for title information services. Title information services refers to the provision of access

to information contained in title plants—detailed information about the chain of title to

individual properties, indexed to facilitate efficient title searches for underwriting purposes.

Title information services are important as a standalone product and as a critical input to the

provision of title insurance. Fidelity and Stewart provide title information services via title

plants they own, jointly or individually. In at least fourteen relevant geographic markets, three or

fewer providers of title information services will remain post-Merger and the Merger likely

would result in increased prices or reduced quality for title information services.

Fidelity is the largest of the Big 4 underwriters. Fidelity has gained this position

in large part through a series of acquisitions. In 1996, Fidelity became the fourth-largest

underwriter by acquiring Nations Title. In 2000, Fidelity became the nation’s largest underwriter

by purchasing Chicago Title. In 2008, Fidelity became even larger by purchasing

LandAmerica’s title insurance brands out of bankruptcy. In at least 27 states and the District of

Columbia, Fidelity holds in excess of 40% of the large commercial title insurance market and has

the greatest share of large commercial transactions in 28 states and the District of Columbia.

Stewart is also a member of the Big 4. Stewart has earned a reputation among

market participants for being more creative and flexible in providing title insurance—to the

benefit of its customers—and for selling title insurance at lower prices than the other Big 4

underwriters.

The Merger is likely to lessen substantially competition in the provision of title

insurance to large commercial customers. After the Merger, the market for title insurance

underwriting for large commercial transactions will be highly concentrated in every U.S. state

and the District of Columbia, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) greater than 2,500.

In at least 42 states and the District of Columbia, the merger is presumptively

unlawful, as the Merger will result in a highly concentrated market and an increase in the HHI

concentration measure of more than 200 points. For example, in Alaska, Idaho, Maryland, New

Mexico, and Virginia, the Merger results in increases of more than 1,000 points and a final HHI

of more than 4,000 points. Under the thresholds established by the U.S. Department of Justice

and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“HMG”), these states will

experience an increase in concentration giving rise to a presumption of enhanced market power.

Reducing the Big 4—the “only real players on the commercial side,” per one key

Fidelity executive—to the Big 3 threatens significant harm to customers purchasing title

insurance for large commercial transactions. By merging with one of its closest rivals, Fidelity

will eliminate an important competitor, entrenching and likely increasing the effectiveness of the

existing oligopoly, and eliminating valuable head-to-head competition where it remains today.

Stewart has shown a greater willingness to undercut the other Big 4 underwriters

on price, or offer more favorable coverage terms, in order to win business. Even within this

four-firm “oligopoly,” Fidelity has been forced to reduce its prices in response to Stewart.

Stewart also finds creative ways to mitigate or assume risk in order to compete for business and

has been willing to provide coverage where Fidelity and others in the Big 4 have declined to do

so unless the customers can meet additional burdensome conditions. Where the current

oligopoly has already softened competition, Stewart’s approach has prompted others in the Big 4

to adjust their own competitive strategies to the benefit of customers.

New entry or expansion by existing market participants would not be timely,

likely, or sufficient to counteract the anticompetitive effects of the Merger. There are significant

barriers to entry into markets for the provision of title insurance for large commercial

transactions and the provision of title information services, including securing state licensure,

necessary capital, a national geographic footprint, and proven experience in handling large

commercial transactions. These barriers make entry or expansion difficult, and incapable of

constraining the merged entity. High entry barriers also make timely and sufficient entry

unlikely in the relevant markets for title information services.

Respondents cannot show cognizable efficiencies that would offset the likely and

substantial competitive harm from the Merger.

JURISDICTION

Respondents are, and at all relevant times have been, engaged in activities in or

affecting “commerce” as defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, and Section 1 of

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12.

The Merger constitutes a merger subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15

U.S.C. § 18.

RESPONDENTS

Fidelity is a for-profit, publicly traded corporation existing and doing business

under and by virtue of the laws of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business

located at 601 Riverside Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32204. Fidelity is the country’s largest

title insurance company. It underwrites title insurance under several brands, including Fidelity

National Title Insurance Company, Chicago Title Insurance Company, Commonwealth Land

Title Insurance Company, Alamo Title Insurance, and National Title Insurance of New York,

Inc. Fidelity issues policies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Through a subsidiary,

Fidelity also owns title plant assets throughout the United States. In 2018, Fidelity’s revenues

totaled $7.594 billion, of which $7.526 billion derived from title premiums, escrow, title

information services, and other fees related to the provision of title insurance.

