Risk Management for DoD Security Programs
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Risk Management for DoD Security Programs
Student Guide
Welcome to Risk Management for DoD Security Programs. The goal of this course is to
provide security professionals with a risk management process that incorporates five
steps: asset assessment, threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment,
and countermeasure determination.
Practical Application
A corresponding job aid (Risk Management – Tables, Charts & Worksheets) is
available in the course resources link which provides examples of each of the tables,
charts and worksheets that are referenced in the courseware and are an integral part of
the risk management process. This job aid can be used as quick reference material or
as a starting point in your own risk management analysis.
Introduction
Rapid changes in the political, social, economic, and technological arenas have caused
protection to become more complex, while resources for security have become more
restricted. The risk management process provides a systematic approach for acquiring
and analyzing the information necessary to protect assets and allocate security
resources.
To meet today’s security challenges; the national-level security policy initiatives endorse
a holistic risk management approach which provides a level of balance that will
accomplish the following:
• Realistically match security to the threat
• Effectively allocate limited resources
• Provide necessary security at an affordable price
The Risk Management Process
Risk management is a five-step process that provides a framework for collecting and
evaluating information to:
• Assess assets (identify value of asset and degree of impact if asset is damaged
or lost)
• Assess threats (type and degree of threat)
• Assess vulnerabilities (identification and extent of vulnerabilities)
• Assess risks (calculation of risks)
• Determine countermeasures (security countermeasure options that can reduce
or mitigate risks cost effectively
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During the analysis process values are assigned corresponding to the impact of asset
loss, threats, and vulnerabilities, and then a resulting risk value is calculated.
The final step in the process is to make a risk management decision. This decision
involves analyzing the outcomes from each step (typically using a numerical rating
and/or linguistic value) and analyzing the information as a whole to determine the most
appropriate countermeasure options for each asset.
Impact and Risk Scale
Low
Medium
High
Critical
Range
0-3
4-13
14-50
51-100
Mid-point
2
8
31
75
Threat and Vulnerability Scale
Degree of
Threat
Low
Medium
High
Critical
Range
.01-.24
.25-.49
.50-.74
.75-1.00
Mid-point
.12
.37
.62
.87
The Risk Management Process
Step 1 – Assess Assets
The first step in the risk management process is to identify and assess your
organization’s assets. An asset is anything of value or importance to the organization or
an adversary, such as people, computers, buildings or strategic advantages. This first
step determines the value of each asset and prioritizes the asset based upon the
consequence of loss. During this step, focus only on assets that are worthy of protection
and are most important to your organization and the national security of the United
States.
Assets can be assigned to one of five categories:
• People
• Information
• Equipment
• Facilities
• Activities & Operations
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Each category is broken into multiple levels to assist with capturing details about each
asset. Each level within the categories is then used during the asset analysis. Asset
analysis studies are done at a Level I, II, III, and IV, or deeper as necessary. (See job
aid for an example of the Asset Category Table.)
NOTE: Categories can be adjusted to meet your organizational needs.
Identify Assets
A variety of resources, including reports, databases and equipment documentation,
assist in determining significant assets. However, the best information is attained
through a series of interviews with knowledgeable personnel or subject matter experts
(SMEs), including the following:
• Customer
• Program/Facility Manager
• Chief of Operations
• Chief of Security
When interviewing SMEs, use a structured asset survey questionnaire to determine
asset criticality. Questions should include, but not be limited to the following:
• What critical mission activities take place at this site? Describe.
• What critical/sensitive information (both classified & unclassified) is located at
this site?
• What critical/valuable equipment is located at this site? Why is it critical/valuable?
What assets would be viewed as critical to an adversary?
• Where are the assets located?
• Who are the facility personnel, tenants, customers, and visitors? What
relationship do they have to the critical mission activities/operations?
• What do you view as undesirable events to your assets? Describe the expected
impact if the event were to occur.
Identify Undesirable Events
Once you have identified the significant assets, the next step is to identify potential
undesirable events. The occurrence of an undesirable event is the focal point of the risk
management process. Document and assign a rating to each potential undesirable
event that could adversely affect a specific asset.
Research available resources or use the SME interview technique to identify undesirable
events. The following questions can help guide you:
• What undesirable events have happened in the past?
• What undesirable events regarding a particular asset concern the asset owner?
