Mobile Market Study

ISBN 978-1-869457-17-4

Project no. 13.03/16462

Public Version

Mobile Market Study – Findings

The Commission:

Dr Stephen Gale

Dr Jill Walker

Elisabeth Welson

John Crawford

Date of publication:

26 September 2019

Associated documents

Publication

date

Reference

Title

6 October 2017

N/A

Mobile Market Study - Terms of

Reference

27 March 2018

N/A

Mobile Market Study – Scope paper

31 August 2018

ISBN 978-1-869456-54-2

Study of Mobile Telecommunications

Markets in New Zealand - Issues Paper

16 May 2019

ISBN 978-1-869456-88-7

Mobile Market Study – Preliminary

Findings

16 May 2019

N/A

Red Dawn Consulting – Global Mobile

Industry Trends: Implications for

New Zealand

16 May 2019

N/A

Red Dawn Consulting – MVNO

Landscape: Global perspectives and

New Zealand Applications

16 May 2019

N/A

Behavioural Insights Team – Behavioural

Biases in Telecommunications: A review

for the Commerce Commission

Commerce Commission

Wellington, New Zealand

Glossary

Acronym

Title

2nd Generation mobile communications technology

3rd Generation mobile communications technology

4th Generation mobile communications technology

5th Generation mobile communications technology

ACCC

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

ARPU

Average Revenue per month per User/subscriber

Backhaul

In a telecommunications network, backhaul is the capacity between

the core backbone network and the local edge networks

BEREC

Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications

CDMA

Code-Division Multiple Access – a 2G mobile phone standard

developed in the United States

CDR

Consumer Data Right – typically a data portability right, whereby a

consumer can easily provide a standardised set of their usage

information to a potential provider

Commerce Act

The Commerce Act 1986

DFAS

Direct Fibre Access Service defined in section 164 of the

Telecommunications Act. Typically used in mobile networks for

dedicated backhaul services

EBITDA

An accounting term – Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation

and Amortisation

eSIMs

Embedded SIM – a non-removable version of a SIM card

Ethernet

A family of computer networking technologies most commonly

used in wired Local Area Networks and Wide Area Networks

Gigabyte. 1 gigabyte = 1024 megabytes

GCSB

(NZ) Government Communications Security Bureau

GHz

Gigahertz. 1 gigahertz = 1000 megahertz

GSM

Global System for Mobile communications – a standard developed

to describe the protocols for 2G digital cellular networks

GSMA

Global System for Mobile Communication Association – trade body

that represents the interests of mobile network operators

worldwide

IoT

Internet of Things – the network of physical and virtual objects

accessed through the internet (such as smart sensors and smart

meters)

Internet Protocol – the method or protocol by which data is sent

from one computer to another on the internet. Each computer

(host) on the internet has at least one IP address that uniquely

identifies it from all other computers on the internet

LFC

Local Fibre Company – provider of fibre access services under the

NZ Government’s UFB initiative (see section 156AB of the

Telecommunications Act)

LTE

Long Term Evolution – a name given to the fourth generation of

mobile technology that can provide high speed mobile broadband

MBIE

Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment

MBSF

Mobile Black Spot Fund – Government fund to provide greater

mobile coverage on state highways and in tourism locations where

no coverage currently exists

MHz

Megahertz – one million oscillations per second

MNO

Mobile Network Operator – an operator that owns or controls all

the elements necessary to deliver mobile services to consumers,

including radio spectrum and the wireless network infrastructure

MTAS

Mobile Termination Access Service – a regulated service that

provides for the termination on a cellular mobile telephone

network of voice calls and SMS messages

MTR

Mobile Termination Rates – the wholesale prices for the MTAS

MVNE

Mobile Virtual Network Enabler – a company that provides the

platforms to keep pace with rapidly evolving consumer demand for

services. They also allow rapid on-boarding and integration of an

MVNO with an MNO and provide the ability to connect with third

parties via defined IT systems

MVNO

Mobile Virtual Network Operator – an operator that provides

mobile services but does not generally have its own radio spectrum

or much of the infrastructure required to provide mobile services. It

therefore relies on buying services from an MNO. The amount of

control it has over the services it offers will vary according to the

nature of its agreement

NERA

NERA Economic Consulting

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Ofcom

Office of Communications – the regulatory and competition

authority for broadcasting, telecommunications and postal

industries in the United Kingdom

OTT

Over the top – refers to content and applications provided from a

third party and delivered to an end user device, leaving the retailer

responsible only for transporting IP packets

RBI (and RBI2)

Rural Broadband Initiative – an initiative where the Government

partners with private sector telecommunications operators to

upgrade or extend telecommunications networks outside UFB areas

RCG

Rural Connectivity Group – a joint venture between 2degrees,

Spark and Vodafone who have a contract with the Government

under RBI2 and the MBSF

RSP

Retail Service Provider – RSPs provide telecommunications services

to consumers

RSM

Radio Spectrum Management – business unit of MBIE responsible

for managing radio spectrum

RTP

Restrictive Trade Practices

SIM

Subscriber Identity Module card – commonly known as a SIM card

that contains a microchip that stores data that identifies the user,

for use in GSM and compatible 3G and 4G mobile phones

SMS

Short Message Service – commonly known as a text messaging, this

is a service for sending and receiving short messages between

mobile devices

STD

Standard Terms Determination – the Commerce Commission’s

primary mechanism for regulating non-fibre telecommunications

services under the Telecommunications Act by determining the

terms on which a designated access service or specified service

must be supplied

Telecommunications

Act

The Telecommunications Act 2001

UFB

The New Zealand Government's Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative

UMTS

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System – the 3G successor

to the 2G GSM standard, which allows voice telephony, mobile

internet access, fixed wireless internet access, video calls and

mobile TV

WiFi

Wireless Fidelity Standard – a series of standards for a popular

technology that allows electronic devices to exchange data

wirelessly (using radio waves), including allowing mobile devices to

connect to high speed internet connections

WISPA NZ

Wireless Internet Service Providers Association of New Zealand Inc

– an association of Wireless Internet Services Providers (WISPs)

that typically service rural locations in New Zealand where mobile

networks currently do not operate, or have limited coverage

 
7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Glossary  4 
Executive summary and findings  9 
Mobile services market study  9 
Competition in the mobile market  9 
Findings from our study of the mobile services market  10 
Chapter 1  Introduction  16 
Purpose of the study and legal framework  16 
Purpose of the study  16 
Legal framework for the study  17 
Timeline of the study  17 
Purpose and structure of the Findings report  18 
Chapter 2  Mobile networks and services  20 
Purpose of this chapter  20 
Mobile networks  20 
Mobile services  22 
Mobile service providers  25 
Mobile regulatory settings in New Zealand  26 
Changes to regulation  27 
Chapter 3  Development of mobile services and competition  28 
Purpose and structure of this chapter  28 
Purpose  28 
Structure  28 
Analysis of the mobile market  28 
Market structure and market shares  29 
Bundling  34 
Pricing  36 
Usage trends  46 
Investment  48 
Profitability  50 
Quality of mobile services  52 
Consumer satisfaction  54 
Our views on the key issues in the mobile market  57 
Spectrum  57 
MVNOs  58 
Consumer engagement  59 
Chapter 4  Key issues we identified  60 
Purpose and structure of this chapter  60 
Spectrum  60 
Introduction  60 
Spectrum and competition between existing MNOs  60 
Spectrum and new entry  66 
Other obligations and payment terms for spectrum allocation  69 
   

 
8 
MVNOs  72 
Introduction  72 
Potential benefits to consumers from MVNOs  72 
MVNO operating models and margins  75 
Emerging competition at the wholesale level  77 
Consumer engagement and experience with mobile services  85 
Introduction  85 
How easily can consumers access the information they need?  85 
How easily can consumers assess the information they have?  86 
How easy is it for consumers to act?  90 
Behavioural biases  94 
Potential remedies/actions  96 
Chapter 5  State of competition in the mobile market  100 
Purpose and structure of this chapter  100 
Purpose  100 
Structure  100 
Our view on the state of competition in the mobile market  100 
Existing competition  100 
Conditions for further expansion and entry  104 
Consumer engagement  106 
Chapter 6  Future developments in mobile services  109 
Purpose of this chapter  109 
5G mobile networks  109 
eSIMs  112 
Network slicing  114 
Infrastructure sharing  115 
Chapter 7  Regulated services  119 
Purpose of this chapter  119 
Mobile termination access services  119 
National roaming  122 
Mobile co-location  123 
Number portability  125 
Backhaul  125 
 
   

Executive summary and findings

Mobile services market study

X1 Mobile communications have developed into an essential function, supporting

New Zealanders in all aspects of their lives. Mobile services allow consumers to

contact friends and family, conduct business, be entertained, and engage with

Government, medical, educational and emergency services when not connected to a

fixed network. The importance of mobile communications is expected to increase

even further in the future with the continued growth of machine-to-machine

communications and the internet of things (IoT).

X2 Rapid technological change is a hallmark of the telecommunications sector,

particularly in markets in which mobile services are supplied. Non-traditional

network providers and over the top (OTT) suppliers such as Google and Apple add to

the challenges for regulatory authorities and policy makers seeking to ensure that

the competition and regulatory policy settings are appropriate.

X3 One of our mandates under the Telecommunications Act 2001 (Telecommunications

Act) is to monitor competition, and the performance and development of,

telecommunication markets. In this study we have analysed the current state of

competition for mobile services, likely future developments, and the potential

impacts on competition and consumers. This analysis included examining issues of

how the supply of mobile services has performed, barriers to entry and expansion,

and the extent to which consumers of mobile services are engaged and can take

advantage of competing retail offers.

Competition in the mobile market

X4 Three vertically integrated national mobile network operators (MNOs) - 2degrees,

Vodafone and Spark - provide retail mobile services to New Zealand consumers.

Alongside these MNOs are a small number of mobile service providers that operate

solely at the retail level as mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). These

retail-only mobile operators include the Vocus brands and the Warehouse, as well as

sub-brands like Spark’s Skinny mobile. Kogan Mobile has also recently launched

mobile services in New Zealand. This compares with ten years ago when there were

only two vertically integrated national MNOs and a small number of MVNOs and no

MNO sub-brands.

X5 Increased competition has contributed to improved outcomes for consumers

through lower prices, increasing quality, and greater choice of services. Most key

indicators like pricing, quality of service, coverage, and choice are trending in a

positive direction.

X6 During our study, we identified spectrum, MVNOs and consumer engagement as

important factors likely to influence the further development of competition in the

mobile market going forward.

Findings from our study of the mobile services market

X7 In this section we set out our consolidated findings and our actions arising from our

study into the mobile market.

X8 Table X1 sets out our general findings on the current state of the mobile market.

Table X1 Findings on the development of the mobile market

Finding

number

Finding

Market shares among the three national MNOs have become more evenly

balanced over time, particularly in the prepaid and residential on-account

segments.

Ongoing investment in the mobile networks has seen all three MNOs investing

in new generations of mobile technology and 2degrees completing the roll-out

of its national network.

All three national MNOs are reporting profits, although profit margins vary,

reflecting differences in market share and mix of customers.

The three national MNOs appear to perform well on most technical measures

of quality, although there is some evidence that the quality of coverage for 4G

services (as measured by availability) may be relatively low compared to other

countries.

Prices of mobile services have been falling. Prices for low and medium usage

bundles compare well with other OECD countries. Prices for higher usage

bundles remain relatively expensive, especially when compared with Australia,

although recent market developments have resulted in ongoing innovation

and improved value for consumers in relation to higher usage bundles.

Usage of mobile calls and in particular mobile data has continued to increase in

recent years, with the amount of mobile data used per subscriber more than

doubling over the last two years. Although average usage of mobile data

appears to be relatively low compared to other countries, this may be due to a

number of factors, including pricing of higher usage bundles and the

availability and quality of fixed networks (including WiFi hotspots) in

New Zealand.

X9 Tables X2, X3 and X4 set out our findings on the key issues of spectrum allocation,

MVNOs, and consumer engagement.

Table X2 Findings on spectrum

Finding

number

Finding

Spectrum is a scarce and critical input into the supply of mobile services.

Significant asymmetries in spectrum holdings (including in terms of the

amount and type of spectrum held) can affect competition in the mobile

market. The design of future allocation processes for spectrum should have

regard to such asymmetries. In setting limits on the amount of spectrum that

may be acquired, it may also be appropriate to have regard to existing holdings

in other bands which represent a substitute for the spectrum being auctioned

or allocated.

We do not believe there is a case for regulatory intervention to promote a

fourth national MNO to enter the market. However, the design of the

upcoming 3.5 GHz spectrum allocation process should not preclude new

parties (including parties who may complement or compete with the existing

MNOs) from obtaining spectrum.

We do not believe that there is a strong case for including a condition on

spectrum rights that requires wholesale access to be offered to third parties.

Table X3 Findings on MVNOs

Finding

number

Finding

F10

Until recently, wholesale competition between MNOs to host MVNOs has

been limited. MVNOs currently serve just over 1% of the retail mobile market,

although there is some evidence that increased wholesale activity by 2degrees

has prompted a response from Spark and Vodafone in offering MVNO access.

New commercial MVNO agreements have been signed during the past 18

months, such as those between Trustpower and Spark, and Kogan Mobile and

Vodafone.

F11

With three national mobile networks, sufficient competitive conditions at the

wholesale level exist and we expect MVNOs should emerge if they are

commercially viable. The commercial viability of an MVNO will in part depend

on the terms agreed with the host MNO. Based on the evidence that we have

seen and the entry expected (as noted in F10), competition at the wholesale

level has improved. However, spectrum allocation decisions will be critical to

support this competition.

F12

In light of this, we do not consider MVNO access regulation to be appropriate

at this time. There would need to be greater evidence of market failure in

respect of outcomes delivered to mobile consumers to justify wholesale access

regulation. We intend to monitor the development of MVNOs, including the

commercial terms being offered by the MNOs.

Table X4 Findings on consumer engagement

Finding

number

Finding

F13

Most consumers can easily access their mobile usage information, but

information on mobile performance (speeds, actual quality of coverage etc) is

harder to access.

F14

Most consumers find it easy to compare available plans, but report that they

only do so infrequently.

F15

Our evidence shows that the process for residential consumers to switch

between mobile suppliers is relatively easy, given that:

a) mobile number portability is available;

b) there are low numbers of locked handsets; and

c) long-term contracts for residential consumers are not prominent.

Bundling of mobile and fixed-line services, which can increase customer

stickiness, does not appear to be widespread in the residential market.

F16

While residential consumers report being able to easily access usage

information and compare plans, and that the process of switching appears to

be relatively easy, a significant proportion of consumers have not compared

plans in the last 12 months and have remained with their current supplier for

more than five years. This suggests that there is a degree of consumer inertia,

and we have commenced an analysis of mobile bills to shed light on whether

this is cause for concern.

F17

Switching in the business market appears to be more complex and more

infrequent than residential mobile services. Businesses typically purchase

mobile and fixed services as a package, often through fixed-term contracts,

with brand reputation being an important driver. Larger business customers

are more sophisticated buyers, generally have more access to specialist advice

and support, and are more likely to have dedicated procurement resources.

X10 A summary of our findings on the state of competition and our actions is set out in

table X5 and table X6 below.

Table X5 Findings on the state of competition

Finding

number

Finding

F18

Our view is that competition in the retail mobile market has become more

established with three independent, national network-based competitors. This

has resulted in mobile consumers benefitting from an increasingly competitive

market environment.

F19

There remain some areas where we anticipate competitive outcomes for

consumers could improve further, such as pricing for higher usage bundles of

mobile services (although recent market developments have improved

consumer outcomes for higher usage bundles). Average mobile data usage in

New Zealand remains low by international standards, which may be due to a

number of factors, including pricing of higher usage bundles and the

availability and quality of fixed networks (including WiFi hotspots) in

New Zealand.

F20

We believe that the conditions for effective competition exist, with the three

MNOs each having a network of similar technology with similar geographic and

population coverage metrics. We consider that:

a) spectrum must be allocated with wholesale and retail competition

matters at the forefront of decisions;

b) with the pre-conditions for competition in place and the adequate

allocation of spectrum, we would expect MVNO services to

continue to develop where market opportunities exist; and

c) there may be room for improved consumer engagement, to

ensure that consumers are aware of and able to easily take

advantage of competing offers to drive competition.

Table X6 Actions on the state of competition

Action

number

Action

We will continue to engage with MBIE on the importance of the upcoming

spectrum allocation/auctions for delivering competitive outcomes in the

mobile market.

We have amended the annual monitoring questionnaire to capture

information on the development of MVNO market share and business

sustainability. We also intend to periodically review commercial MVNO

arrangements. This will provide us with greater ongoing visibility of the terms

being offered to MVNOs, and how the commercial terms compare to key price

and non-price dimensions of MVNO access.

We will undertake further work as part of our wider responsibilities under

section 9A and Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act (outside of this study) to:

a) improve our understanding of the extent to which consumers can

and do access, assess and act on relevant information in the

mobile and wider telecommunications markets;

b) assess consumers’ choices of mobile plans against their usage,

including quantification of the potential savings mobile consumers

could make if they were on plans that better match their usage;

and

c) assess the quality of services provided by mobile suppliers and the

extent to which consumers are actively engaged in the mobile

market, as part of our wider retail service quality programme,

including our ability to review or create retail service quality codes

if appropriate.

X11 In table X7 we summarise our findings on some of the potential future

developments that may affect competition.

Table X7 Findings on future developments in the mobile market

Finding

number

Finding

F21

5G will initially be an evolution over existing networks, and over time network

densification will occur. Investment in 5G may alter the economics of mobile

provision and raises the prospect of greater infrastructure sharing, and larger

incentives to utilise network capacity through MVNO agreements.

F22

eSIM capable devices are likely to become more prevalent, with the potential

to reduce switching costs for both consumers, MNOs and MVNOs. However,

there is the potential for competition to be suppressed if MNOs do not enable

eSIMs or lock eSIM devices to their network.

F23

We may see more infrastructure sharing. Whether this enhances or suppresses

competition will depend on how the arrangements are structured. We would

expect to see infrastructure sharing proposals that raise potential competition

concerns come to us for authorisation.

X12 In table X8 we set out our findings on regulated services and our planned reviews of

those services over the next five years.

Table X8 Findings on regulated services

Finding

number

Finding

F24

Our review of the current market conditions, and likely future developments,

has not identified sufficient grounds for us to bring forward our planned

reviews of regulated services. The scheduled reviews for these services are set

out in Table 1 in Chapter 2.

F25

Backhaul services, whether metropolitan or between national network nodes,

appear not to have constrained the competitiveness or development of mobile

services, to date. However, we recognise the potential for bottlenecks to

develop as mobile (eg, 5G), fibre technologies (eg, passive optical networking)

and fibre regulation undergo a period of significant change.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Purpose of the study and legal framework

Purpose of the study

1.1 We have undertaken this study of mobile markets in New Zealand (study) to gain a

better understanding of how the mobile market is currently performing and

developing, and to consider how the mobile landscape may evolve in the future.

1.2 The mobile market study has helped us to:

build an evidence base, so we can track relevant trends and identify

whether there are any current or potential barriers to competition

delivering benefits for consumers of mobile services in New Zealand;

ensure that any future market interventions, if required, will be

appropriate and proportionate;

identify areas in the mobile market that might require more or less focus

on an ongoing basis;

inform policy makers, industry and consumers of the performance of the

mobile market through regular monitoring and reporting of market

performance and development;

consider whether any regulatory measures (including deregulation) may

be appropriate;

consider whether to recommend legislative changes; and

consider whether any investigations into potential breaches of the Fair

Trading Act 1986, Part 2 of the Commerce Act 1986 (Commerce Act) or

Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003 may be required.

Throughout this document we refer to the market in which mobile services are supplied. We do not

consider that a formal definition of the dimensions of the relevant market or markets (as might be

undertaken for the purposes of Part 2 or Part 3 of the Commerce Act) is required for this study.

Legal framework for the study

1.3 We have conducted this study under section 9A of the Telecommunications Act.

Section 9A sets out that:

(1) In addition to the other functions conferred on the Commission by this Act, the

Commission-

(a) must monitor competition in telecommunications markets and the

performance and development of telecommunications markets; and

(b) may conduct inquiries, reviews, and studies (including international

benchmarking) into any matter relating to the telecommunications industry or

the long-term benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within New

Zealand; and

(d) must make available reports, summaries, and information about the things

referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c); and

(e) must monitor retail service quality in relation to telecommunications services;

and

(f) must make available reports, summaries, and information about retail service

quality in a way that informs consumer choice.

(2) The functions in subsection (1)(d) and (f) do not require the Commission to release

all documents that the Commission produces or acquires under this section or

section 10A.

1.4 One of the ways we use section 9A studies is to gather information about, and

develop our understanding of, telecommunications markets.

Timeline of the study

1.5 On 6 October 2017, we announced this study of mobile markets in New Zealand

and invited interested parties to submit on our proposed Terms of Reference for

the study.

1.6 We received submissions from 2degrees, Blue Reach, Chorus, InternetNZ, New

Street Research, Spark, Trustpower, Vocus, Vodafone and the Wireless Internet

Service Providers Association of New Zealand (WISPA NZ). Public versions of the

submissions are available on our website.

The former section 9A was replaced on 13 November 2018 pursuant to section 25 of the

Telecommunications (New Regulatory Framework) Amendment Act 2018 (2018 No 48). The replacement

section 9A included new sections 9A(1)(e) and (f). The addition of these two clauses in section 9A did not

affect this study.

Commerce Commission website, “Mobile market study”, https://comcom.govt.nz/regulated-

industries/telecommunications/projects/mobile-market-study’.

1.7 Following the submissions on the Terms of Reference, we published our scope

paper on 27 March 2018, and indicated that we would publish an Issues Paper and

seek submissions.

1.8 We published our Issues Paper on 31 August 2018, and received submissions from

2degrees, Chorus, InternetNZ, Spark, Trustpower, Speedchecker Ltd, Venture

Southland, Vocus, Vodafone and WISPA NZ . Public versions of the submissions are

available on our website.

1.9 We published our Preliminary Findings paper on 16 May 2019, and received

submissions from 2degrees, BAINZ Consulting, Chorus, InternetNZ, Nova, Sky,

Spark, Trustpower, TUANZ, Vocus, and Vodafone. We also received cross-

submissions from 2degrees, Chorus, Spark, Trustpower, Vocus, and Vodafone.

Purpose and structure of the Findings report

Purpose of the report

1.10 In this report, we present our findings and actions from our analysis of the

performance and development of the mobile market. It also considers emerging

trends and their potential impact on competition and market outcomes.

1.11 In preparing our findings, we have considered the submissions received in response

to our Terms of Reference, Issues Paper, and Preliminary Findings paper, as well as

information gathered from stakeholders, analysis from independent consultants,

and other information that we have referenced throughout this paper.

Structure of the report

1.12 Chapter 2 provides background on mobile networks and services, and the

regulatory settings that currently apply to the mobile market.

1.13 Chapter 3 describes the development of mobile services and competition using the

following range of competition indicators:

market structure and market shares, including by market segment;

bundling of mobile services with other services;

pricing, including how prices for mobile services have moved over time,

and how prices in New Zealand compare to prices in other countries;

usage trends, including how volumes of mobile calls, messaging services,

and mobile data have changed over time, and the importance of mobile

services to consumers;

investment in mobile access infrastructure and spectrum;

profitability of mobile suppliers;

quality of mobile services, including network coverage, availability, mobile

data speeds, and customer service; and

consumer satisfaction.

1.14 Chapter 4 sets out a detailed exploration of three key issues we identified that may

have an influence on delivering competitive outcomes for mobile consumers in

New Zealand. These are:

spectrum – the allocation of, or access to, adequate spectrum is an

important issue to sustain competition and to accommodate rapidly

growing demand for mobile services;

MVNO access – the competitive conditions for the provision of wholesale

mobile services; and

consumer engagement – the ability of consumers to make informed

decisions and their willingness to take advantage of competition between

suppliers of mobile services. Consumer engagement is important for

driving competition and facilitating entry and expansion.

1.15 Chapter 5 sets out our views on the state of competition in the mobile market,

having considered the performance of the mobile market in New Zealand to date

and the key issues which are likely to influence the further development of

competition in the mobile market going forward.

1.16 Chapter 6 discusses a selection of potential developments which may be relevant

to future mobile competition and consumers.

1.17 Chapter 7 sets out our examination of our regulatory settings and services in light

of the performance and potential evolution of mobile services.

Chapter 2 Mobile networks and services

Purpose of this chapter

2.1 This chapter introduces and briefly describes the services within the scope of our

study. We discuss the components of a generic mobile telecommunications

network and the services that are supplied over it.

2.2 We distinguish between mobile services (where the signal connecting consumer

devices is handed over between cell sites as the consumer moves around) and fixed

wireless services (which are more location-specific).

2.3 We also summarise the different types of providers of mobile services and briefly

outline the current regulatory framework.

Mobile networks

2.4 A mobile network (or a cellular network) is a communications network where the

device is linked to a cell site by a wireless connection. Figure 1 illustrates the key

elements of a mobile network.

Figure 1 Mobile network

2.5 In a mobile network, the overall area covered by the network is divided up into

smaller areas called cells. Each cell is served by a fixed transmitter and receiver

called a base station, which is located at the cell site. User devices such as cell

phones or wireless routers use the base stations to communicate over the cellular

network.

2.6 Mobile services and mobile network architectures have undergone significant

evolution since mobile networks were first deployed. Depending on the specific

region of the world, different sets of standards were adopted for each network

generation.

In Europe and most of the world, the Global System for Mobile (GSM)

standard was used for the second generation (2G) of mobile systems. This

later evolved to the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)

for the third generation (3G) and Long Term Evolution (LTE) for 4G.

In the USA, the CDMAOne standard became the dominant 2G system

which later evolved to CDMA2000 for 3G and LTE for 4G.