Stewart is a for-profit, publicly traded corporation existing and doing business

under and by virtue of the laws of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business

located at 1360 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 100, Houston, Texas 77056. In the United States, Stewart

provides title insurance and related services through its subsidiaries, Stewart Title Guaranty

Company and Stewart Title Insurance Company. Stewart issues policies in all 50 states and the

District of Columbia. Stewart and its affiliates own title plant assets throughout the United

States. In 2018, Stewart’s revenues totaled $1.907 billion, of which $1.837 billion came from its

title-related business services, including title information services.

THE ACQUISITION

Pursuant to a merger agreement dated March 18, 2018 (“Merger Agreement”),

Fidelity seeks to acquire Stewart for 50 percent cash and 50 percent Fidelity common stock, in a

transaction valued at $1.2 billion. Respondents’ combined revenues from title-related business

services exceed $9.3 billion.

INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

Title insurance is an insurance product that protects the policyholder from

financial loss resulting from third-party claims or liens on the insured property. The owner or

buyer of real estate typically purchases title insurance in conjunction with a variety of other

services essential to closing a real estate transaction, and pays a one-time premium at closing.

There are two types of title insurance policies. A title insurance policy that

protects the owner of a property is called an owner’s policy; a title insurance policy that protects

the mortgage lender is called a lender’s policy. Typically, the owner or buyer of real estate

purchases both the owner’s policy and the lender’s policy.

The vast majority of real estate transactions in the United States result in the

issuance of a title insurance policy, whether the underlying property is residential or commercial

in character. Residential properties include single-family homes, individual condominium units,

multi-unit residential buildings with up to four units, and individual vacant residential lots.

Commercial properties include everything else, including larger multi-family residential

properties, such as apartment buildings.

Underwriters deliver title insurance through direct operations and agency

operations. In direct operations, underwriters issue title insurance directly to property buyers and

lenders. In agency operations, an independent title agent issues the title insurance policy on

behalf of an underwriter—known as “writing on the underwriter’s paper.” The underwriter on

whose paper the policy is written bears the risk underlying the policy. Agents often maintain

relationships with multiple underwriters, enabling them to choose which underwriter’s paper to

use for each individual transaction.

A customer typically places an order for a title insurance policy at or near the start

of a real estate transaction. After receiving an order, the underwriter or its agent conducts a title

search to identify potential title defects or other encumbrances on the property, such as liens,

easements, usage restrictions, and transfer restrictions.

In many parts of the country, underwriters and their agents rely on title plants

when conducting the title search. If there is no title plant for a specific county, title searchers

must turn to less efficient options such as public institutions (e.g., county recorder and assessor

offices).

Once the title search is complete, the underwriter or title agent issues a title

commitment listing any defects found during the title search that will be excluded or excepted

from the final insurance policy unless cured before closing.

Customers prefer title insurance policies with fewer exceptions. As the real estate

transaction progresses, the customer may seek to convince an underwriter that an excepted risk

should be covered by the title insurance policy. In such situations, the underwriter may have to

spend additional resources working with the customer to understand the peculiarities of the

specific transaction.

Alternatively, an underwriter may be willing to accept additional risk for a fee by

allowing the customer to purchase an endorsement that provides coverage for a specified issue.

Underwriters may vary in the conditions they impose on the insured before agreeing to issue a

given endorsement.

An escrow officer or closer—often an employee of the underwriter or its agent—

conducts the closing in most real estate transactions. Upon closing, the escrow officer transfers

the funds from the buyer to the seller. At this time, the buyer pays the title insurance premium.

The underwriter then issues the final title insurance policy, either directly to the customer or

through an agent.

When an underwriter issues the title insurance policy directly, it retains the entire

title insurance premium and any additional fees (e.g., fees for endorsements). When an agent

issues the title insurance policy on behalf of an underwriter, the agent receives the entire

premium and additional fees. The agent then must remit a contractually established or

negotiated portion of this revenue to the underwriter. The division between the agent’s retained

revenue and the amount remitted to the underwriter is referred to as the “split.”

Each state and the District of Columbia independently regulates the provision of

title insurance. State regulators impose various restrictions on title insurance providers,

including licensing rules and regulations governing title insurance premiums and related fees.

In general, state regulation of title insurance premiums falls into one of three

categories:

a. Promulgated Rate: In three states (New Mexico, Florida, and Texas), certain

aspects of price and insurance coverages are set by the state. However, in no

promulgated-rate state is every aspect of price, quality, and service determined by

the state. For example, state regulations in New Mexico and Florida permit

underwriters to file a rate below the promulgated rate for approval by the state

regulator. Promulgated rate regimes do not establish requirements on many

important non-price aspects of title insurance underwriting, including the level of

service or the particular underwriting standards and conditions that an underwriter

may offer for any given transaction.

b. Filed Rate: In filed-rate states, title insurance underwriters file rate manuals for

approval by a state regulator. The rate manual establishes the underwriter’s title

insurance prices for transactions within each filed-rate state. These rate filings are

publicly available and accessible by competitors. Some filed-rate states permit

competing underwriters to file rates collectively through a rating bureau rather

than requiring each underwriter to submit an individual rate filing. In these rating

bureau states, underwriters may elect to file separate rates with lower prices if

they so choose, subject to state regulatory approval of the individual rate filing.

c. Negotiable Rate: In negotiable-rate states, title insurance underwriters determine

their prices or coverage on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Such transaction-

by-transaction negotiation also occurs for large commercial transactions in many

filed-rate states where state regulations permit underwriters to include

negotiability provisions in their filed rates. Respondents’ rate filings in many

states allow them to negotiate rates for transactions over a particular liability

threshold. Thus, in these states, underwriters may negotiate on a transaction-by-

transaction basis for many or all large commercial transactions.

RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS

Title Insurance Underwriting for Large Commercial Transactions

Title insurance underwriting for large commercial transactions is a relevant

product market. The industry recognizes that large commercial transactions have distinct

requirements from other commercial transactions and that the set of available suppliers for these

transactions is limited. Each of the Big 4 has a dedicated commercial division that focuses

specifically on servicing these transactions. While the industry is not always consistent in what

constitutes a large commercial transaction, for purposes of this complaint, a large commercial

transaction is a transaction resulting in a policy with a liability amount in excess of $20 million.

There is no substitute for title insurance. Most real estate transactions in the

United States involve financing from a lender, and most lenders require title insurance. Owners

and lenders cannot switch to any other product for the purpose of ensuring marketable title,

priority of liens, and the ability to sell the loan on the secondary market.

Commercial real estate transactions involve the sale or financing of non-

residential real property—essentially, any properties other than single-family homes, individual

condominium units, and multi-family residential buildings with four or fewer units. In

commercial transactions, property buyers or their counsel typically choose the title insurance

underwriter subject to lender approval.

Each large commercial transaction requires an individual title insurance order

with transaction-specific negotiation over a variety of terms. The negotiated terms may include

price, scope of coverage, service levels, and ancillary fees and services. This transaction-by-

transaction negotiation occurs regardless of whether a customer solicits multiple bids for a given

large commercial transaction. These individual negotiations allow suppliers to tailor specific

price and non-price terms for each large commercial transaction.

Underwriters receive information about the nature of the property and the liability

amount as part of the title insurance order. As a result, underwriters can distinguish large

commercial transactions from other transactions.

Property owners and lenders seeking title insurance for large commercial

transactions cannot use arbitrage to defeat a price increase. Each title insurance policy, though it

shares a common form and many similar terms with other policies, is a unique product resulting

from significant research into title defects for a specific property (or set of properties). Title

insurance policies guarantee the transfer of title in the underwritten transaction only; a new

policy must issue for subsequent transactions involving the same property.