• What undesirable events have happened to similar assets?
Measure Impacts
Once undesirable events for each asset are identified, the next step is to measure the
impact of such an occurrence. Consider the consequences for each asset that is lost,
harmed, or otherwise adversely affected. Again research resources and interview SMEs
to gain the needed information. Use the following questions as a guide:
• Could significant damage to national security or loss/injury to human life occur as
a result of this event?
• Could ongoing operations be seriously impaired or halted?
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• Could costly equipment or facilities be damaged or lost?
Create Risk Assessment Worksheet
Once the impact of an undesirable event is defined, create a Risk Assessment
Worksheet for organizing and later analyzing the information to assist with the analysis.
At this stage of the risk management process, populate the first two columns of the
worksheet with the following elements:
• Asset name
• Undesirable event description and impact or potential loss from the undesirable
event
Notice that the worksheet contains empty columns. These columns will be completed as
you progress through the remaining steps of the risk management process. (Upon
completion of the asset assessment step, the first four columns of the worksheet will be
completed.) (See job aid for a Risk Assessment Worksheet)
Risk Assessment Worksheet
Assign Asset Value
Now that you have identified assets and compiled a list of undesirable events, the next
step is to assign a linguistic value of the impact:
• Critical (C) - A critical rating indicates that compromise to the targeted assets
would have grave consequences resulting in loss of life, serious injury, or
mission failure.
• High (H) - A high rating indicates that a compromise to assets would have
serious consequences resulting in loss of classified or highly sensitive data or
equipment/facilities that could impair operations affecting national interest for an
indefinite period of time.
• Medium (M) - A medium rating indicates that a compromise to the assets would
have moderate consequences resulting in loss of sensitive information, sensitive
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data or costly equipment/property that would impair operations affecting national
interests for a limited time period.
• Low (L) - A low rating indicates that little or no impact on human life or the
continuation of operations affecting national security or national interests would
result.
Further differentiate each asset by indicating high, medium, and low within each
assigned value.
For a critical value, designate an asset as a high/critical or a low/critical. Doing so
provides the ability to weigh a value between assets. For example, the compromise of
Top Secret information may be more detrimental than the loss of Confidential
information.
Linguistic values, or verbal terms, are less precise than numerical ratings. In addition, it
will be more difficult later on in the risk management process to determine which
combinations of ratings equal various risk ratings. Therefore, linguistic values are
assigned a numerical rating to determine the degree of an asset within each linguistic
category. The numerical rating scale ranges from 1 to 100. Additionally, the numeric
scale allows for more effective ranking of valued assets within a given range.
For example, all personnel are important, but key project scientists may be ranked
higher than a security guard. Thus, a scientist may be valued as critical and assigned a
value of 90 yet a security guard may also be valued as critical but assigned a lower
value of 60.
After each asset and corresponding undesirable event/impact is assigned a numerical
rating representing asset loss, rank each asset in the numerical rating (impact) column
by the value of the loss (rating).
When assigning ratings, be sure that the value assigned is based on the asset owner’s
perspective. In many cases an asset may be important to an asset manager, agency, or
department, but may only have minor importance to the U.S. Government, which
ultimately owns the asset and pays for its security. Basing ratings on the asset
manager’s perspective could result in asset overprotection at the expense of other more
critical assets.
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Risk Assessment Worksheet
Step 2 - Threat Assessment
The second step in the risk management process is to assess threats. The goal of this
step is to assess the current threat level for the identified assets.
The first step in assessing threats is identifying an asset’s adversaries and threats.
There are many types of threats, some which are perpetrated by people or
organizations, which are usually referred to as adversaries, while others are accidents or
due to natural phenomenon and are not considered adversaries.
An adversary is any individual, group, organization, or government that conducts
activities, or has the intention and capability to conduct activities detrimental to assets.
Common examples of adversaries are terrorists, criminals, and foreign intelligence
entities.
A threat is any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause the loss of,
or damage to an asset. Threat may also be defined as the intention and capability of an
adversary to undertake detrimental actions against an asset owner’s interests.
Threats are assigned to one of the following categories:
• Criminal: A criminal is an adversary who violates the law causing the loss of or
damage to assets. Examples include: violent acts against people, theft, hacking,
etc.