2.7 New Zealand MNOs currently use the GSM, UMTS and LTE systems for their 2G, 3G

and 4G networks respectively. Most mobile services in New Zealand use 3G or 4G

networks, with 2G either already decommissioned or being progressively phased

out. Vodafone has recently announced that it will launch a 5G network in

December 2019 in parts of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Queenstown.

2.8 Radio spectrum is a critical input to the deployment of a mobile network. It refers

to the radio frequencies allocated to the mobile industry and other sectors for

communication over-the-air.

2.9 MNOs use a variety of spectrum bands to provide mobile services. Lower spectrum

frequencies provide wider coverage and have better penetration (meaning they are

better able to pass through objects such as walls) than higher spectrum

frequencies. MNOs will use higher spectrum frequencies if they have exhausted the

lower ones or need more capacity.

2.10 This has meant that MNOs typically use lower spectrum frequencies to serve rural

locations, where coverage rather than capacity is a concern. Conversely, in urban

areas where capacity (rather than coverage) is a concern, MNOs typically use

higher frequency spectrum.

2.11 Backhaul (transport) is a generic term used to describe a point to point service

where aggregated traffic is carried between different points (‘nodes’) in a network.

In a mobile network, the MNO uses backhaul to connect its cell sites to other

aggregation nodes such as mobile switching centres. Backhaul contributes to the

service performance that an MNO’s customers receive as it impacts on the capacity

of the network and the latency of mobile services provided.

See https://news.vodafone.co.nz/article/vodafone-5g-launch-marks-day-one-new-ownership.

Latency represents the reaction time of a network. It measures the time it takes for an end user’s device

to receive a response to a request.

2.12 The MNO may deploy its own backhaul infrastructure or may purchase backhaul

from third parties. The backhaul requirements of a mobile network are typically

based on fibre to ensure service performance levels, however wireless backhaul

(digital microwave links) may be used in locations where fibre build out is

prohibitively expensive, traffic is low and spectrum interference is not an issue.

2.13 Mobile networks interconnect with one another (and fixed networks) so that

subscribers on one network are able to communicate with subscribers on other

networks.

2.14 Mobile networks can also provide connectivity to IoT devices such as smart sensors

(to measure, for example, temperature or motion) and smart meters (to measure,

for example, electricity usage). IoT describes the network of physical and virtual

objects accessed through the internet.

Mobile services

2.15 Mobile services are communications services (voice, messaging, and data) which

remain available to subscribers as they move around. Mobile services are delivered

over a cellular mobile network to devices such as mobile handsets, or data devices

such as tablets with in-built mobile connectivity, or ‘dongle’ devices using cellular

modems (Figure 2). These devices contain a subscriber identity module (SIM) card,

which authenticates the subscriber and allows them to connect to their chosen

network.

Figure 2 Mobile devices

2.16 Mobile networks were initially designed to carry voice and messaging services. The

emergence of 3G and, in particular, 4G mobile network technologies has made the

IoT devices can be connected via a mobile network or a specialised IoT network.

delivery of mobile data services at least as important as voice and messaging,

providing for mobile broadband connectivity and OTT services.

2.17 These services are mobile in the sense that they can be used while moving around

and are not tied to a specific fixed location of the consumer’s device. As a

consumer moves from the coverage area of one cell site to that of a neighbouring

cell site, the signal to their mobile device is handed over between cell sites.

2.18 Mobile services are different to voice and broadband services that are delivered to

a fixed location, including fixed-line services (delivered over copper, coaxial cable or

fibre-based networks) and ‘fixed wireless’ services (delivered over a wireless

network). These fixed-line and fixed wireless services typically offer a local WiFi

connection to devices and enable mobile devices to use fixed-line data allowances

(which are often unlimited) rather than mobile data.

2.19 From a consumer’s perspective, a fixed wireless modem looks similar to a fixed-line

modem. In both cases, consumers’ devices are connected either through local WiFi

or an Ethernet cable. The main difference is that behind the fixed wireless modem,

the network connection is via a wireless network rather than a copper or fibre

cable.

2.20 In our 2016 review of the Schedule 1 services,

we noted that fixed wireless

services provide similar functionality and features as a fixed-line broadband service

at similar prices. We also found that mobile broadband services were considerably

more expensive on a price per gigabyte (GB) basis than fixed wireless and fixed-line

broadband services, and that the average amount of data usage was considerably

higher for fixed broadband services than for mobile broadband. This remains the

case. For example, Spark offers entry-level fibre and fixed wireless broadband

services for the same retail price ($75 per month for up to 120GB, or $0.63 per GB).

By comparison, Spark offers mobile broadband for $69.99 for 12GB ($5.83 per GB).

2.21 The performance of broadband services delivered over different fixed-line and

wireless network technologies varies, as shown in our Measuring Broadband

New Zealand report.

This suggests that fixed wireless services are currently

competing with other fixed-line services in New Zealand, and in particular with

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, (5 July 2016), para A24. The review considered 14 services, including

mobile co-location and number portability, both relevant to mobile services. The process for reviewing

Schedule 1 services is discussed further at para 2.42 below.

Spark website accessed September 2019.

Commerce Commission and SamKnows, “Measuring Broadband New Zealand”, (13 June 2019).

DSL-based services.

Mobile broadband services are likely to have a more

complementary relationship at this stage.

2.22 Although we do not include fixed wireless services when assessing the current state

of competition in mobile markets, we recognise that there are likely to be some

economies of scope on the supply side which may affect decisions around entry

and expansion by MNOs and MVNOs.

2.23 The ability to offer fixed wireless services will depend on spectrum holdings, in

particularly the frequency bands required to deliver the capacity associated with

fixed wireless services. We also note that fixed wireless services are likely to be an

important feature of 5G deployments and possible MVNO product offerings.

2.24 Mobile services have typically been offered to consumers through two types of

retail plans. Prepay plans are where consumers pay for services in advance, and on-

account plans, also called post-pay, are where consumers pay at the end of each

month of service.

2.25 On-account plans may be in the following forms:

fixed-term contracts, where the consumer signs up for a contract period

of, for example, 12 or 24 months. In the past, these plans have typically

been offered with a handset discount, and with the consumer facing an

early termination charge to break the contract; and

open term plans, where the consumer pays for the service on a month by

month basis and is not locked into a fixed-term contract.

2.26 Mobile service providers in New Zealand have moved more towards offering open

term plans for residential customers. These can be paired with monthly interest

free payments for new handsets. Interest free payments spread the purchase price

of a handset across a 12, 24 or 36-month period with the option to pay off the

remaining amount in full at any point.

2.27 If the customer switches to another supplier, they are required to pay the balance

on the handset and in some cases to repay any discount the customer received at

the time of purchasing the handset. Spark’s, Vodafone’s and 2degrees’ current

In its Annual Report 2019, Chorus also referred to competition from wireless networks contributing to a

reduction in its copper-based broadband revenues (from ADSL and VDSL services). Chorus, Annual Report

2019, p 21.

We note that the boundary between fixed services (fixed-line and fixed wireless) and mobile services may

become increasingly blurred, eg as a result of WiFi.

handset promotional offers all appear to relate to open term plans with interest

free payments.

2.28 Both types of on-account plans lock consumers who pair their purchase of handsets

into a payment period. However, by separating the cost of the handset from the

cost of the mobile service, the open term plans make the handset portion of the

cost more transparent, potentially allowing consumers more flexibility and choice

when considering switching plans or providers.

2.29 The on-account market can be further split into residential and business segments.

2.30 Mobile plans are typically made up of a set ‘bundle’ of texts, calls, and data. The

majority of plans have data caps; however, there have been moves recently

towards plans that are marketed as having uncapped or ‘unlimited’ data. These

uncapped data plans are not truly unlimited as they are subject to fair-use terms

and MNOs severely throttle customers’ speeds after a certain amount of data has

been consumed. We are currently considering whether the use of the term

‘unlimited’ in describing these plans has the potential to mislead consumers and

breach the Fair Trading Act 1986.

2.31 A number of the ‘unlimited’ plans currently available include a group or shared

option, where the price per user reduces if additional users are added.

Mobile service providers

2.32 There are two types of service providers competing in the supply of mobile services

to consumers.

MNOs own key mobile network infrastructure (such as spectrum, cell

towers, radio access and core network equipment) and supply mobile

services to wholesale and retail customers. The ability to offer coverage is

important due to the mobility of demand. An MNO can offer coverage by

building its own national network or by sharing capacity (either through

co-location or roaming). MNOs may launch sub-brands to target specific

segments of the retail market.

MVNOs are operators that provide mobile services to consumers but

generally do not own licenced radio spectrum or much of the

infrastructure required to provide mobile services. Instead, MVNOs rely on

buying wholesale services from an MNO. The amount of control an MVNO

As advertised online as of September 2019.

has over the services it offers will vary according to the nature of its

agreement with its host MNO.

2.33 There are different types of MVNO operating models. These are typically described

as ranging from a licensed reseller, which is the minimalist form of MVNO, through

various intermediate models, to a ‘full’ MVNO (sometimes also referred to as a

‘thick’ MVNO). Under a full MVNO model, the MVNO invests in more of the key

components of a mobile network. The MVNO models offer the MNO the

opportunity to generate revenue from spare network capacity and to reach

customer segments where the MVNO may have better reach.

Mobile regulatory settings in New Zealand

2.34 There are two types of regulated telecommunications services in Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act:

specified services, for which we Commission can determine non-price

terms; and

designated services, where the Commission can determine price terms and

non-price terms.

2.35 We set the terms of access for the regulated services through a Standard Terms

Determination (STD).

2.36 Table 1 outlines the mobile services currently included in Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act.

Table 1 Specified and designated mobile services in Schedule 1

Service

Type

Introduced

Next Schedule 3

review due

Subject to

an STD

Mobile termination

access service (MTAS)

Designated

23 September 2010

23 September 2020

Yes

Mobile co-location

Specified

19 December 2001

30 June 2021

Yes

Local and mobile

number portability

Designated

19 December 2001

30 June 2021

Yes

National roaming

Specified

19 December 2001

20 September 2023

These services, and the reasons why they are listed in Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 2001, are

discussed further in Chapter 7.

The STD for mobile co-location was first introduced in 2008.

2.37 Mobile termination access services (MTAS) are the termination services a network

operator needs to purchase to allow its subscribers to communicate with the

subscribers of another mobile network.

2.38 Mobile co-location is a service that enables an MNO to install mobile network

transmission and reception equipment on the mast of another MNO.

2.39 Local and mobile number portability allows customers to keep their number when

switching between service providers.

2.40 National roaming allows customers of one mobile network to use another network

when they are outside their own service provider’s coverage area.

2.41 In November 2018 a new Part 7 was also added to the Telecommunications Act,

which provides for the introduction of retail service quality obligations and powers,

including the ability for the Commission to review existing industry codes and

create codes of conduct that could apply to mobile services.

Changes to regulation

2.42 Schedule 3 of the Telecommunications Act sets out the process for altering

regulated services in Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act.

Under clause 1(1) of Schedule 3, we can investigate whether to add a new

service to Schedule 1, amend an existing service in Schedule 1, or remove

a service from Schedule 1, if we are satisfied that there are reasonable

grounds for an investigation into the matter.

Under clause 1(3) of Schedule 3, we must consider, at no more than 5

yearly intervals from when a Schedule 1 service came into force, whether

there are reasonable grounds for commencing an investigation into

whether that service should be deregulated (by removing it from

Schedule 1).

Commerce Commission, “Review of MTAS as a designated service”, (23 September 2015).

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, [2016] NZCC 13, (5 July 2016).

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, [2016] NZCC 13, (5 July 2016).

Commerce Commission, “Final decision on consideration of deregulation of national roaming”, [2018]

NZCC 14, 4 September 2018.

Chapter 3 Development of mobile services and

competition

Purpose and structure of this chapter

Purpose

3.1 This chapter looks at the development of competition in the supply of mobile

services in New Zealand. We focus on how competition has evolved, and whether

there are any factors which may have affected market dynamics in recent years.

Structure

3.2 This chapter sets out:

our analysis of how the mobile market has performed in delivering

outcomes to mobile consumers. This includes our examination of a

number of key indicators: market structure and market shares, bundling of

services, pricing, usage trends, investment, profitability, quality of mobile

services, and consumer satisfaction; and

the identification of a number of key issues which are in our view likely to

underpin the further development of competition in the mobile market

going forward. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Analysis of the mobile market

3.3 During this study, we have examined how the retail market for mobile services has

performed in New Zealand. We have taken into account the following:

information that we have previously summarised in our Issues Paper and

our Preliminary Findings Paper;

submissions received on the Issues Paper, and submissions and cross-

submissions on the Preliminary Findings Paper;

industry responses to our 2018 annual monitoring questionnaire; and

updated price benchmarking results from Teligen.

3.4 There have also been other developments since we released our Issues Paper that

are relevant to the mobile services market in New Zealand. These include:

Dense Air’s acquisition of spectrum and its plans to use small-cell

technology to complement existing mobile coverage;

Infratil’s acquisition of a 50% share in Vodafone New Zealand;

Trustpower’s announcement that they had signed an MVNO agreement

with Spark; and

Kogan’s announcement that they had signed an MVNO agreement with

Vodafone. Kogan launched mobile services in New Zealand in September

2019.

3.5 In considering competitive conditions in the retail mobile market, we have

examined a range of key competition indicators, which we discuss in the following

sections. These indicators are relevant to how the retail mobile market has

performed in terms of delivering outcomes to mobile consumers in New Zealand.

Spark supported the use of a range of competition indicators in any market

analysis, particularly given the rapid change observed in mobile markets.

Market structure and market shares

3.6 Retail mobile services are predominantly supplied by the three MNOs, Spark,

Vodafone,

and 2degrees.

In addition, several access-based MVNOs, Warehouse

Mobile, Vocus, and Compass, serve a small share of mobile subscribers. Kogan

Mobile has also recently started offering prepaid mobile services.

3.7 Table 2 summarises the number of mobile subscribers in New Zealand as of

June 2018, based on responses to our 2018 annual monitoring questionnaire.

On 12 July 2019, Infratil announced that it and Brookfield Asset Management had received regulatory

approvals from the Commerce Commission and the Overseas Investment Office to acquire Vodafone

New Zealand.

Spark, “Mobile market Study – Preliminary Findings: Submission” (28 June 2019), para 11.

Spark New Zealand is a publicly traded company.

As noted above, Vodafone New Zealand was acquired by Infratil and Brookfield Asset Management. The

transaction completed on 31 July 2019. Infratil, “Completion of acquisition of Vodafone New Zealand”,

(31 June 2019).

2degrees’ parent company is Trilogy International Partners.

Table 2 Mobile subscribers, 2018

Provider

Subscribers

Vodafone

2,591,092

40.5%

Spark (including Skinny)

2,423,532

37.9%

2degrees

1,313,497

20.5%

Total MNOs

6,328,121

98.9%

MVNOs (Warehouse Mobile, Vocus, Compass)

69,261

1.1%

Total

6,397,382

100.0%

Source: Responses to 2018 annual monitoring questionnaire

3.8 A number of parties have announced that they have secured wholesale agreements

with MNOs, which have allowed them to, or will allow them to enter the mobile

market in New Zealand as MVNOs.

Kogan Mobile has signed a commercial MVNO agreement with

Vodafone.

Kogan launched mobile services in New Zealand in

September 2019.

In November 2018, Trustpower announced that it had secured an MVNO

agreement with Spark. This will enable Trustpower to start offering mobile

and wireless broadband services.

Trustpower, which also supplies retail

electricity, said it had nearly 400,000 customers in total, including 96,000

fixed-line telecommunications customers.

3.9 Nova has recently entered the mobile market through its acquisition of an existing

MVNO, MegaTEL.

Corinne Reichert, “Kogan Mobile launches off Vodafone in New Zealand.” ZDNet, (4 June 2018).

https://www.zdnet.com/article/kogan-mobile-launches-off-vodafone-in-new-zealand/.

https://www.zdnet.com/article/kogan-mobile-live-in-new-zealand-as-prepay-player.

Trustpower media release, “Trustpower pleased to announce wireless broadband and mobile services on

the way for customers”, 20 November 2018.

Trustpower Annual Report 2019, p 38.

Nova submission on the Preliminary Findings Paper, (28 June 2019), para 3.

3.10 MyRepublic has also announced that it intends to launch MVNO services in

New Zealand.

3.11 Vocus currently has an MVNO agreement with Spark, and it has announced that it

intends to test the wholesale market by issuing a request for proposal for its MVNO

business.

3.12 In addition, towards the end of 2018, Dense Air acquired 70 MHz of spectrum in the

2.5 GHz band from Blue Reach and Cayman Wireless.

Dense Air has informed us

that it intends to use the spectrum to offer network extension services to the

existing MNOs in New Zealand (similar to what it does in other countries), by using

small-cell technology at the edge of cells to enhance coverage. Dense Air’s entry is

more complementary to the existing MNOs, as Dense Air does not intend to

compete with existing mobile operators at either the retail or wholesale level.

3.13 Figure 3 shows trends in mobile market shares, including 2018 data from our latest

annual monitoring questionnaire. As shown in Figure 3, over the last 10 years:

2degrees initially rapidly increased its share of total mobile subscribers,

reaching 22% by 2013. Since 2013, 2degrees’ share of subscribers has

remained flat, with a small fall reported in 2018, to 21% (from 24% in

2017). As we noted in the 2018 Annual Monitoring Report, this was largely

a result of the closure of its 2G network in early 2018;

Vodafone’s share of mobile subscribers has fallen steadily from around

53% in 2009 to 41% in 2018; and

Spark’s share of subscribers dropped from 46% in 2009 to 34% by 2013,

recovering in recent years as Spark’s Skinny brand, launched in early 2012,

expanded.

Communications Day, “MyRepublic plans ANZ MVNO launch within a year”, (26 June 2018), and

Commerce Commission correspondence with MyRepublic.

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings Paper, (28 June 2019), para 17.

See http://denseair.net/dense-air-acquires-2-6-ghz-spectrum-assets-in-new-zealand/.

Commerce Commission, “Annual Telecommunications Monitoring Report 2018 Key Facts”, (18 December

2018), p 19.

Figure 3 Mobile market shares – total subscribers

3.14 Competition in the supply of mobile services has strengthened since the arrival of

2degrees in 2009. The retail market has become less concentrated as 2degrees has

gained market share, particularly in the prepaid mobile services market segment

but also more recently in the on-account residential mobile services market

segment. TUANZ submitted that the continuing presence and expansion of

2degrees in the mobile market is critical.

We agree that the emergence of

2degrees has been important in the development of an increasingly competitive

mobile market.

3.15 The prepaid mobile services segment is relatively low value; based on responses to

our annual monitoring questionnaire, the average revenue per user (ARPU) for

prepaid customers was $12 per month in 2018, compared to ARPU for on-account

subscribers of $43 per month.

3.16 The business segment has remained more concentrated, and this led us to

undertake a study in 2015 to see whether there were any barriers to expansion in

this segment.

The 2015 study identified a number of key factors that business

customers value when selecting a mobile provider. These include reliable coverage,

good customer service, competitive pricing, the ability to offer bundles of services,

and having an established reputation.

TUANZ submission on the Preliminary Findings Paper, (30 June 2019), para 14.

Commerce Commission, “Summary of business mobile market segment study” (30 March 2017)

https://comcom.govt.nz/regulated-industries/telecommunications/monitoring-the-telecommunications-

market/topic-papers-other-reports-and-studies/business-mobile-market-study.

3.17 The 2015 study also found a perception among business customers that 2degrees

represented a lower cost, low quality brand with less coverage, although 2degrees’

own business customers reported the highest levels of satisfaction.

3.18 In revenue terms, 2degrees’ retail market share remained unchanged in 2018,

while Spark’s share increased slightly, and Vodafone’s share continued to drop.

2degrees’ on-account residential mobile revenues have been increasingly

important, and this trend continued during 2018.

3.19 One factor influencing changes in market share is the level of porting activity.

Approximately five percent of New Zealand mobile subscribers port their number

each year. In the year ending June 2018, a total of 301,762 mobile numbers were

ported.

3.20 A number of submissions have argued that the mobile market remains highly

concentrated, with a high proportion of customers served by only 3 MNOs.

According to these submitters, there is little competitive threat from MVNOs,

whose collective market share is low in New Zealand.

3.21 As shown in Table 2 above, the share of mobile subscribers supplied by MVNOs in

New Zealand is around 1%. However, MVNO market share is only one indicator of

competition in a market. As noted earlier in paragraph 3.5, we have examined a

range of indicators, including market shares more generally, as well as the

indicators discussed below.

3.22 As discussed later in this report, we also consider that competitive conditions at the

wholesale level have been improving in recent years, and that this is likely to be in

large part due to 2degrees becoming more active in pursuing wholesale

opportunities. This increased competition at the wholesale level has led to

improvements in the commercial terms offered to MVNOs and potential MVNOs,

allowing for new MVNO-based entry to emerge. This should lead to an expansion in

the MVNO share where MVNOs are able to offer value to consumers.

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 2; BAINZ Consulting, submission on

the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 2; Nova, submission on the Preliminary Findings paper,

(28 June 2019), para 7; Internet NZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 17.

Bundling

3.23 Bundling of multiple services can be beneficial for consumers by offering

convenience of single billing or by offering cheaper prices when the services are

purchased in a bundle than when purchased separately. However, potential

competition concerns may arise if a service provider offers bundles of services that

its competitors cannot replicate.

3.24 In the case of bundles involving mobile services, such foreclosure concerns may be

mitigated by competition between the MNOs, unless an MNO offers a “must have”

service that the others cannot replicate. In addition, bundling can increase

consumer stickiness and customer acquisition costs which could potentially soften

competition.

3.25 Chorus, Vocus and Trustpower submitted that the ability of non-MNOs to compete

in retail markets may be constrained unless they are able to obtain wholesale

access to mobile services on reasonable terms.

For example, according to

Trustpower, the bundling of fixed-line and mobile services are continuing to grow,

with a particular appeal to high-value customer segments. Trustpower noted that

wholesale access to mobile services will be important for fixed-line only providers

in order to avoid the MNOs foreclosing more valuable customer segments.

Analysys Mason made a similar point:

The anticipated increase in popularity of bundles in New Zealand’s telecoms market,

as well as the shift from prepaid to contract subscriptions, suggests that customers

will increasingly choose to purchase domestic telecoms (and family member)

bundles inclusive of mobile services. The convenience and savings offered by

fixed–mobile bundling means that operators which lack a mobile product will find it

much harder to attract high-value customer groups, regardless of the other

telecoms, TV or utility products offered in the bundle.

3.26 Trustpower submitted that this differs materially from bundling fixed-line and

electricity services, as the inputs required to supply these services are easily

accessible due to there being open wholesale markets with regulated access for

these services.

3.27 Consumers have benefitted from discounts by bundling fixed and mobile services.

For example, in the past, the three MNOs have all offered discounted prices for

Chorus submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 16; Vocus submission on the Issues paper,

(26 October 2018), para 89-94; Trustpower submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 15.

Trustpower submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 3.5.2; Trustpower submission on the

Preliminary Findings Paper (28 June 2019), p 8.

Analysys Mason, “Final Report for Trustpower: MVNO aspects of the Commission’s mobile market review”

(28 October 2018), p 23.

Trustpower submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 3.5.3.

residential fixed broadband services if a qualifying mobile subscription is also

purchased.

3.28 According to the responses to our 2018 annual monitoring questionnaire the

volume of fixed broadband subscriptions that attracted such a discount accounted

for less than 20% of the fixed broadband services supplied by the MNOs, although

it has been increasing.

3.29 The 2018 Consumer NZ survey results indicate that 73% of respondents do not

purchase a product that bundles their mobile service with other services.

those who do purchase mobile services as part of a bundle, the main services

included with mobile are fixed-line broadband services and content.

3.30 The ability to bundle mobile connectivity with content was ranked relatively low by

respondents to Analysys Mason’s Connected Consumer Survey in New Zealand.

According to the 2018 survey results, the most important factors that influence

mobile consumers’ choice of a mobile plan include lower pricing of mobile services

(52%), data allowances (33%), value (24%), network coverage (16%), and data

speeds (15%).

Bundling mobile with music was an influential factor for 8% of

respondents and bundling with video content was influential for 2%.

3.31 Spark has moved away from offering discounts to customers who purchase both

fixed and mobile services from Spark. For example, Spark noted that its new

‘Unplan’ broadband plan does not offer a bundled discount, and that it expects the

number of bundled discounts involving mobile to fall over time as customers

migrate to its new broadband plans. According to Spark,

It is unclear whether bundling of mobile services may be a concern in the future. But

bundling can only be a concern where the bundle includes an element with market

power and there isn’t effective competition for the bundle, i.e. a fixed/mobile

bundle may compete against a fixed/electricity bundle. If anything, communications

markets are expected to be more competitive over time, leading us to conclude that

bundling of mobile services is unlikely at this time to represent a potential

competition problem.

Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018. Survey conducted in December 2018, select results published

February 2019.

We note that the actual proportion of respondents who do not purchase a bundle of mobile and other

services may be higher than 73%. Some Skinny respondents said they bought a mobile bundle with

broadband. However, Skinny does not offer bundles of mobile and broadband services. The respondents

may be buying both mobile and broadband services from Skinny, but it is not a ‘bundle’ in that the

services are not tied or billed together.

Analysys Mason, “Connected Consumer Survey 2018: mobile customer satisfaction in Australia and

New Zealand”, slide 11.

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 46.

3.32 Although Spark has moved away from such bundling, the other MNOs are

continuing to offer bundled discounts across fixed and mobile services, and as

noted above, the aggregate number of discounted services has been gradually

increasing.

3.33 At this stage, it appears that non-MNOs, such as Vocus, Trustpower, and Nova (who

has recently acquired an MVNO, MegaTEL) have been able to offer, or expect to

offer, similar or new bundles, for example involving fixed and mobile services along

with other services such as electricity.

Vocus offers discounts to residential customers who purchase both fixed-

line broadband and mobile from Vocus.