Large commercial transactions are susceptible to harm due to a number of distinct

requirements, or strong customer preferences, that limit the underwriter options for these

transactions to the Big 4. In order to provide title insurance for large commercial transactions,

underwriters must meet several key requirements, including, but not limited to:

a. Financial strength: Customers purchasing title insurance for large commercial

transactions require an underwriter that has sufficient surplus to make the

policyholder whole in the event of a catastrophic title defect. Most states, and

many policyholders, limit the liability an underwriter may assume based on the

underwriter’s balance sheet.

b. Commercial expertise: For large commercial transactions, customers have a

strong preference for underwriters with significant, demonstrated expertise who

can handle any possible issue that may arise. Likewise, customers prefer to have

defects identified and adequately resolved prior to closing, rather than having to

file a claim after suffering financial loss because of an inexperienced underwriter.

c. National footprint: Customers with large commercial transactions often engage in

frequent transactions across the United States. These customers strongly prefer to

develop a relationship with an underwriter with a national footprint, allowing

them to turn to a single point of contact to coordinate procurement of title

insurance wherever they may need it. A single point of contact results in a more

efficient title procurement process for customers, as the underwriter can develop

familiarity with the customer’s business and real estate processes, and can also

provide pricing, coverage, and service benefits.

Title Information Services

Title information services refers to providing access to title plant information,

whether by direct access to title plants via ownership or subscription, or indirect access to

information contained in title plants (e.g., search services). Typically, title plants are specific to

a single county because the information contained in most title plants comes from county

records. In some metropolitan areas, however, a single title plant may cover multiple counties.

Title information services customers require property information covering the

county in which the property at issue is located, and title information services providers usually

provide access to title plants on a county-by-county basis. Title information services customers

cannot substitute title information services products that do not cover the relevant county for

ones that do.

Relevant product markets for title information services include, but are not limited

to, title information services covering the following counties or county-equivalents:

a. Santa Cruz County, Arizona;

b. Marin County, California;

c. Monterey and Santa Cruz Counties, California;

d. San Mateo County, California;

e. Sonoma County, California;

f. Fremont County, Colorado;

g. Gunnison County, Colorado;

h. Cook County, Illinois;

i. Cascade County, Montana;

j. Bernalillo, Sandoval, and Valencia Counties, New Mexico;

k. Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington Counties, Oregon;

l. Harris County, Texas;

m. Hays County, Texas; and

n. Cowlitz County, Washington.

There is no substitute for the provision of title information services covering these

counties or county-equivalent areas. In each case, county recorders and other public sources for

information pertaining to real estate are insufficient substitutes for title plants because of the

reduction in accuracy or increase in cost associated with using public records in place of a title

plant.

RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

Title Insurance Underwriting for Large Commercial Transactions

Each U.S. state and the District of Columbia constitutes a separate geographic

market for title insurance underwriting for large commercial transactions. For purposes of this

complaint, the relevant geographic markets are the 42 individual states and the District of

Columbia where the merger is presumptively anticompetitive, and the three states in which the

merger potentially raises significant competitive concerns. A full list of these states can be found

in Appendix A.

Most large commercial transactions occur within a single state. A customer

seeking to purchase title insurance for a property in a specific state or territory must purchase

title insurance from a title insurance underwriter (or the title insurance underwriter’s agent) who

is licensed to sell title insurance in that state. Each state imposes and enforces its own distinct

set of licensing and operational requirements, including risk limits, price regulation, and

coverage rules. In the event of a price increase for title insurance in an individual state,

customers cannot turn to an underwriter that is licensed in a different state or territory.

In addition, the impact of certain defects of title varies based upon state law. As a

result, it is not practicable for a customer seeking title insurance in one state to turn to a title

insurer who lacks expertise in that state to purchase title insurance.

Large commercial transactions that involve the simultaneous issuance of separate

title insurance policies in multiple states still require an underwriter capable of issuing separate

policies in every separate state involved. An underwriter cannot underwrite the entire transaction

unless it is able to issue policies in each individual state, and the underwriter must still comply

with each state’s individual pricing requirements when preparing the portfolio of policies.

To the extent that such multi-state transactions are analyzed in a geographic

market that is larger than individual states, the harm caused by the Merger would be magnified

by the broader market. Only the Big 4 have the personnel, scope of operations, broad and deep

licensure, and financial surplus necessary to service most such multi-state transactions.

Title Information Services

The relevant geographic markets for title information services may be as narrow

as the individual counties covered by the relevant title plants or may be as broad as the entire

world. Title information services are provided digitally in many counties, such that customers

may turn to a supplier located anywhere in the world provided the supplier’s title plant offers the

appropriate geographic coverage. Where title plants are maintained in analog form, however,

customers must be able to access the relevant information efficiently for manual review; thus,

they require local providers.

MARKET PARTICIPANTS

The Big 4 are the only practical alternatives for the vast majority of customers for

title insurance for large commercial transactions. Marketplace outcomes reflect these drastic

differences between the Big 4 and all other underwriters. From 2015 to 2018, the Big 4

underwrote transactions accounting for approximately 98 percent of all title insurance revenues

for large commercial transactions nationwide. Over the same time period, the Big 4 accounted

for at least 98 percent of title insurance revenues for large commercial transactions in 45 of the

50 individual states, as well as the District of Columbia.

The Big 4 are the only practical alternatives for customers with large commercial

transactions because they are the only underwriters with sufficient financial strength to bear the

risk associated with such transactions.

The primary measure of a title insurance underwriter’s financial strength is its

surplus. Surplus refers to the pool of assets each underwriter dedicates to cover potential claims

above its statutorily-required reserves. Surplus is a key determinant of the maximum amount of

liability that an underwriter may insure in any particular transaction, typically referred to as the

underwriter’s “single risk limit.” States, underwriters themselves, and sometimes customers

impose single risk limits on each underwriter.

Surplus levels are “critical to winning business” in the commercial segment,

according to a Stewart strategic planning document. Each of the Big 4 has a surplus greater than

$500 million. Fidelity has the largest with $1.79 billion in surplus. Stewart is third-largest with

$631 million in surplus. Outside the Big 4, only one underwriter exceeds $100 million in

surplus; the rest are below $65 million. Consistent with these surplus amounts, the Big 4 have

considerably larger single risk limits than other title insurance underwriters.

In order to insure a transaction that exceeds its single risk limit, the insurer must

use coinsurance or reinsurance. With reinsurance, a lead underwriter cedes risk above a

specified threshold to a reinsurer, which charges the underwriter an additional premium.

Customers for large commercial transactions often prefer not to purchase title insurance from a

smaller insurer that is dependent on reinsurance to cover potential claims. Reinsurance adds to

the complexity and risk of the transaction by adding an extra layer of insurance, which may

complicate the customer’s ability to recover in the event of a claim. Moreover, the reinsurance

premium adds additional cost that may ultimately pass through to the customer or render a bidder

uncompetitive against a larger insurer that is less dependent upon reinsurance.

With coinsurance, multiple underwriters enter into direct relationships with the

policyholder and each underwriter becomes liable for an agreed upon portion of the risk.

Customers for large commercial transactions often prefer not to purchase a coinsured title

insurance product because the product may have more administrative complications, a higher

price, or both.

In addition, lenders often require their borrowers to use the Big 4 for title

insurance for their large commercial transactions.

Market participants in the relevant markets for title information services vary by

the county of coverage but include title insurance underwriters, title agents, and data companies.

MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THE MERGER’S PRESUMPTIVE

ILLEGALITY

Title Insurance Underwriting for Large Commercial Transactions

Post-Merger, the combined entity would have a large share in most states and the

District of Columbia. In many states, Fidelity and Stewart’s combined market share for large

commercial transactions is greater than 50 percent; in most states, the combined market share is

greater than 40 percent. The Merger would greatly increase concentration in already highly

concentrated markets and is presumptively unlawful.

The HMG and courts use HHIs to measure concentration. HHIs are calculated by

totaling the squares of the market shares of every firm in the relevant market pre- and post-

merger. The HMG presume a transaction is likely to create or enhance market power—and is

presumptively illegal—when the post-merger HHI exceeds 2,500 and the merger increases the

HHI by more than 200 points. In at least 42 states and the District of Columbia, the Merger

leads to concentration levels and changes in concentration that make the Merger presumptively

unlawful.

