u.s.
Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement
STATEMENT
OF
JOHN
MORTON
ASSISTANT
SECRETARY
u.S.
IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY
REGARDING
A
HEARING
ON
"THE
LESSONS
AND
IMPLICATIONS
OF
THE
CHRISTMAS
DAY
ATTACK: SECURING
THE
VISA
PROCESS"
BEFORE
THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE
ON
HOMELAND
SECURITY
AND
GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS
Wednesday, April 21, 2010 - 10:00 a.m.
342 Dirksen Senate Office Building
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, distinguished Members
of
the
Committee:
On behalf
of
Secretary Napolitano, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
international efforts
of
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to protect national
security and prevent terrorist attacks. Today, I plan to discuss the Visa Security Program (VSP)
in the context
of
the 9/11 Commission's findings, which emphasized the importance
of
our
immigration system more thoroughly vetting individuals entering our country and developing
functional counterterrorism measures.
Within the Department
of
Homeland Security (DHS), ICE's VSP is one
of
a number
of
programs designed to protect the homeland and identify individuals who present a risk before
they can harm the United States. The VSP places a DHS law enforcement officer (Le., an ICE
special agent) in a United States embassy to work collaboratively with Department
of
State
(DOS) consular officers and Diplomatic Security Agents to secure the visa adjudication process.
Before describing the VSP, our budget, the plans for expansion, and challenges
of
expanding, let
me describe
ICE's
international efforts more generally.
ICE's
Presence Overseas
ICE, as the second largest federal investigative agency,
has
a significant international
footprint. ICE, through our Office
of
International Affairs (OIA), has
63
offices in 44 countries,
staffed by more than 300 personnel. ICE personnel in these offices collaborate with foreign
counterparts in joint efforts to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations
engaged in money laundering, contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation, forced child labor,
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human rights violations, intellectual property rights violations, child exploitation, and human
smuggling and trafficking, and facilitate repatriation
of
individuals with fmal orders
of
deportation.
In fiscal year (FY) 2009, ICE opened offices in: Amman, Jordan; Brussels, Belgium;
Cartagena, Colombia; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Jakarta, Indonesia and continued to expand its
coordination with
U.S. military commands, specifically United States Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), United States African Command (AFRICOM), and United States European
Command (EUCOM).
In
FY 2010, to increase our overseas presence and advance the efforts to
investigate crimes that reach beyond our borders, ICE is proposing to open offices in
Afghanistan, Israel, Vietnam, and Yemen.
ICE's OIA is responsible for administering and staffing the VSP.
The
VISa
Security Program
During the creation
ofDHS,
Congress gave DHS some oversight responsibilities for the
visa process. Specifically, Section 428
of
the Homeland Security Act (HSA)
of
2002 authorized
the Secretary
of
Homeland Security to: administer and enforce the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and other laws relating to visas; refuse visas for individual applicants in accordance
with law; assign
DHS officers to diplomatic posts to perform visa security activities; initiate
investigations
of
visa security-related matters; and provide advice and training to consular
officers. In short, the HSA directed DHS to assist in the identification
of
national security threats
to the visa security process.
The visa adjudication process is often the first opportunity our government has to assess
whether a potential visitor or immigrant presents a threat to the United States. The United States
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Government has long recognized the importance
of
this function
to
national security.
DRS
regards the
visa
process as
an
important part
of
the border security strategy, and
VSP
is one
of
several programs focused
on
minimizing global risks. The
VSP
relies
on
trained
law
enforcement agents
to
look
at
an applicant in greater depth and examine their social networks
and business relationships with a goal
of
developing information previously unknown to the
United States Government
to
assess whether individual applicants pose security threats to the
United States.
ICE
agents assigned
to
Visa Security Units (VSU) are professional
law
enforcement agents who focus
on
selected applicants and any connection the applicants may
have to terrorism.
In
the context
of
the visa security process, they begin
by
reviewing documents submitted
by
applicants, and reviewing the results
of
automated checks (from the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS), and others). To conduct a thorough investigation,
an
ICE agent
assigned to a
VSU
must
have the ability to interview the applicant
of
concern and must be
exposed to local information
to
understand whether the applicant's affiliations raise any
particular flags. Each individual VSU, with input from DOS, develops a targeting plan, based
on
assessed conditions and threats. Depending
on
the nature
of
the concern that
an
applicant poses
a threat, the ICE
agent's
investigation
may
be
complex and in-depth,
in
some cases taking
months
to
complete.
Of
course, not every investigation lasts months. ICE agents assigned to the
VSP
are experienced
law
enforcement agents
who
have spent years developing interview,
interrogation, and other skills while investigating crimes
in
the United States.
DRS
does
not
participate
in
all visa adjudication procedures; rather,
DRS
becomes a part
of
the process following initial screening
of
an
applicant.
As
such, where
VSU's
are present,
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DOS consular officers and ICE agents must establish effective and productive partnerships in
order to enhance the security
of
the visa process.
VSP efforts complement the consular officers' responsibility for interviewing the
applicant, reviewing the application, and supporting documentation and conducting automated
screening
of
criminal and terrorist databases, with proactive law enforcement vetting and
investigation. In carrying out this mission, ICE special agents conduct targeted, in-depth law
enforcement-focused reviews
of
individual visa applications and applicants prior to issuance, as
well as recommend refusal or revocation
of
applications when warranted.
ICE now has
VSU's
at 14 high-risk visa adjudication posts in 12 countries. While I can
not identify the specific posts in this forum, I will gladly brief the members and staff
of
this
committee in a classified or law enforcement sensitive setting at a later date.
At
these
14
posts,
in
FY
2009, ICE agents screened 904,620 visa applicants and with their DOS colleagues
determined that 301,700 required further review. Following investigation, in collaboration with
their DOS colleagues, ICE recommended refusal
of
over 1,000 applicants.
In
every instance,
DOS followed the VSU recommendation and ultimately refused to issue the visa. VSP
recommendations have also resulted in DOS visa revocations.
Expansion
of
the Visa Security Program
Under the direction
of
the Homeland Security Council, beginning in May 2008, ICE and
DOS collaborated on the development
of
the VSP Site Selection Methodology. In brief, the
process for selecting a particular site for a VSU begins with an ICE site evaluation, which
involves a quantitative analysis
of
threats posed and site assessment visits. The DHS formal
nomination process follows, involving an analysis
oflCE's
proposals
by
DHS. Then, the
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National Security Decision Directive-38 (NSDD-38) process, a mechanism that gives the Chief
of
Mission in a particular post control over the size, composition, and mandate
of
full-time
staffing for the post, commences within DOS. Only once the
Chief
of
Mission has approved an
NSDD-38 request can ICE begin deployment.
ICE continues to look for opportunities to establish offices overseas to screen and vet
additional visa applicants at high-risk visa issuing posts beyond the
14
posts at which we are
currently operating. The
FY
2010 budget designated $7.3 million to sustain and expand the
VSP. With this funding level, ICE estimates that it can deploy to four additional posts. ICE has
been conducting site visits and facilitating the NSDD-38 process in an effort to determine
whether it would be beneficial to expand VSP operations to additional high-risk visa
adjudicating posts. Based
on
collaborative site selection methodology with DOS, ICE conducted
additional classified threat assessments on four posts in preparation for joint VSP-DOS site visits
to embassies/consulates abroad. The VSP program has continued to grow since its inception.
While ICE is continuing to expand the program, further expansion is contingent on ICE's
dedicating existing overseas funding to these efforts and approval
ofNSDD-38
requests at the
posts in question.
ICE will continue moving forward to deploy new offices to the highest risk visa
adjudicating posts worldwide as resources allow, and will continue to conduct joint site visits
with DOS to create opportunities for deployment. Moreover, ICE recognizes that the VSP is but
one relatively small component in the nation's counterterrorism strategy.
My
counterparts at
DOS and I are engaged
now
in a process
of
determining a common strategic approach to the
broader question
of
how best to collectively secure the visa issuance process. We look forward
to continuing to report back to you with updates on this process.
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Recent Successes
To put the VSP discussion in perspective, I offer two brief examples
of
the results
of
including ICE in the visa process. In September 2008, DOS raised concerns about visa
applicants sponsored
by
an international non-governmental sports group. ICE investigated and
determined that the majority
of
past applicants sponsored
by
the group remained in the
United States beyond their period
of
admission, and that the sport group's president had three
previous visa denials, with one on national security grounds. ICE disseminated information
about potential future applicants throughout DHS and to DOS visa-issuing posts. This equipped
CBP Inspectors stationed at airports and the border and DOS consular officers with detailed
information about the sports group to prevent future use
of
the club as a mechanism to gain entry
into the United States, and to prevent national security threats from exploiting the scheme to gain
entry.
Secondly, in July 2009, again while examining visa applications, ICE agents identified an
Iranian national who applied for a visitor's visa to come to the United States to attend an
information technology (IT) conference on behalf
of
his employer. Although the Security
Advisory Opinion (SAO) process did not reveal a basis to find the Iranian national ineligible,
ICE's review revealed that the Iranian national's
employer-on
whose behalf he was attending
the IT
conference-is
an Office
of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)-designated organization
allegedly used
by
the government
of
Iran to transfer money to terrorist organizations, including
Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of
Palestine-General Command and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The visa applicant himself stated that he planned to attend the IT conference to explore
the purchase
of
technology for his employer. While attending the conference alone did not
7
render the Iranian national inadmissible, the combination
of
attending
on
behalf
of
his employer
(an OFAC-designated entity) and the stated purpose to "explore purchasing options" for IT
equipment constituted reasonable grounds for denial
of
the visa. Therefore, ICE recommended
that DOS deny the visa on national security grounds, in accordance with the INA, as his purpose
for coming to the United States was to possibly procure IT equipment for a designated OF AC
organization. DOS concurred with
ICE's
recommendation and denied the visa.
I offer these examples to illustrate in real terms the benefit
of
a strong working
relationship with DOS, and how the partnership advances the goal
of
preventing those who may
intend to harm the United States from using a visa to enter our nation.
The Visa Security Program's Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU)
The Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process is the mechanism administered by DOS,
supported by other government agencies, to provide consular officers advice and background
information to adjudicate visa applications abroad in cases
of
security or foreign policy interest.
In May 2007, Congress mandated the creation
ofa
Security Advisory Opinion Unit (SAOU)
within the VSP. VSP now supports the SAO process and the
SAOU's
findings are incorporated
into the overall SAO recommendation used by consular officers to adjudicate targeted visa
applications
of
national security or foreign policy interest.
The SAOU is currently operating a pilot program that screens visa applicants and
communicates any potential admissibility concerns to DOS. The SAOU currently has co-located
personnel at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), the National Targeting
Center-Passenger (NTC-P), both located in the National Capital Region, and also has personnel
assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The integration
of
the SAOU into
8
these centers allows for real-time dissemination
of
intelligence between the various stakeholders
in the visa adjudication process.
CONCLUSION
I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify today and for its
continued support
of
ICE and our law enforcement mission. In partnership with the State
Department and other vital partners, I will continue collaborating to ensure the security
of
the
visa while maintaining a fair and efficient process for legitimate visitors and immigrants to enter
the United States.
I would be pleased to answer questions you may have at this time.
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