In announcing its intention to offer mobile services, Trustpower said that

mobile is increasingly important to its customers, and that its wholesale

agreement with Spark will enable it to offer a wider range of bundles to its

customers.

Pricing

3.34 Mobile consumers typically purchase bundles of mobile services which provide a

monthly allowance of minutes, texts, and data.

3.35 Throughout this study, we have had regard to the benchmarking of mobile prices

undertaken by Teligen on behalf of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), which we use in our annual monitoring reports.

In order to

examine how prices for mobile services have moved over time and how prices in

New Zealand compare to other countries, Teligen’s benchmarking considers the

cost of filling various usage baskets. Teligen’s price benchmarking of mobile

services is based on the two largest MNOs in each country in the OECD and allows

prices to be compared across a range of usage baskets. Teligen updates its

benchmarking three to four times each year.

Slingshot website accessed September 2019. The discount offered by Slingshot amounts to a $300 credit

over 12 months.

Trustpower media release, “Trustpower pleased to announce wireless broadband and mobile services on

the way for customers”, (20 November 2018).

See for example, Commerce Commission, “Annual Telecommunications Monitoring report: 2018 Key

facts”, (18 December 2018), Table 3.

3.36 A number of submissions have commented on the pricing of mobile services in

New Zealand.

2degrees: New Zealand has a small population and challenging

topography, making it relatively expensive to supply mobile services.

Despite this, since 2degrees’ entry, New Zealand’s ranking in terms of

mobile pricing has improved compared to other OECD countries.

2degrees: Benchmarking can overlook important differences. For example,

many Australian mobile plans are for fixed-term contracts; in New Zealand,

2degrees introduced open term plans and monthly repayment options for

handsets.

Spark: Referred to open term plans in New Zealand versus fixed-term

contracts in Australia, and that some of the Australian high usage plans

referred to in the Issues Paper included promotional bonus data

allowances and minimum 12-month contract terms.

Spark: Recent competitive developments in New Zealand have led to

further improvements in value for money for high usage plans. Spark has

increased the threshold on its ‘unlimited’ plans from 22GB to 40GB. Spark

noted that other operators offer group plans with up to 40GB per person

for as low as $40 per month. Such plans compare favourably to other

countries, including Australia.

NERA: The OECD’s August 2018 benchmarking shows New Zealand prices

below both the OECD average and Australia for low and high usage baskets

(including unlimited calls + 20GB, and unlimited calls + unlimited data).

NERA also said that it was important to consider price trends over time,

that prices per GB have been declining steeply in New Zealand, and that

the emergence of high usage plans (20GB and ‘unlimited’ data) and price

reductions for these plans in recent years is consistent with competition

occurring as demand develops.

Vodafone: New mobile plans introduced by the New Zealand MNOs in

2017 with high or unlimited data allowances have brought New Zealand

much more in line with other OECD countries. For example, Vodafone

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (October 2018), p 12.

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (October 2018), p 12, 28.

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 27.

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 9c.

NERA, “Competition in the New Zealand Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 38-40.

submitted that New Zealand’s ‘unlimited’ plans compare well to

comparable offers in Australia.

Data caps continue to increase in

New Zealand, with Vodafone increasing the cap on its Red+ plans to 40GB,

and 2degrees increasing the speed threshold on its ‘unlimited’ plans to

40GB.

Vocus: In the absence of disruptive offers from MVNOs, MNOs have little

incentive to compete down high prices of larger data plans, despite

increasing demand for data.

BAINZ Consulting: There is little price differentiation in New Zealand, and

the pricing for mobile services in New Zealand are higher than Australia.

Sky: Although prices for low and medium usage bundles in New Zealand

seem to compare well with other OECD countries, New Zealand consumers

pay more for high usage bundles than in other countries, particularly

Australia. It is difficult to reconcile this with the finding that conditions for

effective competition exist.

Chorus: It is not clear why higher volume mobile bundles are expensive in

New Zealand compared to other countries. In New Zealand, there are

significant price differences between mobile broadband and fixed wireless

services, suggesting cross-subsidisation and insufficient competition for

mobile.

3.37 Mobile plans offering higher volumes of data are becoming increasingly popular

and important. As an example, the total number of residential on-account

subscribers purchasing bundles of voice, SMS, and data allowances of 3GB or more

increased from 133,000 subscribers in 2016, to 319,000 subscribers in 2017. This

has continued to increase, to 497,000 subscribers in 2018. According to Spark, the

predominant trend in the retail market is the shift towards ‘unlimited’ data plans,

including plans that can be shared across several users.

3.38 To reflect the increasing importance of high usage plans, our 2018 Annual

Monitoring Report included a number of higher usage baskets (including unlimited

Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 29.

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 4.

Vocus submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 96.

BAINZ Consulting submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 1.

Sky submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 10.1, 14.

Chorus submission on the Issues Paper, (26 October 2018), page 7; Chorus submission on the Preliminary

Findings paper (28 June 2019), p 3.

Spark cross-submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), para 10.

calls and 20GB) when comparing mobile prices in New Zealand and other countries.

During this study, we have had regard to a range of baskets, including the unlimited

calls and 20GB data basket, when comparing mobile pricing.

3.39 NERA’s submission on the Issues Paper claimed that the OECD’s August 2018

benchmarking shows that New Zealand performs better than both the OECD

average and Australia, including for high usage baskets. However, we note that in

Teligen’s initial results for its August 2018 benchmarking, which were discussed by

NERA in its submission, Teligen had incorrectly reported a price for New Zealand

based on a Skinny plan with a data allowance that did not fill the 20GB basket.

When corrected, New Zealand’s price for that basket remained 23% higher than

Australia, but below the OECD average.

3.40 We note that Teligen no longer considers New Zealand’s ‘unlimited data’ plans

(where speed is throttled once a threshold has been reached) to qualify as

unlimited data plans, and so New Zealand no longer appears in the Teligen results

for that basket.

3.41 Table 3 shows the May 2019 results for the same baskets that we used in the 2018

Annual Monitoring Report. For comparison, the figures in brackets are the August

2018 results reported in our 2018 Annual Monitoring Report.

Table 3 Latest Teligen benchmarking results, May 2019

May 2019 price, NZD PPP

(Aug 2018)

NZ % price variance from

Mobile phone

services basket

NZ rank

in OECD*

Aust.

OECD

average

Aust.

OECD

average

30 calls + 500MB

10/37

(8/36)

(16)

(22)

(26)

29%

-32%

100 calls + 2GB

17/37

(15/36)

(28)

(22)

(41)

115%

-22%

300 calls + 5GB

21/37

(17/36)

(45)

(34)

(56)

270%

-1%

unlimited calls +

20GB

20/33

(16/31)

(65)

(53)

(109)

178%

-17%

* A ranking of 1 indicates the lowest price for that basket in the OECD.

Source: based on Teligen benchmarking results, May 2019.

NERA, “Competition in the NZ mobile market) submission on the Issues Paper”, (26 October 2018), p 14.

The plan was Skinny’s $46 Combo, which has 12GB data.

3.42 As discussed further in the following section, the average volume of data used by

mobile consumers in New Zealand was 2GB per month in 2018, although this is

growing strongly. For the 2GB and 5GB baskets, the New Zealand price reported by

Teligen is currently at or below the OECD average, as illustrated in Figure 4 and

Figure 5.

Figure 4 Mobile prices (100 calls + 2GB)

Figure 5 Mobile prices (300 calls + 5GB)

3.43 For the larger usage baskets, the results shown in Table 3 indicate that mobile

prices in New Zealand are relatively high when compared to Australia but remain

below the average for the OECD. In fact, New Zealand’s ranking has slightly

deteriorated since the August 2018 results (used in our 2018 Annual Monitoring

Report). For example, in the unlimited calls + 20GB basket, the August 2018 results

reported New Zealand as 16th most expensive out of 31 countries; in the February

and May 2019 results, New Zealand’s rank had fallen to 20

out of 33 countries.

3.44 The reason for this appears to be the withdrawal by Skinny of its sub-brand (‘Skinny

Direct’) in respect of new customers towards the end of 2018. Skinny Direct’s retail

plans were the cheapest plans in New Zealand for some of the higher usage baskets

used by Teligen. For example, for the unlimited calls + 20GB basket, the cheapest

plan in New Zealand had been Skinny Direct’s 25GB plan (NZ$65 per month), which

appeared in Teligen’s benchmarking results in May and August 2018.

3.45 In Teligen’s May 2019 benchmarking, Skinny Direct’s plans no longer appear, with

the cheapest plan in New Zealand now Skinny’s NZ$66 plan (per 4 weeks), which is

equivalent to NZ$71.50 per month. While below the OECD average for this basket

(NZ$86), this remains significantly higher than the price in Australia (NZ$26), as

shown in Table 3.

3.46 Although the New Zealand prices for the higher usage baskets shown in Table 3 are

relatively high compared to Australia, it should be noted that the New Zealand

plans reported by Teligen provide more data than is required to fill the Teligen

baskets. For example, in the unlimited calls + 20GB basket, Skinny’s plan provides

for 33GB of data each month (the Australian plan reported by Teligen for this

basket provides for 20GB of data).

3.47 We have also compared specific retail mobile plans available in New Zealand and

Australia. The New Zealand MNOs do not offer fixed-term contracts to residential

customers, with retail plans available on a pay-monthly basis. In Australia, Optus

and Vodafone currently offer both pay-monthly mobile plans as well as 12-month

contract plans, with greater value offered under the latter. Telstra has recently

moved away from mobile plans with fixed-term contracts, and now offers plans on

a pay-monthly basis only.

3.48 Table 4 summarises the highest data plans currently offered by each MNO in

Australia and New Zealand.

Telstra media release, “Telstra says goodbye to lock-in plans and introduces new build-your-own mobile

plans”, (25 June 2019).

Prices of the Australian plans are converted to NZ$ using PPP rates derived from the Teligen benchmarking

(May 2019).

Table 4 Mobile prices (price per GB), highest data plans offered

Pay-monthly

Vodafone

Australia

Telstra

2degrees

Skinny

Spark

Vodafone

Price (NZ$)

$56

$103

$85

$83

$80

Data (GB)

150

Price per GB

$3.76

$0.68

$2.13

$1.93

$2.00

National calls

and SMS

unlimited

(incl to Aus)

unlimited

(incl to Aus)

unlimited

(incl to Aus)

unlimited

(incl to Aus)

12-month

contract

Optus

Vodafone

Australia

Price (NZ$)

$81

$67

Data (GB)

120

Price per GB

$0.68

$0.56

Source: operator websites, accessed September 2019. Prices are for the highest data plans offered by each

MNO in Australia and New Zealand

3.49 In the Preliminary Findings paper, we noted that for pay-monthly plans, the value

offered by the New Zealand MNOs was similar to the plans available in Australia,

although considerably higher value was available in Australia for customers who

are prepared to sign up for a 12-month term. While it remains the case that the

price per GB remains higher in New Zealand for the largest bundles, there have

been a number of recent market developments which have resulted in improved

value for higher usage mobile consumers in New Zealand.

In April 2019, 2degrees introduced a shared ‘unlimited’ mobile plan,

offering 40GB for $85 per month. The average price per subscriber drops

as additional subscribers are added. A maximum of four people are able to

subscribe to the plan, at which point the average price per subscriber is

$40 per month for 40GB. In addition, 2degrees offered a short-term

promotion in June 2019, offering a 50% discount on most of its

pay-monthly prices for three months.

In May 2019, Skinny added a 40GB plan for $77, renewing every four

weeks. When adjusted to a monthly basis, the Skinny plan offers 43GB for

$83.

As Spark noted in its submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, it

recently increased the threshold at which speeds are throttled on its

‘unlimited’ mobile plans, from 22GB to 40GB.

According to Spark, there

has been a significant shift towards such plans in the New Zealand

market.

Vodafone has also recently increased the threshold on its ‘unlimited’

plans, from 22GB to 40GB.

in September 2019, Kogan Mobile commenced offering prepaid mobile

plans with unlimited calls and SMS, and up to 32GB per month. Subscribers

can pay in advance for 30 days, 90 days, or 365 days.

3.50 We also note that the various plans shown in Table 4 have different inclusions. For

example, some of the New Zealand plans include subscriptions to content (such as

Netflix and Spotify), while the Australian plans often include services such as

picture messaging, international calls, and in some cases international roaming.

3.51 Spark submitted that New Zealand MNOs have moved away from fixed-term

contract plans following feedback from consumers and the Commission.

Our

concerns with contracts were with the one-sided nature of the conditions and

unfair penalties for termination that existed in contracts at the time. Unfair

contract terms can apply to any kind of contract, whether fixed or open term.

3.52 The use of fixed-term contracts per se is not necessarily problematic. As noted

above, consumers in Australia have the choice of fixed-term contracts and

pay-monthly plans. Consumers who are prepared to sign up for a 12-month term

can receive higher value compared to the pay-monthly plans.

3.53 In the Consumer NZ survey, respondents were asked what is the one thing that

their mobile service provider could do to increase overall satisfaction. Having an

‘open term’ plan was the least important feature, with better pricing, cheaper data,

and better service quality being the most important.

This suggests that

consumers might be willing to enter fixed-term contracts in order to get better

value, although as noted above, the pay-monthly plans available in New Zealand

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 9c.

Spark cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), para 10.

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 27b. Spark has since clarified to the

Commission that they were referring to our comments on the management of fixed term contracts,

particularly the actions we have taken against parties who included what we considered may be

potentially unfair contract terms within a fixed term contract structure.

Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018.

continue to offer improved value to consumers through higher data thresholds as

well as lower prices for shared plans.

3.54 A number of submissions earlier in our study (on the Issues Paper) responded to

Analysys Mason’s observation that mobile ARPU has been increasing in

New Zealand in recent years. NERA claimed that the Analysys Mason result appears

to have been driven by an anomaly in the Global System for Mobile Communication

Association (GSMA) data reported for Vodafone.

3.55 Vodafone submitted that the GSMA data includes fixed and mobile revenues, which

spiked in 2013 as a result of Vodafone’s acquisition of TelstraClear (which included

high-value fixed-line enterprise customers). Vodafone also submitted that the

GSMA data for 2016 contained an error. Vodafone referred to the revenue and

subscriber data supplied to us as part of the annual monitoring questionnaire,

which shows ARPU declining since 2010.

3.56 Figure 6 summarises the estimated mobile ARPU based on the responses to our

annual monitoring questionnaires. This indicates that mobile ARPU in New Zealand

has been flat (or shows a slight decline if handset revenues are excluded, as shown

by the dotted line).

3.57 The increase in ARPU in 2012/13 appears to have been driven by an increase in

Spark’s ARPU, which in turn was related to the closure of its CDMA network. As we

have previously noted, the closure of the CDMA network in 2012 resulted in a

reduction in the number of Spark’s subscribers.

Spark reported that the loss of

lower value prepaid subscribers resulted in an increase in its mobile ARPU in

2013.

NERA, “Competition in the New Zealand Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 54.

Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 6-7.

Commerce Commission, “Annual Telecommunications Monitoring Report 2013”, (21 May 2014), p 23-24.

Spark Annual Report 2013, p 53.

Figure 6 Mobile ARPU, 2008-2018

3.58 As noted in the following section, the average monthly volume of mobile-originated

calling minutes per mobile subscriber has been increasing over this period, as has

the average volume of mobile data per mobile subscriber.

3.59 These ARPU and usage trends are consistent with falling prices for mobile services

over time.

3.60 A further indication of how prices of mobile services have changed over time can

be seen by comparing Teligen’s benchmarking results for a consistent basket. For

example, Teligen has reported benchmarking results for a basket of 900 calls and

2GB since 2012.

In 2012, the cheapest mobile plan in New Zealand which filled this basket

was a Telecom plan offering calls and 2GB for $139 per month.

In 2019, the cheapest mobile plan is a Skinny plan offering calls and 5GB

for $39 per month.

3.61 Chorus has submitted that there appear to be significant differences in prices per

GB between mobile broadband and fixed wireless services. Chorus submitted that

this may reflect insufficient competition for mobile services, which may be cross-

The Skinny plan is Skinny’s $36 Combo, which renews every four weeks. This price is adjusted by Teligen to

be equivalent to a price per month. The monthly equivalent data allowance would be 5.4 GB per month.

subsidising fixed wireless services.

However, we note that fixed wireless services

are location-specific, providing connectivity to consumers at fixed locations.

3.62 As a result, the capacity required to support such services can more easily be

directed to those fixed locations. In contrast, for mobile broadband services,

demand is mobile as consumers are likely to be moving around, including between

cell sites. This mobility of demand makes mobile services more challenging to

deliver in terms of network management.

Usage trends

3.63 Responses to our 2018 annual monitoring questionnaire show that mobile voice

minutes continued to grow during 2018, both in aggregate and on a per subscriber

basis. SMS volumes continued to decline as consumers increasingly favour OTT-

based messaging services. This is particularly evident from Analysys Mason’s

Connected Consumer Survey 2018, which found the following:

81% of smartphone users in New Zealand use OTT communication and

social media services, with penetration particularly high in younger cohorts

(94%-95% among users aged below 34); and

messaging services were the most common OTT service used by

respondents.

3.64 In our 2018 Annual Monitoring Report, we noted that the volume of data used by

mobile consumers continued to grow strongly in 2018, with the average volume of

mobile data per connection reaching 2GB per month in 2018, up from 1.2 GB in

2017, as shown in Figure 7. The OECD has reported that average data usage in

New Zealand has increased by 130% between 2016 and 2018.

Chorus submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 7; Chorus submission on the Preliminary

Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 5.5.

Analysys Mason, “Connected Consumer Survey 2018: OTT communication services in Australia and

New Zealand”, slides 7, 10.

OECD, “1.13 Mobile data usage per mobile broadband subscription” (December 2018), at

http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics/.

Figure 7 Mobile data usage

3.65 According to Consumer NZ’s survey of mobile consumers, 82% of respondents used

mobile broadband in 2018, up from 77% in 2017.

3.66 Submissions have generally been unanimous that there has been strong growth in

demand for mobile data, and that this is expected to continue. Chorus noted that

growth in demand for mobile data could be tempered to the extent that prices for

mobile data in New Zealand are high.

Spark noted that the amount of data

consumed by mobile customers in New Zealand has increased on average by

around 77% per year since 2010, with significant growth experienced on its

network. Spark also noted that all MNOs have launched large data bundle plans,

including group plans, which are proving to be popular.

3.67 2degrees submitted that voice and SMS traffic were likely to decline, as calls and

messaging services become increasingly data-based. This will contribute to demand

for larger data allowances, putting pressure on network capacity and the need for

more spectrum.

Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018.

Chorus submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 7.

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 8, 9.

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (October 2018), p 14.

3.68 Vodafone and Spark also noted that there must be sufficient spectrum made

available to meet the expected growth in mobile data.

3.69 Although the average amount of mobile data per connection has been increasing

strongly in New Zealand, New Zealand’s average appears to be relatively low

compared to other OECD countries, as shown in Figure 8. This may in part reflect

relatively high prices for larger bundles of mobile voice and data in New Zealand,

although other factors may also explain this, such as the availability and quality of

fixed broadband networks. As Vodafone has submitted, New Zealand has relatively

high fixed network usage compared to countries such as Finland, and

New Zealanders appear to spend more time connected to WiFi networks on the

mobile devices than other countries.

Figure 8 Average mobile data per mobile subscription (December 2018)

Investment

3.70 The MNOs have continued to invest in their mobile networks, both in terms of

network upgrades and expansion of coverage. The Government has also

contributed to the expansion of infrastructure in rural areas through the Rural

Broadband Initiative (RBI) and Mobile Black Spot Fund (MBSF).

3.71 NERA submitted that despite rapid growth in mobile and fixed wireless data usage,

Spark’s mobile users have experienced increased quality (in terms of speed, packet

Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 29; Spark submission on the Issues paper,

(26 October 2018), p 40.

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 7.

Commerce Commission generated chart based on OECD, “1.13 Mobile data usage per mobile broadband

subscription” (December 2018)”, at http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics/.

loss, round trip time). This indicates that Spark has continued to invest in capacity

ahead of demand.

3.72 2degrees referred to the investment that it had undertaken to date in product and

network deployment, and that it must continue to invest further, including at the

wholesale level.

The MNOs submitted that competition between MNOs has

resulted in increased investment at the network, technology, and services level, as

well as in customer service quality.

3.73 We have updated the data on investment in mobile access made by each of the

MNOs, as reported in responses to our annual monitoring questionnaire. This is

shown in Figure 9. Each MNO has in most years invested up to $100 million per

annum in their mobile networks. The investment peaks appear to relate to

Telecom’s investment in its new wideband code-division multiple access (W-CDMA)

network in 2009, and investment by the three MNOs in 700 MHz spectrum in

2015.

Figure 9 Investment in mobile access, by MNO

NERA, “Competition in the New Zealand Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 74-84.

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 7.

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 7; Vodafone submission on the Issues

paper, (26 October 2018), p 3.

Telecom’s Annual Report 2009 refers to capital expenditure during 2009 of $300M on its new XT mobile

network.

The results of the 700 MHz auction were announced in June 2014, with Spark acquiring 2x20MHz for

$158M; Vodafone acquiring 2x15MHz for $68M; and 2degrees acquiring 2x10MHz for $44M; MBIE, “700

MHz auction: notice of provisional results” (19 June 2014).

3.74 A number of submissions argued that regulatory uncertainty can impact the ability

to fund much-needed new capacity, and that mobile operators are facing

investment in 5G technology at a time when mobile revenues are flat and

profitability is constrained.

Spark submitted that MNOs are continuing to invest to

meet growing demand and new services, and referred to its investment

programme to augment network capacity and to develop new services.

2degrees

also submitted that issues such as the reserve prices and payment terms for new

spectrum will influence investment in network deployment.

Profitability

3.75 Several submissions on the Issues Paper referred to profitability. For example,

NERA included the following diagram, and observed that “New Zealand has an

EBITDA

margin which is consistently under the world average and this gap is

increasing over time.”

Figure 10 EBITDA margin over time

Spark submission on the Issues paper(26 October 2018), p 2; 2degrees submission on the Issues paper,

(26 October 2018), p 24.

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 9b.

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 5.

Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortisation.

NERA “Competition in the New Zealand Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 61.

3.76 The NERA submission was not explicit on whether the EBITDA margins reflect pure

mobile operations, or mobile operations that are integrated with fixed-line

operations. Spark has subsequently informed us that the Merrill Lynch EBITDA data

shown in Figure 10 is based on Merrill Lynch estimates of margins for mobile

operations, where segmented results for fixed and mobile operations are not

separately reported.

3.77 However, it is not clear how Merrill Lynch has derived the segmented mobile

margins, and whether its estimates take into account the structure of the

New Zealand telecommunications sector.

While the EBITDA margins shown above

may be consistent with a competitive mobile market, the lack of transparency has

limited the weight we placed on the Merrill Lynch results.

3.78 The EBITDA margins shown in Figure 10 above for New Zealand appear to relate to

Vodafone and Spark only and sit at around 35%. The EBITDA and revenues reported

by Trilogy for 2degrees over the last three years is summarised in Table 5. This

indicates an EBITDA margin of 14% in 2015, increasing slightly to 16% in 2017 and

2018.

Table 5 2degrees EBITDA, revenues, and EBITDA margins

Year ended 31 December

2015

2016

2017

2018

Revenues (US$’000)

$ 393,055

$ 488,969

$ 520,042

$ 556,410

EBITDA (US$’000)

$ 55,455

$ 80,923

$ 85,307

$ 90,396

EBITDA margin

14%

17%

16%

EBIT (US$’000)

$3,022

$ 21,487

$ 24,502

$24,236

Source: Trilogy International Partners Consolidated Financial Statements as of December 31, 2017 and 2018

3.79 The EBITDA margin for 2degrees (16%) appears to be considerably lower than the

estimated EBITDA margins shown in Figure 10 for the two larger MNOs in

New Zealand. This may in part reflect measurement issues with the Merrill Lynch

For example, with structural separation of the fixed-line broadband networks in New Zealand, Spark and

Vodafone purchase wholesale fixed broadband services from Chorus and the other LFCs. This may result in

higher operating expenditure (and lower capital expenditure) for Spark and Vodafone, compared to the

other developed markets shown in Figure 10.

See http://www.trilogy-international.com/.

estimates.

However, it is also likely to reflect differences in scale between the

three MNOs.

It may also partly reflect 2degrees’ higher mix of prepaid

subscribers.

Quality of mobile services

3.80 Mobile service quality has several dimensions, including network coverage, mobile

broadband speeds, service availability, and customer service. In terms of

New Zealand’s performance on these, a number of observations can be made.

Network coverage: All MNOs offer mobile services to more than 97% of

population (4G to 95%).

Mobile broadband speeds: Speeds are increasing with the deployment of

4G LTE. In February 2018, OpenSignal reported New Zealand’s 4G

download connection speed of 33 Megabits per second, which was 8th

fastest out of 88 countries.

Availability: 3G or 4G availability in New Zealand ranks well, with

OpenSignal ranking New Zealand 6th out of 95 countries.

New Zealand’s

ranking in terms of availability of 4G services is lower, although increasing.

In February 2018, OpenSignal reported 4G availability in New Zealand of

69% (65

out of 88 countries); in May 2019, 4G availability had increased

to 76% (57

out of 87 countries).

Customer service: Consumer NZ’s mobile consumer survey found that the

larger MNOs perform relatively poorly when compared to 2degrees and

Skinny in terms of customer service waiting times and overall customer

satisfaction.

100

As noted above, there may be an issue with the segmentation of the fixed and mobile operations of Spark

and Vodafone.

This is consistent with the findings of McKinsey that profitability of MNOs correlates strongly with market

share. See McKinsey, “Middle East and Africa: Telecommunications industry at cliff’s edge”, (2016),

Exhibit 14.

OpenSignal, “The State of LTE (February 2018)”. OpenSignal is a company that specialises in tracking

mobile network performance from the consumer’s perspective.