In three states, the HHI increases by between 100 and 200 points and results in a

highly concentrated market. Under the HMG, a merger that results in an increase of this level

potentially raises significant competitive concerns and warrants scrutiny. In five states, the

market is already highly concentrated and the merger will not result in an HHI increase of 100 or

above.

In most state-level markets, the Merger also will result in a large increase in

concentration. For example, in Alaska, Idaho, Maryland, New Mexico, and Virginia, the Merger

results in a final HHI of more than 4,000 points and increases of more than 1,000 points. This

change is concentration is four times the level that leads with a presumption of illegality. In

Arizona, Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,

and North Carolina, the Merger results in a final HHI of more than 4,000 points and increases of

more than 200 points. In Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,

Pennsylvania, and Texas, the Merger results in a final HHI of more than 3,500 points and

increases of more than 650 points. In each of these markets, among others, the Merger is

presumptively unlawful.

In at least 30 states and the District of Columbia, the parties are two of the three

largest title insurers for large commercial transactions.

Title Information Services

The Merger is presumptively unlawful in no fewer than fourteen relevant title

information services markets. Each of these markets will be highly concentrated after the

Merger and will experience a large increase in concentration.

Post-Merger, three or fewer independent title plant providers will remain for title

information services covering at least the following six counties:

a. Fremont County, Colorado;

b. Gunnison County, Colorado;

c. Cook County, Illinois;

d. Santa Cruz County, Arizona;

e. Cascade County, Montana; and

f. Cowlitz County, Washington.

In eight other markets, by acquiring Stewart, Fidelity will gain control of at least

of the ownership interests in certain joint title plants offering title information

services. This ownership stake will confer to Fidelity control over joint plant operations,

allowing Fidelity to increase prices for, or diminish access to, the information contained in these

title plants. For example, the Merger will reduce the number of relevant owners, and grant

Fidelity an increased share in excess of , of the joint title plant that provides title

information services covering Bernalillo, Sandoval, and Valencia Counties, New Mexico. No

other provider offers comparable title information services in these counties.

ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS

Anticompetitive Harm in Markets for Title Insurance Underwriting for Large

Commercial Transactions

The Merger likely will result in anticompetitive harm to customers seeking title

insurance for large commercial transactions in 45 states and the District of Columbia. The forms

this harm may take, as well as the mechanisms by which it is likely to occur, vary by state and

state regulatory regime.

The Merger will eliminate significant head-to-head competition between Fidelity

and Stewart for individual large commercial transactions. Today, this competition between

Respondents benefits purchasers of title insurance. In addition, the elimination of Stewart as an

independent competitor will increase the ability and incentive of the remaining underwriters to

pursue tacitly a more cooperative strategy to the detriment of customers with large commercial

transactions.

Anticompetitive Harm in Markets for Title Information Services

The Merger also is likely to cause anticompetitive effects by combining

Respondents’ title information services assets.

As a result of the Merger, Fidelity will have greater incentive and ability to

increase prices or reduce access to its combined title plants covering no fewer than fourteen

counties or county-equivalent areas. In each such area, the Merger reduces the number of

remaining competitively significant players to three or fewer. Post-Merger, Fidelity would be

able to increase prices or reduce access to title information services either unilaterally or in

coordination with competing providers.

Respondents’ title plant assets are close substitutes in at least six counties

throughout the United States. The Merger eliminates significant direct, head-to-head

competition between Fidelity and Stewart for title information services covering these counties.

In at least eight counties or county-equivalent areas, Respondents own

overlapping interests in joint title plants that, when combined, will result in Fidelity controlling a

stake in the plant. In these counties, the Merger will increase the incentive and ability

of the joint plant owners to raise prices or reduce output for title information services. For

example, in Bernalillo, Sandoval, and Valencia Counties, New Mexico, Fidelity will increase its

ownership stake to control of a single joint plant offering subscription access to

third-party title companies. Post-Merger, at most three joint owners will remain in the plant.

With control of Stewart’s ownership share, Fidelity will need the agreement of one additional

joint plant owner to increase subscription fees.

LACK OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS

Barriers to Entry and Expansion

No other firm is likely to replace the loss of competition from the Merger.

Respondents cannot show, post-Merger, that any firm is likely to replace the competition

provided by Stewart.

Respondents cannot demonstrate that new entry or expansion by existing firms

would be timely, likely, or sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the Merger. A firm

seeking to enter or expand in the market for title insurance underwriting for large commercial

transactions would face significant barriers to entry.

Past failed efforts to enter and expand confirm that no insurer will be able to

replicate Stewart’s competitive significance. No entrant or failed entrant has come close to

achieving the scale and competitive significance of the Big 4 for at least the past decade.

A firm looking to enter or expand into a particular state or territory must satisfy

regulatory requirements in order to underwrite title insurance. It can take years for a new

underwriter to acquire the necessary state licenses, especially since some states require an

underwriter to be “seasoned”—that is, to operate profitably in other states—for several years

prior to licensure. New entry to these states therefore would not be timely. Even assuming entry

would occur, this delay would allow the anticompetitive effects of the transaction to accrue for

several years.

Once licensed, an insurer must still clear significant additional hurdles to become

operational in each state. In order to replicate Stewart’s operational presence, a new entrant

would need to establish a national network of commercial services offices, local direct offices,

and agency operations in every state and the District of Columbia.

In addition, to participate in the relevant underwriting markets, an entrant must

procure title information services. Title information services are essential to underwriting title

insurance. Some states explicitly require title plant access or ownership as a condition of

licensure. For example, Oregon requires title companies to own a title plant in every county in

which they sell title insurance. The costs and time required to construct title plants or otherwise

procure access to title information services can be significant. The Merger’s likely effects in

markets for title information services may increase this barrier to entry where Respondents own

overlapping title plant assets.

In order to replicate Stewart’s competitive significance in the relevant markets, an

insurer must do more than clear these barriers in a single state—they must clear them in

substantially all states. Thus, an additional barrier to entry facing a firm looking to enter or

expand is the need to have a national footprint and the ability to provide a single point-of-contact

who can access that footprint.

Even if an underwriter could establish or expand its operations and licenses to

replicate Stewart in a timely manner, additional barriers to entry remain, including capital

requirements. An underwriter’s surplus determines its ability to compete for large commercial

transactions; no other underwriter comes close to Stewart’s surplus outside of the Big 4.

It is extremely unlikely that any fringe competitor or new entrant would be able to

develop surplus on par with Stewart. Outside of the Big 4, the next largest underwriters in terms

of surplus are approximately one-sixth and one-tenth the size of Stewart. Growing surplus

through business operations would take considerable time, and securing cash from investors is

unlikely, given the relatively low rate of return that one would expect from an investment in a

title insurer.

Demonstrated expertise underwriting large commercial transactions is also a

barrier to entry. Customers prefer using those underwriters that have the indisputable expertise

to underwrite (and address any arising claims) in a timely manner. Given the amount of money

at issue in large commercial transactions, customers place increased importance on the

underwriter’s expertise. The Big 4 have a strong incumbency advantage from their historical

experience underwriting large commercial transactions. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that any

entry in the near term could be sufficient to prevent the anticompetitive effects flowing from the

Merger.

In order to enter or expand, an underwriter must recruit and hire competent and

experienced salespeople, underwriters, and title officers. Hiring enough employees to enter or

expand on a sufficient scale to constrain the merged firm would take a significant amount of time

and effort, particularly in light of non-competition agreements and retention bonuses that the Big

4 have employed with respect to their key personnel.

A firm seeking to enter or expand in the market for title information services also

would face significant barriers to entry associated with constructing a title plant. An entrant

would need to collect, compile, and index historical property records for each property located in

a geographic area. This process is time-consuming and expensive. As a result, entry or

expansion in title information services is unlikely and would be neither timely nor sufficient to

replace the competition lost as a result of the Merger.

Efficiencies

Respondents cannot demonstrate cognizable merger-specific efficiencies that

would be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption and evidence of the Merger’s likely

significant anticompetitive effects.

VIOLATION

Count I – Illegal Agreement

The allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 91 above are incorporated by reference as

though fully set forth.

The Merger Agreement constitutes an unfair method of competition in violation

of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

Count II – Illegal Acquisition

The allegations of Paragraphs 1 through 93 above are incorporated by reference

as though fully set forth.

The Merger, if consummated, may substantially lessen competition in the relevant

markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18, and is an

unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15

U.S.C. § 45.

NOTICE

Notice is hereby given to the Respondents that the fourth day of February, 2020, at

10:00 a.m., is hereby fixed as the time, and the Federal Trade Commission headquarters offices

at 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 532, Washington, D.C. 20580, as the place, when and

where an evidentiary hearing will be had before an Administrative Law Judge of the Federal

Trade Commission, on the charges set forth in this complaint, at which time and place you will

have the right under the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act to appear and show

cause why an order should not be entered requiring you to cease and desist from the violations of

law charged in the complaint.

You are notified that the opportunity is afforded you to file with the Commission an

answer to this complaint on or before the fourteenth (14th) day after service of it upon you. An

answer in which the allegations of the complaint are contested shall contain a concise statement

of the facts constituting each ground of defense; and specific admission, denial, or explanation of

each fact alleged in the complaint or, if you are without knowledge thereof, a statement to that

effect. Allegations of the complaint not thus answered shall be deemed to have been admitted.

If you elect not to contest the allegations of fact set forth in the complaint, the answer shall

consist of a statement that you admit all of the material facts to be true. Such an answer shall

constitute a waiver of hearings as to the facts alleged in the complaint and, together with the

complaint, will provide a record basis on which the Commission shall issue a final decision

containing appropriate findings and conclusions and a final order disposing of the proceeding. In

such answer, you may, however, reserve the right to submit proposed findings and conclusions

under Rule 3.46 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings.

Failure to file an answer within the time above provided shall be deemed to constitute a

waiver of your right to appear and to contest the allegations of the complaint and shall authorize

the Commission, without further notice to you, to find the facts to be as alleged in the complaint

and to enter a final decision containing appropriate findings and conclusions, and a final order

disposing of the proceeding.

The Administrative Law Judge shall hold a prehearing scheduling conference not later

than ten (10) days after the Respondents file their answers. Unless otherwise directed by the

Administrative Law Judge, the scheduling conference and further proceedings will take place at

the Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 532, in Washington,

D.C. Rule 3.21(a) requires a meeting of the parties’ counsel as early as practicable before the

pre-hearing scheduling conference (but in any event no later than five (5) days after the

Respondents file their answers). Rule 3.31(b) obligates counsel for each party, within five

(5) days of receiving the Respondents’ answers, to make certain initial disclosures without

awaiting a discovery request.

NOTICE OF CONTEMPLATED RELIEF

Should the Commission conclude from the record developed in any adjudicative

proceedings in this matter that the Merger challenged in this proceeding violates Section 5 of the

Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and/or Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended,

the Commission may order such relief against Respondents as is supported by the record and is

necessary and appropriate, including, but not limited to:

If the Merger is consummated, divestiture or reconstitution of all associated and

necessary assets, in a manner that restores two or more distinct and separate, viable and

independent businesses in the relevant markets, with the ability to offer such products and

services as Fidelity and Stewart were offering and planning to offer prior to the Merger.

A prohibition against any transaction between Fidelity and Stewart that combines

their businesses in the relevant markets, except as may be approved by the Commission.

A requirement that, for a period of time, Fidelity and Stewart provide prior notice

to the Commission of acquisitions, mergers, consolidations, or any other combinations of their

businesses in the relevant markets with any other company operating in the relevant markets

A requirement to file periodic compliance reports with the Commission.

Any other relief appropriate to correct or remedy the anticompetitive effects of the

transaction or to restore Stewart as a viable, independent competitor in the relevant markets.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Federal Trade Commission has caused this complaint to

be signed by its Acting Secretary and its official seal to be hereto affixed, at Washington, D.C.,

this fifth day of September 2019.

By the Commission, Chairman Simons recused and Commissioner Wilson dissenting.

April Tabor

Acting Secretary

SEAL:

APPENDIX A

States in Which the Merger is Presumptively Unlawful

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of Columbia

Florida

Georgia

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Kansas

Kentucky

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Virginia

West Virginia

Wyoming

States in Which the Merger Warrants Scrutiny

Louisiana

Washington

Wisconsin