by the sovereign. Indeed, it means that property, which in the state of nature is ‘fragile’,
provisional and in part simply a usurpation, becomes ‘stronger and more irrevocable’ as it is
cemented in law. Here echoing Hobbes, Rousseau argues that in the state of nature man
had a natural right to everything (at least, to everything that was useful to him) but this right
was of little value. Thus: ‘in the state of nature, in which everything is common property, I
owe nothing to others, having promised them nothing; the only thing I recognize as
belonging to others are those that are of no use to me’ (1994b[1762], 73). At the same time,
Rousseau does argue that first occupancy (under specified conditions) should give rise to a
property title (whether in the state of nature or in civil society) and that ‘the right of the first
occupant is more real than the right of the strongest’ (1994b[1762], 60). But it is only in civil
society, that there is a ‘true’ right of property, guaranteed by the laws of the sovereign:
The remarkable thing about this transfer of ownership is that when the community
receives the possessions of individuals it does not in any way despoil them, but
instead ensures that their ownership is legitimate, changing usurpation into genuine
right, and enjoyment of use into property .. their act of ceding ownership to the state
has benefited not only the public but, even more, themselves, and they have as it
were acquired everything that they have given - a paradox which is easily explained
if we distinguish between the rights that the sovereign and the owner have over the
same piece of property.
(Rousseau, 1994b[1762], 62)
Of course, the rights that the sovereign has are real – ‘the right that each individual has over
his property is always subordinate to the right that the community has over everyone’. But,
at the same time, the sovereign can only ever act by laws of general application and, within
these limits, ‘any man can make full use of his goods and liberty that is left him’
(1994b[1762], 70). At one point, Rousseau indicates that ‘what each person transfers, in
accordance with the social pact, as regards his power, his goods, and his freedom, amounts at
most to the portion of these things that it is important for the community to use’ though he adds that it is
for the sovereign to decide what that portion is (1994b[1762], 68, emphasis added).
Rousseau is clear that this is a good deal for the individual: ‘nothing is truly renounced by
private individuals under the social contract. They have effected a ‘beneficial transfer’: