Untitled

CUI

Table of Contents

Purpose….…………………………………………………………………………………...3

Facts…………………………………………………………………………………………..3

Threat Level………………………………………………………………………………3

Findings…………………………………………………………………………………..4

(1)

Street Gangs………………………………………………………………………...4

(2)

Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs)……………………………………………...5

Recommendations for Commanders ..................................................................... 6

Additional Information……………………………………………………………………7

Intelligence Gaps………………………………………………………………………….7

Appendix A - Gangs and Groups Identified in Investigations and CRIMINT in FY20 ..........8

Appendix B - Definitions .............................................................................................. 9

CUI

1. (U) Purpose

(U) This assessment provides findings and recommendations for gang and activity

affecting Army assets. It is based on criminal investigations, intelligence collection and

analysis of collected data. The data and information contained within is focused on

events occurring between 1 October 2019 and 30 September 2020. The assessment

includes relevant updated and detailed information on several key aspects of gang and

activity in FY20.

2. (U) Facts

a. (CUI) Threat Level. The overall threat

posed by gangs is assessed by calculating

the percentage of gang -related criminal

investigations on Army installations. The

following rating scale was utilized in

determining the threat levels for this

assessment: NEGLIGIBLE - 0%; LOW - 0.1%

- 3.0%; MODERATE - 3.1% - 6.0%; HIGH -

6.1% - higher.

(CUI) The overall threat posed by gangs on

Army installations is assessed as LOW. Of

the 10,774 felony Law Enforcement Reports

(LERs) in FY20, there were 29 (0.51 %)

LERs with known or suspected gang member

involvement. Of the 29 LERs, 23 were street

gang and 6 were OMG.

(CUI) During FY20, 93 individuals with an

Army nexus were identified through either an

LER or a criminal intelligence report

(CRIMINT) as participating in either a street

gang or Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG). Of

the 93 individuals, 52 (30%) participated in

street gangs and/or activities and 41 (23%)

participated in an OMG and/or activities.

(CUI) The 29 LERs generated during FY20 is a

decrease of 58% from FY19 wherein 64 LERs were produced. During FY19 street

gangs accounted for 51 LERs and OMG accounted for 13 LERs.

(CUI) LERs by LE Entity

(CUI) LERs and CRIMINT Reporting

CUI

party off post. The investigation revealed, in addition to the assault, the PFC was also

intimidated by another active duty PV2 and PFC for displaying a red bandana but not

being a member of the Bloods street gang.The offenders were identified as being

affiliated with the Blood street gang.

(CUI) On 05 November 2019, CID was notified that a local PD conducted a search

warrant on the residence of a SPC for suspicion of distribution of a controlled

substance. During the search, the local PD discovered approximately 4.5 lbs of

marijuana, multiple firearms, ammunition, a large quantity of U.S. currency, a money

counting machine, military body armor and packaging materials consistent with the

Distribution of Marijuana.The Investigation also revealed the SPC and her husband as

being verified members of Eight Tray Gangster Crips.

(U) Analyst observations: FY20 saw the outbreak of Covid-19 in which many areas had

curfews and limited the ability to leave one’s personal residence.The COVID

environment may have reduced the number of criminal gang activities simply due to

groups not being able gather in public without being noticed.

(2) (U) OMG

(CUI) The threat from OMGs and their support clubs

against Army assets is assessed as NEGLIGIBLE

(.06%). Of the 10,774 CID LERs in FY20, 6 involved

OMGs resulting in a 54% decrease from FY19

which had 13 LER’s. The reports associated with

OMGs is indicative of known OMG behavior of

obtaining territory, earning money and maintaining

respect. Out of the 6 LERs pertaining to OMG, 5

(83%) of the incidents occurred on an Army

installation and 1 (17%) occurred off post. Of the six

LERs, two involved Possession and/or Use of a

Controlled Substance, one Defrauded the

Government, one Damage to Government Property,

one was charged with Failure to Obey a General

Order and one committed Theft.

(CUI) Of the 6 investigations involving OMG and their support clubs and having an

Army nexus, 4 (66%) of the subjects were active duty, 1 (17%) was a retired Soldier

and 1 (17%) was a civilian. Analysis of the active duty Soldiers revealed 2 (33%) were

African American, 4 (67%) were Caucasian and all were male. Of the 4 active duty

Soldiers, 1 (25%) was 20-24 years of age, 1 (25%) was 24-27 years of age and 2

(50%) were 37-40 years of age. Two (50%) of the Soldiers were junior enlisted (E4-

E5), 1 (25%) was senior enlisted (E7) and 1 (25%) was a Warrant Officer (WO2). Of

(CUI) Soldier wearing riding vest

CUI

the active duty Soldiers, three had Secret security clearances and one had Top

Secret/SCI.