• Terrorist: A terrorist is an adversary who uses violence or the threat of violence
to inculcate fear, with the intent to coerce or intimidate governments or societies
in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
Examples include Al Qaeda, HAMAS, etc.
• Insider: An insider is an adversary who has special access or privileges, e.g.,
employees, contractors, customers, etc.
• Economic espionage: Economic espionage is the theft or misappropriation of
U.S. proprietary information or trade secrets, especially to foreign governments
and their agents. Both traditionally friendly nations and recognized adversaries
conduct economic espionage.
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• Foreign Industrial Espionage: Foreign industrial espionage is espionage
conducted by a foreign government or a foreign company with direct assistance
of a foreign government against a private U.S. company for the purpose of
obtaining commercial secrets.
• Foreign Intelligence Entity: Foreign Intelligence Entities are organizations that
are part of a foreign government and engage in intelligence activities.
• Natural disaster: Natural disasters are phenomena that occur in nature that
have the potential to damage assets or interrupt activities and operations.
Examples include: floods, lightning, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, etc.
After identifying the adversaries, the next step is to analyze threat data to understand the
adversaries’ profile, specifically their intent.
Analyze Intent
Intent refers to an adversary’s intended plans that may pose a threat to an asset.
Analyzing intent requires an understanding of the adversary’s perspective. Research
resources, or use the SME interview technique to identify intent. The following questions
can help guide you:
• What are the adversaries’ goals?
• To what degree are the adversaries motivated to achieve those goals?
• How will exploiting or harming U.S. assets bring the adversaries closer to their
goals?
• What level of risk are the adversaries likely to accept?
• Are the adversaries willing to risk getting caught?
• What might the adversaries lose if caught exploiting or harming U.S. assets?
• Are there other methods for adversaries to obtain their goals?
• Will the adversaries choose one of those methods?
Group the identified adversaries into categories to help in the analysis and organization
of your assessment. The following categories are examples:
• Individuals - common criminals, insiders, and disturbed individuals
• Groups & Organizations - terrorists, corporate competitors, narco-traffickers
• Governments - foreign intelligence entities, foreign militaries, state-sponsored
entities
After you have grouped the adversaries, create an Intent Assessment Chart to analyze
and summarize the data. A “yes” or “no” response is required for the following:
• Knowledge of an asset
• Need
• Each adversary’s demonstrated interest level
Some of this information can be obtained from intelligence and counterintelligence
organizations. This is generally the weakest link in the overall risk management process
because access to this type of information is often limited.
Based on the number of “yes” responses, assign a high, medium, or low intent level for
each adversary. Typically, three “yes” responses equate to a high intent level, two “yes”
responses translate to a medium, and one “yes” response indicates a low overall intent
level.
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Intent Assessment Chart
Adversary
Insider,
Terrorist, FIE,
Criminal
Intent
Knowledge of
Asset
Need
Demonstrated
Interest
Overall Intent
Level
Adversary 1
Yes
Yes
Yes
High
Adversary 2
Yes
Yes
No
Medium
Adversary 3
Yes
No
No
Low
Determine Capability
After assessing an adversary’s intent, determine the capability level to carry out an
undesirable event.
Capability refers to an adversary’s ability or capacity to act as a potential threat to an
asset. Analyzing capability requires an understanding of the necessary skills and
resources required to:
• Determine if an adversary possesses the resources to pose a threat to an asset
To gather information on an adversary’s capabilities, research resources or interview
SMEs to answer the question:
• Does the adversary have the following components for exploiting or attacking an
asset?
Knowledge of specific locations and their vulnerabilities
Requisite technology and skills
Weapons or tools
Requisite special knowledge
Support structure
When researching an adversary’s capabilities, remember that the adversary may use a
combination of overt or covert methods/activities to collect information to target an
asset. These methods/activities include the following:
• SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) is comprised of communications and the electronic
and telemetry collection of information in the non-visible portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
• HUMINT (Human Intelligence) is intelligence derived from people through
interviews, elicitation, or reports originating from people.
HUMINT insider – information collection techniques:
• Attempting to obtain information without need to know
• Making unusual use of or requests for classified publications
• Attempting to access classified databases
• Removing information without approval
• Placing classified material in a desk or briefcase
• Copying classified material in other offices
• Borrowing or making notes of classified material
• Bringing cameras or recording devices into cleared facilities
• Obtaining or attempting to obtain witness signatures on classified
destruction records
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• Stockpiling classified or proprietary documents outside cleared
area
HUMINIT insider indicators - personnel who:
• Are disgruntled with management
• Are disgruntled with the U.S. Government
• Are fascinated with and have a strong desire to engage in spy
work
• Suddenly purchase high value items
• Suddenly settle large outstanding debts
• Travel to foreign countries repeatedly
• Make short trips overseas
• Have contact with foreign officials and representatives
• Attempt to conceal contacts with foreigners
• Have relatives or friends residing abroad
• Avoid or decline assignments requiring a counterintelligence-
oriented polygraph
• Work an unusual amount of overtime
• Sudden decline in work quality
• IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) involves using various sources, such as satellites,
photos, infrared, imaging radar, and electro-optical for collecting image data.
• MASINT (Measurement and Signatures Intelligence) It excludes signals
intelligence and traditional imagery intelligence. When collected, processed, and
analyzed, MASINT locates, tracks, identifies, or describes the signatures
(distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target sources. It includes the
advanced data processing and exploitation of data from overhead and airborne
imagery collection systems. MASINT data can be acquired from a variety of
satellite, airborne, or ship borne platforms; remotely piloted vehicles; or from
mobile or fixed ground-based collection sites.
• OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) includes resources such as newspapers,
internet, magazines, international conventions, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests, seminars, and exhibits (e.g., CNN.com, The New York Times,
Aviation Week, and Space & Technology).
Once each adversary’s capabilities are determined, create a Collection Capability
Assessment Chart to record the data. Assign a rating of high, medium, or low for each
adversary’s capabilities.
Collection Capability Assessment Chart
Adversary
Insider, Terrorist,
FIE, Criminal
Collection Capabilities
HUMINT
SIGINT
IMINT
MASINT
OSINT
Overall
Capability
Level
Adversary 1
High
High
Medium
Medium
High
High
Adversary 2
High
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Medium
Adversary 3
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
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Determine History
After assessing an adversary’s intent and capability, determine an adversary’s history of
carrying out undesirable events.
An adversary’s history is an account of past actions taken against assets. Analyzing an
adversary’s history requires both an understanding of an adversary’s past attempts to
attack assets as well as any successful attacks on assets. Conduct SME interviews and
research resources to answer the following questions:
• Has the adversary attacked or exploited assets and personnel before?
• Has the adversary attempted to attack or exploit assets? If not, why not?
• Has the adversary been suspected of attacking or exploiting assets?
• Might some foreseeable event cause the adversary to attempt an attack in the
future?
After identifying an adversary’s history, document this information by creating a History
Assessment Chart. This chart requires completing information regarding an adversary’s
suspected, attempted, or successful incidents.
History Assessment Chart
Adversary
Insider, Terrorist,
FIE, Criminal
History
Suspected
Incidents
Attempted
Incidents
Successful
Incidents
Adversary 1
2 technical devices
found
2 attempted forced
entries
Unknown
Adversary 2
5 alarm activations;
adversary sighted
in area
2 attempted forced
entries
Unknown
Adversary 3
None
None
None
Research resources and conduct SME interviews to gain knowledge regarding an
adversary’s intent, capability, and history. Depending on the threat topic at hand, the
best sources for a given threat range from unclassified sources, such as the Internet, to
classified sources, such as Top Secret intelligence or documentation. Some of the
resources/SMEs that should be consulted include the following:
• Classified sources
Files
Counterintelligence support activity
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• Unclassified sources
Local law enforcement
The news
Government publications/websites
Training and awareness organizations
Assign Threat Rating
Once the intent, capability, and history of an adversary are identified, determine a threat
assessment rating.
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You have made a chart for each of the steps in the threat assessment process (intent,
capability, and history). Using those three charts, create a new chart, the Threat
Assessment Summary Chart to summarize and analyze all the information.
The Threat Assessment Summary Chart contains a column to list the adversary and a
rating of the adversary’s intent, capability, and history. The intent and capability columns
are populated with a high, medium, or low rating and the history column is populated
with a “yes” or “no” response (whether there is a history or not of attacking an asset).
This chart assists with keeping track of individual adversaries.
Putting it all together:
• The intent column is a summary of the Intent Assessment Chart
• The capability column is a summary of the Collection Capability Assessment
Chart
• The history column is a summary of the History Assessment Chart
Threat Assessment Summary Chart
Adversary
Insider, Terrorist,
FIE, Criminal
Intent
(Interest/Need)
Capability
(Methods)
History
(Incidents/Indicators)
Overall
Threat
Level
Adversary 1
High
High
Yes
High
Adversary 2
Medium
Medium
Yes
Medium
Adversary 3
Low
Medium
No
Low
After determining the overall threat level, create a second chart, the Threat Level
Decision Matrix. This chart assigns a “yes” or “no” rating for each adversary’s intent,
capability, and history.
Once completed, a threat level is assigned based on the number of “yes” ratings. The
greater the number of “yes” ratings, the higher the threat level. The threat level is the
relative rating based on the best available information. To determine the relative degree
of threat, rating criteria has been developed to ensure consistent threat rating levels.
The Threat Level Decision Matrix requires assigning a level of critical (C), high (H),
medium (M), or low (L) for each asset’s threat/adversary(s).
For example,
“yes + yes + yes” = critical
“no + no + no” = low
Threat Level Decision Matrix
Intent
(Interest/Need)
Capability
(Methods)
History
(Incidents/Indicators)
Threat
Level
Yes
Yes
Yes
Critical
Yes
Yes
No
High
Yes
No
Yes/No
Medium
No
Yes
No
Medium
No
No
No
Low
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After determining the threat levels, map them back to the assets and their associated
impacts. For example, hackers may be identified as being adversaries with a specific
threat level. The adversary is then mapped to computer assets but probably not to other
assets.
The last step is to assign a numerical rating to determine the degree of each threat or
the likelihood that an adversary will launch an attack. The numerical rating scale ranges
between .01 and 1.00. This range provides the opportunity to weigh the threats with
some being assigned a higher numerical value than others even though they are within
the same degree of threat category.
The Threat Assessment Rating Table represents likelihoods or probabilities. The
percentages in this table assist with understanding the threat assessment rating BUT the
numerical table facilitates the risk analysis process in step four of the risk management
process.
Risk Assessment Worksheet
Step 3 - Assess Vulnerabilities
The third step in the risk management process is to assess vulnerabilities. The goal of
this step is to identify the current vulnerability level or any weakness that can be
exploited by an adversary to gain access to an asset.
Perform a three-step vulnerability assessment to identify the following:
• Potential vulnerabilities related to specific assets and their undesirable events
• The degree of each asset’s vulnerability to a threat.
• Existing countermeasures and their level of effectiveness in reducing
vulnerabilities.
The process of identifying vulnerabilities may sound familiar because it encompasses a
traditional security survey. Look for exploitable situations resulting from inadequate
security, personal behavior, commercial construction techniques, or insufficient security
procedures. Typical vulnerabilities include weak door locks, the absence of guards, poor
password controls, and insufficient distance between a building and a street.
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Vulnerability Areas
Five general areas are open to potential asset vulnerabilities:
• Human
• Operational
• Information
• Facility
• Equipment
Human Vulnerability Areas
Human vulnerability areas include persons who exhibit the following traits/issues:
• A big ego: Persons with a big ego may mishandle or improperly protect critical
assets.
• Anger management problems: Persons with anger management problems may
damage or destroy critical assets out of anger.
• Are ignorant of technology: Persons who are ignorant of technology fail to learn
how to properly operate computers, secure telephones, etc. This may place sensitive
information at risk.
• Behavioral issues: Behavioral issues apply to disgruntled personnel, persons with
personality disorders, etc. These persons may represent either a direct or indirect
threat to assets.
• Boredom: Persons suffering from boredom may become careless.
• Greedy: Persons who are greedy may compromise or steal critical assets for
personal gain.
• Loose lips: Persons with loose lips may compromise sensitive information.
• Mental illness: Persons with mental illness may represent a threat to critical assets
or place critical assets in jeopardy either knowingly or unknowingly.
• Overworked: Persons who are overworked may become careless.
• Practice poor security: Persons practicing poor security fail to comply with security
requirements and may place critical assets in jeopardy.
• Seek revenge: Persons who seek revenge may attack critical assets to get even for
a perceived wrong.
• Substance abusers: Persons who are substance abusers may pose a threat to
critical assets by selling them for cash or being careless while under the influence.
Operational Vulnerability Areas
Operational vulnerability areas include the following:
• Poor tradecraft practices that potentially place critical assets at risk. For example,
failure to develop and operate a property control system places critical assets at risk
• Observables are practices, activities, or assets that can be surveilled. The
information gained could be utilized to threaten critical assets. An example is an
activity that uses roving security guard patrols at exact intervals. An adversary may
be able to observe this fact and estimate a timeframe within which to infiltrate a
facility.
• Other Operations Security (OPSEC) issues – OPSEC is an analytical process
used to deny an adversary information, generally unclassified, concerning an
organization's intentions and capabilities by identifying, controlling, and protecting
indicators associated with planning processes or operations. OPSEC does not
replace other security disciplines - it supplements them.
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• Press exposure of sensitive information represents a potential vulnerability. For
example, an activity with poor entry control procedures may be susceptible to
loss/theft of property and may have implanted listening devices.
Information Vulnerability Areas
Information vulnerability areas include the following:
• Information unnecessarily disseminated to a wide audience – the wider the
dissemination the more difficult it is to protect.
• Failure to practice need-to-know - “Need-to-know” refers to the determination by
an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires
access to specific classified information in order to perform an authorized
governmental function.
• Poor program administration includes failure to properly safeguard sensitive
information, improperly classifying information and failure to mark classified
information.
• Failure to follow Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements - Adversaries
routinely request information through FOIA. Failure to properly evaluate information
that has been requested for public release may pose a threat to critical assets
Facility Vulnerability Areas
Facility vulnerability areas leave assets in jeopardy. These are some potential issues:
• Location – Areas designated as high crime areas or with a significant potential for
natural disasters could be a concern.
• Poor perimeter fencing with holes, gaps, vegetation overgrowth, etc.
• Building design characteristics with floor plans that inhibit access control
measures, ground floor windows along a heavy pedestrian route, etc.
• Tunnels and drains that permit an avenue of approach by an adversary
• Unsecured doors that allow adversary access.
• Parking lots provide adversaries with a venue for observing a facility, perpetrating a
crime, detonating mobile explosive devices, etc.
• Vehicle barriers – They must be reinforced and security personnel must be trained
to be effective.
• Untrained guard forces may be ineffective in observing, preventing, or responding
to an adversary attack. Guard forces must understand their duties and be trained to
carry them out.
• Unsecured windows provide adversaries with a potential avenue of approach.
• Insufficient access control allows adversaries a potential means of entry either
detected or undetected.
• Gates must be properly operated when in use, locked when not in use, and regularly
evaluated to ensure they do not provide adversaries with a potential avenue of
approach.
Equipment Vulnerability Areas
Equipment vulnerability areas include the following:
• Signal interceptions that can occur when using devices like cell phones, wireless
networked computers, and personal digital assistants (PDAs).
• TEMPEST emanations - TEMPEST is the short name referring to the investigation,
study, and control of compromising emanations from telecommunications and
information systems equipment. Computer equipment, typewriters, etc. emanate
electronic signals that can be collected by an adversary. They can then interpret the
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signals and obtain the information that was being processed on the electronic
equipment.
• Equipment tampering in which equipment is modified to permit collection of
information by an adversary. For example, modifications to a reproduction machine
might enable image storage of everything copied.
• Remote activation/operation that allows modifications or programming permitting
an adversary to remotely activate and/or operate equipment.
Vulnerability Assessment
View each asset as if you were the adversary. Study the asset and ask the questions:
• “If I were adversary “x”, I would break into this facility by…”
• “If I wanted to physically harm person “x” in this facility, I would…”
This questioning process should be used on each asset for every adversary.
Common vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit include the following:
• Information leaks
• Physically stored equipment and information
• Electronically stored and transmitted information
• Assets at risk of visual observation
• Vulnerability data
Gather Vulnerability Data
Vulnerability data can be obtained from a variety of subject matter experts (SMEs).
Utilize the SME interview technique and question those who work most closely with
protecting the asset.
For example, security guards almost always recognize vulnerabilities from past
experiences or careful evaluation of their surroundings. Likewise, computer system
administrators and program managers are likely to be aware of vulnerabilities in their
systems through a variety of experiences, professional publications, conferences, and
contacts.