OpenSignal defines ‘availability’ as the percentage of time that users can connect to the service. This

differs from population or geographic coverage, both of which omit the time dimension.

OpenSignal, “The State of Mobile Network Experience: Benchmarking mobile on the eve of the 5G

revolution”, (May 2019).

As discussed later, Dense Air intends to use recently acquired spectrum to enhance the coverage of

mobile services in New Zealand.

100

Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018.

3.81 A number of parties have submitted on the issue of service quality. According to

2degrees, mobile service quality has a number of dimensions, including those we

identify above. 2degrees supported the monitoring of retail service quality as long

as it avoids unnecessary costs and allows for meaningful comparisons between

operators. 2degrees also noted that monitoring mobile performance is more

complex than fixed-line services due to the greater sharing of resources.

101

3.82 On behalf of Spark, NERA submitted that although the roll-out of 4G started later in

New Zealand compared to Canada, the US, UK, and Australia, New Zealand’s 4G

coverage expanded quickly to reach levels similar to these countries.

102

3.83 Spark and Vodafone have both referred to New Zealand ranking 2

highest in the

GSMA Global Mobile Connectivity Index (GMCI).

103

The GMCI is comprised of four

equally weighted sub-indices, measuring:

mobile infrastructure (including mobile coverage, speeds, spectrum);

affordability of mobile services (mobile tariffs as a % of GDP per capita);

‘consumer readiness’ (literacy, educational enrolment etc); and

content (movies, music, games and sports).

3.84 Vodafone noted that New Zealand ranked 5

best in terms of infrastructure, 7

terms of affordability and 10

in terms of network performance.

104

3.85 Vodafone argued that quality metrics should focus on the experience of consumers

rather than arbitrary measures of technology used (such as the Commission’s focus

on 4G availability). Vodafone submitted that the New Zealand mobile networks

perform well, and that fixed-line services are more problematic in terms of

complaints than mobile.

105

3.86 In our view the availability measures relate very much to the experience of

consumers. If a service is not available, it compromises the consumer experience.

The availability metrics provide an additional measure of service quality to

coverage and speed by introducing a time dimension to the assessment of service

quality. However, we agree that availability alone does not provide a full view of

quality.

101

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 14-15.

102

NERA “Competition in the New Zealand Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 69-71.

103

Spark submission, 26 October 2018, para 52; Vodafone submission, (26 October 2018), p 3.

104

Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 4.

105

Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 30.

3.87 Spark submitted that OpenSignal’s 4G availability metric does not measure

coverage as such, but the period of time a device connects to a 4G rather than a 3G

network. According to Spark, this can be influenced by various factors, including the

MNO’s network configuration (to prefer connection to 3G or 4G), service

performance, the extent to which voice calls are delivered using 3G or Voice over

Long Term Evolution (VoLTE), and the capability of the device to connect to various

4G bands.

106

3.88 Spark has also said that its network monitoring indicates that Spark customers

connect to its 4G network for a significantly higher proportion of time than

suggested by OpenSignal.

107

3.89 The reasons for the difference in 4G availability reported by Spark and OpenSignal

are not clear. For example, it might be that Spark performs relatively well in terms

of 4G availability, although we currently do not have 4G availability results for the

other MNOs. As discussed later in the ‘Consumer engagement’ section, access to

information on mobile performance (including data speeds, service availability, and

coverage) is an area that could be improved through the wider consumer and retail

service quality work that we are prioritising.

3.90 Although New Zealand’s mobile networks generally appear to perform well in

terms of most measures of quality, publicly available information on New Zealand’s

overall performance in terms of 4G availability (measuring the proportion of time

that end users can connect to 4G services) ranks relatively poorly.

3.91 As noted by NERA, New Zealand initially lagged behind other countries on 4G

coverage, although currently it is broadly comparable. For example, in Australia

Telstra and Optus report current 4G coverage of 99% and 97% respectively, which

is slightly higher than the 96%-98% reported by the New Zealand MNOs.

108

Consumer satisfaction

3.92 The consumer experience with mobile services is mixed. As shown in Figure 11,

consumers experience fewer problems with mobile telecommunications than with

fixed-line telecommunications but experience more problems with mobile services

than utilities or banking services.

106

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 15-16.

107

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 19.

108

Telstra Annual Report 2018, p 9; and https://www.optus.com.au/shop/mobile/network.

Figure 11 Purchasing experiences in the past two years by product or service category

3.93 While fixed-line telecommunications create more complaints than mobile services,

many issues are industry wide (eg, billing, contracts, and sales tactics).

109

3.94 Satisfaction levels with mobile services are above fixed-line telecommunications

services and energy retailers but below banks (see Table 6).

Table 6 Consumer satisfaction by sector

110

Industry

Overall Satisfaction with Suppliers

Largest

Supplier

Best Supplier

Worst Supplier

Industry

Average

Retail - home tech

65%

85%

54%

68%

Retail - mobile

handsets

59%

83%

54%

62%

Banking

54%

87%

54%

60%

Mobile

51%

77%

51%

56%

Fixed-line

telecommunications

49%

68%

43%

51%

Energy

46%

66%

46%

51%

Source: Derived from Consumer NZ (Telecommunications 2018, Banking 2019, Retail 2018, Energy 2019).

111

109

Complaints made to the Commerce Commission.

110

Red numbers show the lowest industry in each satisfaction category, green numbers the highest. % is the

percentage of respondents who said they were very satisfied with their service provider.

111

Results for the banking, energy and telco sectors are from Consumer NZ’s nationally representative

surveys of the New Zealand population; results for the retail home tech and mobile handset categories are

from Consumer NZ member surveys.

Findings on the development of the mobile market

Market shares among the three national MNOs have become more evenly

balanced over time, particularly in the prepaid and residential on-account

segments.

Ongoing investment in the mobile networks has seen all three MNOs investing

in new generations of mobile technology and 2degrees completing the roll-out

of its national network.

All three national MNOs are reporting profits, although profit margins vary,

reflecting differences in market share and mix of customers.

The three national MNOs appear to perform well on most technical measures

of quality, although there is some evidence that the quality of coverage for 4G

services (as measured by availability) may be relatively low compared to other

countries.

Prices of mobile services have been falling. Prices for low and medium usage

bundles compare well with other OECD countries. Prices for higher usage

bundles remain relatively expensive, especially when compared with Australia,

although recent market developments have resulted in ongoing innovation and

improved value for consumers in relation to higher usage bundles.

Usage of mobile calls and in particular mobile data has continued to increase in

recent years, with the amount of mobile data used per subscriber more than

doubling over the last two years. Although average data usage appears to be

relatively low compared to other countries, this may be due to a number of

factors, including pricing of higher usage bundles and the availability and

quality of fixed networks (including WiFi hotspots) in New Zealand.

Our views on the key issues in the mobile market

3.95 As discussed in the above sections, competition in the mobile market has been

developing to the point where there are now three national MNOs, as well as a

small number of MVNOs. Further MVNO-based entry has also been announced.

The performance of the mobile market has generally improved in terms of

delivering competitive outcomes to consumers, through lower prices, increasing

quality, and greater choice of services.

3.96 Based on the above, as well as information provided in submissions received

throughout the course of this study, there are three key issues which are likely to

influence the further development of competition in the mobile market going

forward. These issues relate to spectrum, MVNOs, and consumer engagement.

Together these will potentially have a significant influence on conditions for

competition in the mobile market.

3.97 We briefly discuss the importance of each of these issues below, before turning to

each of them in more detail in Chapter 4.

Spectrum

3.98 Radio spectrum is a critical input used in the deployment of a mobile network. The

type and amount of spectrum held by the MNOs will affect the way in which they

deploy their networks, and the capacity and services they can offer to retail and

wholesale customers.

3.99 The three MNOs currently have asymmetric holdings of spectrum, particularly in

the sub-1 GHz bands and in some of the higher frequency bands. 2degrees

submitted that it holds 18.5% of key mobile spectrum, compared to 40% held by

Spark and 30% held by Vodafone.

112

3.100 According to 2degrees, it has been able to compete and expand since its entry,

although its ability to continue to do so will depend on acquiring sufficient new

spectrum, particularly due to the rapid increase in demand for mobile data.

Throughout this study, Vodafone and Spark have also referred to the importance of

adequate spectrum being released in the 3.5 GHz band to support the development

of 5G networks.

3.101 We note that 2degrees has now largely completed the roll-out of its national

network, for which it has incurred significant fixed and sunk costs. As long as each

of the MNOs has sufficient capacity, which will be influenced by their spectrum

112

2degrees submission on the Issues Paper, (October 2018). The balance of 11% was held by Blue Reach at

the time of 2degrees’ submission on the Issues Paper.

holdings, they are likely to face strong incentives to compete at both the retail and

the wholesale level.

3.102 The allocation of spectrum will continue to have a very important influence on

competitive conditions in downstream markets, including the mobile market, and

on how competition evolves in the future.

113

MVNOs

3.103 During this study, we have sought to better understand the performance of the

retail market, and whether we should consider intervening to promote additional

MVNO-based entry. If competition in the retail market is found to be delivering

poor consumer outcomes which are not expected to improve, it may be

appropriate to consider intervening at the wholesale level (such as through

regulation of MVNO access) to promote entry. Any such intervention would need to

be compared to what would happen in the absence of regulation – for example,

whether competition at the wholesale level is likely to lead to sustainable MVNO-

based entry.

3.104 In this regard, we have sought views on whether competitive conditions at the

wholesale level have changed as a result of 2degrees having completed its national

network, and how wholesale competition is expected to evolve over the next two-

three years.

3.105 In response, a number of parties have provided extensive submissions throughout

this study on competitive conditions at the wholesale level. Several submissions

noted that MVNOs have brought a range of benefits in other countries, such as

greater variety of mobile services, price competition, and increased options for

bundling of mobile services with other services which in turn may be of growing

importance for the effectiveness of competition in telecommunications markets.

3.106 Submissions from Spark, Vodafone and 2degrees generally claim that they are

increasingly competing to attract MVNO business, pointing to the entry of

Warehouse Mobile as well as the (then) anticipated new entry by Trustpower and

Kogan Mobile.

3.107 For such MVNO-based competitors, the availability of MVNO access on reasonable

terms will influence their ability to expand and evolve in retail markets. Until

recently, there appears to have been limited competition between MNOs to host

113

The importance of competition objectives for spectrum allocation has been recognised in many overseas

jurisdictions. See for example, BEREC, “BEREC report on practices on spectrum authorization, award

procedures and coverage obligations with a view to considering their suitability to 5G”, (6 December

2018); ACCC “Allocation limits advice for the 3.6 GHz spectrum allocation”, (July 2018).

MVNOs, and this may have resulted in commercial MVNO agreements which have

not been conducive to MVNO entry and expansion.

3.108 However, there has been some evidence provided in submissions and elsewhere

that the level of wholesale activity has been increasing in recent years. Some

parties have submitted that this increased activity at the wholesale level may be a

result of this study. While the scrutiny brought about by this study may have had

some effect in stimulating wholesale activity, we have also considered whether

sustainable wholesale competition has emerged as a result of 2degrees completing

its national network and becoming more active in pursuing wholesale opportunities

and encouraging MVNOs on its network.

Consumer engagement

3.109 The level of engagement by consumers is an important source of competitive

pressure on suppliers of mobile services. An important part of this study has been

to better understand the nature and effectiveness of consumer engagement in the

mobile market, and whether consumers face any issues in comparing and switching

between retail mobile offers.

3.110 Although submissions have not revealed significant issues for consumer

engagement in the mobile market, we remain of the view that it is important to

better understand the extent to which mobile consumers are engaged and active,

and what is important to consumers when choosing a mobile service provider.

3.111 The ability of different consumers to review their needs and to periodically

compare and switch between retail mobile offers will affect expansion conditions

within the mobile market and the incentives for mobile providers to compete. The

ability of a mobile service provider to enter and expand in market segments will

affect its competitive position. This is because the number and the mix of

customers are likely to influence a mobile provider’s costs, profitability, and its

ability to continue to invest in its network.

Chapter 4 Key issues we identified

Purpose and structure of this chapter

4.1 During this study, we identified three key issues which may influence the

performance of the mobile market in delivering competitive outcomes for mobile

consumers in New Zealand:

spectrum;

MVNO access; and

mobile consumer engagement.

4.2 This chapter sets out our more detailed exploration of these three key issues,

discussing them and presenting our findings and actions.

Spectrum

Introduction

4.3 This section sets out our analysis and findings on radio spectrum allocation

including:

the importance of spectrum for competition between existing MNOs;

the importance of spectrum for new entry;

other obligations and payment terms for spectrum allocation; and

a summary of our views on spectrum.

Spectrum and competition between existing MNOs

4.4 Radio spectrum is a critical input used in the deployment of a mobile network. The

type and amount of spectrum that is allocated to MNOs will affect the way in which

they deploy their networks and the services that can be offered in downstream

markets, including wholesale and retail markets. The existing spectrum holdings of

the three MNOs are summarised in Figure 12.

Figure 12 Spectrum holdings

4.5 The asymmetries in existing spectrum holdings between the MNOs varies across

spectrum bands. For example:

in the sub 1 GHz bands, Spark holds a total of 70 MHz spectrum

(700 MHz/850 MHz), Vodafone holds a total of 60 MHz spectrum

(700 MHz/900 MHz), and 2degrees holds a total of 40 MHz spectrum

(700 MHz/900 MHz);

in the 1800 MHz band, each of the MNOs currently hold 50 MHz spectrum;

in the 2100 MHz band, Spark and 2degrees each hold 30 MHz, while

Vodafone holds 50 MHz; and

in the 3.5 GHz band, Vodafone currently holds 56 MHz (which it will use for

its 5G services from December 2019), and Spark holds 14 MHz

4.6 As discussed below:

the existing management rights in the 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz bands are

due to expire in 2021. The Government has recently announced its

decisions on the proposed renewal of management rights within these

bands; and

the existing management rights in the 3.5 GHz band are due to expire in

2022.

114

The management rights for the use of spectrum in this band

beyond 2022 are due to be allocated in 2020.

4.7 The spectrum held by Spark and to a lesser extent Vodafone in some of the higher

frequency bands (particularly the 2300-2600 MHz bands) has enabled them to

launch fixed wireless broadband services while minimising disruption to their

mobile customers. For example, the number of subscribers to Spark’s fixed wireless

broadband service increased from 84,000 subscribers as of June 2017, to 140,000

subscribers as of June 2019.

115

4.8 The ability to offer fixed wireless services may have been a factor in Trustpower’s

decision to sign an MVNO agreement with Spark. Many of Trustpower’s rural

customers are unlikely to have access to fibre services in the near future, and these

customers can be served using fixed wireless services.

116

4.9 In March 2019, the Government announced its decision on the renewal of radio

spectrum management rights in the 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz bands. These rights

are due to expire in 2021. As a result:

117

in the 1800 MHz band, of the 50 MHz currently held by each of 2degrees,

Spark and Vodafone, 40 MHz is proposed to be renewed; and

in the 2100 MHz band, all of the existing rights held by 2degrees (30 MHz),

Spark (30 MHz), and Vodafone (50 MHz) are proposed to be renewed.

118

4.10 A number of submitters agreed that significant disparities in spectrum holdings are

likely to distort competition at both the retail and the wholesale level. For example,

Sky said that effective spectrum allocation “lies at the heart of a competitive

mobile market”.

119

Trustpower and Spark agreed that spectrum is a critical input,

and that significant asymmetries in holdings can affect competition.

120

Vocus said it

114

The current holdings of 3.5 GHz spectrum shown in Figure 12 are in the lower part of the 3.5 GHz band.

RSM are currently inviting expressions of interest for a proposed short-term allocation of spectrum in the

upper portion of the 3.5 GHz band to support the deployment of 5G services between 2020-2022.

115

Spark New Zealand FY19 Results Summary, p 35.

116

Trustpower media release, “Trustpower pleased to announce wireless broadband and mobile services on

the way for customers”, (20 November 2018).

117

Government media release, “Spectrum rights renewed in 3G and 4G bands”, (12 March 2019), available at

https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/spectrum-rights-renewed-3g-and-4g-bands.

118

An additional 10 MHz in the 2100 MHz band held by Telstra is not to be renewed.

119

Sky submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 2.1.

120

Trustpower submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 3; Spark submission on the

Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 1.

supported a rebalancing of spectrum to bolster the ability of 2degrees to compete

at both the retail and wholesale levels.

121

4.11 Vodafone also agreed that spectrum is a key input that will continue to have a very

important influence on competitive conditions in downstream markets.

122

According to Vodafone, compared to other countries, New Zealand has a significant

amount of spectrum allocated to the MNOs, which has lowered the costs of

network deployment and reduced the impact of other challenges (such as covering

complex terrain and a small population).

123

4.12 Vodafone submitted that existing spectrum holdings have been driven by

competition, allocation rules set by the Government, and commercial decisions by

operators (citing the example of the 700 MHz spectrum allocation process, in which

2degrees did not seek to acquire the full block that was available to it). According

to Vodafone, the resulting spectrum holdings reflect the market shares of each

MNO, with 2degrees holding more spectrum on a per subscriber basis than

Vodafone and Spark.

124

4.13 2degrees holds a smaller block of sub-1 GHz spectrum, and although its parent has

stated that it has been able to compete with the other MNOs,

125

2degrees has

submitted that its ability to continue to compete and expand depends on acquiring

new spectrum.

126

According to 2degrees’ submission, existing disparities in

spectrum should not be widened, and in particular:

127

2degrees should be able to acquire at least the same amount of 3.5 GHz

spectrum as the other MNOs. Each MNO should be able to acquire a

minimum of 80 MHz,

128

although 100 MHz would be ideal, allowing

optimal long-term competitive delivery of wireless services; and

2degrees should be able to acquire the unused 2100 MHz held by Telstra.

4.14 In responding to Vodafone on spectrum holdings, 2degrees submitted that

Vodafone’s position would lock the market into a ‘current state’, with 2degrees’

121

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 38.

122

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 9.

123

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 3, 10.

124

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 13.

125

Trilogy International Partners, “Annual Information Form for the Year Ended December 31, 2017”,

(21 March 2018), p 16.

126

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 6.

127

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 9-10.

128

2degrees submission on the Issues Paper (October 2018), p 23.

market share being frozen by lower spectrum holdings. 2degrees submitted that

this would not support ongoing competition at the retail or wholesale level.

129

2degrees also noted that at the time of the 700 MHz spectrum auction in 2014,

2degrees was capital constrained. At the time, 2degrees was yet to record a profit,

and was still deploying its national network and making substantial payments for

national roaming.

4.15 In allocating spectrum, it is important that consideration is given to the likely

competitive effects of any allocation. While we recognise that there may be

competing objectives that the Crown will likely need to balance, we consider that

promotion of competition should be an important consideration in spectrum

allocation for the long-term benefit of New Zealanders.

4.16 The competition impacts of spectrum acquisitions can be considered in two ways:

under the Commerce Act through the merger clearance process and the

ability for the Commission to undertake merger enforcement

investigations under section 47 of the Commerce Act; and

through tools applied as a matter of Government policy as part of auction

design to promote competition, including setting the reserve price for

spectrum allocations, spectrum caps (or acquisition limits), ‘use it or lose

it’ provisions, implementation requirements, and payment terms.

130

4.17 In considering whether an acquisition (including renewals) of spectrum would be

likely to substantially lessen competition under section 47 of the Commerce Act, we

look at the impact of the acquisition on telecommunications markets. This is a

relative test that examines competition with and without the acquisition to see

whether competition would likely be substantially lessened as a result of the

acquisition. The competitive impact may not only depend on the particular band of

spectrum being acquired, but also on holdings in other spectrum bands which may

be a close substitute.

4.18 The use of mechanisms such as spectrum caps as part of an auction for new

spectrum allocations may seek to further promote competitive conditions. RSM has

been consulting on the key issues surrounding the allocation of further spectrum

(initially in the 3.5 GHz band) to support the deployment of 5G services, including

the use of spectrum caps.

131

The MNOs have submitted, both to RSM and

129

2degrees cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (July 2019), p 3-4.

130

These tools are discussed in the recent Cabinet Paper on 5G spectrum. See Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of

Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (27 February 2019), para 49, 56, 76 and 78.

131

RSM, “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand: Discussion document”, (March 2018); “Discussion document:

Technical Arrangements of the 3.5 GHz Band”, (June 2019).

throughout this study, that they should each be able to acquire 80-100 MHz of

3.5 GHz spectrum.

4.19 We consider that a key feature of the allocation process for this spectrum will be

the setting of acquisition limits that prevent any party or parties from dominating

spectrum holdings and distorting competition in downstream markets. The

Minister of Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media (the Minister) has

recommended to the Cabinet Economic Development Committee that a limit be set

on the amount of national 5G spectrum given to any one operator, “to prevent

stronger players in the market from shutting out weaker incumbents or potential

new entrants”.

132

4.20 In its advice to the Australian Minister for Communications on spectrum limits in

relation to 3.6 GHz spectrum, the ACCC noted it may be appropriate to take into

account existing holdings of spectrum in other bands when considering how much

new spectrum a party should be able to acquire.

133

4.21 In commenting on spectrum caps to be applied in the upcoming 3.5 GHz auction,

Spark said it would be concerned if an aggregate spectrum cap were to be

applied.

134

Spark submitted that any conclusions on spectrum asymmetries should

consider utilisation of existing holdings, and Spark’s core spectrum holdings are

heavily utilised. As a result, Spark will need to invest in either additional spectrum

or more sites. According to Spark, the latter is becoming more challenging due to

community concerns, and so if Spark cannot acquire the spectrum it needs, the

result will be capacity constraints, with implications for consumers and

competition.

135

4.22 We note Spark’s submission on the importance for Spark of acquiring enough

spectrum, otherwise network capacity will be compromised as it reaches spectrum

saturation, and as it faces challenges building more sites. While this may be the

case, it is likely to equally apply to the other MNOs, and, in particular, 2degrees due

to its existing spectrum holdings. If existing asymmetries are widened significantly,

such constraints are likely to be exacerbated. For example, we have already seen

that 2degrees has not yet launched fixed wireless services, and this may be due to

its lack of higher capacity spectrum.

132

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released 27 February

2019), para 5, 27, 49.

133

ACCC, “Allocation limits advice for the 3.6 GHz spectrum allocation”, (July 2018), p 2.

134

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 26.

135

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 30-31.

4.23 Spark also submitted that spectrum bands have different characteristics (such as

coverage vs capacity), and that not all bands are strong substitutes.

136

At present,

only the 3.5 GHz band has widespread equipment availability and large bandwidths

available to support 5G services. According to Spark, existing holdings can have

little practical relevance when considering 3.5 GHz spectrum acquisitions.

137

4.24 However, Spark has previously stated that different spectrum bands are readily

substitutable. In its application for clearance to acquire 2300 MHz spectrum, Spark

made the following statement:

138

Spectrum in the 2300MHz and other spectrum bands made available for mobile and

broadband services (including the 700MHz, 850MHz, 900MHz, 1800MHz, 2100MHz,

2500/2600MHz and 3400MHz bands) are readily substitutable with each other for

the provision of LTE FWA services.

4.25 Substitutability between spectrum bands is an important consideration when

looking at the implications for competition of a spectrum acquisition. This may be

particularly relevant for the allocation of 3.5 GHz spectrum and the renewals of

1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrum.

Spectrum and new entry

4.26 As discussed above, access to spectrum is important for existing operators to

compete in downstream retail and wholesale markets. Access to spectrum is also

required for new entrants.

4.27 In addition to looking at differences in the current spectrum holdings of the three

existing MNOs, we have considered whether parties other than the existing three

MNOs should be able to participate in any future allocation of spectrum. This

includes potential new MNOs, as well as other parties such as regional service

providers.

4.28 Based on our analysis of the performance of the retail mobile market in

New Zealand, there does not appear to be a strong case for regulatory intervention

to promote a fourth MNO to enter the New Zealand market.

136

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 33.

137

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 37.

138

Spark, “Notice Seeking Clearance of a Business Acquisition Pursuant to Section 66 of the Commerce Act

1986”, 18 December 2015, para 8.7.

4.29 Several parties agreed that there is not a case for regulatory intervention to

support a fourth MNO. For example:

2degrees submitted that a fourth national MNO is unlikely to be

sustainable in a market with falling margins, in which network build is

costly, and in which significant ongoing investment is required. 2degrees

noted that new entry is emerging in the form of MVNOs as a result of

wholesale competition;

139

Covec submitted that it would be challenging to build a fourth mobile

network in New Zealand and estimated a break-even market share of 10%

of revenues would need to be achieved relatively quickly.

140

Covec noted

that a fourth MNO would further fragment spectrum holdings.

141

TUANZ indicated that a fourth MNO was unlikely due to the capital costs

required to build coverage across a geographically challenging and small

market.

142

4.30 However, the upcoming 3.5 GHz spectrum allocation should not preclude the

possibility of new entry if investors see a potential business case to acquire and use

spectrum. In our view, any entry decision should be up to investors, who should be

able to determine the merits of a business case for entry. Reserving the new

spectrum solely for the use of the existing three MNOs would erect an absolute

barrier to entry and would preclude the possibility of new entry into downstream

markets.

4.31 A number of parties agreed. For example, Spark submitted that the design of

spectrum auctions should not prevent possible entry from new operators.

143

4.32 Such entry may not necessarily be in the form of a fourth MNO that would compete

against the existing MNOs. For example, in November 2018 Dense Air acquired

70 MHz of spectrum in the 2600 MHz band in New Zealand.

144

Dense Air intends to

use the spectrum to offer network extension services to the existing MNOs, by

using small-cell technology at the edge of cells to enhance coverage.

139

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 8.

140

Covec submission on the Issues paper, (24 October 2018), para 62.

141

Covec submission on the Issues paper, (24 October 2018), p 8, 9.

142

TUANZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (30 June 2019), para 16.

143

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 25.

144

http://denseair.net/dense-air-acquires-2-6-ghz-spectrum-assets-in-new-zealand/.

4.33 Dense Air’s entry is more complementary to the existing MNOs, as Dense Air does

not intend to compete with existing mobile operators at the retail level.

145

The

Dense Air business model is targeted at enhancing MNOs coverage and capacity

using Dense Air’s licenced spectrum to in-fill coverage gaps in urban areas and

extend capacity weak spots in more rural areas where it is not economically

efficient for MNOs to deploy this additional infrastructure themselves.

4.34 Potential interest in upcoming spectrum allocations in New Zealand has emerged

from regional wireless internet service providers (WISPs). InternetNZ highlighted

the importance of non-mobile operators such as WISPs being able to compete for

spectrum rights.

146

According to InternetNZ, the issues raised by the Wireless

Internet Service Providers Association of New Zealand (WISPA NZ) – including the

prospect that spectrum currently used by WISPs may be transferred to the MNOs –

are particularly relevant.

147

4.35 It appears that the WISPs will continue to have access to spectrum in the 3.5 GHz

band, although the precise details of WISP allocations are yet to be confirmed. In its

March 2018 discussion document on 5G spectrum, RSM referred to a total of 280

MHz of spectrum in the 3.5 GHz band as being available for 5G networks.

148

4.36 In February 2019, the Minister of Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media

said that officials have since identified that 390 MHz of spectrum could be allocated

in the 3.5 GHz band, which could in principle be sufficient to meet the needs of up

to four national network operators, as well as regional service providers (WISPs).

149

The amount of 3.5 GHz spectrum actually available for direct allocation will also

depend on Treaty of Waitangi policy, and guard band considerations.

150

4.37 The Minister also noted that the allocation of 3.5 GHz spectrum is expected to take

place in 2020, with the associated rights to use the spectrum to apply from 2022.

151

145

http://denseair.net/dense-air-acquires-2-6-ghz-spectrum-assets-in-new-zealand/.

146

InternetNZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 13.

147

InternetNZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 11.

148

RSM “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand: Discussion document”, (March 2018), p 5.

149

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released

27 February 2019), para 5, 27.

150

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released

27 February 2019), para 27.

151

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released

27 February 2019), para 6.

Other obligations and payment terms for spectrum allocation

4.38 Several parties have commented on whether obligations should be attached to the

allocation of spectrum. Such obligations could include the following:

obligations to offer wholesale access to third parties;

obligations to ensure the spectrum is used, rather than hoarded.

4.39 Wholesale access obligations have been supported by several parties, including

Trustpower,

152

TUANZ,

153

and Nova.

154

4.40 As discussed further in the MVNO section below, we do not see a strong case for

regulatory intervention in respect of MVNO access. Our reasons for this – that the

downstream retail market in which mobile services are supplied to end users is

performing reasonably well, and that competition is also emerging at the wholesale

level – apply both to the case for ex ante regulation (such as through the addition

of an MVNO access service to Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act) and the

case for including an obligation attached to spectrum rights to offer wholesale

access to third parties.

4.41 We also note that although Red Dawn Consulting (RDC) flagged a wholesale

obligation as a potential option to consider, RDC noted a potential disadvantage is

that such an obligation may have an adverse impact on the extent and timing of 5G

deployments. This could result in a significant detriment for end users. RDC also

noted that it is uncommon for national regulators to attach wholesale obligations

to spectrum, with a small number of exceptions (Germany and Romania).

4.42 Several submitters have referred to the risk that spectrum might be hoarded rather

than used to roll out services. For example, InternetNZ has expressed concerns that

spectrum is a scarce resource that is allocated for periods of up to 20 years, which

can result in hoarding.

155

2degrees also submitted that it will be important to have

meaningful but realistic implementation conditions to dissuade speculative

bidding.

156

152

Trustpower submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 23.

153

TUANZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (30 June 2019), para 42.

154

Nova submission on the Preliminary Findings paper’ (28 June 2019), para 8.

155

InternetNZ submission on the Issues Paper’ (26 October 2018), p 9.

156

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 8.

4.43 We support the inclusion of ‘use it or lose it’ obligations on parties acquiring

spectrum. In this regard, we note that the recommendations of the Minister of

Broadcasting, Communications and Digital Media to the Cabinet Economic

Development Committee in February 2019 propose to include obligations to use

spectrum allocated in the 3.5 GHz band. Such obligations are to ensure that

spectrum is actually used, and to discourage hoarding and speculation, which could

also have an adverse impact on competition. The requirements proposed by the

Minister would require the recipients of the spectrum rights to implement a

network within:

157

five years in the case of a national network, extendable to seven years on

payment of a sum to be decided; and

two years in the case of a regional or local network.

4.44 We also note that the February 2019 Cabinet Paper on 5G spectrum refers to the

option of allowing recipients of spectrum to pay for the spectrum by instalments,

and that the Minister will consider the case for instalments as part of the design of

the 3.5 GHz auction.

158

This approach could reduce the barriers for new entrants or

allow parties to secure viable spectrum allocations.

4.45 We will continue to engage with MBIE on the design of future spectrum auctions

including the 5G auction.

157

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released 27 February

2019), para 5, 27 , 56.

158

Cabinet Paper, “Allocation of Radio Spectrum for 5G Mobile”, (12 December 2018 - released

27 February 2019), para 78.

Findings on spectrum

Spectrum is a scarce and critical input into the supply of mobile services.

Significant asymmetries in spectrum holdings (including in terms of the

amount and type of spectrum held) can affect competition in the mobile

market. The design of future allocation processes for spectrum should have

regard to such asymmetries. In setting limits on the amount of spectrum that

may be acquired, it may also be appropriate to have regard to existing holdings

in other bands which represent a substitute for the spectrum being auctioned

or allocated.

We do not believe there is a case for regulatory intervention to promote a

fourth national MNO to enter the market. However, the design of the

upcoming 3.5 GHz spectrum allocation process should not preclude new

parties (including parties who may complement or compete with the existing

MNOs) from obtaining spectrum.

We do not believe that there is a strong case for including a condition on

spectrum rights that requires wholesale access to be offered to third parties.

MVNOs

Introduction

4.46 This section sets out our analysis and findings on MVNOs, including:

a brief outline of the potential benefits that MVNOs can bring for

consumers of mobile services;

describing the types of MVNO operating models and the gross margins

expected for each type of MVNO model;

examining the emergence of competition at the wholesale level for MVNO

services in New Zealand; and

summarising our findings with respect to MVNOs.

Potential benefits to consumers from MVNOs

4.47 MVNO entry can provide consumers with more choice of standalone mobile

services as well as bundles that include mobile and other services. MVNOs can offer

price competition and some service innovation, product differentiation, and a more

flexible set of tariff arrangements which may better meet the needs of specific

customer niches. MVNOs often enter to target niche segments of the market that

traditional MNOs may not be willing or able to serve.

4.48 There are also benefits to consumers from being able to purchase bundled services.

Fixed-line service providers can use an MVNO model to provide bundled offers. For

example:

Vocus has been offering discounts to residential customers who purchase

both a fixed-line broadband service, and a mobile service. For example, its

Slingshot brand offers a monthly discount as well as upfront credits

(currently $300) when a customer signs up to any broadband and mobile

plan for 12 months;

159

Trustpower, when it launches, intends offering its fixed broadband and

electricity customers the option of acquiring mobile services in its

bundles.

160

Nova has also recently acquired an MVNO (MegaTEL), enabling

159

Slingshot website accessed September 2019.

160

Trustpower media release, “Trustpower pleased to announce wireless broadband and mobile services on

the way for customers”, (20 November 2018).

it to offer mobile services along with its energy and fixed-line services;

161

and

WISPA NZ have indicated that there would be strategic value for WISPs in

being able to offer a full-service bundle, including mobile, to rural

consumers.

162

4.49 In submissions on the Preliminary Findings, there were a range of views on the

importance of MVNO-based competition. Trustpower submitted that MVNO

competition is important, and that the Commission may have taken a narrow view

of the role that MVNOs can play in promoting competition. According to

Trustpower, while some MVNOs may complement MNOs in serving customer

niches, broader MVNO models have been successful in other countries in delivering

cheaper prices, increased product variety, and consumer choice. Trustpower said

that there is no reason why this cannot happen in New Zealand, as long as MVNO

access arrangements don't limit the ability of MVNOs to compete and innovate.

163

4.50 Nova said that the ability of non-MNO retailers to gain wholesale access to mobile

services on reasonable terms is crucial to ensuring sufficient competition and

choice in both fixed and mobile markets.

164

TUANZ submitted that as a fourth MNO

is unlikely to be sustainable, increased competition will have to come from

MVNOs.

165

4.51 2degrees expects new MVNOs to offer additional choice to consumers, although

submitted that the small size of the New Zealand market limits the scope for MVNO

expansion compared to other countries. 2degrees also noted that there is already

strong price competition between MNOs, and that MVNOs may face challenges in

gaining the scale required to justify investment in fuller MVNO models.

166

4.52 Vodafone and Spark questioned whether greater MVNO participation in the retail

market would actually improve consumer outcomes. According to Vodafone,

consumers in New Zealand are currently getting a good deal on mobile services,

and there is no evidence that MVNOs would add anything.

167

Spark referred to

NERA’s finding that there is no evidence of a link between MVNO market share and

161

Nova submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 3.

162

WISPA NZ submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2.

163

Trustpower submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 4-5.

164

Nova submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 6.

165

TUANZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (30 June 2019), para 26.

166

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 3, 10.

167

Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 16.

improved consumer outcomes (such as download speeds, data usage, or 4G

uptake).

168

4.53 In considering the benefits that MVNO-based entry brings for consumers, the

performance of the retail market in which mobile services are delivered to

consumers is relevant. If the retail market was found to be delivering poor

outcomes to consumers, the benefits from promoting additional entry or expansion

in the retail market, including through MVNOs, are likely to be greater.

4.54 In Chapter 3, we examined the development of mobile services and competition in

New Zealand, based on a range of key indicators. These include indicators relating

to the structure of the mobile market (including market shares and entry

conditions), as well as performance indicators such as pricing, investment, and

service quality. We found that the retail market continues to develop and deliver

increasingly competitive outcomes for mobile consumers.

4.55 Trustpower noted that in other countries with a similar population to New Zealand,

such as Denmark, Austria, Norway, and Ireland, there are a larger number of

MVNOs.

169

However, while other countries have a larger number of MVNOs, we are

ultimately interested in the long-term benefit of end users of telecommunications

services, including mobile services, in New Zealand. In this regard, we have looked

at the performance of the retail market for mobile services in terms of delivering

competitive outcomes for consumers.

4.56 There appears to be mixed evidence of the benefits brought by MVNOs. This likely

depends on the extent of competition between MNOs and the terms and

conditions under which MVNOs operate in different jurisdictions.

4.57 We remain of the view that MVNO-based entry can bring a range of potential

competitive benefits, including offering greater choice, service innovation

(including bundles of mobile services and other services), and more competitive

pricing. As noted earlier, MVNOs often target niche segments of the market that

traditional MNOs may not be willing or able to serve.

4.58 However, MVNOs are dependent on their host network, and this may limit the

extent to which they can differentiate their offerings from those of their host MNO,

depending on the terms and conditions of access.

170

168

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 51d.

169

Trustpower cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), p 4.

170

The ACCC has also stated that it considers MVNOs to provide a limited constraint on the MNOs in

Australia, “particularly as they rely on purchasing wholesale end-to-end mobile services from MNOs.”

MVNO operating models and margins

4.59 MVNOs typically provide the same or similar retail services as a traditional MNO.

They purchase capacity from an MNO, then in turn offer services to their own

customer base and acquire new customers from MNOs or other MVNOs.

4.60 There are different types of MVNO operating models. These are typically described

as ranging from a licensed reseller, which is the minimalist form of MVNO, through

intermediate models, to a ‘full’ MVNO (sometimes also referred to as ‘thick’

MVNOs). Under a full MVNO model, the MVNO invests in more of the key

components of a mobile network apart from radio spectrum. The MVNO models

offer the MNO the opportunity to generate revenue from spare network capacity.

4.61 Figure 13 illustrates the different MVNO operating models.

Figure 13 MVNO operating models

4.62 The number of key components carried out by the MVNO grows for each

progressive model, as does the expected margin discount typically offered by the

MNO.

171

This is because the level of investment required by the MVNO increases as

it moves from a simple reseller with minimal investment through to a ‘full’ MVNO,

where the MVNO owns and operates core network elements. As a result, the

ACCC, “Statement of Issues TPG Telecom – proposed merger with Vodafone”, (13 December 2018),

para 121 and 190.

171

The discounts expected under each of the MVNO operating models are further discussed below.

division of components between the MVNO and the host MNO will vary across the

operating models, and the level of discount will reflect this division.

4.63 Table 7 below shows the typical range of gross margins (representing discounts off

retail prices) expected for each of the MVNO models illustrated in Figure 13. These

ranges are taken from the experience of RDC and its involvement in approximately

one hundred MVNO arrangements globally.

172

Table 7 MVNO operating models and gross margin

MVNO Model

Gross Margin Range

Licensed Reseller

10-20%

Service Provider

20-35%

Light MVNO

35-55%

Full MVNO

45-70%

Source: RDC “MVNO Landscape: Global perspectives and New Zealand Applications” April 2019.

4.64 We note that the European Commission cleared a 4-to-3 merger in Austria on the

condition that the merged entity meet a number of conditions to facilitate new

entry, including providing wholesale access to MVNOs. The pricing terms of that

wholesale access included a discount of 25% off the retail price (retail-minus

discount).

173

4.65 We understand that the model operated by the Warehouse Mobile would sit

towards the left-hand side of Figure 13 (Licensed reseller). Vocus and Trustpower

appear to sit somewhere between Service Provider and Light MVNOs.

174

4.66 As RDC has noted, the potential growth of MVNO models may be moderated by the

relatively small size of the New Zealand market and the set-up costs associated

with MVNO operating models. According to RDC:

for an MVNO based on a licensed reseller model, set-up costs for the

MVNO are low;

for a light MVNO, set-up costs incurred by the MVNO can be between

$1 million and $2 million; and

172

RDC, “MVNO landscape: Global perspectives and New Zealand Applications”, (24 April 2019), p 12-13.

173

European Commission Decision, Case No M.6497 – Hutchison 3G Austria / Orange Austria, (12 December

2012), p 165.

174

Informed by RDC, “MVNO Landscape report” (24 April 2019), p 30.

for a full MVNO, set-up costs incurred by the MVNO can be between

$2 million and $3 million.

4.67 RDC suggest that the full MVNO model is unlikely to be justified for a market the

size of New Zealand.

175

4.68 Spark and Vodafone agreed with RDC’s view that given the small size of the

New Zealand market, there may be limited opportunities for MVNOs, and that such

opportunities are likely to be at the reseller end of the spectrum shown in Figure 13

above.

176

4.69 We note RDC’s view that the light MVNO model is likely to be appropriate for

New Zealand:

177

In NZ, we suggest that the Light MVNO model is the most appropriate. The licenced

reseller and service provider models are unlikely to provide sufficient margins, nor the

ability to facilitate service differentiation for potential new entrants.

4.70 Trustpower and Vocus submitted that it is important for MVNOs to have the

opportunity to negotiate access for thicker MVNO models, to give them greater

control and deeper access to the mobile networks.

178

Trustpower noted that

service providers with scale, particularly in fixed-line markets, are likely to be

interested in thick MVNO arrangements.

4.71 We discuss the emergence of wholesale competition between the MNOs in the

following section, where we note that a number of MNOs have expressed a

willingness to continue to develop commercial arrangements to provide MVNOs

with greater flexibility for differentiation and innovation. However, as noted by

RDC, thicker MVNO models will involve greater investment by the MVNO partner.

Emerging competition at the wholesale level

4.72 Until recently, competition between the MNOs to supply wholesale mobile services

to MVNOs appears to have been limited. The MVNOs that emerged in New Zealand

prior to 2015 were hosted by either Vodafone or Spark, and market evidence

indicates that commercial arrangements may have been a factor in limiting the

ability of the MVNOs to expand in the retail market. As noted in Chapter 3, the

175

RDC, “MVNO landscape: Global perspectives and New Zealand Applications”, (24 April 2019), p 14.

176

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 46; Vodafone submission on the

Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 17.

177

RDC, “MVNO landscape: Global perspectives and New Zealand Applications”, (24 April 2019), p 14.

178

Trustpower submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 5-6; Vocus cross-submission

on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), para 22 and 25.

share of the retail mobile market supplied by MVNOs is around 1%, which is

considerably lower than in comparable countries.

179

4.73 Evidence collected during the study indicates that, until recently MNOs have shown

little interest in hosting MVNOs, with MVNO negotiations often being difficult and

protracted.

4.74 Trustpower has previously submitted that competitive tension at the wholesale

level in New Zealand is likely to be low, due to the third MNO being a relatively late

entrant with more limited coverage than the other MNOs.

180

2degrees has also

submitted that it had previously been limited in its ability to offer competitive

MVNO services:

181

When pricing MVNOs, 2degrees offers a national service, including coverage in areas

where it purchases national roaming services. In the past, the blended rates it offers

on voice, SMS and data would have been higher due to the costs and risks

associated with national roaming, but these have improved over the last two years

as the reliance on national roaming has reduced. Now, in 2018, national roaming

accounts for a very small amount of network traffic.

4.75 2degrees also argued that in the past, two MNOs with broadly similar market

shares had little incentive to support MVNOs, “but the presence of a growth-

oriented third network will change behaviour”.

182

2degrees pointed to similar

trends in overseas markets, where a third MNO pursues growth using MVNOs,

prompting a competitive response from incumbents.

4.76 There is some evidence to suggest that competitive conditions at the wholesale

level have recently been improving, along the lines suggested by 2degrees.

The Warehouse Mobile launched mobile services in late 2015, based on

2degrees’ network.

Spark submitted that it has improved the commercial terms it has been

offering for MVNO services.

183

179

For example, in its final report on its Communications Sector Market Study, the ACCC reported the market

share of MVNOs as being greater than 10%. See ACCC, “Communications Sector Market Study”,

(April 2018), Figure 4.2.

180

Trustpower, “Promoting a vibrant mobile market in New Zealand”, (3 November 2015), p 12.

181

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 17.

182

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 18.

183

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 113.

Trustpower received competing MVNO offers from 2degrees and Spark in

2018

184

In November 2018, Trustpower announced it had signed an MVNO

agreement with Spark, enabling Trustpower to start offering mobile and

wireless broadband services. Trustpower said it had nearly 400,000

customers in total across all its services, including 91,000 fixed-line

telecommunications customers.

185

Kogan Mobile, who supply mobile services in Australia, has recently

launched mobile services in New Zealand, based on its wholesale

agreement with Vodafone.

186

MyRepublic has also announced that it intends to enter as an MVNO in

Australia and New Zealand, following its entry into the Singapore

market.

187

4.77 Although it did not secure Trustpower’s MVNO business, 2degrees is likely to

continue to compete for MVNO opportunities as:

it has invested in a Mobile Virtual Network Enabler (MVNE) platform that

supports independent and differentiated MVNO models;

it can now offer comparable levels of coverage as the other MNOs; and

having incurred the fixed costs of building its network, it can improve scale

and reduce unit costs through increased wholesale activities.

4.78 Several parties have questioned whether competitive conditions at the wholesale

level have improved in recent years. For example, Trustpower submitted that while

its preference is for commercial arrangements, it is not confident that wholesale

competition has developed to provide sufficient incentives for MNOs to negotiate.

Trustpower submitted that the recent interest shown by MNOs in hosting MVNOs

is likely to be a result of this study.

188

4.79 Nova acknowledged that 2degrees is likely to compete for MVNO opportunities,

given its investment in an MVNE platform, although Nova has not yet seen any

184

2degrees submission on the issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 16.

185

Based on its 30 September 2018 results. Also

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12163254, 20 November 2018.

186

See https://www.koganmobile.co.nz/.

187

Communications Day, “MyRepublic plans ANZ MVNO launch within a year”, (26 June 2018), and

Commerce Commission correspondence with Kogan Mobile and MyRepublic.

188

Trustpower submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 7.

actual evidence that 2degrees has prompted a competitive response from Spark or

Vodafone.

189

Sky questioned why the wholesale market for mobile services in

New Zealand has not yet developed as in other countries,

190

while InternetNZ also

submitted that New Zealand’s low MVNO share is out of step with other OECD

countries.

191

4.80 According to Vocus, any finding that 2degrees has increased competition at the

wholesale level is optimistic and speculative.

192

Vocus submitted that it is prepared

to be proven wrong, and it intends to issue a request for proposal (RFP) which will

give all three MNOs an equal opportunity to bid for its MVNO business.

193

4.81 2degrees has noted that it continues to be in discussion with several potential

MVNOs.

194

2degrees said that it will continue to pursue MVNO wholesale

agreements as it has invested in its own MVNE platform and has an incentive to

recover the cost of that investment.

195

4.82 2degrees also disputed other submissions that competition for MVNOs is only

emerging as a result of this study. 2degrees submitted that it had invested in its

MVNE platform prior to the commencement of this study,

196

and that it continues

to be interested in engaging in genuine commercial discussions with existing and

potential MVNOs.

4.83 For MNOs, wholesale agreements must be commercially viable. In providing

wholesale MVNO access, the MNO will risk cannibalising some of its retail market

share to the MVNO, particularly if the MNO has established sub-brands which may

be vulnerable to the MVNO.

4.84 The MNO will need to balance this risk of cannibalisation against the risk that the

MVNO will secure a wholesale agreement with a rival MNO, enabling it to compete

at the retail level in which case the MNO would then still risk losing those

customers. This risk has increased with the presence of three established mobile

networks.

4.85 For an MVNO, the commercial terms of a wholesale agreement, and in particular

the gross margin or discount off retail prices that the MVNO receives, should reflect

189

Nova submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 7(b).

190

Sky submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 20.

191

InternetNZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 16.

192

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 13.

193

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 17.

194

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2.

195

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 17, 18.

196

2degress cross-submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (July 2019), p 8.

the functions carried out by the MVNO. As shown in Table 7, the typical gross

margins will vary, depending on the type of MVNO operating model.

4.86 We appreciate that throughout this study, a range of views have been submitted to

us on the state of the wholesale market for mobile services in New Zealand. A

number of parties have referred to New Zealand’s low MVNO market share, and

the difficulties of negotiating wholesale access, as evidence of a lack of competition

or market failure. However, in our view, market failure would need to be

demonstrated not solely on the basis of a single, narrow indicator such as MVNO

market share, but in terms of the broader market in which mobile services are

supplied to consumers. Ultimately, our concern is the long-term benefit of end

users. As discussed in Chapter 3, the performance of the mobile market has

generally improved in terms of delivering competitive outcomes to consumers

through lower prices, increasing quality, and a greater choice of services.

4.87 As noted above, competitive conditions at the wholesale level have also been

improving, in particular as a result of 2degrees completing its own national network

and reducing its reliance on Vodafone. 2degrees noted that MVNOs represent an

important source of revenue and an opportunity to grow market share, increase

utilisation of its network, and gain economies of scale. This provides 2degrees with

an incentive to continue to pursue wholesale opportunities. We have seen

evidence of this, with 2degrees investing in the development of wholesale

arrangements through its MVNE platform to support differentiated wholesale

services. 2degrees has been seeking wholesale opportunities with existing and

potential MVNOs for a number of years prior to this study.

197

4.88 During this study, we have reviewed a considerable amount of information on the

development of commercial MVNO arrangements in New Zealand. This includes

commercial agreements and supporting information. For example, one MVNO

commissioned independent advice on what reasonable commercial terms

(including retail-minus discounts) would look like. The discounts contained in the

commercial agreements that we have reviewed are broadly in line with that advice,

and with the ranges provided by RDC as summarised in Table 7.

4.89 While recent activity in the market indicates competitive conditions for MVNOs are

improving, there are barriers to switching between MNOs that may impact the

willingness of MVNOs to change their host network. One barrier is the need for an

MVNO to have its customers switch out SIM cards for their service to continue on

197

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2.

another host network. The introduction and support of eSIMs by MNOs has the

potential to reduce this barrier significantly over time.

198

4.90 We note that MVNOs in other countries have emerged in a range of circumstances.

In some countries, MVNO access has been introduced via conditions on the award

of spectrum or as conditions imposed on mergers.

199

In a small number of cases,

MVNO access is directly regulated. In countries such as the UK and Australia, there

is no MVNO regulation, with MVNOs emerging as a result of commercial

negotiations.

4.91 We agree with NERA’s submission (on behalf of Spark) that access regulation of

markets with multiple competing networks is not common, and that to do so would

require compelling evidence of a competition problem or market failure.

200

NERA

also note that a lack of MVNOs may simply indicate there are not many profitable

niches for MVNOs to reach that are not already served by MNOs.

201

4.92 Wholesale competition between the MNOs has recently strengthened and is likely

to be sustained because the underlying structural conditions now exist to support

it. However, as noted earlier in this chapter, this may be influenced by the future

allocation of spectrum. In this regard, we note that the increased capacity available

on 5G networks may further stimulate wholesale activity.

4.93 As a result, there is potential for further MVNO entry and expansion, as long as the

terms of MVNO access are competitive and the MVNO is able to add value to the

retail market. Competition, supported by spectrum allocation, should deliver this.

198

We discuss eSIMs further in Chapter 6 below.

199

See for example, the Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria merger in 2012 (referred to in para 4.64

above). In the US, in its recent decision on the T-Mobile/Sprint merger, the Department of Justice has

proposed a requirement to offer MVNO access to a third party (Dish). See Department of Justice,

“Proposed Final Judgment”, (26 July 2019), p 19.

200

NERA submission on behalf of Spark, “Competitive effects of MVNO’s and assessment of regulated MVNO

access”, (26 October 2018), para 3.

201

NERA submission on behalf of Spark, “Competitive effects of MVNO’s and assessment of regulated MVNO

access”, (26 October 2018), at para 5a.

4.94 Although we remain of the view that there is no need to intervene to regulate

MVNO access at this stage, we intend to monitor the development of MVNOs,

including ongoing monitoring of MVNO market shares and the impact that

MVNO-based entry has in the retail market. We also intend to undertake periodic

reviews of commercial MVNO arrangements. Reviewing commercial contracts will

provide us with greater ongoing visibility of the terms being offered to MVNOs,

202

and how the commercial terms compare to key price and non-price dimensions of

MVNO access. The competition that is developing at the wholesale level for MVNO

services would be expected to encompass multiple dimensions of MVNO contract

terms, including price and non-price terms. While the range of MVNO operating

models vary considerably, some of the key dimensions include the following:

pricing and margin protection;

branding and marketing;

devices and SIMs;

migration to other MVNO models;

service equivalence;

operations; and

contract termination.

4.95 Several parties submitted that as part of such monitoring, we should establish

targets for MVNO market shares, and that these could trigger an investigation into

whether to regulate MVNO access.

203

We do not agree with setting such formal

targets, as this would hinge any decision to commence a Schedule 3 investigation

on a narrow metric which may not adequately reflect any market failure. As noted

earlier, we have examined the performance of the downstream retail market by

considering a broad range of competition indicators.

4.96 We also note submissions from a number of parties that we should publish

benchmarks for a wholesale price for MVNO access, and a reference contract, in

202

During 2017, we similarly undertook a review of commercial roaming arrangements. See Commerce

Commission, “Summary of findings of investigation of the national roaming agreement between Vodafone

and 2Degrees”, (October 2017).

203

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 28; Nova submission on the

Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 10.

order to provide guidance to MVNOs in their negotiations with MNOs.

204

In this

regard, we refer to the gross discounts summarised in Table 7, which provides an

indication of the gross margins expected for the different forms of MVNOs. As

discussed earlier, these margins are based on RDC’s experience with MVNOs in

other markets, and are broadly consistent with other evidence we have reviewed

during this study. We do not agree with suggestions that we publish a reference

contract. Rather we think it preferable that contracts are negotiated to best suit

parties’ needs in the context of a competitive wholesale market.

4.97 The competition that has been emerging at the wholesale level has enabled a

number of prospective MVNOs to secure wholesale mobile access agreements with

the MNOs. Such wholesale agreements should enable further entry into the retail

mobile market, as long as MVNOs are able to offer retail services or bundles of

services that are attractive to end users.

Findings on MVNOs

F10

Until recently, wholesale competition between MNOs to host MVNOs has

been limited. MVNOs currently serve just over 1% of the retail mobile market,

although there is some evidence that increased wholesale activity by 2degrees

has prompted a response from Spark and Vodafone in offering MVNO access.

New commercial MVNO agreements have been signed during the past 18

months, such as those between Trustpower and Spark, and Kogan Mobile and

Vodafone.

F11

With three national mobile networks, sufficient competitive conditions at the

wholesale level exist and we expect MVNOs should emerge if they are

commercially viable. The commercial viability of an MVNO will in part depend

on the terms agreed with the host MNO. Based on the evidence that we have

seen and the entry expected (as noted in F10), competition at the wholesale

level has improved. However, spectrum allocation decisions will be critical to

support this competition.

F12

In light of this, we do not consider MVNO access regulation to be appropriate

at this time. There would need to be greater evidence of market failure in

respect of outcomes delivered to mobile consumers to justify wholesale access

regulation. We intend to monitor the development of MVNOs, including the

commercial terms being offered by the MNOs.

204

Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 33-37; Nova submission on the

Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 10; Chorus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper,

(28 June 2019), para 26.

Consumer engagement and experience with mobile services

Introduction

4.98 Markets will best deliver benefits to New Zealanders when both the demand

(consumer) side of the market and the supply (provider) side of the market are

working well. Where active and well-informed consumers switch to those providers

who best meet their needs, suppliers are incentivised to innovate and efficiently

meet those needs. Active customers who are prepared to switch will also make it

easier for new suppliers to enter and expand by lowering customer acquisition

costs.

4.99 This section sets out our consideration of:

how effectively mobile consumers are able to engage in the mobile

market, following the three As (Access, Assess, and Act) approach to

evaluating the state of consumer engagement within the mobile

market;

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whether mobile consumers exhibit behavioural biases which may influence

competition between existing suppliers as well as the prospect for

potential suppliers to enter the mobile market; and

potential remedies and actions that could be taken to promote consumer

engagement in the mobile market.

4.100 We then summarise our views on consumer engagement in the mobile market.

How easily can consumers access the information they need?

4.101 For consumers to be able to engage effectively in the mobile market and make

informed purchasing decisions, they need to have the right information available to

them. Consumers need to access information on both the key features of

competing offers and their own mobile usage in order to compare these offers and

to select which offer will best meet their needs.

4.102 Consumers can freely access plan information on mobile provider websites (and

comparison websites).

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Consumers can also gain (often incomplete) plan

information through advertising and word-of-mouth.

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Office of Fair Trading, “What does Behavioural Economics mean for Competition Policy?”, (March 2010),

p 10-17.

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As discussed below, the utility of price comparison websites will depend on how the information is

presented.

4.103 According to Consumer NZ’s survey of mobile consumers, most consumers appear

to find it easy to access their mobile usage information, as shown in Figure 14.

4.104 The same survey also showed the ways in which consumers access their usage

information, with 58% of consumers accessing their usage via a mobile app, 18% via

their provider’s website, and 16% via their monthly bill (although we note that this

usage information is often limited to a short time period eg, one month). In their

submissions throughout this study, the MNOs also noted that consumers can

access their usage information on their mobile provider’s app or website.

Figure 14 Ease of accessing mobile usage information

4.105 Along with plan information and their usage trends, consumers could benefit from

information on mobile performance ie, the quality of the mobile service they are

currently receiving or could possibly receive from another provider. While all three

MNOs have coverage maps on their websites there is no shared map for consumers

that compares coverage between the three MNOs.

4.106 In addition, even when there is nominal coverage there may be ‘holes’ in this

coverage caused by a range of factors eg, signal degradation caused by buildings

and/or topography, or network base stations being at or nearing capacity.

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How easily can consumers assess the information they have?

4.107 Even if consumers have access to usage and performance information, they also

need to be able to assess their options ie, the plans available in the market and

service quality against their mobile service needs. This assessment is complicated in

that consumers need to anticipate what their future usage will be.

4.108 The presence of complex choices and/or of non-transparent add-on costs may

make plan comparisons more difficult. This can lead to consumer confusion,

deterring consumers from actively comparing retail plans. Even where consumers

do compare plans, they may end up making poor choices.

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See, for example, the earlier discussion of 3G and 4G availability in the context of quality of mobile service

in Chapter 3.

4.109 As an example, where prices are advertised on a non-standardised basis, the ability

of consumers to correctly identify the cheapest option will be affected. In this

regard, we note that Skinny offers bundles of mobile minutes, texts, and mobile

data which renew every 28 days. Other mobile providers offer bundles of minutes,

texts, and data on a monthly basis. In order to make a valid comparison, consumers

would have to adjust the prices and allowances of the Skinny offer to a monthly

equivalent. For example, Skinny’s $77 plan – with unlimited minutes and texts, and

‘unlimited’ data (with speeds throttled once a 40GB threshold is reached) – is

equivalent to $83.42 per month.

4.110 We also note that mobile providers typically offer a range of add-on options which

allow consumers to purchase additional minutes or data. Where a consumer is not

aware of these additional charges, their ability to select the plan best suited to their

needs will be diminished.

4.111 Such confusion may deter consumers from comparing retail plans. As shown in

Figure 15, most consumers do not compare mobile plans frequently.

Figure 15 Frequency of comparing plans

4.112 2degrees submitted that this was not cause for concern as customers that are

happy tend not to invest time and effort into reviewing other plans.

2degrees noted

that according to Consumer NZ’s survey of mobile consumers, 70% of consumers

are satisfied with their current mobile service provider.

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4.113 Nevertheless, consumers may be able to get a better deal if they did compare

available options. If many consumers ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ compare plans due to the

difficulty of the process, this would be a significant concern. As shown in Figure 16

this does not appear to be the case, as over half of respondents find it easy to

compare plans.

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2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper (28 June 2019), p 12. We note that Consumer NZ

found that 70% of consumers who have not switched within the last 12 months were satisfied with their

service.

Figure 16 Ease of comparing providers and plans

4.114 It is worth noting that some consumer segments find it relatively more difficult to

compare plans. For example, 32% of consumers aged 65 or older in the Consumer

NZ survey found it ‘difficult’ to compare mobile providers and plans.

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It may also

be the case that although they generally perceive it to be easy to compare retail

plans, consumers may not actually end up on the plan that is best suited to their

needs.

4.115 The business segment covers a range of customers, with differing abilities and

attitudes to reviewing competing mobile plans. Smaller enterprises may face similar

search costs and challenges as residential customers when assessing retail offers.

Larger corporate customers with higher level of spend on mobile services (often

within a whole of business contract) or with more specific requirements are more

likely to be better served due to the value of their business. Such customers will

often have a procurement team to manage competitive tenders and contracts.

4.116 An important issue for consumers being able to make informed purchasing

decisions is whether accurate and clear information is available. We have

investigated misleading claims from mobile providers in the past. These have

included:

misleading consumers over 2G network closures;

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and

the clarity and visibility of contract terms and charges for SMS/multimedia

media services (MMS)/data when consumers send messages or exceed

their data bundle allowances.

4.117 These are indicative of the issues consumers can face when trying to assess which

offers in the market may best meet their needs.

Bundling

4.118 While bundles may provide consumers with benefits in the form of discounts and

convenience (one bill, one point of contact), the presence of bundles adds another

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Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018.

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Commerce Commission media release, “Four telcos warned by Commission”, (14 Aug 2017).

factor the consumer must consider when comparing plans. This can make it more

difficult for consumers to assess different retail offers.

4.119 Bundling of services can also increase customer stickiness, for example:

Trustpower has reported that churn rates for bundled services (electricity,

gas and broadband) are materially lower than for standalone energy

services;

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and

in our 2018 decision on the proposed merger between Sky and Vodafone,

we noted evidence indicating that bundling reduces customer churn and

increases customer acquisition costs.

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4.120 As discussed earlier, uptake of bundles that include mobile services is currently low

among residential consumers. Consumer NZ found that 73% of respondents in its

2018 survey do not bundle their mobile service with other services, and Analysys

Mason’s Connected Consumer Survey also found that when choosing a mobile plan,

the ability to bundle mobile connectivity with other services was ranked relatively

low by respondents.

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Of consumers who do bundle their mobile service, most

bundle it together with fixed-line broadband and/or streaming services.

4.121 The prevalence of business consumers buying mobile services as part of a wider

bundle is likely to be higher than residential customers due to the importance of

whole of business connectivity. For example, in our 2015 business mobile market

study, 78% of businesses said that bundled solutions are important.

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As noted in

the preceding paragraph, Analysys Mason has found that bundling is ranked

relatively low by individual consumers.

4.122 Currently in New Zealand there do not appear to be any bundles of mobile services

with products for which there are no good alternatives. However, the Commission

will continue to monitor the development of bundles.

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Trustpower, “Investor Briefing 2018 half Year Results”, (8 November 2018), slide 7.

212

Commerce Commission, “Vodafone Europe B.V. and Sky Network Television Limited [2017] NZCC 1 Sky

Network Television Limited and Vodafone New Zealand Limited [2017] NZCC 2”, (22 February 2018),

para X26, 182 to 185.

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Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018; Analysys Mason, “Connected Consumer Survey 2018: mobile

customer satisfaction in Australia and New Zealand”, slide 11.

214

UMR, “Competition for Business Customers in the Mobile industry: A Report for the Commerce

Commission”, (December 2015), p 28.

4.123 We will also continue monitoring the uptake of bundles that include mobile

services to assess whether firms may be using bundles strategically to raise barriers

to entry and to limit the market available to competitors.

How easy is it for consumers to act?

4.124 The level of switching observed in a market may be indicative of the ability of

consumers to act and take advantage of competing offers. Various types of costs

consumers incur can impede switching.

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4.125 However, it is important to understand what underpins the level of switching –

including the reasons for switching or not switching, and any barriers to switching –

and the implications for consumers. For example:

a high level of switching may result in poorer consumer outcomes if

consumers end up on plans that make them worse off. For example,

research in the UK has found that 17% of consumers switching electricity

suppliers ended up worse off;

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and

a low level of switching may reflect a high level of satisfaction among

consumers with their current supplier, with suppliers competing to retain

their customers.

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4.126 Over the past four years the number of mobile subscribers who have ported (kept)

their number when switching between suppliers has stayed constant at around 5%

per annum.

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The Consumer NZ 2018 survey indicates a slightly higher rate of

switching (9% in the past 12 months) which could be in part explained by

customers relinquishing their number when they switch.

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This is slightly lower

than numbers for Australia at 10% and the average for 28 European countries at

13%.

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4.127 In our 2015 business mobile market study we found that 14% of businesses had

changed mobile provider within the previous two years, and that this was lower

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For example, transaction costs, compatibility costs, learning costs, contractual costs or psychological costs,

see Office of Fair Trading (UK) OFT655, “Switching Costs Economics Discussion Paper 5: Part One Economic

models and policy implications”, (April 2003), Ch 2.

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Wilson, C., and Waddams Price, C., “Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier?”, (10 March 2010).

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This may be by way of suppliers’ drip-feeding incremental improvements to their customers.

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Porting numbers are from the New Zealand Telecommunications Forum (TCF) Number Portability

Statistics, overall subscriber numbers are from our Annual Monitoring Questionnaire.

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Consumer NZ, Telco Consumer Survey 2018.

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ACCC, “Communications Sector Market Study Final Report”, (April 2018), p 120; European Commission,

“Consumer Markets Scoreboard 2018 Edition”, (2018), Fig 25.

than the percentage of businesses that had switched power company (26%) but

higher than the percentage that had switched banks (5%).

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4.128 Both 2degrees and Spark submitted that, in their experience, switching levels are

higher than the statistics above, as the statistics above exclude ‘internal switches’

where a customer changes plans but not their provider.

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While we acknowledge

that internal switching between plans offered by the same supplier may indicate

that consumers are more active, we consider that switching between suppliers is

more relevant to competition.

4.129 While the switching statistics show that some consumers are moving, over half of

residential consumers have not switched provider in the last five years (see Figure

17).

Figure 17 Time with current provider

4.130 There is no fixed proportion of the market that should be expected to switch.

Consumers not switching provider is not necessarily a concern if those consumers

do not face significant barriers to switching.

4.131 Figure 18 shows that 19% of consumers think that it is difficult to switch.

Figure 18 Perceived ease of switching provider

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UMR Research, “Competition for Business Customers in the Mobile Industry: A Report for the Commerce

Commission”, (December 2015), p 91, 96.

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2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 13; Spark submission on the

Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 59, 60.

4.132 A low level of switching could also reflect that consumers are generally satisfied

with their current provider. As shown in Figure 19, 70% of consumers who have not

switched in the past 12 months stayed with their current provider because they are

satisfied with the service they are receiving.

Figure 19 Main reason for staying with provider

4.133 Spark agreed with this hypothesis, submitting that year-on-year increases in value,

quality and other benefits mean that customers are content to remain with their

current supplier.

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This view was supported by 2degrees during the

cross-submission process.

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4.134 2degrees also noted in its cross-submission that customers can often meet their

needs by switching between plans rather than mobile providers.

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4.135 Although satisfaction with current provider is the most common reason given for

not switching, a number of the other reasons given by mobile consumers for

remaining with their current provider relate to barriers to switching. These include

a lack of confidence of getting a better deal, perceptions around the effort involved

in changing providers, and the presence of fixed contracts.

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Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 2.

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2degrees cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), p 9.

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2degrees cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), p 9.

Switching barriers

4.136 A number of barriers to switching suppliers have been reduced in the mobile

market. This is likely to explain why most consumers consider switching between

mobile suppliers to be easy.

4.137 Most importantly, the introduction of mobile number portability has reduced

switching costs by allowing consumers to retain their numbers when they change

suppliers.

4.138 Another example relates to handset locking. As previously noted, the practice of

locking handsets increases switching costs and has led to us raising concerns over

the practice in the past.

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4.139 We will continue to monitor the number of locked handsets and the break fees

attached to these phones. Even where break fees do not apply, the inconvenience

of having to unlock a device is likely to raise switching costs for the consumer.

4.140 There have been cases of consumers on fixed-term contracts that include a handset

continuing to pay the same price for mobile services beyond the end of their

contract.

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As pointed out in submissions during this study, this is not a significant

issue in New Zealand as there has been a move away from fixed-term contracts

which include handsets in the residential market.

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4.141 While the move away from fixed-term contracts for residential customers will have

made switching easier, there is likely a trade-off in that contract plans can offer

considerably better value. As seen in Australia, twelve-month contracts often offer

better value in exchange for the commitment of a contract, particularly enabling

much higher data allowances. However, we note that Telstra has recently moved

away from mobile plans with fixed-term contracts.

4.142 In the business segment, our 2015 business mobile market study found that 73% of

businesses surveyed were on fixed-term contracts.

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Our 2018 annual monitoring

questionnaire found that 58% of business customers were on fixed-term contracts.

This suggests there may have been a move towards open term contracts, similar to

the current trend in the residential on-account segment where the market has

moved towards handset payment plans.

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While we raised concerns in the past, we also noted that a transparent lock in period that reflects the

recovery of subsidised costs may not undermine competition.

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Behavioural Insights Team “Applying behavioural insights to regulated markets”, (26 May 2016), p 45.

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For example, 2degrees submission on the Issues Paper, (October 2018), p 29; Spark submission on the

Issues Paper, (26 October 2018), para 157.

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Commerce Commission, “Summary of business mobile market segment study” (30 March 2017).

4.143 We note that while concerns may arise with fixed-term contracts that have

excessive terms, we are not opposed to the existence of fixed-term contracts

per se. The existence of twelve-month contracts alongside pay-monthly plans may

be positive from a consumer choice perspective.

Behavioural biases

4.144 We have examined whether consumers, when faced with competing retail offers of

mobile services, may make decisions in which they fail to select an offer that would

better meet their needs than their current offer. Such decisions may result from

‘behavioural biases’ which inhibit consumers from making better choices.

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4.145 As discussed above, more than half of respondents to Consumer NZ’s mobile

consumer survey reported that they had been with their current provider for more

than five years. This may indicate a preference among the majority of mobile

consumers for the familiarity of their current supplier (a preference for the ‘status

quo’).

4.146 Although a reason given by most mobile consumers for not switching is that they

are satisfied with their current provider, we note that mobile consumers tend to

compare alternative offers infrequently. As a result, such consumers may be

unaware if there are other retail offers available that might better meet their

needs.

4.147 It may also be the case that a consumer’s existing supplier offers incremental

improvements in value (such as additional data for the same monthly price) in

order to retain the customer and to reduce their propensity to shop around. As

discussed earlier, both Spark and 2degrees have noted that increases in value,

quality and other benefits mean that customers are more likely to remain with

their current supplier.

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This may reinforce a ‘status quo’ bias, even if better

offers were available elsewhere.

4.148 Even if consumers were aware of better competing offers, there is research that

indicates that consumers “value what they have more than what they might have”.

Such an aversion to losing what they currently have may result in consumers

230

Behavioural Insights Team, “Behavioural Biases in Telecommunications: A review for the Commerce

Commission”, (May 2019).

231

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 2.

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2degrees cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), p 9.

missing out on benefits from switching, as competing suppliers would have to offer

substantial inducements to get a consumer to switch.

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4.149 Consumers may also be overconfident in their ability to forecast their usage, for

example the number of minutes or the amount of data they will use each month.

This may be an issue where demand is changing rapidly, and the costs of incorrectly

forecasting usage are high. In this regard, the cost of purchasing additional mobile

data appear to be relatively high. For example, Vodafone’s mobile data add-ons

include $15 for 1GB, and 2degrees’ mobile data add-ons include $20 for $1GB.

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4.150 Where a customer’s actual usage is higher than expected and results in the

customer having to purchase additional data, this can result in a monthly bill that is

significantly higher than expected (a form of ‘bill shock’).

4.151 Conversely, where customers overestimate their usage, they may end up with

unused minutes and data. Where unused allowances can be rolled over, the

customer can carry forward unused balances. However, where this persists, this

may indicate that the customer is on a more expensive plan that is necessary to

meet their usage.

4.152 Spark submitted that it is not convinced that the Commission’s analysis of

behavioural biases reflects the complexity of customer behaviour. Spark argued

that more longitudinal evidence (data over a longer period) is required to be

confident that a behavioural bias problem exists. Spark expects that further analysis

would confirm that there is no behavioural bias problem.

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4.153 Similarly, Vodafone submitted that customers are often in the best position to

make decisions about their plans and that plan decisions can be influenced by

several factors that are entirely rational and in the consumer’s interest.

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4.154 We agree that consumer decision making is complex and that there can be a wide

range of reasons for consumers staying with their provider or plan. To shed light on

whether the high number of customers choosing to remain with their mobile

supplier is cause for concern, we are currently undertaking some research into the

extent to which mobile consumers are on retail plans that do not best suit their

needs. This is discussed further below.

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Lunn P. “Telecommunications Consumers: A Behavioural Economic Analysis”, (19 January 2012), p 10-11.

234

Operator websites accessed September 2019.

235

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 57-58.

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Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 7.

Are consumers on plans that are suited to their usage?

4.155 Although there is some evidence that mobile consumers find it easy to compare

retail plans, they only do so infrequently. Consumers may therefore be unaware if

there are other retail offers available that might better meet their needs. This is a

potentially important issue to ensure that suppliers face the correct incentives to

compete for customers. At this stage, we do not have robust evidence on whether

mobile subscribers are on plans that are well-suited to their usage.

4.156 We are currently analysing mobile bills to understand whether mobile consumers

are ‘leaving money on the table’ by remaining on plans that are more expensive

than they need to be in order to satisfy their usage. There are two situations where

a consumer may be paying too much for mobile services:

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a consumer’s actual usage (in terms of minutes, SMS, and mobile data

used per month) is lower than the allowance they are purchasing; or

a consumer’s actual usage could be met using a cheaper plan (either with

the same operator or with a competing operator).

4.157 Consumers must anticipate their future needs to assess which plan best meets their

needs. This can be difficult for consumers,

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although a number of plans currently

available (such as Vodafone’s MyFlex plan) provide consumers with flexibility to

adjust in light of their usage.

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This has been raised as an issue in other markets

(such as electricity) where consumers have not necessarily chosen the best plan.

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4.158 We will be looking to understand the best approaches to encourage consumers to

review their current plans and to consider switching to alternatives that may offer

better value. We are undertaking some analysis of mobile bills as part of our wider

section 9A monitoring and consumer work, outside of this study.

Potential remedies/actions

4.159 It appears that consumers can access information on mobile services, assess

alternatives, and switch relatively easily. However, consumers do not appear to

frequently compare mobile plans, and there are some features of mobile plans

which may reduce the ability of consumers to identify plans that are best suited to

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We note that consumers may also be willing to pay more for improved service.

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Dr P Xavier, “Behavioural Economics and Customer Complaints in Communications Markets”, (May 2011),

Ch 5.

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An example in the case of fixed broadband services is Spark’s ‘Unplan’ offers.

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Wilson, Chris M. and Price, Catherine Waddams, “Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier?”, (10 March

2010). This found that 17% of consumers in the UK electricity market reduced their surplus (were worse

off) by switching.

their usage. We also note that a large proportion of mobile consumers have

remained with their current supplier for five years or more.

4.160 The passage of the Telecommunications (New Regulatory Framework) Amendment

Act 2018 introduced several new consumer provisions aimed at improving retail

service quality (RSQ) through increased information and added consumer

protections. These provisions apply to both fixed-line and mobile

telecommunications.

4.161 Both 2degrees and Vodafone expressed concern in their submissions over possible

regulatory action in this area:

2degrees commented that it is keen to ensure that the Commission’s

responses are proportionate to any problem/s that are identified. It also

outlined that it would be concerned if an expensive and complex

consumer engagement mechanism were to be introduced;

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and

Vodafone noted that any intervention that limits consumer choice risks

creating worse outcomes for New Zealanders.

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4.162 We agree that any regulatory action or intervention needs to be proportionate and

take account of the potential costs. At this stage we are not advocating regulatory

action in relation to consumer engagement in the mobile market. However, mobile

consumers will continue to be considered as part of our wider consumer and RSQ

work. This will help ensure that any future interventions are proportionate.

4.163 Our analysis of mobile bills is being conducted separately from this mobile market

study and the results of this analysis will inform our ongoing monitoring and

oversight of the mobile market as well as wider consumer and RSQ activities.

4.164 There have been recent legislative changes in Australia to introduce a Consumer

Data Right (CDR), which will first apply to banking, followed by energy and then

possibly telecommunications.

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MBIE is considering the role that CDR initiatives

could play in the New Zealand commercial and consumer environment. The CDR is

essentially a data portability right and has the potential to enable greater levels of

transparency and encourage competition between providers.

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2degress submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 13-14.

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Vodafone submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 8.

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ACCC website, Consumer Data Right, (28 March 2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/consumer-

data-right-cdr-0.

4.165 Establishing a CDR that achieves the desired outcomes is not easy.

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As noted

earlier, it appears that mobile consumers are already able to access information

about their usage of mobile services. Hence, we are proposing to continue to

monitor developments in Australia and other markets rather than recommending

the introduction of such a measure in New Zealand.

4.166 Price comparison websites can facilitate the comparison of different mobile service

plans and lower search costs for consumers. However, there may be concerns over

the transparency and independence of these websites and the accuracy of the

information they present.

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As price comparison websites cover both mobile and

fixed telecommunications services, we will evaluate them further, outside of this

study, as part of our wider consumer work.

244

Behavioural Insights Team, “Behavioural Biases in Telecommunications: A review for the Commerce

Commission”, (May 2019).

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Ofcom runs an accreditation scheme for price comparison websites to ensure that comparisons of services

are “accessible, accurate, transparent and comprehensive.” See https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-

and-statements/category-2/price-calculator-accreditation.

Findings on consumer engagement

F13

Most consumers can easily access their mobile usage information, but

information on mobile performance (speeds, actual quality of coverage etc) is

harder to access.

F14

Most consumers find it easy to compare available plans, but report that they

only do so infrequently.

F15

Our evidence shows that the process for residential consumers to switch

between mobile suppliers is relatively easy, given that:

a) mobile number portability is available;

b) there are low numbers of locked handsets; and

c) long-term contracts for residential consumers are not prominent.

Bundling of mobile and fixed-line services, which can increase customer

stickiness, does not appear to be widespread in the residential market.

F16

While residential consumers report being able to easily access usage

information and compare plans, and that the process of switching appears to

be relatively easy, a significant proportion of consumers have not compared

plans in the last 12 months and have remained with their current supplier for

more than five years. This suggests that there is a degree of consumer inertia,

and we have commenced a review of mobile bills to shed light on whether this

is cause for concern.

F17

Switching in the business market appears to be more complex and more

infrequent than residential mobile services. Businesses typically purchase

mobile and fixed services as a package, often through fixed-term contracts,

with brand reputation being an important driver. Larger business customers

are more sophisticated buyers, generally have more access to specialist advice

and support, and are more likely to have dedicated procurement resources.

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Chapter 5 State of competition in the mobile market

Purpose and structure of this chapter

Purpose

5.1 In this chapter, we set out our views on the state of competition in the mobile

market. This draws on our overview of the mobile market in Chapter 3 and on our

assessment of the key issues discussed in Chapter 4.

Structure

5.2 We first discuss how competition between the existing mobile suppliers has

evolved since the entry of the third MNO. We then consider the conditions for

further expansion by existing suppliers and for entry of new suppliers. We conclude

with our views on whether consumers have been able to take advantage of

competition between suppliers of mobile services.

Our view on the state of competition in the mobile market

Existing competition

5.3 Competition in the New Zealand mobile market has become more established with

the emergence of the third MNO.

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The entry of 2degrees, and the completion of

its own national network in recent years, has resulted in mobile consumers now

having the choice of three independent network-based competitors, each offering

similar levels of population and geographic coverage.

5.4 We have previously noted that the entry of 2degrees had a significant impact in

terms of improving consumer choice and competitive offerings. When 2degrees

first entered in 2009, it initially offered prepaid mobile services,

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with prices that

were significantly lower than those offered by Vodafone and Telecom at the

time.

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For a discussion of established competition, see Yarrow, G., “Report on the impact of maintaining price

regulation”, (January 2008).

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2degrees started offering on account mobile services in 2010.

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Commerce Commission, “New Zealand Retail Prices for Fixed Line and Mobile Services: A Benchmarking

Comparison”, (November 2010), p 23.

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5.5 Both Vodafone and Spark have responded to the entry and expansion of 2degrees.

For example:

in early 2012, Spark launched its Skinny brand offering prepaid mobile

bundles, initially targeting the youth end of the market before refocusing

as a budget brand in 2013;

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in 2014, we noted that competition had been more intense in the low to

medium use and prepaid segments of the mobile market, as evidenced by

a reduction in prices in these segments compared to the OECD average;

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and

in 2016, Vodafone introduced its MyFlex prepaid plan, providing

customers with the flexibility to adjust the number of minutes, texts, and

data in their prepaid bundles.

5.6 Such competition has continued and has extended into the higher value segments

of the retail market. For example, all three MNOs now offer bundles of unlimited

minutes, SMS and ‘unlimited data’ (although all of these plans have data

thresholds, beyond which the quality of the service is degraded). Several recent

market developments have improved value for higher usage mobile consumers in

New Zealand.

In April 2019, 2degrees introduced a shared ‘unlimited’ plan, at $85 per

month with a data threshold of 40GB beyond which speeds are reduced.

The price per subscriber drops as additional subscribers are added. Up to

four people can subscribe to the plan, at which point each subscriber gets

40GB for $40 per month. In addition, 2degrees offered a short-term

promotion in June 2019, offering a 50% discount on most of its pay-

monthly prices for three months.

In May 2019, Skinny added a 40GB plan for $77, renewing every four

weeks. When adjusted to a monthly basis, the Skinny plan offers 43GB for

$83.

As Spark noted in its submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, it

recently increased the threshold at which speeds are throttled on its

‘unlimited’ mobile plans, from 22GB to 40GB.

251

According to Spark, there

249

Commerce Commission, “Annual Telecommunications Monitoring Report 2014”, (June 2015), p 25.

250

Commerce Commission, “International Price Comparison for Retail Mobile Telecommunications Services

2013”, (March 2014), p 17.

251

Spark submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 9c.

102

has been a significant shift towards such plans in the New Zealand

market.

252

Vodafone has also recently increased the threshold on its ‘unlimited’

plans, from 22GB to 40GB.

In September 2019, Kogan Mobile commenced offering prepaid mobile

plans with unlimited calls and SMS, and up to 32GB per month. Subscribers

can pay in advance for 30 days, 90 days, or 365 days.

5.7 As shown earlier in Figure 3, the overall market shares of the three MNOs have

been quite stable in recent years. Over the five years to 2018, Spark’s share of

mobile subscribers increased from 34% to 38%, largely as a result of Skinny’s

increase in the prepaid segment. Vodafone’s share has dropped from 44% to 41%,

with declines in the residential segment and gains in the business segment.

5.8 2degrees’ overall market share has been flat in recent years, and it has a relatively

high proportion of prepaid customers, resulting in a lower ARPU. However, it has

been continuing to expand in the higher value residential on-account segment,

albeit at a growth rate that appears to be slowing.

5.9 As discussed in Chapter 3, prices of mobile services in New Zealand have been

falling, as evidenced by ARPU and usage trends. The volume of mobile voice

minutes and mobile data used by each mobile subscriber has continued to increase,

although average mobile data usage in New Zealand remains relatively low by

international standards. This may be due to a number of factors, including pricing

of higher usage bundles and the availability and quality of fixed networks in

New Zealand.

5.10 A number of submissions throughout this study have argued that the mobile

market in New Zealand is competitive and has been performing well.

253

Other

submitters put forward a different view, that competition is not effective at the

retail (and wholesale) level, and that 2degrees had struggled to compete as a result

of its limited network coverage and its reliance on roaming.

254

252

Spark cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), para 10.

253

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2; NERA, “Competition in the New Zealand

Mobile Market”, (26 October 2018), para 29, 32, 34; 2degrees submission on the Issues paper,

(26 October 2018), p 7; Vodafone submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 3. Also see

submissions from these parties on the Preliminary Findings paper.

254

Trustpower submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), para 3.1.1; Vocus submission on the Issues

paper, (26 October 2018), para 11; WISPA NZ submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2. Also,

see submissions on the Preliminary Findings paper.

103

5.11 We note that as it was deploying and expanding its own network, 2degrees’

reliance on roaming may have constrained its ability to independently compete in

some segments. 2degrees entered by building its own mobile network in the main

centres (initially covering 47% of New Zealand’s population with its own network)

and relying on roaming on Vodafone’s mobile network in order to be able to offer

national coverage.

5.12 2degrees has since extended its own network coverage to reach levels similar to

the other MNOs. Figure 20 summarises the latest information available from our

2018 annual monitoring questionnaire, showing 3G and 4G coverage of each MNO.

Figure 20 Total national 3G and 4G coverage (2018)

5.13 As 2degrees invested in expanding its own network coverage, its reliance on

roaming on Vodafone’s network has diminished. 2degrees submitted that it relies

on roaming for less than 1.5% of its traffic.

255

This is consistent with the responses

to our annual monitoring questionnaire.

5.14 There is some evidence that in the past, 2degrees’ smaller network footprint may

have created reputational challenges in serving some segments of the mobile

market. For example, in our 2015 mobile market study into the business segment

of the mobile market, we found a general perception among business customers

that 2degrees offered a lower service quality and less extensive coverage.

255

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2.

104

5.15 However, we also found that those business customers who subscribed to 2degrees

were the most satisfied (93% of business customers were satisfied with their

mobile service, compared to 77% for Spark and 81% for Vodafone).

256

5.16 After 10 years in the mobile market, 2degrees has an established track record as an

MNO in New Zealand and a number of parties have acknowledged that perceptions

of 2degrees appear to be changing.

257

We also note that 2degrees is the only

telecommunications provider to appear in Colmar Brunton’s Corporate Reputation

Index in 2019, which is a measure of New Zealand’s most respected brands.

258

5.17 According to 2degrees, the completion of its network build means that the

structure of the New Zealand mobile market is set for increased retail and

wholesale competition:

259

Achieving a comparable footprint to its competitors means New Zealand now has

three truly national network operators. This creates enduring competitive tension

because 2degrees, as the newest entrant, is strongly incentivised to continue

growing to deliver a return on past investment – and fund upcoming 5G

deployment.

5.18 As noted earlier, 2degrees has invested in the development of wholesale

arrangements through its MVNE platform, which allows wholesale customers to

develop their own differentiated products.

260

5.19 It therefore appears that 2degrees is well-positioned to compete in the supply of

mobile services across all customer segments.

5.20 However, as we discuss in Chapter 4, the ability of each MNO to compete going

forward will also depend on the amount and type of spectrum held by the MNOs.

Conditions for further expansion and entry

5.21 In considering the ability of existing suppliers of mobile services to expand further,

and new suppliers to enter, we have examined potential barriers to entry and

expansion which could influence competition in the New Zealand mobile market

going forward.

256

UMR Research, “Competition for Business Customers in the Mobile Industry: A Report for the Commerce

Commission”, (December 2015), p 87.

257

For example, WISPA NZ submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 2.

258

Colmar Brunton, “Corporate reputation Index 2019”, available at https://www.colmarbrunton.co.nz/wp-

content/uploads/2019/04/Colmar-Brunton-Corporate-Reputation-Report-April-2019.pdf.

259

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 1.

260

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 17.

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5.22 For MNOs, access to adequate spectrum will be an important issue to sustain

competition and to accommodate rapidly growing demand for services supplied

over mobile networks, particularly mobile data and wireless broadband services

which require significant capacity. We note that disparities in spectrum holdings

can potentially affect downstream competition, and that this may be a particularly

important issue for consideration in the upcoming allocation of 3.5 GHz spectrum.

5.23 As discussed in Chapter 4, there does not appear to be a case for regulatory

intervention to promote a fourth MNO to enter the market. However, we consider

it appropriate to allow parties other than the existing three MNOs to participate in

future spectrum acquisition processes.

5.24 The availability of national roaming is also important for an entrant as it builds out

its own network. National roaming allowed 2degrees to offer widespread coverage

as it invested in its own network. Roaming remains a specified service in Schedule 1

of the Telecommunications Act.

5.25 For MVNO-based competitors, the availability of MVNO access on competitive

terms will influence the ability of MVNOs to enter and evolve in the retail market.

We note that there are a range of MVNO operating models, and we have assessed

information on existing and potential MVNOs in New Zealand.

5.26 Until recently, competition between the MNOs to supply wholesale mobile services

to MVNOs appears to have been subdued. Absent competition from 2degrees, the

other MNOs appear to have shown little interest to offer MVNO access, suggesting

unsatisfactory wholesale market conditions for MVNOs.

5.27 There is some evidence to suggest that competitive conditions at the wholesale

level have recently been improving, with 2degrees more aggressively pursuing

wholesale opportunities. As discussed in Chapter 4, 2degrees has invested in the

platforms and systems to support more independent and differentiated MVNO

models. This is evidenced by its efforts to attract Trustpower’s MVNO business.

Vocus recently submitted that it intends to test the wholesale market by issuing an

RFP for its MVNO business.

5.28 The other MNOs appear to have been responding. 2degrees submitted that it has

driven a ‘positive competitive dynamic’ for MVNOs, with Trustpower announcing

that it will be launching retail services following a competitive MVNO process won

by Spark.

261

We also note that Kogan Mobile has recently launched MVNO-based

mobile services.

261

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (June 2019), p 3.

106

5.29 2degrees is likely to face ongoing incentives to attract MVNOs onto its network in

order to recover its investment in its MVNE platform, and to help it grow mobile

volumes and achieve economies of scale. Its ability to continue to do so is likely to

depend on gaining adequate spectrum in future allocations.

5.30 We therefore consider that competitive conditions are emerging that are likely to

support commercial MVNO activity where there is a market opportunity for such

services. The prospects for MVNO-based entry and expansion are also likely to

depend on whether consumers of mobile services are actively engaged and

prepared to switch between suppliers.

Consumer engagement

5.31 As competing suppliers emerge in a market, the increased range of choice and

offers can give rise to issues around the level of consumer engagement and

confidence. As we have noted, if consumers find it difficult to compare proliferating

offers and to choose the services that best meet their needs, this is likely to create

barriers to entry and expansion in the supply of mobile services.

5.32 In Chapter 4, we examined the available evidence on the ability of consumers to

compare alternative offers and to switch between service providers.

5.33 It is important for consumers of mobile services to be able to easily access

information on their usage and to compare retail prices of mobile services. It

appears that most consumers can easily get information on their monthly usage,

such as the number of minutes and texts, and the amount of data they use

(although usage history is often limited to a short time period eg, one month).

Consumers also appear to find it easy to compare retail plans, but only do so

infrequently.

5.34 Non-price features of mobile services are less visible to consumers, including

information on speeds and the extent and quality of coverage.

5.35 Switching between mobile suppliers appears to be relatively easy, given that

mobile number portability is available, there are low numbers of locked handsets,

and that long-term contracts for residential consumers are not prominent in

New Zealand. Despite this, a significant proportion of consumers have remained

with their current supplier for more than five years, suggesting a degree of

customer inertia.

5.36 A key reason why consumers state they remain with their current supplier is that

they are satisfied with their service. However, this does not generally reflect active

comparison by many consumers of alternatives and may simply reflect a status quo

bias encouraged by gradual improvements in plan content. Consumers give a

107

variety of reasons for remaining with their current supplier, including the customer

being unsure whether they could get a better deal elsewhere.

Findings on the state of competition

F18

Our view is that competition in the retail mobile market has become more

established with three independent, national network-based competitors. This

has resulted in mobile consumers benefitting from an increasingly competitive

market environment.

F19

There remain some areas where we anticipate competitive outcomes for

consumers could improve further, such as pricing for higher usage bundles of

mobile services, (although recent market developments have improved

consumer outcomes for higher usage bundles). Average mobile data usage in

New Zealand remains low by international standards, which may be due to a

number of factors, including pricing of higher usage bundles and the

availability and quality of fixed networks (including WiFi hotspots) in

New Zealand.

F20

We believe that the conditions for effective competition exist, with the three

MNOs each having a network of similar technology with similar geographic and

population coverage metrics. We consider that:

a) spectrum must be allocated with wholesale and retail competition

matters at the forefront of decisions;

b) with the pre-conditions for competition in place and the adequate

allocation of spectrum, we would expect MVNO services to

continue to develop where market opportunities exist; and

c) there may be room for improved consumer engagement, to

ensure that consumers are aware of and able to easily take

advantage of competing offers to drive competition.

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Actions on the state of competition

We will continue to engage with MBIE on the importance of the upcoming

spectrum allocation/auctions for delivering competitive outcomes in the

mobile market.

We have amended the annual monitoring questionnaire to capture

information on the development of MVNO market share and business

sustainability. We also intend to periodically review commercial MVNO

arrangements. This will provide us with greater ongoing visibility of the terms

being offered to MVNOs, and how the commercial terms compare to key price

and non-price dimensions of MVNO access.

We will undertake further work as part of our wider responsibilities under

section 9A and Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act (outside of this study) to:

a) improve our understanding of the extent to which consumers can

and do access, assess and act on relevant information in the

mobile and wider telecommunications markets;

b) assess consumers’ choices of mobile plans against their usage,

including quantification of the potential savings mobile consumers

could make if they were on plans that better match their usage;

and

c) assess the quality of services provided by mobile suppliers and the

extent to which consumers are actively engaged in the mobile

market, as part of our wider retail service quality programme,

including our ability to review or create retail service quality codes

if appropriate.

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Chapter 6 Future developments in mobile services

Purpose of this chapter

6.1 This chapter sets out our analysis of some of the key issues relating to the future

development of the mobile market—in particular, those issues raised throughout

the study. These include potential future developments in the supply of mobile

services and our views on their potential effects on competition.

6.2 One of the aims for this study was to gain a better understanding of how mobile

markets are currently performing and developing, and to consider how the mobile

landscape may evolve in the future.

262

This chapter attempts to address the second

aspect of that aim.

6.3 The selection of future developments in this chapter is a subset of the potential

future developments in mobile technology and trends and is not intended to be

exhaustive. 5G and eSIMs are potentially transformative technologies. Network

slicing and increased infrastructure sharing have the potential to alter the

investment profiles for MNOs and access conditions for MVNOs. For a fuller and

broader investigation of future trends please refer to the Red Dawn “Global

Industry Trends” Report.

263

5G mobile networks

6.4 5G is the next generation of mobile technology and will require mobile operators to

invest in spectrum and in key network infrastructure, including radio access

network equipment, backhaul and core networks.

264

6.5 The competition between 5G networks in New Zealand and the timing of their

deployment will be heavily dependent on the upcoming spectrum allocations.

Operators must also navigate their proposed 5G infrastructure and network

deployment plans through the statutory process administered by the Government

Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) before they are able to commence

deployment.

265

262

Commerce Commission, “Scope for our study of mobile telecommunications markets in New Zealand”,

(27 March 2018), para 2.

263

Red Dawn Consulting, “Global mobile industry trends: Implications for New Zealand”, (April 2019).

264

Ferry Crijpink, Alexandre Ménard, Halldor Sigurdsson, and Nemanja Vucevic, “The road to 5G: The

inevitable growth of infrastructure cost”, McKinsey & Company, (February 2018).

265

This process is set out in the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013.

110

6.6 The statutory process relates to identifying and mitigating any network security

risks that may arise in relation to public telecommunications networks. In

November 2018, following a media release by Spark, the GCSB confirmed that it

had identified a network security risk associated with Spark’s planned use of

Huawei’s equipment within its 5G radio access network.

266

267

The GCSB process is

ongoing, and Spark has the opportunity to mitigate the concerns raised by the

GCSB.

6.7 In the event those concerns cannot be mitigated to the GCSB’s satisfaction, the

ultimate decision will rest with the Minister responsible for the GCSB. Only the

Minister responsible for the GCSB can issue a direction to prevent, sufficiently

mitigate, or remove a network security risk identified by the GCSB.

6.8 In making such a direction, the Minister responsible for the GCSB must consult with

the Minister for Trade and Export Growth and the Minister for Broadcasting,

Communications and Digital Media, and must have regard to additional factors

including:

the impact on the MNO of meeting the costs associated with the direction;

the potential consequences that the direction may have on competition

and innovation in telecommunications markets; and

the anticipated benefits to New Zealand from preventing, sufficiently

mitigating, or removing the network security risk.

6.9 The consequences of any decision that has the effect of excluding or restricting the

involvement of Huawei, or any equipment supplier, in the roll-out of 5G networks

could potentially affect the development of competition and the costs of deploying

5G networks in New Zealand.

6.10 In commenting on the GCSB decision, 2degrees has referred to the importance of

multiple vendors to deliver price competition, and that if the GCSB decision is

confirmed and extended to 2degrees, “it will be a real disappointment for

competition.”

268

Spark has also commented publicly that “Huawei had been a very

competitive provider of services that had helped keep the vendor market

honest.”

269

266

GCSB statement, (28 November 2018); https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/news/gcsb-statement/.

267

Spark, “GCSB declines Spark’s proposal to use Huawei 5G equipment”, (28 November 2018).

268

https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/108940155/gcsb-declines-huawei-proposal.

269

https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/108261662/kiwi-mobile-phone-users-would-pay-for-5g-ban-

on-chinas-huawei-2degrees-warns.

111

6.11 The roll-out of 5G networks will enable MNOs to further benefit from supply side

economies of scope by offering multiple services over the same infrastructure,

particularly fixed wireless, mobile services and IoT. While there is a lot of industry

and media interest about innovation and new applications using 5G technology in

areas such as production, smart devices, agriculture, and entertainment, the initial

focus from MNOs in New Zealand appears to be in the enhanced capacity for

mobile and fixed wireless broadband.

270

6.12 In its initial phase, 5G is likely to be a basic overlay on existing 4G technology

platforms. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project, which is the international body

that governs cellular standards, has completed and published the 5G technical

standards. This allows for the deployment of fully compliant 5G networks, on top of

existing legacy LTE networks.

6.13 Much like the transitions from 3G to 4G and 4.5G, the initial launch of 5G in

New Zealand is likely to involve the replacement of equipment on existing base

stations. If data usage continues to grow exponentially, and new use cases come

online, higher spectrum frequencies and additional cell sites are likely to be

needed. This may increase the cost of further 5G deployment compared to the

initial phase and potentially increase the complexities and scale for consenting, site

sourcing, site access and environmental consents.

271

6.14 Spark, Vodafone and 2degrees have all indicated that they plan to roll out

competing 5G networks by leveraging their existing network infrastructure.

272

Vodafone has announced that it will initially launch 5G services in select locations in

Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Queenstown in December 2019, using its

existing 3.5GHz spectrum holdings (which are due to expire in 2022) and with Nokia

Networks as its technology partner.

273

Spark has also signalled its intention to

launch 5G services as soon as spectrum becomes available.

274

6.15 Dense Air’s recent entry into New Zealand, and its wholesale small-cell

infrastructure sharing approach, potentially provides a complementary service to

the existing MNOs that will improve 4G and 5G services.

270

Spark, “5G: The evolution towards a revolution: Briefing Paper”, (August 2018), p 11.

271

Land Access and the National Environmental Standard for Telecommunication Facilities concerns were

raised in a number of submissions to RSM’s “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand” discussion document.

272

Spark submission on “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand: Discussion Document”, (30 April 2018) p 1,

Vodafone New Zealand submission on “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand: Discussion Document”, (May

2018), p 2, and 2degrees submission on “Preparing for 5G in New Zealand: Discussion Document”, p 2.

273

https://news.vodafone.co.nz/article/vodafone-5g-launch-marks-day-one-new-ownership

274

https://www.sparknz.co.nz/news/fy19-results/.

112

6.16 Spark and Vodafone have also leveraged their mobile infrastructures to deploy IoT

networks in New Zealand, in anticipation of the expected increase in the demand

for IoT applications across a wide range of industry sectors including agriculture,

transport and horticulture. These networks compete with standalone IoT networks

that use different wireless technologies. Standalone IoT networks that have also

launched recently in New Zealand include Kotahinet and Thinkxtra.

eSIMs

6.17 An eSIM is a chip that is soldered directly onto a device’s circuit board and

performs the functions that are today undertaken by a physical SIM card. Instead of

the user having to physically switch SIMs in the device to change networks, this can

be conducted over-the-air or by electronic means instead.

6.18 eSIMs can be embedded in traditional handsets, tablets, wearable technology

(eg, smart watches) and IoT applications.

275

eSIMs offer the opportunity to

eventually make the switching experience seamless as there are no physical

elements to contend with; all aspects of switching can be done remotely.

6.19 eSIMs could benefit MVNOs that wish to bulk transfer their customer base in the

event of switching from one host MNO to another. eSIMs could also enable MVNOs

to differentiate further in niche markets and on pricing, allowing consumers to

seamlessly switch to the best offers available and to stimulate regular switching.

6.20 eSIMs could also create opportunities for global handset makers or OTT players to

become ‘mega MVNOs’ and possibly leverage this position to get better deals from

MNOs. An early example of this is Google’s ProjectFi in the USA.

6.21 There are three prerequisites for the benefits of eSIMs to be realised. Firstly, there

need to be eSIM devices. Secondly, carriers must support eSIMs. This is the most

critical requirement. Lastly, supporting systems are required to enable customers

to switch between providers.

276

6.22 The US Department of Justice recently acknowledged the importance of supporting

eSIMs in its Proposed Final Judgment on the T-Mobile/Sprint merger. One of the

conditions on the merger is that the merged entity, as well as a third party

275

Apple iPhone XR, XS, and XS Max and Google Pixel 2, 2XL, 3, 3XL, 3A and 3A XL and NUU Mobile X5

handsets are currently the only e-SIM capable handsets.

276

Wik Consult, “Economic aspects of embedded SIM for the telecommunications consumer segment”,

(2017).

113

acquiring divested assets (Dish), agrees to support eSIM technology on

smartphones.

277

6.23 Spark is currently the only New Zealand MNO to support eSIMs on its network, but

this support is limited to a select few devices.

278

Vodafone indicated that eSIMs

would be supported on its network by the first quarter of 2019, though this has yet

to happen.

279

2degrees has stated its intention to support eSIMs but has not given

a concrete timeframe.

6.24 Chorus noted in its submission on our Preliminary Findings that “The potential

benefits of eSIMs will likely require changes to, or uptake of, new hardware and

processes. They may also require changes to processes for Mobile Number

Portability”.

280

Chorus also encouraged us to satisfy ourselves that MNOs’

indications that they will support eSIMs are met, enabling the use of devices across

multiple mobile networks.

6.25 Uptake of eSIM devices is predicted to be modest, with the Red Dawn Emerging

Trends Report stating that:

281

The number of eSIM devices could reach anywhere between 148 million to 420

million shipments in 2022…. Smartphones will contribute to nearly two-thirds of all

eSIM device shipments by 2022. Despite such spectacular growth, less than 5% of

smartphones sold globally in 2022 will be eSIM compatible.

6.26 As submissions to the Issues Paper noted, eSIMs may not only affect customers.

Spark highlighted that eSIMs could also potentially alter the distribution channels

of mobile providers and facilitate service providers’ ability to sell mobile plans and

services digitally if they had an agreement with an MVNO and an OTT provider.

282

6.27 Spark also suggested that “…eSIMs may well transform devices – smartphones,

iPads, wearables – into digital distribution channels for mobile providers that lack

physical stores or pre-existing relationships with retail channels.”

283

2degrees

expects that modest cost savings could be realised from eSIMs as the need to

distribute physical SIM cards diminishes.

284

277

See Department of Justice, “Proposed Final Judgment”, (26 July 2019), p 21.

278

https://www.spark.co.nz/esim.

279

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12130793.

280

Chorus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 3.

281

Red Dawn Consulting, “Global mobile industry trends – Implications for New Zealand”, (24 April 2019),

p 32.

282

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 29.

283

Spark submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 27.

284

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 40.

114

6.28 Given the potential of eSIMs to enhance retail and wholesale competition and to

lower switching barriers,

285

we would be concerned with behaviour that sought to

reduce the competitive benefits of eSIMs, for example:

eSIM locking that could increase switching costs for owners of

carrier-locked wearables;

exclusion of other mobile service providers, such as MVNOs; and

limited or restrictive offering of eSIM devices that unduly restrict the

functionality of eSIM devices.

Network slicing

6.29 Network slicing is a form of virtual networking architecture. In simple terms, it

allows network owners to divide up their physical network into multiple virtual

end-to-end networks. This virtualisation enables a variety of different services to be

offered, each able to be carefully tailored.

286

Such services may include IoT, fixed

wireless services, mobile gaming and new forms of MVNO access, as shown in

Figure 21.

Figure 21 5G Network slices

285

See Vocus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 6.

286

Mohammad Asif Habibi et al, “Network Slicing in 5G Mobile Communications: Architecture, Profit,

Modelling and Challenges”, Conference Paper, (August 2017).

115

6.30 Network slicing uses virtualisation technologies such as Network Function

Virtualisation or Software Defined Networking. These technologies offer an

effective way to exploit the benefits of a common network infrastructure, enabling

operators to establish and run multiple network services in parallel.

287

288

6.31 5G network slicing should enable network operators to develop a broader service

portfolio and accordingly diversify, expand and increase ongoing revenue streams

by providing higher quality innovative services that may have a higher ARPU.

6.32 This has the potential to enable non-traditional providers such as Apple and Google

to purchase dedicated network slices to run their services. These providers will still

be reliant on the MNO networks and may provide complementary services rather

than providing an additional competitive constraint on MNOs.

289

6.33 In addition, it is possible that the forthcoming spectrum auction offers up

possibilities for MNOs to create opportunities for more MVNO entry using network

slicing technology.

Infrastructure sharing

6.34 Infrastructure sharing arrangements can result in cost efficiencies by lowering the

cost of network deployment. However, such arrangements can also produce a

range of detriments through reduced infrastructure-based competition. Such

detriments may include higher prices (leading to a reduction in allocative efficiency)

as well as lower levels of innovation (a loss of dynamic efficiency). As a result,

infrastructure sharing will involve a trade-off between different forms of

efficiencies.

6.35 Infrastructure sharing has the potential to affect the economics and speed of LTE

and then 5G deployments, although the overall impact is difficult to predict at this

early stage of development.

6.36 Chorus also highlighted the potential for competition effects due to a risk that

competitive retail tension may decrease with infrastructure sharing agreements

between vertically integrated suppliers. We note Chorus’ concern and reiterate the

287

Matias Richart et al., “Resource Slicing in Virtual Wireless Networks: A Survey”, IEEE Transactions on

Network and Service Management, Vol. 13 Issue 3, (September 2016), p 462.

288

Nokia, “Dynamic end-to-end network slicing for 5G”, (June 2016).

289

Matteo Vincenzi et al, “Multi-Tenant Slicing for spectrum Management on the Road to 5G”, IEEE Wireless

Communications Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 5, (October 2017), p 118- 125. Konstantinos Samdanis et al, “From

Network Sharing to Multi-tenancy: The 5G Network Slice Broker”, IEEE Communications Magazine,

Vol. 54, Issue: 7, (July 2016).

116

point made immediately above that, presently, predicting the likely competition

effects is difficult.

290

6.37 On the other hand, TUANZ’s submission is strongly supportive of infrastructure

sharing, especially in rural areas, noting that effective infrastructure sharing is more

likely to mean that rural end users experience similar levels of connectivity quality

as their urban counterparts.

291

6.38 BEREC, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, has

recently produced a snapshot of infrastructure sharing arrangements across

European National Regulatory Authorities. BEREC defines infrastructure sharing as

follows:

292

Mobile infrastructure sharing (both passive and active) describes the process by

which operators share infrastructure to deliver a mobile service to end users.

"Passive sharing" is the sharing of the passive elements of network infrastructure

such as masts, sites, cabinet, power, and air conditioning. "Active sharing" is the

sharing of active elements in the radio access network such as antennas and radio

network controllers (RNC).

6.39 The trade-off between the costs of deployment and infrastructure competition may

become more pronounced given the potential densification of cell sites required for

5G.

6.40 In this context, the infrastructure established by the Rural Connectivity Group

(RCG) could be relevant. The RCG plans to deploy 520 cell sites and share spectrum

to improve rural coverage and connectivity under the RBI2 and MBSF. According to

RCG:

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The cell sites we build will be shared by New Zealand’s mobile network operators –

Vodafone, Spark, 2degrees – to provide mobile services from all three mobile

companies and ensure competitive broadband services to rural customers. The

towers will also be open access for wireless internet service providers to utilise. The

infrastructure will allow all operators to share the radio access network equipment

and one set of antennas, meaning the size of the infrastructure can be flexible to

suit the geographic location.

6.41 Depending on its configuration, parts of the RCG infrastructure could be reused for

future deployment of 5G technology by MNOs, at lower cost than a greenfield

implementation. In this way, it is possible that it will be economic to provide 5G

services in areas where it might otherwise be uneconomic.

290

Chorus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 2.

291

TUANZ submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), para 39-39.

292

BEREC, “Report on Infrastructure sharing”, (14 June 2018), BoR (18) 116, p 2.

293

Rural Connectivity Group’s website “Why is RCG unique” - https://www.thercg.co.nz/why-is-rcg-unique/.

117

6.42 Infrastructure sharing arrangements are likely to facilitate 5G coverage, particularly

in more rural areas. 2degrees submitted that although the viability and form of 5G

infrastructure sharing in different regions is yet to be determined, 2degrees expects

that 5G infrastructure sharing will largely follow 4G:

infrastructure competition in areas of high traffic/capacity demand;

passive infrastructure sharing and co-location in areas with moderate to

low traffic/capacity demand; and

active infrastructure sharing in areas of low traffic density, with access to

RCG facilities in RBI2 areas.

294

6.43 2degrees reiterated its preference for issues surrounding infrastructure sharing to

be addressed commercially by the parties in the first instance, due to the extant

uncertainties and complexities. 2degrees sees no requirement for regulatory

intervention at this stage.

295

6.44 We acknowledge the WISPA NZ submission on the Issues Paper that infrastructure

sharing may enable rural consumers to benefit from 5G sooner than having

separate networks, although it is too early to say definitively. In its submission,

WISPA NZ also noted that RCG infrastructure is potentially important to the roll-out

of 5G in rural areas — although this depends on whether the intended location of

the RCG towers is suitable to support higher frequency transmissions, and whether

the quality of backhaul available at those towers is adequate to support 5G.

296

6.45 In the case of the RCG joint venture that facilitated improved connectivity under

the RBI2 and the MBSF, the Telecommunications Act provides these programmes

with restrictive trade practices (RTP) authorisation under the Commerce Act.

297

6.46 We note that any new infrastructure sharing arrangements could potentially

require RTP authorisation under the Commerce Act.

6.47 We also note that any new authorised infrastructure sharing to support 5G

deployments could include conditions relating to third party access to shared

infrastructure. In the case of the RCG, it has a Deed of Open Access Undertakings

(the Deed) that includes non-discrimination obligations.

294

2degrees submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 31-33.

295

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 4.

296

WISPA NZ submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 3.

297

Section 156AZF of the Telecommunications Act 2001.

118

6.48 The non-discrimination provision in the Deed states that the “RCG will ensure there

is non-discrimination in relation to the supply of a Relevant Service”.

298

The

Relevant Services are Wholesale Tower Co-location and Wholesale Backhaul.

6.49 Where sharing extends to radio spectrum, there may be additional efficiency gains

in terms of spectrum usage. For example, if blocks of spectrum are awarded to

different parties, some spectrum must be used as guard bands to prevent

interference. If a single block of spectrum is awarded and shared, the amount of

spectrum set aside as guard bands may be reduced, freeing up more spectrum to

be used.

Findings on future developments in the mobile market

F21

5G will initially be an evolution over existing networks, and over time network

densification will occur. Investment in 5G may alter the economics of mobile

provision and raises the prospect of greater infrastructure sharing, and larger

incentives to utilise network capacity through MVNO agreements.

F22

eSIM capable devices are likely to become more prevalent, with the potential

to reduce switching costs for both consumers, MNOs and MVNOs. However,

there is the potential for competition to be suppressed if MNOs do not enable

eSIMs or lock eSIMs devices to their network.

F23

We may see more infrastructure sharing. Whether this enhances or suppresses

competition will depend on how the arrangements are structured. We would

expect to see infrastructure sharing proposals that raise potential competition

concerns come to us for authorisation.

298

RCG, “Deed of Open Access Undertakings for RBI2”, clause 5.1.

119

Chapter 7 Regulated services

Purpose of this chapter

7.1 This chapter sets out our findings and actions concerning the five regulated services

that currently relate to the mobile market, in light of submissions received during

the study, the completion of the Schedule 3 reviews of Designated and Specified

Services in June 2016, and National Roaming in September 2018.

Mobile termination access services

7.2 MTAS are the termination services a fixed or mobile network operator needs to

purchase to allow its subscribers to communicate with the subscribers of a mobile

network. The MTAS service is illustrated in Figure 22.

Figure 22 Mobile termination access service

7.3 A mobile network needs to be able to interconnect with other networks to ensure

that its subscribers can communicate.

7.4 MTAS is a designated access service under Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications

Act, which allows us to determine the price and non-price terms of the service.

MTAS includes termination of voice calls and SMS.

7.5 In 2011, we finalised an STD in respect of the MTAS, in which we set mobile

termination rates (MTRs) for voice calls and SMS. These are summarised in Table 8.

Table 8 Mobile termination rates

Effective from

6 May 2011

1 Oct 2011

1 Apr 2012

1 Apr 2013

1 Apr 2014

Voice (cpm)

7.48

5.88

3.97

3.72

3.56

SMS (cpSMS)

0.06

Source: Commerce Commission Decision 724

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7.6 Every five years, we are required to review whether Schedule 1 services should

remain in Schedule 1. The MTAS service was last reviewed in 2015 and we

concluded that it should remain in Schedule 1.

7.7 Our reasons for keeping MTAS in Schedule 1 included that each MNO has a

monopoly over the termination of calls on its network under the calling party pays

principle, and that the ability to increase MTRs can distort downstream

competition.

299

Our next scheduled review of MTAS is September 2020.

7.8 Chorus reiterated the points made in its submission on our Terms of Reference for

the Mobile Market Study, that the regulated reductions in voice MTRs were set via

benchmarking in 2011 and the reductions finished in 2014, and that international

evidence indicates that the cost of mobile termination is decreasing.

300

Chorus also

indicated that it was concerned with above-cost termination rates which it argued

leads to “a risk of a wealth transfer from fixed-line only RSPs to RSPs who operate

mobile networks”.

301

7.9 Vocus supported the Chorus position in its cross-submission.

302

Both parties would

like to see a review of MTRs brought forward prior to the scheduled Commission

review of MTAS in 2020. Chorus had previously argued that the MTAS rate was high

relative to overseas comparators and that it was distortionary, compared with the

real costs of servicing mobile calls, particularly fixed-to-mobile calling rates.

303

7.10 In several overseas jurisdictions, MTRs are set on a pure long run incremental

cost

304

pricing principle. Our current pricing principle under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act is total service long run incremental cost, which may

result in different pricing calculations.

7.11 We note that overseas jurisdictions have significantly lowered their MTRs over the

past few years, including comparator countries used to set our benchmark price in

our 2011 MTAS STD. For example, Australia was one of the comparators we used

299

Commerce Commission, “Consideration of whether to commence an investigation into whether to omit

the Mobile Termination Access Services from Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 2001”,

(23 September 2015), para 4.

300

Chorus, “Submission in response to the Commerce Commission’s Mobile Market Study Terms of

Reference”, (30 November 2017); Vocus Communications, “Mobile Market Study Scoping”,

(30 November 2017).

301

Chorus submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 3.

302

Vocus cross-submission on Preliminary Findings paper, (19 July 2019), para 32.

303

Chorus submission on the Issues paper, (26 October 2018), p 6.

304

The forward-looking costs incurred over the long-run which are directly attributable to a defined

increment of service.

121

and had a benchmark rate of A5.8 cents per minute.

305

However, in 2015 the ACCC

set a new TSLRIC-based MTR for voice calls at A1.7 cents per minute.

306

7.12 We remain committed to first undertake the five-yearly review of MTAS scheduled

for 2020, prior to commencing a re-benchmarking of the prices in the MTAS STD. In

that review, we intend to consider the competition implications of emerging

services such as OTT communication services.

7.13 We have previously noted the development and adoption of OTT services utilising

Voice-over-Internet Protocol. OTT services can potentially be a substitute for

conventional mobile services. OTT services incur no termination charges when both

parties have the OTT service on their device.

7.14 In our 2015 review of MTAS, we referred to evidence from the European

Commission and the ACCC that, although OTT services were emerging as a

potential constraint on MTAS, OTT services were not yet effective substitutes.

307

We noted that mobile voice traffic in New Zealand continued to increase, although

SMS traffic had started to fall in recent years. We concluded that we did not have

enough evidence to determine whether OTT services are an effective substitute for

mobile services.

7.15 Since 2015, mobile voice traffic has continued to increase in New Zealand and SMS

traffic has continued to decline. As we noted in our 2017 Annual Monitoring

Report, the decline in SMS volumes is expected to continue given the increasing

popularity of various OTT messaging services like Facebook Messenger, iMessage,

WhatsApp and Viber.

308

7.16 Analysys Mason’s Connected Consumer Survey reported that 81% of

New Zealanders with a smartphone use OTT services, with messaging services

being the most common.

309

305

Commerce Commission, Decision 724, (5 May 2011), p 71.

306

ACCC, “Mobile Terminating Access Service Final Access Determination: Final Decision”, (August 2015).

307

Commerce Commission, “Consideration of whether to commence an investigation into whether to omit

the Mobile Termination Access Services from Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 2001”,

(23 September 2015), para 46-49.

308

Commerce Commission, “Annual Telecommunications Monitoring Report: 2017 Key Facts”,

(20 December 2017), p 25.

309

Analysys Mason, “Connected Consumer Survey 2018: mobile customer satisfaction in Australia and

New Zealand”, (February 2019).

122

7.17 We note that the ACCC has recently decided to retain the MTAS voice termination

service as a regulated service, but has deregulated the MTAS SMS termination

service, as OTT messaging services are now considered to be effective substitutes

for SMS.

310

National roaming

7.18 National roaming allows customers of one mobile network to use another network

when they are outside their own service provider’s coverage area.

7.19 National roaming is a wholesale mobile access service which allows customers on

one MNO to roam on the network of another MNO. Roaming is typically used by

new entrants or smaller MNOs to offer national coverage in the mobile markets.

7.20 When it first entered the mobile market in New Zealand, 2degrees had deployed a

mobile network which covered 47% of New Zealand’s population. To be able to

offer national coverage, 2degrees initially relied on roaming on Vodafone’s mobile

network, which 2degrees secured through a commercial agreement. 2degrees has

since invested in expanding the footprint of its own network, and now has coverage

like that of its competitors.

7.21 In 2018 we considered the roaming service as part of the five-yearly reviews of

services in Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act. Our final decision was to

retain national roaming as a specified service.

7.22 We concluded that there may be potential competition issues arising from the

allocation of spectrum for 5G. A new entrant would likely require a roaming

arrangement to provide immediate coverage while it built out its physical

network.

311

7.23 We also noted that the regulated service is specified only, which means that we do

not set price terms. This mitigates the risk that roaming will distort investment

incentives facing both the MNO relying on roaming and the MNO supplying

roaming. However, roaming as a regulated service acts as an important backstop in

the event of commercial negotiations failing.

310

ACCC, “Domestic Mobile Terminating Access Service Declaration Inquiry: Final Report”, (June 2019).

311

Commerce Commission, “Review of National Roaming: Final decision on consideration of deregulation of

national roaming”, (4 September 2018), p 7-8.

123

Mobile co-location

7.24 Mobile co-location is a service that enables an MNO to install mobile network

transmission and reception equipment on the mast of another MNO (see Figure

23).

Figure 23 Mobile co-location

7.25 In New Zealand, mobile co-location is a specified service and has been subject to an

STD since 2008.

312

We reviewed whether mobile co-location should remain a

specified service in 2016 and concluded that it should remain in Schedule 1.

313

7.26 We noted that the ability to co-locate equipment on the infrastructure of another

MNO facilitates the efficient deployment of mobile technology by sharing the cost

of facilities such as towers and masts. The ability to share such costs is likely to

312

Commerce Commission, “Standard Terms Determination for Co-location on Cellular Mobile Transmission

Sites, Schedule 1 Mobile Co-location Service Description”, (11 December 2008).

313

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, (5 July 2016), para 154.

124

become increasingly important as a mechanism for reaching more remote areas

with current and new technology such as 4G LTE and 5G.

314

7.27 We also noted that there had been increased use of co-location, particularly during

the period from 2012 to 2015, and that co-location had been occurring both on RBI

and non-RBI sites.

7.28 Under RBI1, the Government appointed and funded Vodafone to upgrade existing

cell sites and build new cell sites in rural areas. Under that arrangement, Vodafone

must offer co-location services in respect of cell sites funded through RBI1. MBIE

has reported that 154 new cell sites have been built under RBI1, all of which allow

for co-location by competing operators. In addition, 387 cell sites have been

upgraded.

315

7.29 Co-location on existing cell sites can be more challenging than on new cell sites, as

existing cell site infrastructure may have been built to accommodate a single set of

equipment. The installation of additional equipment may require strengthening of

the mast infrastructure and may also result in the equipment being located further

down the mast, leading to reduced coverage.

7.30 The second stage of the RBI programme (RBI2) is further extending mobile

coverage in rural areas, while the Government’s MBSF is providing greater mobile

coverage along state highways and in tourism destinations where no coverage

currently exists. MBIE reports that 26 tourist sites have received new mobile

coverage, 238km of State Highways have improved coverage, and 25 mobile towers

are now complete. Overall, 38,662 rural homes and businesses can now access

improved broadband.

316

7.31 The RCG is a joint venture between the three MNOs appointed by the Government

to build the infrastructure to extend mobile coverage under the RBI2 and MBSF

programmes. This differs from the RBI1 scheme in that under the RCG model, the

three MNOs will share radio access network equipment and antennas on each site

constructed by the RCG.

314

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, (5 July 2016), para X28.1.

315

See https://www.mbie.govt.nz/assets/aae2c79c33/december-18-broadband-quarterly-update.pdf.

316

Crown Infrastructure Partners “Quarterly Connectivity Update Q2 to June 2019” (June 2019), p4.

125

Number portability

7.32 Introduced in 2007, the designated local and mobile number portability service

allows customers to keep their number when switching between service providers.

We reviewed whether number portability should remain a specified service in 2016

and concluded that it should remain in Schedule 1.

317

7.33 The New Zealand Telecommunications Forum Inc. administers the scheme, and the

number portability determination ensures that the process for porting a fixed or

mobile telephone number while switching providers is easy to initiate, and that end

users are not left without communications for a long period.

7.34 We plan to complete our next 5-yearly Schedule 3 review of the service by

June 2021.

Backhaul

7.35 Backhaul services that support mobile networks are not currently regulated under

Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act.

318

7.36 MNOs rely on backhaul services to connect cell sites and other network nodes.

319

Such connectivity supports both mobile services and fixed wireless services and

may take the form of actively managed wholesale services (such as leased line

bandwidth services), or passive services (such as the direct fibre access service

(DFAS)).

7.37 We understand that Spark and Vodafone self-supply some of their backhaul

requirements, but also acquire backhaul from other parties such as Chorus. In

2017, 2degrees announced that it had selected Chorus as the provider of wholesale

backhaul services to support 2degrees’ fixed and mobile services.

320

7.38 Fibre-based backhaul is the main technology used to support the supply of high

speed mobile data services. We expect fibre backhaul to increase in importance

317

Commerce Commission, “Review of Designated and Specified Services under Schedule 1 of the

Telecommunications Act 2001”, (5 July 2016), para 150.

318

The backhaul services regulated under Schedule 1 of the Telecommunications Act 2001 are specific to

copper regulated access services UCLL, UCLFS and UBA.

319

Backhaul in this context refers to a class of services used to transport traffic between active elements (ie,

nodes) of a mobile or fixed-line network. Backhaul services may be used anywhere within the mobile or

fixed-line operators’ network – nationally (eg, Chorus’ regional transport service (CRT)), regionally (eg,

intra-candidate area backhaul service (ICABS)) and locally (eg, DFAS).

320

2degrees media release “2degress announces Chorus as primary provider of national backhaul” (8 August

2017)

126

with the deployment of 5G mobile networks because of the need for low latency

and high capacity backhaul.

7.39 We note that 2degrees expressed some concern over backhaul pricing in Chorus/

Local Fibre Company (LFC) areas, where Chorus and the LFCs are in effect

monopoly suppliers of mobile backhaul.

321

We also note that Part 6 of the

Telecommunications Act provides for the price-quality regulation of DFAS (which

may be used as backhaul) for Chorus.

7.40 The direct fibre access services that Chorus and the LFCs provide to mobile

operators are subject to maximum prices set in 2011 under the terms of the UFB

contracts. Those prices will be frozen at the 2019 rates and be subject to annual

inflation adjustments from 1 December 2019 and ending on the day before

1 January 2022. Thereafter, LFCs will not be subject to price-quality regulation, but

as we note above, Chorus will. We may review the effectiveness of the regulation

of backhaul services that are subject to price-quality regulation upon completion of

the first regulatory period no later than 31 December 2025.

7.41 We indicated in our s9A backhaul study that we will continue to monitor

developments in the backhaul sector going forward.

322

Among other reasons, as

noted above, fibre-based backhaul will become increasingly important for the

successful completion of competing 5G networks.

7.42 We note that wireless backhaul may also be an alternative, particularly where fibre

is unavailable or impractical. The use of wireless backhaul will be dependent on the

availability of appropriate spectrum and local conditions.

7.43 The level of competitive intensity in the supply of backhaul services varies around

New Zealand. In some regions, there are several competing backhaul networks,

such as Chorus, Spark, Vodafone, Vocus, Vector, and the LFCs. In other areas, the

options are more limited, and the likely development of small-cell infrastructure to

support some 5G use cases could further challenge the competitive dynamic for

backhaul services in New Zealand.

7.44 As noted above, the MNOs rely on backhaul services from Chorus and the other

LFCs to supply mobile and fixed wireless services. To the extent that mobile and

fixed wireless services emerge as a competitive threat to fibre-based access

services supplied by Chorus and the LFCs, the incentives to supply backhaul services

may change.

321

2degrees submission on the Preliminary Findings paper, (28 June 2019), p 4.

322

Commerce Commission, “Section 9A Backhaul services study – Our findings”, (11 June 2019) p 12-13, p 35.

127

7.45 In effect, Chorus and the LFCs would be supplying an upstream input to

competitors in a downstream market. This may become increasingly significant in

the context of 5G, as fixed wireless services are expected to be an important early

use case supported by 5G deployments.

7.46 We also note that some Chorus backhaul products within Chorus’ fibre candidate

areas (eg, DFAS) are likely to be regulated fibre fixed-line access services under

Part 6 of the Telecommunications Act and thus be subject to the maximum

allowable revenue set by the new regulatory regime for fibre.

323

7.47 The other LFCs will not be subject to price-quality regulation but will be subject to

information disclosure requirements. MBIE has been consulting on the proposed

content of regulations to be made under section 226 of the Telecommunications

Act that will apply to each regulated fibre service provider.

324

7.48 We undertook a section 9A study into backhaul services and released our findings

on 11 June 2019.

325

We indicated in those findings that we intend to “continue to

monitor the availability and prices of the different commercial backhaul services in

Chorus’ portfolio on an ongoing basis as part of our section 9A functions”.

326

noted further that we would consider the need for any changes to all regulated

backhaul services as part of the scheduled review of certain regulated copper

fixed-line services to be completed by no later than 31 December 2025.

327

7.49 In conclusion, our analysis of the current state of mobile market competition, likely

future developments, and the work we have commissioned by external experts on

emerging trends in the mobile market (which has been published separately),

328

confirm our view that the current regulatory settings are fit for purpose. Therefore,

our findings on our regulated services are set out below.

323

The scope of the FFLAS that are regulated under Part 6 will be set in regulations that are still to be made.

324

See https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/exposure-draft-of-regulations-section-226-

telecommunications-act/.

325

Commerce Commission, “Section 9A Backhaul services study – Our findings”, (11 June 2019).

326

Commerce Commission, “Section 9A Backhaul services study – Our findings”, (11 June 2019), p 13.

327

Commerce Commission, “Section 9A Backhaul services study – Our findings”, (11 June 2019), p 12.

328

See https://comcom.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/146679/RDC-Mobile-industry-trends-14-May-

2019.PDF.

128

Findings on regulated services

F24

Our review of the current market conditions, and likely future developments,

has not identified sufficient grounds for us to bring forward our planned

reviews of regulated services. The scheduled reviews for these services are set

out in Table 1 in Chapter 2.

F25

Backhaul services, whether metropolitan or between national network nodes,

appear not to have constrained the competitiveness or development of mobile

services to date. However, we recognise the potential for bottlenecks to

develop as mobile (eg, 5G), fibre technologies (eg, passive optical networking)

and fibre regulation undergo a period of significant change.