(CUI) In addition to the 6 investigations involving OMGs, there were 35 unique

CRIMINT reports associated with OMGs, which is a 73% decrease from FY19 which

had 131. Out of the 35 unique individuals, 16 (46%) were active duty, 3 (8%) were

Army Reserves, 4 (11%) were National Guard, 3 (8%) were retired, 3 (8%) were former

Service members, 1 (3%) DoD Contractors and 5 (14%) were civilians. All of the

civilians were non-DoD affiliated.

(CUI) A review of the 35 CRIMINT reports revealed the ranks of the Soldiers involved

ranged from PVT to MAJ with a significant number being Non Commissioned Officers

between the ranks of E5-E8. There were eight SGT, five SSG, four SFC, one MSG and

one 1SG.

(U) Example of OMG incidents:

(CUI) On 10 December 2019, CRIMINT reporting revealed that an active duty SSG

was identified by local law enforcement as a member of the Chieftain OMG, which is a

support club for the Hells Angels. Upon review of the SSG’s social media, photographs

of his vest with 1% patches were found along with support pages for the Hells Angels.

(U) Analyst observations FY20 saw the outbreak of Covid-19, in which many areas had

curfews and limited the ability to leave one’s personal residence. This would certainly

stifle the number of criminal gang activities simply due to not being able go into public

without being noticed.

3. (U) Recommendations for Commanders.

(CUI) Commanders should continue to ensure Soldiers are educated on and comply

with AR 600-20. Penalties for violations of the gang activities prohibitions include the

full range of statutory and regulatory sanctions, both criminal and administrative. In

accordance with AR 600- 20, military personnel must reject active participation in

criminal gangs and other organizations that advocate supremacist, extremist, or

criminal gang doctrine, ideology or causes. Examples of active participation include

fundraising, recruiting, wearing colors or clothing, or having tattoos or body markings

associated with gangs or DE groups. This would also apply to OMG support clubs.

Commanders should provide information discovered about this type of activity to CID to

aid in crime prevention efforts.

(CUI) Commanders should continue to pursue and identify Soldiers engaged in gang

related activities and report such activities to CID and their legal advisor.

(CUI) Commanders, MP and CID, should continue to report gang affiliation confirmed by

other law enforcement agencies to the Soldier's security officer in accordance with AR

380-67 (Personnel Security Program), 24 January 2014.

CUI

4. (U) Additional Information.

(CUI) The CID has partnered with Army Corrections Command to incorporate prison-

intelligence into the total Army CRIMINT effort. This initiative will ensure prison-derived

information is shared with CID and other law enforcement agencies for further analysis

and investigation. Additionally, both agencies have partnered with the FBI’s Correction

Intelligence Initiative.

(CUI) The CID has also partnered with the FBI National Gang Intelligence Center

(NGIC) and National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to incorporate gang and

activity reporting and intelligence into the Army crime reporting and prevention effort.

This initiative integrates gang activity reporting and intelligence from across federal,

state, and local law enforcement and provides critical information on the growth,

migration, criminal activity, and association of gangs that pose a threat to the U.S., as

well as Army assets. The NGIC and NJTTF is manned by special agents and analysts

from multiple federal agencies and provides a plethora of knowledge and assistance to

Army CID. Agencies include the ATF, U.S. Marshals, Drug Enforcement Agency,

Bureau of Prisons, and Department of Homeland Security. The databases of each

component agency provide valuable information to the CID, permitting centralized

access to information.

5. (U) Intelligence Gaps. There are many challenges in measuring and assessing the gang

threats within the U.S. Army. Quantitative information regarding gang’s activity is

somewhat limited and the data available is not necessarily comprehensive. This limitation

is due to the variations of state and local gang reporting and regulations.

(CUI) Many states, including California, stopped entering individuals in gang databases

due to lawsuits.

(CUI) Army law enforcement entities are not properly documenting their encounters

with a gang.

(CUI) Not all gang members are known to Army law enforcement, resulting in the

underreporting of gang related activity. Also contributing to this gap, the number of

gang members in the Army is dynamic; new members enter undetected, gangs and

regularly seek new recruits and existing members move through permanent change of

station (PCS) and deployments.