Additional sources that can assist with gathering vulnerability information include the
following:
• Personnel who work at the “site”
• Existing site surveys
• Engineering drawings and blueprints
• Maps
• Security planning documents
• Surveys and audits
• Incident reports
Regressive Analysis
Asset vulnerabilities may already have some type of security countermeasure in place.
The best method to analyze these asset vulnerabilities is through regressive analysis.
Regressive analysis requires analyzing the asset in an unprotected state first and then
analyzing the asset in conjunction with current countermeasures.
Regressive analysis is a five-step process:
1. Assess the asset’s vulnerabilities in a pure, unprotected state.
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2. Reevaluate the asset’s vulnerabilities taking into consideration the efficacy of the
existing countermeasures.
3. Identify the asset’s vulnerability differences between the unprotected and
protected assessments.
4. Identify the ineffective countermeasures.
5. Identify and characterize the specific vulnerabilities that still exist, given the
current countermeasures.
Classify Countermeasures
Countermeasures are classified according to their implementation requirements. Some
countermeasures are procedural in nature, others involve equipment/devices, and still
others involve personnel usage.
Procedures
Equipment
(Physical/Technical)
Manpower
• Security Policies
• Security Procedures
• Training
• Awareness Programs
• Legal Prosecution
• Security Investigations
• Polygraph
• Disclosure Statements
• Personnel Transfer
• Contingency/Emergency
Response Planning
• OPSEC Procedures
• Cover Procedures
• Locking Mechanism
• Window Bars
• Doors
• Fences
• Alarms/Sensors
• Hardware/Software
• Badges
• Lighting
• TEMPEST Devices
• Paper Shredder
• Weapons
• Closed-circuit TV
• Safe Haven
• Vault
• Contractor Guard Force
• Special Police Officers
• Local Guards
• Military Guards
Assign Vulnerability Level and Rating
After completing the regressive analysis, it is important to assign an asset a vulnerability
level. Asset vulnerability is determined using a number of criteria including the following:
• Quality: The degree of difficulty required to exploit a single vulnerability. In other
words, how hard is it to exploit a given asset?
• Quantity: The number of complementary vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
• Efficacy of Countermeasures: The ability of each existing countermeasure to
effectively prevent or minimize a specific type of attack.
To determine the vulnerability level for a given asset, each of the following questions
must be answered with a “yes” or “no”:
• Is the asset made vulnerable by a single (as opposed to multiple) weakness in
the security system?
• Does the nature of the vulnerability make it difficult to exploit?
• Do multiple effective layers of security countermeasures lessen an asset’s
vulnerability?
Once an asset’s vulnerabilities are determined, assign and chart a vulnerability rating of
critical (C), high (H), medium (M), or low (L) for each asset.
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Finally, assign and chart a numerical rating to determine the degree of each asset’s
vulnerability. The numerical rating scale ranges between .01 and 1.00. This range
provides the opportunity to allow a weighted evaluation of the threats within the same
degree of threat category. After assigning the vulnerability rating, enter it into the
numerical rating (vulnerability) column of the worksheet.
Risk Assessment Worksheet
Step 4 - Assess Risks
The fourth step in the risk management process is to assess risks. The goal of this step
is to analyze the data collected and develop a risk rating.
Risk assessment combines and analyzes the first three assessments (asset, threat, and
vulnerability) to provide an overall picture of potential risks to an asset or group of
assets. Using this information, you will be able to calculate an asset’s risk rating and
assign the asset a risk level.
Risk Factors
Generally, the extent of an asset’s risk is determined by how much the following risk
factors overlap: assets, threats and vulnerabilities. For example, if the rating level for all
factors is critical, then the risk level would be at its highest. However, if any of the factors
have a lower rating level, then the level of risk would diminish based on the lower rating
of each factor.
The assets/impacts must be measured against the probability of threats and
vulnerabilities. The overall risk level varies with relation to the values of each item. The
larger the risk area shared by assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, the higher the risk
level.
The three risk factors are incorporated into a formula to determine and assign a more
precise risk rating:
Risk = Impact x (Threat x Vulnerability) or (R = I [T x V])
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“Impact” represents the consequence of the asset loss to the asset owner.
The “Threat x Vulnerability” value represents the probability of the undesirable event
occurring.
Information in the impact, threat, and vulnerability assessment columns from the Risk
Assessment Worksheet is used in the risk formula to calculate the risk rating.
Convert the numerical risk rating back to a linguistic scale using critical (C), high (H),
medium (M), or low (L) and record the information. This linguistic conversion allows for
categorizing the risk rating into layman’s terms for briefing to management/command.
Risk Assessment Worksheet
What is Acceptable Risk?
An asset’s acceptable risk cannot be determined by a formula. Acceptable risk varies
with time, circumstances, and management’s attitude toward risk in the organizational
environment. The asset sponsors or owners have the responsibility of deciding what
constitutes an acceptable level of risk for their assets.
Step 5 - Determine Countermeasures
The fifth and final step in the risk management process is to determine countermeasure
options. The goal of this step is to identify potential countermeasures for reducing an
asset’s vulnerabilities, in turn reducing the overall risk to that asset.
Countermeasure Analysis
The Countermeasure Analysis Chart is an important tool in determining appropriate
countermeasures for mitigating an asset’s vulnerabilities. All the information acquired to
this point in the risk management process will be used in conducting a countermeasure
analysis and completing the chart.
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Countermeasure Analysis Chart
To identify potential countermeasures, answer the following three questions:
What are the possible protection solutions?
What are the best solutions with no financial constraints?
What are other possible solutions when the best is too expensive?
Countermeasure Cost Determination
The costs of implementing countermeasures must be considered relative to the
following:
• Dollars - Consider the purchase price and the life-cycle maintenance costs (e.g.
installation, preventive maintenance, repair/warranty, replacement, and training).
• Inconvenience - Consider whether the inconvenience caused is offset by the
measure of risk reduction gained. If a countermeasure is inconvenient, people will
find a way to circumvent it.
• Time - Include the time to implement and oversee the countermeasure and the time
to prepare for its implementation, as well as any time required for follow-up and
evaluation.
• Personnel - Consider the number of personnel needed to manage the
countermeasure as well as the skills, knowledge, and abilities of the personnel
involved. Also consider personnel training needs and costs.
• Other - Consider the adverse publicity, political repercussions, reduced operational
efficiency, and unfavorable working conditions resulting from countermeasure
implementation.
Categorize countermeasures according to their function:
• Procedures
• Equipment
• Manpower
Written procedures are the least expensive to implement with the costs rising for
equipment and manpower.
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Cost Benefit Analysis
Once you identify countermeasures and associated costs, compare the costs of each
option with the benefits by answering the following questions:
How does asset value compare to proposed cost of protection?
How does the option mitigate the risk?
To what degree does the option delay, deter, detect, defend, or destroy?
Which option provides the best protection at the lowest cost?
Countermeasure Options
Upon completion of the cost benefit analysis, prioritize the countermeasure options by:
• Identifying countermeasures
• Selecting a reasonable number of countermeasure options
• Determining how each option affects the overall risk level
• Calculating the cost of each option
• Ensuring you address the maximum number of undesirable events with the
various options you recommend
Countermeasure Analysis
Summarize and record all the information onto the Countermeasure Analysis Chart for
each option chosen. The chart requires that you do the following:
• Specify each event (column 1)
• Enter the rating from the Risk Assessment Worksheet (column 2)
• Enter the rating and identify the specific vulnerability from the Risk Assessment
Worksheet (column 3)
• Identify the countermeasure selected on the Countermeasure Worksheet #1
(column 4)
• Enter the cost (column 5)
• Enter the new vulnerability level rating resulting from the new countermeasure
implementation (column 6)
• Calculate and enter the new risk level (R = I x [T x V]) resulting from the new
vulnerability level of column 6 (column 7)
• Total the cost of the proposed countermeasure
The bottom row provides the total cost for all countermeasures and shows from/to risk
data.
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Countermeasure Analysis Chart
Countermeasure Options
Many security professionals are not in a position to obligate funds for countermeasures
and must receive approval from a decision maker. In most situations, they will be asked
to provide comparison information for several different options. Factors influencing
decision makers are the following:
• Asset value
• Current exposure to loss/harm
• Protective measure availability
• Fund availability
• Mandatory security requirements
Normally, the security professional would make three recommendations to the decision
maker:
• Best possible case, money no object
• Sensible recommendation, good security for the money
• Minimum need to meet the requirements
Now that you have completed this course, you should have the tools and knowledge
necessary to identify and apply the five steps of the risk management process in the
development of a risk assessment.