(CUI) Social media platforms are changing and becoming more secure with encryption

technology leaving a blind spot for law enforcement detection of gang activities.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

CUI

(U) Appendix A

(U) Gangs and Groups Identified in Investigations and CRIMINT in FY20

(CUI) Street Gangs involved in LER

Norteno, Bloods Street Gang, Eight Tray Gangster Crips, Fresno Bulldogs, Crips street

gang, Gangsters Disciples, Almighty Black P Stone Nation

(CUI) Gangs involved in CRIMINT

1800 BG (Hybrid Gang), 8Trey Crips, Almighty Gang/ My Only Brothers, Black P.

Stone Nation, Bloods, Brims, Cream/2K, Crips, Gangster Disciples, Jones Drug

Trafficking Organization, Latin Kings, Piru Bloods, Rolling 30's Crips, Sex Money

Murder Blood, Sons of Samoa, Treyway Bloods, West Siders

(CUI) OMG involved in LER

United Heathens MC, Veteran Motor Cycle Club, Banshees, Booze Fighters, Outcast

OMG, Infidels Frater in Arma

(CUI) OMG involved in CRIMINT

Bandidos OMG, Hells Angels, Unforgiven Renegades OMC, Mongols OMG, Assassin

Street Rydaz MC, Chosen Few OMG, Thunderguards OMG, Ruff Ryders MC,

Chieftains OMG, Knights of Sin, Outcast OMG, Sippians, Booze Fighers Motorcyle

Club, Outlaws MC, Sin City Disciples, Vagos OMG, Iron Order OMG, Forbidden

Wheels OMG, Guardians of Solace, Pagan OMG

*** This only represents reporting for FY20 and is not intended to be an all-inclusive listing of all gangs in the U.S. For assistance

regarding gang matters, please contact your local police or sheriff’s department for groups operating in your AOR. Additional

assistance can be provided by CID gang and DE analyst, Mr.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

CUI

(U) Appendix B Definitions

1. (U) Army Nexus: Credible information the person, group, or organization about which

information is collected, has been, is, or may become involved in a crime that impacts or

has an Army/DoD interest (See AR 195-2 (Criminal Investigation - Criminal Investigation

Activities), 9 September 2011, para 4-3d (2), and AR 190-45 (Military Police- Law

Enforcement Reporting), 30 March 2007, para 2-5, for further guidance).

2. (U) Criminal Activity: Activity that breaches the rules or laws for which some

governing authority (via mechanisms such as legal systems) can ultimately prescribe a

conviction. Criminal activity could include misdemeanor or felony crimes.

3. (U) Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT): Complaints, allegations, raw data, or other

pertinent information that was collected, evaluated, retained, and/or appropriately

disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. The

documentation of this type of reporting is neither a validation nor confirmation that a

gang-related incident or crime occurred, but is used to help identify criminals and known

or suspected criminal groups. This type of reporting is primarily used to document

suspect gang or DE affiliation or crimes or incidents for which there is no suspect.

4. (U) Gang: Criminal gangs and activities are ones that advocate the planning or

commission of one or more criminal offenses, by persons who share a group identity,

and may share a common name, slogan, tattoos, graffiti, clothing style or color, or other

shared characteristics like the use of violence and intimidation to further its criminal

objectives.

5. (U) Gang Member: Soldiers are prohibited from participating in gangs or their

activities. Penalties for violations of these prohibitions include the full range of statutory

and regulatory sanctions, both criminal (UCMJ), and administrative, as listed in AR 600-

20 paragrah 4-12d. Below are examples of active participation that are specific to

criminal gangs:

a. (U) Knowingly wearing gang colors or clothing.

b. (U) Having tattoos or body markings associated with criminal gangs.

c. (U) Engaging in activities in furtherance of the objective of such gangs or

organizations that are detrimental to good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment.

6. (U) Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG): OMGs are organizations whose members use

their motorcycle clubs as conduits for criminal enterprises. The OMGs are highly

structured criminal organizations whose members engage in criminal activities such as

violent crime, weapons trafficking, and drug-trafficking. There are more than 300 active

OMGs within the U.S., ranging in size from single chapters with 5 or 6 members to

hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide. The Hells Angels,

Mongols, Bandidos, Outlaws, and Sons of Silence, pose a serious national domestic

CUI

threat and conduct the majority of criminal activity linked to OMGs, especially activity

relating to drug-trafficking and, more specifically, to cross-border drug smuggling.

Because of their transnational scope, these OMGs are able to coordinate drug

smuggling operations in partnership with major international drug-trafficking

organizations.

8. (U) Threat Summary: Just as there is no uniform definition for gangs and gang

members across law enforcement agencies, there is no universally accepted

benchmark or threshold to identify when gang activity or gang-related crime is a

problem. Numerous media articles refer to “gang problems” in the military and

elsewhere, but there is no standard addressing how much gang activity or gang-related

crime has to exist before it can be considered a “problem.” Therefore, in evaluating

whether the gang threat to the Army was negligible, low, moderate, or high, the

following was adopted: the threat assessment of the GATA is measured in two parts:

actual crime committed in the Army and the assessment of the threat towards the Army

from the gang.